https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/6a85f6c4003dd388388bbb4eef93a64b.pdf 8c36126e033a8fb7cb5a074f9bbf6103 PDF Text Text ment disclosed under i hetycfS&JpJmformtljt'ion Act t divulgue en vertu c e alorsur I'acces c/l'informatioi D E P A R T M E N T OF E ERNAL AFFAIRS & . 1SIH7>... Subject. Date APRIL..2^/6^ ^ Publication TOROOTO..GLOM...AND...Mr.L. SS-9 shown fo have 5,500-mile range WASHINGTON (AP) - The Pentagon reported yesterday the Soviet Union's SS-9, missile with m u l t i p l e warheads soared about 5,500 miles down the Soviet Pacific testing range. This means that the multimegaton weapon has at least the striking range of the first U.S. Air Force Minuteman missiles deployed by the United States in the early 1960s. Daniel Henkin, chief spokesman ,for the Pentagon, said it was the "first extended range test of the SS-9 with three multiple re-entry vehicles" although other versions of the rocket have been launched further. Mr. Henkin spoke after Secretary of State William P. Rogers reported in a speech in New York on Monday that the Soviets had fired an SS-9 with multiple warheads. Mr. Henkin said the test was staged April 16. "The test Secretary Rogers reported is one of an ongoing series of tests that has continued over several months," Mr. Henkin said. Mr. Henkin said the Soviets now have about 200 SS-9s deployed and are continuing to turn them out. U.S. intelligence estimates the missile can carry a single warhead of up to 25 megatons or three warheads of five megatons. A megaton is the explosive equivalent of one million tons of TNT. Mr. Henkin said the missile is the Soviet's only weapon now credited with the capability of destroying Minuteman sites. He also said portions of the SS-9 booster have been used by the Soviets in testing of a . fractional orbital bombardment system (FOB) system. The FOB is a depressed trajectory missile which could fly low enough to elude U.S. detection radar. The SS-9's .range of 5,500 miles compares to about 6,700 miles for the Air Force's first-generation Minuteman "and about 9,000 for the later Minuteman II. The Air Force now is testing a Minuteman III which, like the SS-9, will carry three • warheads of smaller megatonnage. J. �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation a DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAI Subject. Date AM A AP?....2.?/.6? Publication [..3™^...®^..^..™$*.. Doomsday devices will rely on hair-trigger mechanisms/ expert testifier signers would like to eliminate WASHINGTON - The Safe- human, decision-makers, even guard anti-ballistic missile at low command levels. Fursystem will lead to a great re- ther, the precision needed for liance on automatic devices to the firing time is so fine that make the ultimate decision on machines must be used to whether Doomsday has ar- choose the precise instant of rived, the former director of firing no matter how the decidefense research and engi- sion to fire is made. . . neering for the Pentagon told "Thus if we wish to be certhe U.S. Senate, Armed Serv- tain that the defense will reices Committee yesterday. spond under conditions of surDr. Herbert York, a nuclear prise the trigger of the ABM physicist now at the Univer- must be continuously sensitive sity of California, spent a and ready. In short, a hair good part of his testimony ex- trigger for indefinitely long plaining why the ABM system periods of time." . He noted, however, that the would have to operate bn a hair trigger, increasing the Pentagon has attempted to chances of an accidental reassure the public that the ABMs wouldJtoT be fired by launch.. mistake or in response to Initially, if approved by false alarm because of the apCongress, the system would prov^Kof "very high authoribe made up of long-range Spartan missiles and shortrange Sprint missiles de'ployed around Minuteman ir tercontinental ballistic missile bases in the border states<of Montana and North Dakota. They would be designed to intercept invading ICBMs coming over the North Pole for the most part in Canadian air space. They would disarm the at-, tacking ICBMs with a nuclear explosion that would cause no injury or damage on the ground below, Dr.. John Foster, the current Pentagon director of research and engineering has testified. Asked about this after the committee rose yesterday, Dr. York said there would be no injury or damage if the Spartans and Sprints functioned; precisely as designed but that i the Sprint would explode at the height "which by no stretch of the imagination could be called outer space. . . . You really wouldn't want to be under it." Dr. York told the commit-' tee: "Any active defense sys- 1 tem such as the ABM must sit in readiness for two or four or eight years and then fire at | precisely the correct second following a warning time of nine oi only a few minutes, g "v, "This warning time ime fflsso -1—*•* that msny^Systems stems o&c 'r Glebe and Moil Correspondent ties" would be needed to. launch the ABM. , He said that he found the need for a hair trigger and precautions against accidental launch "contradictory requirements." He advocated that the United States drop the $7-billion Safeguard proposal and seek arms limitations talks with the. Russians. If these fail, the Defense Department should come up with a completely new strategy to insure ihe nation's security because Safeguard is the "least sensi-ble" of any plan. The ABM system could be overcome too easily turation attack, he there are too many ties for malfunctions. "I stress that lam not'just talking, about. . . statistically predictable failures in system components but rather about possible catastrophic failures in" which at the moment of truth either the system doesn't fire at all or all interceptions fail for some unforseen reason." Dr. York, along with fellow physicist Dr. Wolfgang Panofsky, also took issue with the Defense Department's claim that Russia could reach a first-strike position if the United States does not protect its ICBM force with Safeguard. "I consider a first-strike threat to be an extremely implausible projection of our available intelligence including that concerning SS-9," Dr. Panofsky said. "How large an extrapolation f r o m firm knowledge is the statement that our information about the SS-9 signified first-strike intent on the part of the Soviet Union." Defense Secretary Melvin Laird has testified before the same committee that he thinks there is no question that the Soviet Union is going for a first-strike capability in deploying the giant SS-9 ICBM's. It is a key factor in his and the Nixon Administration's case for deploying ABMs to protect U.S.. Minuteman bases. Mr. Laird also susggested before the committee that there will be some danger to. the U.S. Polaris submarine missile force in the 1970s, but he refused to elaborate in public because the information is classified. Dr. Panofsky took exception to this point. "I am aware of no technical prospects or of any current intelligence indicating the threat to our Polaris submarine force." Another expert witness, Dr. William McMillan, a chemist and advisor to the Pentagon who recently returned from Vietnam, s u p p o r t e d Mr. Laird's statements about the Polaris force and the adminis- tration's proposal for Safeguard. "To them (the Russians) Polaris may not look like 600 missiles, or 6,000 warheads if given a ten-fold MIRV (multiple warheads) multiplication, but rather as only 41 boats to be neutralized. "And our 600 B-52 bombers may be viewed as a much smaller number of airfields to be attacked—for which they may think their Fractional Orbital Bombardment System is well suited." Another witness, former Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Nitze, also endorsed Safeguard, but he avoided aligning himself with the Administration's warning of an emerging Soviet first-strike capability. If. the Soviet develops an ABM and the United States does not it "could well result in an unstable situation with consequent grave dangers not only to the United States but to the rest of the world," he said. 000247 � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDBM00231 Title A name given to the resource Transcript from Globe and Mail Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 4/23/1969 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-c, file 27-11-7, "DEFENCE - CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS - ANTI - BALLISTIC MISSILES (ABM) = DEFENSE - ARMEMENTS DE TYPE CLASSIQUE ET NUCLEAIRE - ENGINS ANTIMISSILES (ABM)," vol. 10357, part 6, Library and Archives Canada, (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Anti-ballistic missiles Description An account of the resource SS-9 shown to have 5,500-mile range Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en