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D E P A R T M E N T OF E X T E R N A L AFFAIR

£.MA

Subject.

Date. M§X...3..»...I.969

Publication
V*j.

I^GlobeJt^M^l,

K&gt;

Another U.S. missile base pops
AUSTRALIA

from a cloud of secrecy
and discontent \
By IAN MOFFIT
SYDNEY

T

HE SHADOW OF U.S. Missile defense over Canada also seems to be
spreading over Australia as the
United States quietly buttons the county
into its global military cloak. A controversial space communications station
planned for Australia might also be the
latest link in a secret U.S. space chain.
Prime Minister John Gorton has revealed agreement in principle on the
latest base, which has sparked a furor
here. Washington has made no statement about the base.
Mr. Gorton briefly announced the
agreement in Canberra's House of Representatives last week. And this week he
mastered a half-hearted Labor Opposition urgency motion attacking the excessive secrecy surrounding U.S. defense
installations in Australia-and the dangers of nuclear retaliation.
The new base will be at Woomera in
South Australia, and it will be a key

communications station in the U.S. satrest grows over, his compliant Liberalellite military reconnaissaribe program,
Country Party coalition Government.
with perhaps extra nuclear functions.
But it is more likely that the divided
' Labor Opposition and an unquestioning
It may be locked in with the
public will accept the idea of the base,
TAC-COMSAT satellite system linking
and that Australia will house another
U.S. combat units on land, sea and in
joint U.S.-Australian facility which will
the air.
have only token Australian participation.
It also could be part of the manned
orbiting laboratory program, as could
The Opposition cut short its attack on
be the secret U.S. base taking shape at
the secrecy surrounding the proposed
Pine Gap, near Alice Springs in Austrabase to prevent opening rifts in its
lia's Red Desert heart. It might even beranks on the issue, even though Governcome part of an early warning arc
ment members taunted the opposition to
guarding against any Soviet orbital
continue. They, were trying to 'lure the
bombardment system aimed over the
Labor Party into a debate which would
South Pole at the United States.
crack it open, like the debacle that afThe Government here has not in- flicted .Labor over the acceptance of the
U.S. naval communications base at
formed the Australian public what it is
Northwest Cape in Western Australia.
in even broad terms, and it tried to justify the base under pressure this^week
Woomera's role in testing large-scale
as an accepted part of the ANZUS treaty
space rockets is rapidly declining, and
of co-operation.
its geographical relationship with China
. and the Soviet Union now assumes sigMr. Gorton, who will start talks in
nificance as a spot from which to track
Washington on Monday, may suffer
and control satellites.
some\political.damage this year as.un-

Pentagon officials have denied that
Woomera will take over the role of the
U.S. base in Pakistan, now being dismantled. Pakistan has refused to renew
the lease.
Australia's Minister of Defense, A.
Fairhall, has evaded questions about
the purpose of the station beyond the
' assurance that it would make a contribution to free-world defense.. "But I
wish you would not ask me- how," he
coyly told the House.
The project will be the latest in about
nine U.S.-Australiah space and communications stations in Australia, and
U.S.-Australian. agreement is reported
to be close on a Project Omega station
site in Tasmania.
Omega is a series of strategicallyplaced stations around the world which
enables ships to fix their positions.
A lecturer in international relations
at the Australian National University in
Canberra, R. J. Cooksey, is preparing a
paper analyzing the significance and
purpose of the Pine Gap base. "It is de-

sirable for the Government to explain
and justify the functions of the many
U.S. aerospace and communications stations in this country, both individually
and collectively," he said.
Mr. Cooksey added that the three central questions that should be answered
are:
, .• ..What are the risks for Australia in
th'e various kinds of nuclear war?
• Is there any greater probability of
U.S. protection against any conceivable
threats to Australia and do the nuclear
risks outweigh the protection?
• Do these U.S: installations help
sustain the delicate balance of deterrence between the two super powers, or
do they possibly contribute to a foreseeable U.S. superiority, and thus increase
the chances of world nuclear war?
Mr. Gorton will not have to answer
these questions in Washington or while
relaxing in the Canadian Rockies after
his talks. But the answers are still
being sought here.
000217

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS—

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Subject
Date

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Publication

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Senate Critics See Radar as Key ABM

Weakness

\ y«
in
with
the
more
political
ap
the
Senate
Armed
Services
a
2.5-mile,
fea'nge,
would
be too
Special to The New York Times
prdach. advocated by other Re Committee.
far-away in the 250-mile-Wide
WASHINGTON, April 30
Senate critics believe they have publicans, such as Senator EdIt will also be emphasized in Minuteman base to help defend
pinpointed a weakness in the ward W-. Brooke of Massachu- a book on the issue to be. pub- the radar.; Furthermore, he ar
proposed Safeguard
defense setts and Senator Charles H. lished shortly under the spon- gued, the Soviet Union could
,
system that could provide a Percy of Illinois..
technical excuse for political The Brooke-Percy proposal sorship of Senator Edward M. use its smaller, less accurate
SS-11 missiles to knock out the
compromise in the-missile de- would call upon the United Kennedy.
States and the Soviet Union to Essentially, the critics' objec- radar, saving its larger SS-9's
fense controversy.
enter into a moratorium on tion is that the radar is highly for the Minuteman silos.
The . alleged weakness in- both testing of missile war- vulnerable to the blast of a nu- Questioned Tuesday by revolves the missile site radar, a heads arid deployment of offen- clear explosion, far more' so porters on the Panovsky objeckey component in the Safe- sive, and defensive weapons than the Minuteman missiles tions, Deputy Defense. Secreguard antiballistic-missile sys- systems while they attempted the Safeguard is supposed to tary David. R. Packard did not
tem, which the Nixon Adminis- to work out an arms limitation defend. They argue that to1 deny that the radar was "soft"
tration has proposed to defend agreement; During this mora- nullify the Safeguard defense and vulnerable. But he exMinuteman intercontinental mis- torium, the'United States could of Minuteman, the Soviet plained that the radar had to
sile bases.
' . proceed with research on an Union would have to knock out be large—and thus vulnerable
The radar, which is one of improved missile radar.
—because "it has to handle • a
only the radar.
the most Gostly, complex comlarge number of objects.", '..
No-Compromise Posture
During
the
hearing
.
it
was
ponents in the Safeguard sys
If the radar were made
While
the
White
House
is
asdisclosed
that
the
radar
could
tem, would furnish guidance to
smaller and simpler, as sugsuming
ano-compromise
poswithstand
about
20
pounds
per
the long-range Spartan inter
gested • by Dr. Panovsky, "it
ceptor missiles as well as to ture on the ABM issue, oppo- square inch of blast overpres- wouldn't work as well." Dr.
nents
cling
to
the
belief
that
sure from an atomic explosion Packard said.
the short-range Sprint missiles
providing the crucial terminal the Administration will be, driv- about enough to demolish a Implicit in the Packard stateen
to
a
compromise
by
the
substantial concrete buildingdefense for the Minuteman
substantial opposition in the while the . "hardened" Minute- merit was the fact that if the
bases.
were made smaller, it
man silos, with their layers of radar
The technical question raised Senate,
could ;no longer handle the
White
House
officials
express
concrete,
could
withstand
200
by ABM opponents is whether
Spartan missiles,, which are
or not the radar-is so vulner- confidence they will have the to 300 pounds per square inch. designed, to provide an area
votes
when
the
Safeguard
proDr.
Wolfgang
Panovsky
of
able to nuclear explosion that
defense, :in contrast to the terthe whole Safeguard system gram comes to a showdown on Stanford University one of the minal : or point defense prothe
Seriate
floor,
probably
in
world's leading authorities on vided by the Sprint missile. If
would collapse in the event of
June.
;.
radar, observed:
(
a large-scale attack. &gt;
that modification were made,
But "nose counts" by the "Clearly an enemy in plan- therefore, the Safeguard would
Compromise Suggested
opposition show 49 or 50 Sen- ning a first strike would attack no longer have the potential of
Some critics, such as Senator ators firmly committed against primarily the more vulner- growing into the nationwide
John Sherman Cooper, Repub the Safeguard system; 44 or 45 able radar and thereby to- population-defense system long
lican of Kentucky, have sug Senators favoring deployment tally deny the effectiveness of advocated by the Joint Chiefs
gested that the radar may pro- and about six Senators uncom- the defense . . . since the Safe- of Staff.
vide the technical grounds for mitted. The opposition is con- guard system contains only a
fident it can win over two or few very large radars, the ofa political compromise.
They suggest that the Nixon three of the uncommitted, while fense needs to destroy only a
Administration, rather than the White House would have to few targets to defeat the
forcing the deployment issue pick up all the uncommitted system."
in the Senate and risking a to win.
Defense of Radar
reversal, could announce a de- The potential vulnerability of
Dr.
George W. Rathjens, a
lay in deployment while an the radar was one of the prinimproved, less vulnerable, mis- ciple technical objections raised former Pentagon weapons anaby scientific critics of the Safe- lyst who is now professor of
sile radar was developed.
This approach to a compro- guard system in two days of political science at the Massamise, they say, could be tied public hearings last week before chusetts Institue of Technology,
observed that the .Safeguard
system would have to allocate
a very large-fraction of its
efforts" just to defend the
radar.
Estimates prepared by scientific critics "of the ABM system
show that if the Soviet Union
aimed 100. warheads— about
the number*of.multiple, warheads expected to be carried
by 30 of its-Iarge'SS-9 inter-:
continental missiles—it would
require 310 Sprints—or about
all that are planned for a Safe
guard site—to provide a high
degree of assurance that the
radar would not be destroyed.
Dr. Rathjens said some
Sprint missiles, which have

000218

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