https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/d401f7a2c07e645fab98c6d9493ea03d.pdf 726f5dae74e3e82c7d31e19f280ca4c3 PDF Text Text Document disci iiscli ised updej^hee Access to<htform tion Act Afcqss to-inprmi Document div ulgi e en \ttu7de\altf sur To/tces a 'information a f DEPARTMENT Subject. Date. May...?6.,....1969 Publication Continued From. Page I, CclJ 7 of Many Foes Is Mistaken 1. or 'Plainly Absurd' By WILLIAM BEECHER Special to The New York|Time» . • WASHINGTON; May . 2 5 — One :of the country's leading nuclear strategists has told Congress that, many arguments iof scientists opposed to a missile defense system range from mistaken to "plainly absurd." Dr. Albert Wohlstetter of the University of Chicago, the man credited with having led the way toward the concept of protecting strategic forces in order to deter an enemy from staging a surprise attack, has issued his rebuke in the form of a 21-page analytical report to the Senate Armed Services Committee. , When the Wohlstetter Report is released by the committee, it is expected to further intensify the already warm debate surrounding the.- Administration's proposed Safeguard missile defense system. At least in part*, the report amounts to a stern rejoinder from someone • outside the Nixon Administration to the recent book-length criticism of' the Safeguard system that was ritten at the behest of Sen-. ' written ntinued on Page 9,Cohimn 1 1 Cimtinui ../.,/ /2JSJ^L•Ja. 1ST REBUTS' SCIENTIST REBUTS ICMf t D ""' lcRrncisH 0? ABr Wohlstetter Says Reasoning r EXTERNAL ai»FJipg a tor Edward M. Kennedy, Derflo fcrat of Massachusetts. •„ Dr. Wohlstetter, who has concentrating on arms control and on protecting strategic forces, chided his .colleagues on the other side of the antimissile argument for either not having done their homework or for having done it sloppily. b" He spoke with the confidence of a man who was once described by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, the President National Security Advised, as the man who more than any other '•provided the intellectual impetus for the recasting of American military strategy in the 1960's." * Unlike the critics, Dr, Wohlstetter said, he is concerned about the safety of America's deterrent force of Minuteman missiles by the middle of the next decade unless they are provided some missile defense. '. The opponents of missile defense, he said, "rather than defend the offense would simply expand it." -That would be more Jikely to start another round in the arms race than to stabilize the situation, he said. * Dr. Wohlstetter' chided Dr. peorge Rathjens, a former disarmament official and one of the authors of the Kennedysponsored attack on Safeguard, for computations that led to his conclusion that an all-out surprice attack by Soviet missiles on the 1,000 American Minuteftien missiles would destroy only 75 per cent of the targets. The "correct" number is 95 per cent, Dr. Wohlstetter insisted. ? "Qr. Wohlstetter GeorW Rathjfens/-a' formep^disarmamteqt official, for tire computations^ajat led tp^his conclusion l ^ t an au>*5ut surprise attack/by Sovie^fcissrle^on the r,0CM"V Am«acariSMmuteman missiles wpuld destrowonbp"75 Tier cenr of thp/targets^ The "correct" "umber is,/B5^jper cejjt; Dr. "wohlstetter, insisted. l ^ e New York Times t Sees Big Overestimate » Dr. Rathjens, he said, erred substantially in overestimating the current "hardness" of Minuteman silos, in underestimating •file projected size of Soviet SS-9 multiple warheads, and in assuming that the Russians would not know which of their missiles had failed to perform properly. •b Instead of figuring on three five-megaton, independently guided warheads for a force of 500 SS-9 Soviet missiles, Dr. Rathjens calculated four onemegaton warheads for each missile. « Three five-megaton warheads Would be enough to wipe out §5 per cent Of the Minutemen, Dr. Wohlstetter said. But, he added, if one-megaton warheads are used in the calculation instead the SS-9 could carry many more than four. \ Dr. Rathjens' estimate of the Hardness of Minuteman silos was based on a "misreading" of unclassified briefing, charts used by the Pentagon, Dr. Wohlstetter said. [•' Rather than having to v 'salvo" Itheir missiles blindly, he said, rehe Russians have the means Tff obtaining reports from their missiles when a warhead is either properly launched or igis fires. 1 Calls Assumption 'Absurd' , Dr. Lapp's assumption that he enemy would devote two warheads of a limited attackrig force to each American silo if ""plainly absurd," according to Dr. Wohlstetter. i 1 If a single warhead has a 95: per cent chance of destroying k Minuteman, aiming two of them at one target would slightl y increase the chances of destruction, he said. But firing the, two at two different missiles j ^vould offer better than a 90 per| cent chance of destroying them > Doth. 1 "I know of no military realist who would regard Dr. Lapp's tactic as a sensible one for the attacker," Dr. Wohlstetter said.: 1 As for Dr. Lapp's suggestionthat the attacker would hold' i back one-fourth of his SS-9 missiles in reserve, Dr. Wohlstetter said this might make sense iri the case of some tanks or tactical, bombers in a conventiona' war but not for those missiles best suited to destroying America's Minuteman . before the;could be •fjrftd afo the Soviet Union in a retaliatory strike. \ : Critical of Lapp Data -Dr. Wohlstetter was e|en iflore sharply critical of the cal culations of Dr. Ralph Lapp, a farmer official of the Atomic Energy Commission. Dr. Lapp f-igured that 76 per cent of the Minuteman force would survive * Soviet SS-9 attack in ithe midK70's. ..Charging that Dr. Lapp's work suffered from "blatant errors," Dr. Wohlstetter said those errors were picked up and repeated in calculations of a number of other scientists. According to Dr. Wohlstetter, Dr. Lapp assumed: flThat the Russians would build a force of only 333 SS-9 missiles rather than the 500 that a continuation of the pres ent construction rate would produce. «rrhat they would hold back one fourth of that'.force* in. reserve for possible later'use during a nuclear fight. ' flThat their missile reliability would remain much poorer! than estimated by American in- j telligence. \ <3That they would fire two of each of their scarce warhead I against each Minutman site, | •thereby ^TfTSCHH^ only onequarter of the possible target. | 000183 � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDBM00262 Title A name given to the resource Transcript from NYT Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 5/26/1969 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-c, file 27-11-7, "DEFENCE - CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS - ANTI - BALLISTIC MISSILES (ABM) = DEFENSE - ARMEMENTS DE TYPE CLASSIQUE ET NUCLEAIRE - ENGINS ANTIMISSILES (ABM)," vol. 10357, part 6, Library and Archives Canada, (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Anti-ballistic missiles Description An account of the resource Scientist Rebuts Criticism of ABM Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en