https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/f09f1c76bcc931f06ba2bda9285d0241.pdf 3162e62f5dea6414144c5d9c4e47ae99 PDF Text Text IF* bcument dis Document divulgue e^ft/ertUd&la/Le/ sup'acces TB • SWC R E T CDN E Y E S tion Act ayinformation Doll ONLY FM CANDELNATO MAYt/69 CDN EYES ONLY TO TT EXTER 1 2 4 1 PRIORITY DE LDN INFO LDN TT WSHDC PARIS BRU HAGUE BONN ROME MOSCO DE LDN BAG ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO PRGUE WSAW BGRAD DE LDN LSBON DE OTT REF MYLET N342 APR29 MINISTERIAL MTG WSHDC APRli-SPECIAL SESSION WITH PRESIDENT NXXON I HAVE FORWARDED BY BAG APR29 FULL SUMMARY RECORD OF ABOVE RESTR MTG OF WHICH THERE WILL BE NO/NO OFFICIAL RECORD OWING HOWEVER TO CURRENT DISRUPTION OF COURRIER SVC I AM SENDING FOLLOWING TELEGRAPHIC SUMMARY, 2oiTHE MTG WAS HELD AT PRESIDENT NIXONS INITIATIVE IN CONTINUATION OF HIS POLICY OF INTIMATE CONSULTATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE*ATTENDANCE AT THE MTG WAS LTD TO HEADS OF DELS PLUS TWQ9IE IN OUR CASEP SSEA MND AND MYSELF. 3oTHE PRESIDENT STATED THAT HE WISHED TO DEVOTE MTG TO EXPLANATION OF USA ABM POLICY NOT/NOT BECAUSE ABMS WERE AN ALLIANCE RESPONSIBILITY BUT BECAUSE OF THEIR RELEVANCE TO ALLlAMCE SECURITY.. 4«HE HAD BEEN FACED IN USA WITH CRITICISM OF ABMS SIMILAR TO CRITICISM OF NATO ITSELF, THAT BOTH WERE ANACHRONISTIC, ??ANY IN USA HAD ASKED THE QUESTION QUOTE WHY SHOULD USA HAVE MORE ARMS STRENGTH WHEN THEY ALREADY HAD EN0U6H?UNQU0TEoIN THE SAME WAY THE VALUE OF NATO WAS QUESTIONED*IF WAR DID OCCUR,THESE CRITICS SAID THERE WOULD BE STRATEGIC EXCHANGE AND THEREFORE THE ALLIANCE COMMITMENT WAS ILLOGICAL, »• o 2 000222 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information PAGE TWO 1 2 4 1 S E C R E T CDN E Y E S ONLY fc,THE PRESIDENT FELT THAT HIS OBLIGATION WA3 TO RESIST THIS KIND / ' C F THINKING IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN ABILITY TO NEGOTIATE RCuE STRENGTH- t THE ONLY THING THE OTHER SIDE UNDERSTOOD, HE STATED THA"' USA SUCCESS DURING CUBAN CRISIS HAD BEEN DUE TO HAVING STRENGTH WK CH HAD ALLOWED USA TO TAKE A STRONG LINE DIPLOMATICALLY. SUBSE-UENTLY BALANCE OF POWER HAD SHIFTED DRAMATICALLYoSINCE 67 THERE HAD S EN INCREASE OK 6 0 PERCENT IN SOVIET NUCLEAR SUBMARINE CAPABILITY A' WELL AS SIMILAR INCREASE IN SOVIET SS9S MISSILES DESIGNED TO K OCK OUT HARDENED ICBM SITES,AT SAME TIME THERE HAD INCREASE IN SOVIET CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY, 6, USA COULD NO/NO LONGER INSIST ON MAINTAINING OVERWHE MING STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY, THIS WOULD NOT/NOT BE CONDUCIVE 0 NEGOTIATIONS,HOWEVERpHE WOULD SEEK SUFFICIENCY OF NUCL AR POWER, ENPUGH TO DETER AND TO ENSURE DIPLO BARGAINING STRENGT , USA COULD NOT/NOT EXPOSE THE WESTERN WORLD TO POLITICAL BLACKMAI * THE CREDIBILITY OF THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT HAD TC BE MAINTAI ED* 7, THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN FACED WITH TWO ALTERNATIVES? *0 STRENGTHEN EITHER OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY OR DEFENSIVE*. HE HAD CHOSEN LATTER. SELECTION OF ABMS AND SPECIFICALLY SAFEGUAR; SYSTEM HA» BEEN BASED ON FOLLOWING REASONS(A)THE EXISTENCE OF A SOVIET ABM SYST .M THE .EFFECTIVENESS OF WHICH WAS NOT/NOT KNOWN BUT WHICH, BAS .D ON VERY : RECENT INTELLIGENCES WAS STILL EXPANDING. THE MAIN RADAR WAS BEING ALIGNED TOWARDS CHINA, oa • O 000223 �IF! cument disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation ) PAST THREE 124 1 S E C R E T C D N E Y E S O N L Y B> THE SENTINEL SYSTEM WOULD HAVE MADE SOVIET PENETRATION MORE DIFFICULT BUT WOULD NOT/NOT HAVE PREVENTED IT, &THE SAFEGUARD SYSTEM PROVIDED AN AREA DEFENCE WHICH WOULD BE EFFECTIVE AGAINST CHINA FOR TEN YEARS AND WOULD LEND CREDIBILITY TO THE USAS PACIFIC POLICY, ^ p. SAFEGUARD WOULD IMPROVE THE BALACE OF POWER WITH USSR BY -. * 'yr PROTECTING THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT ITSELF, 8 , C R I T I C S OF ABM ARGUED THAT SOVIET SS9S COULD NOT/NOT KNOCK OUT THE WHOLE OF THE USA DETERRENT,THERE WOULD ALWAYS BE ENOUGH TO INFLICT UNACCEPTABLE DAMAGE ON THE USSR, BUT THIS WOULD PUT THE USA IN THE SAME POSITION AS USSR DURING THE CUBAN CRISIS-UNABLE TO MAKE ITS DIPLO WILL PREVAIL BECAUSE ITS MILITARY ARM WOULD BE UNEQUAL TO THE BACK-UP TASK, IT WAS THE ESSENCE OF THE ABM DECISION THAT SUFFICIENT POWER SHOULD BE MAINTAINED TO MAKE DIPLO CREDIBLE BE BEING ABLE TO DETER ATTACK. 9, WHILE HIS DECISION WAS NOT/NOT POPULAR IT WAS BASED ON VALID STRATEGIC INFO AND ASSUMPTIONS, NATO HAD SUCCEEDED IN ITS TASK BECAUSE IT WAS STRONG AND UNITED AND BACKED BY USA NUCLEAR SHIELD WHICH USSR BELIEVED TO BE REAL, THE ABM WOULD HELP TO MAINTAIN THIS CREDIBILITY BY A DEFENSIVE MOVE, ABM DECISION WOULD BE EVALUATED ANNUALLY AND THE COURSE OF USA POLICY COULD BE ALTERED IF NEW TECHNOLOGY OR PROGRESS IN TALKS WITH SOVIETS WARRANTED SUCH A CHANGE, ,,»4 000224 �V PAGE FOUR 1241 Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information S E C R E T C D N E Y E S O i l L Y 10,UK DEFENCE MINISTER HEALEY STATED THAT WULE HE HAD BEEiJ CRITICAL OF SENTINEL DECISION BECAUSE ITS RATIONALE WAD NEVER BEEN KftDE CLEAR AND BECAUSE IT HAD NEVER BEEN SUBJ TO INTER"ALLIED CONSULTATION HE DID NOT/NOT HAVE SIMILAR RESERVATIONS /BOUT ^SAFEGUARD, IN LATTER CASE THERE HAD BEEN CONSULTATION Afc3 ^EXPOSITION OF RATIONALE, ALSO BECAUSE SENTINEL HAD BEEN TIED UP WITH BARGAINING WITH THE USSR SOME ABM CAPABILITY HAD TO BE 'RESERVED FOR SAME PURPOSI, HE HOPED, HOW EVER, THAT IN USA DOMESTIC ;EBATE ON ABMS, VULNERABILITY OF ICBMS WOULD NOT/NOT BE EXAGGERATED, CREDIBILITY OF DETERRENT WAS ESSENTIAL TO NATO STRATEGY ..(ll.UK FM STEWART APPROVED PRESIDENTS LINKING OF ABM DEC SI ON AND 'USA DIPLOMACY, DEFENCE SPENDING WAS UNIVERSALLY UNPOPULA ! SUT MINISTERS HAD KNOWLEDGE AND RESPONSIBILITY TO REACH DECISIONS, 12,NORWEGIAN M OF D TIDEMAND ENQUIRED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY SIGN THAT RUSSIANS WERE STOPPING BUILD-UP OF THEH ABM SYSTE :. PRESIDENT REPLIED THAT 67 SITES HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED AROUND MOSCO -UT THAT DEPLOYMENT ELSEWHERE SEEMED TO HAVE STOPPED, WHILE RANDD HAD BEEN ACCELERATED ACTUAL SECOND GENERATION DEPLOYMENT WAS SLO', SECOND CSNERATION DEPLOYMENT WAS BELIEVED TO BE PRIMARILY FOR : EFENCE AGAINST CHINESE BUT SECONDARILY TO PROVIDE CAPABILITY 01 DEFENCE AGAINST SOPHISTICATED ATTACK AND TO MAINTAIN THE STATE F THE ART. 1 3 , NETHERLANDS FM LUNS WAS DISTURBED BY GAP 3ETWEEN PUB: IC IMPRESSION OF USA MISSILE SUPERIORITY AND PRESIDENTS DU CLOSURES. 000225 �iff PAGE FIVE 1241 cument disclosed under the Access to Information Act ment divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation S E C R E T C D N E Y E S O N L Y HE WONDERED IF THIS KNOWLEDGE GAP SHOULD NOT/NOT BE FILLED, PRESIDENT REPLIED THAT SUCH PUBLICITY WOULD BE ALARMIN s AT HOME AND ENCOURAGING TO ADVERSARIES, IN ANY EVENT GAP WAS QUALIFIED, ONLY IN CASE OF ICBMS WAS IT BEING NARROWED, IMPORTANT FACT WAS HOWEVER THAT SOVIETS WERE CAPABLE OF CLOSING GAP COMPLETELY* 14. PRESIDENT DID NOT/NOT REPLY TO INTERJECTION BY MR DEBRE ACCEPTION MR NIXONS ANALYSIS BUT QUESTIONING EFFECT IN EUROPE OF USA/USSR STRATEGIC BALANCE, AGREEMENT BETWEEN USA AND USSR WOULD ONLY EXPOSE WESTERN INFERIORITY IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS IA EUROPE, ,15. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION FROM MR CADIEUX WHY THE USA HAD NOT/NOT y DECIDED TO PUT ABMS IN ALASKA WHERE POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS WOULD HAVE BEEN LESS THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT IN ALASKA THEY "OULD HAVE NOT/NOT BEEN RELEVANT TO THE DEFENCE OF MINUTEMAN SITES. IN ANY EVENT ALASKA AND HAWAI WOULD BE INCLUDED LATER IN THE PROGRAM, MR LAIRD INTERJECTED THAT TWO ABM SITES CHOSEN WOULD PROTECT 30 PERCENT OF MINUTEMAN LOCATIONS, 100 PERCENT AREA DEFENCE WOULD BE ACHIEVED WITH FULL PROGRAM INCLUDING 13TK AND 14TH SITES IN ALASKA AND HAWAI,PRESIDENT ADDED THAT IN PLACING ABMS HEAR CDN BORDER USA WAS DEFENDING CDA AND ALL OTHER NATO ALLIES. 16. ON BPEST COMMUNIQUE PERSIDENT SAID THAT ITS CURRENT PROPAGANDA OVERTONES CAUSED HIM TO VIEW IT WITH MORE SCEPTICISM THAN MIGHT HAVE BEEN CASE FIVE YEARS AGO, IT WAS NOT/NOT HIS INTENTION, HOWEVER, TO ALLOW OPPONENTS TO OBTAIN MONOPOLY AS PROPONENTS OF PEACE, 000226 �XX PAGE SIX 124 2 Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information S E C R E T C D N E Y E S O N L Y USA INTENDED TO PLAY PROPAGANDA GAME AS WELL AS LOOK F R GAINS OF SUBSTANCE. HERE HE CITED ROGERS TALK WITH KUZNETZOV AND DOBRYNIN ON SIMULTANEOUS RATIFICATION OF NPT, 17,REPLYING TO A QUESTION FROM GREEK MINISTER PIPINELI COMMENTING ON MR DEBRES REMARKS, PRESIDENT STATED THAT AND NY AGREEMENT WITH USSR WOULD ATTEMPT ONLY TO QUOTE CODIFY UNQUOTE THE BALANCE OF DETERRENCE, SUCH A BALANCE COULD NOT/NOT, HOW-VER, BECOME OUR ONLY DEFENCE, NATO HAD TO MAINTAIN THE CONVE TIONAL OPTION,USA WOULD HAVE TO TRY TO NEGOTIATE t REDUCTION *.F USSR CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY IN EXCHANGE FOR A STRATEGIC FR EZE, HERE ,HE ADDED THAT SAFEGUARD SYSTEM, THOUGH NOT/fOT JUST FOR BARGAINING PURPOSES,WAS AN IMPORTANT ADDITIONAL DIPLO CHIP, SO ALS 1 WAS IT IMPORTANT DIPLOMATICALLY THAT NATO NOT/NOT DISINTEGRATE AMD ITS -ALREADY INFERIOR CONVENTIONAL POSITION WORSEN. t 1 8 , I N CONCLUSION PRESIDENT NIXON STATED THfT HE WAS CC 3CI0US THAT IN NEGOTIATING WITH SOVIETS THEY WERE AT A WATERS !ED IN HISTORY, HE WAS PREPARED TO GO ALL THE WAY PESPONSIBLY .N NEGOTIATIONS BUT WOULD TAKE NO/NO DECISION TO WEAKEN V.;STERN DETERRENT POWER WITHOUT GETTING CONCESSION! FROM THE C 'HER SIDE,. EVEN IN THE FACE OF OPPOSITION AT HOME. HE \ OPED THE CI 'ER MEM3ERS OF THE ALLIANCE WOULD FOLLOW THE SfHE POLICY. I -IA GOAL WAS THE SAME AS THAT OF OTHER ALLIANCE MEM! ERS* BUT TH1! STARK FACT WAS THAT IF USA POWER WAS REMOVED, THE REST OF THE WORT i WOULD BE LIVING IN TERROR CAMPBELL 1 000227 � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDBM00241 Title A name given to the resource CanDelNATO to External 1241 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 5/1/1969 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-c, file 27-11-7, "DEFENCE - CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS - ANTI - BALLISTIC MISSILES (ABM) = DEFENSE - ARMEMENTS DE TYPE CLASSIQUE ET NUCLEAIRE - ENGINS ANTIMISSILES (ABM)," vol. 10357, part 6, Library and Archives Canada, (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Anti-ballistic missiles Description An account of the resource Ministerial Mtg DC- Special Session with President Nixon Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en