https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/0e1def672ffeba927222dd09ee030140.pdf bbb2a84aff9c1552616160e2a4804d8d PDF Text Text Document disclosed Document divulgue e TRANSMITTAL SLIP TO:... ims. UV&SVr.§&$rA$&?J.. of. StjEit.e.. f o r S ^ t e r ^ a l . Af£$Xxs.x. .Otp.WR*. .Canada FROM: 1 Srfhf motion Secura Date ifey. .3 P.* . X%.9. . .Th/?. .Qan.$<U&F!. Hrribaa.sy.,. .Washington. .D,.C..I]TSA. Air or Surface No. of enclosures The documents described below are for your information. Despatching Authority.. A'.\. K F P . e g . e r / O L F , Copies Description Also referred to: ABM Deployment: Speech by D r > F o s t e r W° Dept of National Defence (DRAE-Dr. Lindsey) Disarmdel SttGKTRY J n_^ * Ext. 2S0/Eng. (Rev. 10/S 1) (Admin* Services Div.) thARCW (Instruction on Reverse Side) -000144 — �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information INSTRUCTIONS 1. This form may be used in sending material for informational purposes from the ~"—Department-to- posts abroad and vice versa. 2. This form should NOT be used to cover documents requiring action. i 3Jf The name of thje person responsible for authorizing the despatch of the materiaishould be shown opposite the words "Despatching Authority". This may be done by signature, name stamp or by any other suitable means. 4. The form should bear the security classification of the material it covers. 5. The column for "Copies" should indicate the number of copies of each document transmitted. The space for "No. of Enclosures" should show the total number of copies of all documents covered by the transmittal slip. This will eking on despatch and receipt of mail. a Ysrr?t*n?;.- //ion? 000145 �NEWS RELEASE OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS) W A S H I N G T O N , D.C. PLEASE NOTE HOLD FOR RELEASE UNTIL 6:00 P M (EDT) MONDAY, MAY 26, 1969 20301 DATE NO. 444-69 OXford 7-3189 (Copies) OXford 5-0192 (Info.) ADDRESS BY DR. J O H N S . FOSTER DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH & ENGINEERING BEFORE WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF PITTSBURGH PITTSBURGH HILTON HOTEL, PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA - MONDAY, MAY 26, 1969, 8 P M (EDT) A basic new element has e n t e r e d the defense decision-makin g p r o c e s s , in the p a s t few m o n t h s . The new element is you - - the P u b l i c . Millions of people like you have shown a d e s i r e to l e a r n the details of a proposed weapon s y s t e m , and the rationales for and against it so that they can help their r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s in Washington make a decision. The immediate i s s u e is the ABM, the Safeguard ballistic m i s s i l e defense. The P r e s i d e n t has asked the Congress for money to install the first phase of a Safeguard defense, and the Congress probably will act some t i m e in the next few w e e k s . The vote will have to be " y e s " or "no" on Safeguard, but it is clear that the issue in Washington and the i s s u e in these public discussions is on m o r e than just a weapon and is far m o r e complex than just " y e s " or "no". You have joined the Washington d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s on a m o s t i n t r i c a t e and s e r i o u s set of i s s u e s at a m o s t vexatious t i m e . you. But I don't want to discourage I want to welcome you to what used to be a s m a l l and w o r r i e d group of d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s in the Congress and Executive branch. m e m b e r of this group. You're one of the w o r r i e r s . Now you a r e a You will find your job MORE 000146 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information » 2 helping to decide for or against Safeguard to be extremely difficult, but you will find it also to be rewarding. After all, it's your money and your lives which are at stake. Safeguard has become mixed up with a number of other i s s u e s . It has become a symbol of the growing frustration with most things military. To some, a stand on Safeguard has become either a vote of confidence in the people who are trying to handle a difficult struggle in Vietnam or an expression of frustration that this war i s still going on. A stand on Safeguard i s mixed up with high taxes and patriotism, with the psychological burdens of the nuclear era, with confidence or p e s s i m i s m over the future of America. Added to all of the emotional isoues, we have a whole host of technical, military and political i s s u e s specific to the Safeguard weapon. Indeed, there i s such a wealth of information and mioinformation that it's easy to select a nice set of arguments to support almost any position. But your objective should not be to find information to support some position you tend to favor, but to find the right position for the United States in a future world of uncertainties. In the future, a most awesome and potentially •dangerous' set of uncertainties surround the problems of all-out nueloar war. This i s the one kind of war which we probably cannot fight and survive ao a 20th century nation. we must avoid ouch a war. To survive, We think we do know how to avoid it. we can "deter" any potential enemy from otarting such a war. We believe This deterrence 000147 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformatio t 3 . is obtained by maintaining long-range nuclear weapons which could survive an all-out attack, even by the Soviet Union, and successfully penetrate enemy defenses to deliver a level of destruction which the attacker would have to consider to be too great. Deterrence works to the extent that the Soviets are convinced we can and will retaliate successfully. Safeguard is a weapon for all-out nuclear war, so it relates to the avoidance of such war - • deterrence. The decision on the Safeguard ballistic missile defense should be made on i t ' s value to us in this truly vital task of avoiding nuclear war. If it is not needed to keep the risk of war at the lowest possible level, or if it would increase that risk, then we should reject the Safeguard. If it will interfere with our a r m s control objectives - - a com- plementary path to the avoidance of nuclear war - - then we should reject Safeguard. It is worth those dollars only if it helps us to deter nuclear war and helps us toward our national goal of meaningful negotiations on offensive and defensive nuclear weapons. So, deterrence and a r m s control give us a logical yardstick* to measure the value of Safeguard. The way to proceed now is to decide whether there is a problem that needs attention and, if so, whether Safeguard or something else measures up as the best available solution. First, is there a problem in avoidance of nuclear war, in deterrence? % The immediate answer is, as you all know, that there almost certainly is no problem today. This country has more than enough weapons to devastate the Soviet Union under the worst foreseeable conditions of attack, and the Soviet leaders most assuredly know this. The risk of nuclear war seems almost "' 000148 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information But the crucial question i s , can we keep the risk near zero? it r i s e ? Could If so, what can we do about it? Now you must face up to the greatest agony of the defense decision-maker. The future is always uncertain. of a war is unpredictable. he can easily keep. The facts are always too few. The course The intentions of a potential enemy are a secret We do not have a crystal ball, yet in order to deter nuclear war in the future we must decide now on weapons needed for that future. The Soviets change their offensive weapons over the years, and as they add and improve, we must continually re-calculate the survivability and deliverability of our deterrent weapons. We make decisions today on weapons that must convince the Soviets five and ten years from now that their offensive weapons will not be able to cut too deeply into the survivability and deliverability of our long-range weapons. threat of retaliation. If we do our job right, we will maintain an effective We will maintain effective deterrence and keep the risk of nuclear war close to zero. There are things which the Soviets could do to cut into the survivability and deliverability of our deterrent weapons. They are now doing some of those things. As you know, we watch the Soviets as they develop and deploy new weapons. We watch their m i s s i l e t e s t s, and we know the capabilities of each kind they have. There is one m i s s i l e which has particularly interested us for several years. It is the big SS-9 ICBM. A few years ago, we assumed that the SS-9 was an excellent city-do a tr oyer - - even bettor than it had to be - - and that it was a good Soviet deterrent weapon. Recently, however, we have learned 000149 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation some things about the SS-9 which disturb us. The Soviets are still adding more of those missiles even though they already have or are installing over 200, fa r more than would be needed to attack our large cities. They have just been testing a version which has three separate warheads. The SS-91 s are the most accurate of the Soviet ICBM's, and we are disturbed by the fact that its accuracy isn't needed for city destruction. The American intelligence agencies are agreed on the estimates of future numbers and capabilities of Soviet SS-9 mis silos. From these projections we can calculate the number of Minuteman missiles which can be expected to survive in a 1975 attack. By 1975, only a few tens of Minuteman could be counted on to survive an all-out attack. Soviet ballistic missile defense may be able to intercept the remaining Minuteman. We have also found out that the Soviets have started production of a highquality nuclear ballistic missile submarine, very much like our Polaris. Seven or eight are already in the water* Our special concern is that such submarines will, in the near future, patrol near our shores, just a few hundred miles from our bomber bases. With such short distances, the missile flight times would be too short to allow time for our alert bomber force to take off and fly to safe distances. Our third kind of deterrent weapon* the Polaris submarines, seems safe for now. Wo know that the Soviets are working hard on anti-submarine warfare weapons and techniques* and that some of their approaches are most ingenious. Consequently we are j^ajkning actions which will reduce the potential vulnerability of our Polaris boats. It should be dear, however, that we cannot t, i j �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information 6. guarantee that Polaris, despite our best effotrts, will not become vulnerable to some unknown degree as future Soviet capabilities improve. The Soviets a l s o are improving tho defenses of their cities against our bombers and our m i s s i l e s . As the improvements are deployed, we must change our assumptions - - as they no doubt do - - about the successful deliverability on-target of a percentage of our retaliatory weapons. We, and the Soviets, must always recalculate the retaliatory damage that we can guarantee. We have no doubt that the American ability to guarantee a devastating retaliation - - and therefore an effective deterrence - - i s quite high today. I repeat, we have more than enough retaliatory weapons to guarantee deterrence. As you know, we stopped adding to our numbers of offensive m i s s i l e s and bombers in 1965 and concentrated on quality. We had a margin of safety - - enough so that we could absorb a Soviet increase in offense and in city defense for some years to come. The Soviets have been increasing their offense at a subotantial rate, but the number of our retaliatory weapons they could destroy otill is not enough to give us concern. In fact, the Soviets could continue to build at this rate for a few more years without seriously threatening to erode our land-based m i s s i l e s and bombers s o deeply that we should expect the risk of war to begin to r i s e . Whon wo look ahead beyond the next few years, however, there is reason to worry. Whilo we do not know what tho Kremlin leaders will be thinking at that time, we can bo oure that ohould the growing Soviet offensive force cut even more deeply 000151 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation 7. into the minimum essential surviving American deterrent force, the risk of nuclear war will rise. I cannot tell you what that risk will be. I can only say that it will be higher than today, and then remind you that nuclear war would be so very dreadful that we should do whatever is reasonable to keep the risk at near-zero, I want to emphasize that I am not talking about black or white, war or no war. I' m talking about the risk of war. I'm not talking about what we think the Soviets will do in 1974 or 1980. I'm talking about what we know they could to. In other words, defense decision-makers, who must always look ahead, are faced with some certainties and some possibilities. their problems deftly and surely. They cannot solve They must hedge against uncertainties and make judgments about risks. If we are concerned over the future, what can we do to hold the risk of nuclear war to present low levels? There are a number of possible solutions to the problem. Let's measure each of them against the rational yardstick of nuclear-war decision making, - - that is, the possible effects of each alternative on avoidance of war, on deterrence and on a r m s control. A first option. We could simply add more deterrent weapons and thus insure that a sufficient nurber could be counted on by us and by the Soviets to survive. But this would be arms race purely and simply. This would not be a step toward 000152 �__._ . . . _ . Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information ___-.- 8. negotiations and arms control j it would be a otep away from it. Of course, it may be that despite our best efforts over the montho and years ahead, arms control efforts will fail and we will again need additional offensive weapons. It would be unfortunate, however, if we had to decide to increase the number of our m i s s i l e s now • - just when a r m s control s e e m s possible. A second option. We could plan to preserve our deterrent forces by launching Minuteman and Polaris m i s s i l e s and the B-52 bombers as soon as radar warning indicates that the Soviets are attacking. If the Soviets knew this to be our plan and were convinced it would be our action, then they certainly would remain deterred. But both the Soviets and Americano would be deeply concerned about the inherent defects and dangers of launch-on-warning. forces had such a defect. Our early nuclear They were unprotected and could be preserved only by launching a pre-emptive strike. We found that the danger was so great, and the credibility of the threat so queotionable, that we quickly ! found a better solution. To put it bluntly, no President ohould be required to j launch his miooiles and inoure the deatho of 100 million human beings on each j side just because it i s reported that destruction oeemo imminent. ; i Every President hao insisted, rightfully so, that the Defence Department maintain a deterrent forco which can ride out an attack and give him time to respond in a way and at a time that io appropriate. That io why we protect our deterrent i m i s s i l e o and bomber o; we do not put thorn on a hair-trigger or plan to launch j I j them by a computer docioion. i 000153 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation 9. A third option. We could put our bombers on flying alert. This would preserve them in time of attack and thus preserve that part of the deterrent. But airborne alert is expensive, Also, it requires that aircraft loaded with nuclear weapons be in the air in substantial numbers at all times. I think this would be unacceptable to you people except in time of grave peril. •'•V • - ' , . ' , - ' . . ' A fourth option. We could add to the hardening of Minuteman and further disperse our B-52's. Both of these actions would help preserve the deterrent forces and would not interfere with arms-control efforts. Therefore we are preparing to do this* But silo hardening runs out of utility when the other side achieves a certain degree of missile accuracy, and bomber dispersal Is a limited solution unless we are willing to permanently base B-52's on civilian fields or build new military airfields and facilities. Hardening and dispersal cannot do the whole job* but they are useful partial solutions, A fifth option. We could wait awhile, work on research and development of better missile defeases and meanwhile try to .negotiate. This solution sounds attractive and we explored It at length in February and March of this year. Unfortunately, however, it does not alleviate the problem. First of all, the 000154 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information 10. problem may not wait. If we delay, and if the solution i s not in hand in 1974, then the risk of nuclear war could begin to risen A delay of this next year would cost us at least two year's delay in the deployment. Secondly, r. we have opent more, than a decade on research and development of ballistic m i s s i l e defenses, and we know what defense is available. There i s only one system available for; the time in question, and that Is Safeguard. Finally, the chances for successful negotations could diminish if we did not proceed with a ballistic m i s s i l e defense. There would be l e s s incentive for the Soviet representatives to negotiate a limitation on their forces in 1975-1980 if without such a limitation the balance of power would shift in their favor. Let me explain that briefly. We know from experience that a substantial margin of destructive power gives a nation additional leverage and maneuver room during a criois. The weapons do not have to be fired, but they can influence the outcome of a Cuban m i s s i l e c r i s i s or a Berlin c r i s i s . Arms control suggests that both sides accept a sufficiency, a rough balance in destructive power. United States. Such a balance now exists between the Soviet Union and But If we continue to limit our offensive destructive power and also announce that we will not improve our defenses, then the Soviets would have l e s s incentive to accept a balance. They might be encouraged to continue their present deployments and achieve a substantial margin in their favor. 000155 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation For all these reasons, we cannot delay our decision on Safeguard without hurting deterrence and arms control. A sixth option. We can continue with our ballistic m i s s i l e defense paced by the threat, and also negotiate. This i s our President's decision. He has recommended to the Congress that we install two Safeguard complexes at two Minuteman fields. This will permit us to give those deterrent weapons the margin of protection they may need by 1974. Safeguard preserves the necessary number of Minuteman m i s s i l e s by intercepting a percentage of the incoming warheads. It need not be a total defense, because we do not need total Minuteman survival. But each warhead intercepted and destroyed by the Safeguard m i s s i l e s permits one more Minuteman m i s s i l e to survive. The two installations will give us a Safeguard base that can be extended if and when added protection i s needed for Minuteman and for the B-52's. In the case of B - 5 2 ' s , we need only intercept the first few incoming warheads, -=• the leading edge of the attack. This will give the bombers the minutes they need to get off their runways and safely away from nuclear blasts. The two installations also give us a chance to test Safeguard realistically against simulated attacks fed into the system by tapes made of actual Soviet or Chinese tests of offensive m i s s i l e s . Meanwhile, a decision to deploy this first phase of Safeguard should encourage the Soviets to negotiate realistically about nuclear arms control. We don't know that it will encourage the Soviets. But we do know that a decision for Safeguard will not discourage them. We know from current Soviet statements and past history that the c l o s e r we 000156 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information 12. move toward a ballistic m i s s i l e defense, the more interested the Soviets become in arms control talks. We s e e two reasons for this. A decision for Safeguard shows the Soviets that they cannot hope to build a Successful first-strike force. As they add'offenfoivfi capability, we will add d e f e n s e s. They will never be able to cut Into that minimum essential number of . American retaliatory weapons. ' l • Also, Safeguard shows the Soviets that this country has a responsible, deterrent nuclear-war policy. We are not adding offensive weapons; we are preserving what we have. Clearly, it would s e e m to be in the Soviet interest, now that they also have achieved sufficiency in offensive weapono, to sit down and talk about controls and ways to level off spending on long-range nuclear weapono. Yet, should a r m s controls fail and the Soviets continue to add to their offensive weapons, we will have a proper hedge to build on. We will be able to expand our defense at the same rate as the Soviets expand their offense and thus keep the risk of attack at the same near-zer o we oee today. At thio point, I want to describe briefly another potential problem of the future. Third countries, Red China for instance, will probably have offensive nuclear weapono, and we must deter against their attack. In addition, technology permits us to protect our population effectively against such a smaller and leoo complicated attack--a protection that technology does not provide in the c a s e of a large, sophiotlcated attack on our c i t i e s . So 000157 �."•" Document disclosed undertheAccess to Information Act E Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation 13. l i f e g u a r d offers a bonus. If and when a potentially hostile third country develops ICBM's, Safeguard can provide o v e r - a l l protection against an attack. We cannot, of c o u r s e , predict that an attack will come. But a defense i s possible and t h e r e i s no virtue in standing naked to any c o u n t r y ' s weapons* This concludes a brief look at the proble m and identification of the best solution. But, when you have gone this far with the decision-making p r o c e s s you haven't finished. You m u s t a s k y o u r s e l v e s two additional e s s e n t i a l questions: Will the proposed defense, the Safeguard s y s t e m , work technically and tactically if t h e r e is an attack? And, if we want that solution, can we afford it? Here again, we should stay away from emotional and i r r e l e v a n t a r g u ments and stick to what i s known and what can be prudently concluded. The chances a r e excellent that Safeguard will do the jobs i t i s designed to do. 4 We a r e testing the components s e p a r a t e l y . They work. We know of no r e a s o n why they won't work when tied together, because we see nothing that does not have a solution within p r e s e n t technology. It will be made to work when we t e s t the two s i t e s , shake them down and take out the bugs. Over the p a s t decade, hundreds of distinguished s c i e n t i s t s and engine e r s have studied the p r e d e c e s s o r s and components of Safeguard; they have identified many potential p r o b l e m a r e a s , o f technology and enemy t a c t i c s , and they have found convincing solutions. The r e c e n t discussions have not r a i s e d any p r o b l e m s which have not a l r e a d y been a d d r e s s e d and r e s o l v e d . This does not m e a n it will work perfectly. That i s not r e q u i r e d . The K r e m l i n m a y calculate its chances on the b a s i s of n e a r - p e r f e c t p e r f o r m a n c e of our �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information 14. Safeguard even though we will have to be conservativ e in our e s t i m a t e s . Actually, the question of whether Safeguard will work i s not r e a l l y a question of the operation of Safeguard components against known enemy weapons. tested. We can mak e the s y s t e m work against the weapons we have seen The p r o b l e m c e n t e r s on c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the enemy offensive weapons in 1975 to 1980 and beyond. We don't know those c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . The Soviets and Chinese probably don't know them e i t h e r. To cope with this uncertainty we plan to observ e their m i s s i l e t e s t s , put their c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s on tape, u s e them against Safeguard and modify Safeguard components a s n e c e s s a r y to cope with the evolving t h r e a t s . That leaves the p r o b l e m of cost. It will cost us about $2.1 billion to i n s t a l l the two sites - - the commitment that the P r e s i d e n t , in effect, i s asking C o n g r e ss for this y e a r . of the Safeguard deployment. If the p r o b l e m s e a s e , this could be the extent If the p r o b l e m s continue, 10 additional sites could be requeste d at l a t e r t i m e s . The total funds that could be obligated for installation of P h a s e I in the coming fiscal y e a r under the P r e s i d e n t ' s r e q u e s t would be some $800 million. This i s what it would cost the Department of Defense to keep the Safeguard option open for a y e a r a s we move into a r m s - c o n t r o l t a l k s . Can we afford it? Money now requeste d of the C o n g r e s s is l e s s than one- half of one p e r c e n t of the F e d e r a l Budget. We certainly can afford it. If you m e a s u r e that cost against the r i s k - - a r e a l cost and a potential r i s k - - you c a n not be c e r t a i n beyond any doubt that it is worth it. As you now u n d e r s t a n d , t h e r e a r e 000159 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation • . . - . - • . « few certainties in this business. • You will have to make up your own minds. We find out what you think by reading your letters, reading about your public meetings and reading the polls (the latest says that you favor Safeguard two-to-one). We look at your reasons for taking a given stand and we look particularly for some new consideration of war-avoidance and arms-control. You will have some weeks to dig deeper into these i s s u e s before the decision will be made. Meanwhile new i s s u e s will be raised about Safeguard, and old ones will be resolved. resolved. It may surprise you to hear that they do get A number of past i s sue afar e no longer disputed seriously. A few weeks ago, for instance, there was concern among some critics about the safety of the Safeguard m i s s i l e s . I think that all involved agree now that the danger of an accidental explosion ie essentially nil. There was criticism because we were placing the old Sentinel ABM near cities and indicating that we were trying, fruitlessly, to defend against heavy city attacks. the projected s i t e s . The Soviets could have misunderstood, and we have moved There can no longer be doubt here or in the Kremlin about our view of the purpose and effectiveness of Safeguard. There was concern that the use of Safeguard interceptor m i s s i l e s could be more destructive to us than the enemy's attack. Calculations open to all have demonstrated that this cannot be true, however, and that issue has faded. There was for awhile an assumption that the Soviets would need so many they offensive weapons to attack Minuteman and B-52's that ,7? just couldn't hope to do it in the next five or ten years. But public discussion of tactics and known �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information 16. ' ' technology has laid that argument to rest. There were predictions that the Kremlin would react adversely to Safeguard and block arms control talks. We now know the Soviet reaction, and we know that those predictions are wrong. The suggestions that we should fire all our Minutemen on warning are fading. So i s the argument that we can always depend on just one tppe of deterrent weapon. has leveled off So i s the argument that the Soviet buildup of offense and that he has abandoned his effort to protect his cities against our deterrent threat. 000161 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation •I So public d i s c u s s i o n and explanations in depth do help. We want them to continue. But in the end, the i s s u e s of d e t e r r e n c e and a r m s c o n t r o l and technology and m o n e y w i l l be s e t t l e d t h i s s u m m e r in the C o n g r e s s on a y e s or no vote. I think the vote w i l l be y e s . H e r e i s why: By then, the C o n g r e s s and public should have sufficient knowledge of the i s s u e s to s e e the a l t e r n a t i v e s c l e a r l y , a n d w e hope that e m o t i o n in this i s s u e w i l l have faded. It w i l l be c l e a r that: - A vote a g a i n s t appropriatio n of the m o n e y to s t a r t Safeguard w i l l be a vote to i n c r e a s e the u n c e r t a i n t i e s of d e t e r r e n c e , to d i m i n i s h the c h a n c e s for r e a l i s t i c a r m s contro l n e g o t i a t i o n s and to f o r e g o a hedge a g a i n s t failure of a r m s c o n t r o l. - A vote for Safeguard w i l l i n s u r e that the r i s k of n u c l e a r war s t a y s a s low a s human planning c a n k e e p it. If a r m s c o n t r o l w o r k s and the r i s k of w a r s t a y s l o w , then Safeguard can be negotiated, can be suspended or r e s t r i c t e d as appropriate. So t h e r e a r e gains on the side of d e p l o y m e n t . The drawback i s in the c o s t - - do w e want to c o m m i t the m o n e y needed to maintain the Safeguard option? The P r e s i d e n t b e l i e v e s that the i n s u r a n c e of Safeguard i s w o r t h the premium. I agree. I b e l i e v e that m o s t of you - - and the C o n g r e s s - - w i l l a g r e e , too. END 000162 � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDBM00267 Title A name given to the resource DC to External Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 5/30/1969 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-c, file 27-11-7, "DEFENCE - CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS - ANTI - BALLISTIC MISSILES (ABM) = DEFENSE - ARMEMENTS DE TYPE CLASSIQUE ET NUCLEAIRE - ENGINS ANTIMISSILES (ABM)," vol. 10357, part 6, Library and Archives Canada, (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Anti-ballistic missiles Description An account of the resource ABM Deployment: Speech by Dr. Foster Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en