https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/41dc59b74ce6781154ae9850d7a90929.pdf 4bef39bb7700e54470d7657890684414 PDF Text Text I I _ Document disclosed unqer thg Access to> Informatii Information Act e n t d i v u l g u e n v e r t u de!|a Loisur l accks d rh''information D CAHADIAN EIES MT [fcPUTY MINISTER O T NATIONAL DEFENCE ° ' SOUS-MINISTRE DE - A ' O E P E N S E NATIONALE CANADA D 3287-5 (DPG) iy&AlA ^ y 2 April I969 TTMA^ Under-Secretary of S t a t e i Department.of External Affairs , East Block, Vfellingtbh S t r e e t , Ottawa, Ontario* A$J^ 21'//'7 ff^AA /s SAFEGUARD ABM SISTBH 1. Enclosed are three copies of a paper covering certain information on the proposed Safeguard ABM system,-which was obtained during a recent visit by DND-personnel to the U.S. Department of Defense. .. E.B. Armstrong Deputy Minister End. ILL V $S£A &pA{i. SECRET CANADIAN EYES OUST t 000050 A' *?/.**) I �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act locument divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information RECENT INFORMATION CONCERNING SAFEGUARD ABM SYSTEM • BACKGROUND On 24-26 March, 1969, Dr. J.C. Arnell (ADM(F)/ DND), Mr."W.B. Snarr (DPG/DND), and Dr.G.R. Lindsey (C/DRAE) visited offices in the Pentagon for discussions of the future air defence system development. However, because of•the•timing of the visit, a considerable amount of information, regarding the recently announced plan for ABM defence, now known as "Safeguard", was volunteered. The visit coincided [fortuitously) with that of the Prime Minister to phe President, and with a great deal of interest in Congress and the press concerning ABM. Senior US defence officials were prepared to speak quite freely on a wide variety of classified topics connected with the ABM, and its potential interaction with Canada. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SAFEGUARD AND SENTINEL The components of Safeguard'will be the same radars and. missiles planned for Sen.tinel. The scheduling of deployment is to be reviewed annually, and phased according to the changing appreciation of the threat, the prospects for arms -control, and other factors. The first deployment .(to be operational in 1974) will- be in- Montana and North Dakota for defence of Minuteman ICBM sites. Subsequent phases could be1: - extended defence of Minuteman (Wyoming and Missouri) - defence of national control authority (Washington, DC) - defence against submarine-launched missiles (installations on each coast) - thin area defence of population (installation spread over Continental USA) With the exception of Washington, DC, the locations of radars and missiles will not be close to large cities. ' 2 SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000051 �-1 - Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY CONTROL OF SYSTEM Under any circumstances, the problems of establishing and controlling a weapon system on.perpetual instant readiness, armed with hundreds of megaton warheads, and located within range of large cities would require planning with the most extreme care. . However, when they are compounded by strong political opposition (partially based on considerations of safety), and questions of delicate Canadian susceptibilities, it can be seen that the problems of firing doctrine and control are absolutely central for the Safeguard system. Quite aside from questions of policy, the complexity of the system*-and the speed with which it must operate, make the magnitude of the problems of computer programming . and "software engineering" the pacing items in the program. If the present deployment goals are to be met, the basic policy framework for the software development will need to be completed by the end of 1969. It will be necessary to establish a large organization (probably based on Bell Telephone Laboratories and IBM under contract to the Sentinel Project Office of the US Army) to carry out this part of the program.. The establishment of .firing doctrine policy will be held at the level of the Secretary of Defense. Even after the system is operating, authority for changes to the programs will be retained by the Secretary of Defense. It is top early to know how much authority and discretion will reside with the operational commander. At a minimum, he might have ho more function than to.push the button and activate the computer program when so ordered by Washington. It is more probable, however, that several alternative strategy options will be programmed. Examples might be: - priority to defence of bomber bases - restriction of defensive fire to one particular sector - suspension of ABM fire in areas where it could interfere with launching of offensive missiles If alternatives are available, the operational commander might be given the authority to select the most appropriate program to use. SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000052 �.. ^ p Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information CANADIAN EYES ONLY In the first phase, an overriding consideration is to be given to safety to population from damage by ABM weapons. The height of defensive bursts will be kept well above the safe limits for risk to population, even at some, sacrifice to the probability of a successful interception. The same criteria will be applied to bursts above US and Canadian territory. One vital requirement of the operational command and control system is to ensure that all pertinent intelligence and other information is collected and presented as a timely and coherent picture. In this regard, great reliance will be placed on the new satellite detection . system known as 949L, whose information will be fed into the Space Surveillance System at Colorado Springs. This detects the radiation from the rocket exhaust of missiles in the boost phase, and provides an estimate of the position, direction of movement, and type of rocket. It is important to. alert the defensive' system to the occurence of lauhchings, so that the new objects can be identified and tracked amid the considerable quantity of "space garbage" already in orbit (which includes many harmless objects which eventually' reenter and descend). Amongst other advantages, the satellite system will reveal the existence and position of submarines launching missiles. Because NORAD now collects the information for aerospace defence, and executes, the command and control of antibomber defence, it seems to be the logical organization in which to place the operational control of the future antimissile defence. Hoi\rever, a number of major questions remain unresolved at present, including jurisdictional disputes between services. It was -understood that no decision by the Secretary of Defense in this regard would be made until at least the end of 1969. Since the first ABM batteries will not be operational for about five years, the decisions on organization of command and control are not particularly urgent at the moment. The best Canadian policy may be to await developments and possible requests or invitations from the U S , rather than to press for decisions in the near future. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS The present Spartan missile has three stages of. propulsion, but the third stage has a very limited.ability to manoeuvre. It loses aerodynamic stability when the second stage is- separated. The weapon is, therefore, not very effective at long range oh the descending half of its traj-ecto-ry. SECRET CANADIAN. EYES ONLY 000053 �4- Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act '• Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY A new third stage is b^ing designed, with much more manoeuvrability. The weight of the additional propellant will necessitate a reduction in the weight of the warhead and of the yield of the explosion. The reduced kill radius will be compensated by a reduced miss distance. With this new third stage, it will be possible to consider interceptions at lower altitude. ; It is expected that SLBMs will be fired on a low trajectory, in order to minimize warning time to the defence (both because of the low apogee and the shorter time of : flight). Against this tactic, the. new third stage of Spartan would be particularly useful. It is possible that the new third stage will allow the.Spartan to be used against high-altitude bomber aircraft. This could be important if the USSR should build a supersonic bomber. 28' M a r c h , 1969. SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY 000054 � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDBM00213 Title A name given to the resource Letter to the Under-Secretary of State Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 4/2/1969 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-c, file 27-11-7, "DEFENCE - CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS - ANTI - BALLISTIC MISSILES (ABM) = DEFENSE - ARMEMENTS DE TYPE CLASSIQUE ET NUCLEAIRE - ENGINS ANTIMISSILES (ABM)," vol. 10357, part 5, Library and Archives Canada, (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Anti-ballistic missiles Description An account of the resource Recent Info Concerning Safeguard ABM System Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en