https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/878720b618e4643f3accccfc8359cafc.pdf 743bfc85e7cdd101629d086d4f014a48 PDF Text Text jnt discloseoUH«ierttrt*4t?gS37o information Act jnt divulgue ejn \ieftrf£e%j.o/die Taates a Tin} trmation 5- o DEPARTMEN#~OF E X T E R N A L AFFAIRS , subject Date / Warns Against Hampering a Future President With a Second-Class Position By ROBERT B. SEMPLE Jr. Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, April 18 — Sharpening both his rationale and his rhetoric, President Nixon defended today the Safeguard antiballistic missile system as vital to national security and promised to press vigorously for its approval. "I'm going to fight as hard as I can for it," Mr. Nixon declared at a news conference, "because.I believe it is absolutely essential for the security of the country." [Question 8, Page 14.] The President's basic justification for Safeguard was much the same as it was on March* 14, when he announced his decision to deploy the antiballistic missile system and sought to portray it as a defensive mechanism designed to protect the city and preserve the nuclear balance. A New Urgency But there was a new emphasis and urgency in his remarks today, reflecting perhaps the increasing opposition • to Safeguard on Capitol Hill. The antimissile project is under attack from a vigorous and determined bipartisan Senate group. Asserting that the Soviet Union had greatly improved its offensive capabilities, he warned that unless the United States moved immediately to improve its offensive or defensive forces, its opponents would move "substantially ahead" "in over-all capability" by 1973. £&Mk .MU..12.>....1?§9 \ /£ / —Publication "I! do not want to see an American President in the future, in the event of any crisis, 1 to have his diplomatic credi- I bility be so impaired because the United States was in a sec- * ond-class or inferior position," he said. "We saw what it meant X to the Soviets when they were second. I don't want that position to be the United States' \ in the event of a future diplo- [ jmatic crisis." 1 j Mr. Nixon also re-empha- ] sized the. potential threat to the United States from Communist China, which he said would posses "a significant nuclear capability" by 1973 or 1974. Results of Inaction Even here he stressed the diplomatic consequences of inaction, asserting that United States diplomacy in the Pacific would lose its credibility unless' "we could protect our country against a Chinese attack aimed at our cities." The President insisted that despite his belief in the system he had no intention of taking his case "to the country" or forcing his feilow Republicans to vote for it along "partisan lines." Some Republicans have Continued on Page 14, Col 3^....IQRK„ TIMES. , strengthen his case with some of the same intelligence data complained that the Republican that his principal associates, National Committee, and Mr mainly Secretary of Defense Nixon's Congressional strate- Melvin R. Laird, have been pre. gists, were demanding party senting in testimony on Capiloyalty on the issue. But the tol Hill in recent weeks. President said he had made his Like Mr. Laird, the President original decision on its merits focused his arguments this and hoped Congress would con morning on intelligence estisider his request in the same mates of actual and potential Soviet nuclear strength, rather spirit. than on speculative estimates "This issue will be fought of the Soviet Union might out, as it should be fought out, or what might not do with its forces. on the basis of what is best "I don't know what their infor the nation. It will not be tentions he said. "We fought out on partisan lines," have to are," base our policy on he declared. their capability." Veto Is Conceded Describing this capability, At the same time, however, Mr. Nixon said that intelliin response to a related ques- gence estimates of Soviet tion, he conceded that he had strength were 60 per cent vetoed the appointment of Dr. higher than estimated at the Franklin A. Long as the new time the Johnson Administration decided to deploy its antidirector of the National Science ballistic missile system, known Foundation because of his "very as Sentinel. noted that the, sincere" opposition to the anti- Soviet UnionHeappeared deter-' ballistic missile system. mined to proceed with the SS-9 The President's disclosure —which carries a 25-megaton that he had accepted the advice warhead—-and to increase its of his aides not to appoint the nuclear submarine fleet by Cornell scientist confirmed re- nearly two-thirds. ports to that effect published * earlier this week. 'Limited Action' The disclosure also indicated "Under these circumstances," that Mr. Nixon was serious he asserted, "I had to make about fighting for the Safe- basically a command decision guard system and was anxious as to what the United States moreover, to present a united should do if were were to avoid front uncontaminated by dis- falling into a second-class or sent. inferior position vis-a-vis the . In his defense of Safeguard, Soviet Union." the President sought to He saiil that one option avaifable to him was to increase the nation's offensive forces "in various directions," but that he had chosen instead to take the : "limited defensive action" of ^deploying enough missies to defend the Minuteman silos — the jcore of the. country's secondstrike capacity. He said he believed then and believed now that he had chosen the wisest course. "I believe," he said, "it is essential for the national security, and it is essential to avoid putting an American President— either this President or the next President — in a position where the United States would be second rather than first or at least equal to any potential enemy." Mr. Nixon said the United States did not require overwhelming superiority, only "sufficiency." But he suggested that the Soviet Union's rapid progress required some countermeasure—in this case, Safeguard. Later, on Capitol Hill, opponents of Safeguard asserted that the United States already enjoyed a comfortable margin of superiority, especially with its B-52 bombers and Polaris 000254 � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDBM00226 Title A name given to the resource Transcript from NYT Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 4/19/1969 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-c, file 27-11-7, "DEFENCE - CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS - ANTI - BALLISTIC MISSILES (ABM) = DEFENSE - ARMEMENTS DE TYPE CLASSIQUE ET NUCLEAIRE - ENGINS ANTIMISSILES (ABM)," vol. 10357, part 6, Library and Archives Canada, (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Anti-ballistic missiles Description An account of the resource President Vows to Fight for ABM 'As Hard as I Can' Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en