https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/6314c6e4c7e57a529d59eb8f040deed3.pdf 1612d89a722f5f1a4a1729b67bc1d3a7 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document i'wriilgueen y^jtiTde la loi sur I'acces a I'information EXTERNAL AFFAIRS TO Mr. Bow FROM Oe A.D. Morgan REFERENCE R-ference AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES SECURITY S4cot.fi CONFIDENTIAL DATI March 2 6 , 1969 NUMBER Vum.ro FILE m ABMs—Is "Safeguard" Escalatory? SUBJECT Su/'el "* o2 - 7 -//-7 DOSSIER MISSION ENCLOSURES Annexes DISTRIBUTION Mr. Smith Mr. Bernier 9 AJ^J, VA&A^P &**3 1 QM #. yr _*_ -c/AJfl (yZ/u*fy~ AA, J^ SftlT*%< (ftA^\ AytYIa % /tA&ApAToAA 1 A$uA^ ArAk <y*A>~A I trust you will not regard it as presumptuous/ is at if I add my.comments on some of the arguments over this ybteyh> subject from the spectators' gallery. My observations are j/AjAAA also prompted in part by the impression that discussions -/ of this subject tend to consist of assertions rather than .-^-^H, analysis and seem general and even vague—e.g. the PMfs •At Triefing paper—and often irrelevant or silly—e.g.. radiation fallout in Canada. In the following comments I intend to deal only with theoretical military-strategic . arguments which are merely one kind and perhaps ultimately the least important kind of-argument in this particular issue. Political-strategic, socio-economic, and psychological considerations {e.g. does the President's decision tend to enhance or weaken confidence abroad in the processes and results of US decision-making and what would be the effect of a given Canadian decision on this point) are probably imore cogent in the long-term. I wish to emphasize also that while the following is an attempt at systematic analysis, it cannot be as rigorous as the question demands because I do not have the time for the necessary research and verification of factual statements. Finally, of course, thiscamateur effort may already be rendered superfluous by the existence (I hope it is} of the kind of strenuously analytical paper for which this would only be preliminary notes. 2. If we assume "escalatory" in the present context. * , _. to mean stimulating the production by the USSR (the Chinese j&y&6ti* will be producing more anyway) of more or better (or both) itwt&ccwi,} missiles, the paradoxical conclusion is that if the USSR . /, VI4 produces more ICBM's the American decision to deploy ( "Safeguard" will have been proven correct. If the USSR produces more ABM's the implications are ..less claar since j} 'yC they would depend upon the nature of the ABM system as a whole (basically "area" vs. "point"). Before working out the argument, I must point out what tends to be overlooked in these debates, namely that any action which the USSR decides to take as a direct result of the US decision .to deploy will only be evident some years from now and it will • • . <c 000042 Ext. 407A/.H. �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information ) e „y impossible to do any more than infer a connection ct/1AJ'A ° %*Aw ^ / between the observable effects, i.e. more Soviet mis - iAZiA* ^•^a^^J^'and the US decision. The missiles might have been ^^^yA/yf*™& y/uf w.s&t produced ..for quite other reasons e.g. Soviet gener. generals jjy&J) y^y/An* successfully defend the view^f that the USSR must have „,(/~/v' /AAA J^t^ULfAtj&Anuclear "superiority". AH> 3. In order to understand the paradox mentioned above, it is necessary to recall the strategic principles upon which the US and Soviet nuclear strategic forces are based. The US strategic force was (and still is though the balance of emphasis is changing) intended to be first a counterforce weapon and second a countervalue (or countercity) weapon. The counterforce role called for the US to strike a "disarming" blow against Soviet nuclear rocket forces in the event of a major Soviet ground attack in Europe thus requiring a Soviet first strike against the US as a necessary concomitant of such an attack. Only secondarily did the US threaten to strike Soviet cities and industrial sites.. The US could adopt this strategic posture because it had a large number of carriers and originally Soviet missiles were "soft" (i.e. unhardened, unburied and liquid-fueled), but it was,and remains a threat of a "firststrike" though conditioned on initial Soviet aggression and directed against military targets identifiable in advance. The countervalue role is connected with the doctrine of second-strike, "assured destruction capability" and "flexible response" and I need not rehearse for you the rationale of this strategic posture, except to recall that y . A it depends, crucially, on absolute confidence (particularly (y^JAA^) ^dPy* in Soviet minds and also in Western perceptions of Soviet minds T—J4AA.UU£/A4K ) that no matter how the USSR attacks the US, it musty fc UAJQ y ^ • / asXif by a law of nature, suffer retaliatory obliteration. AgGyQAAd y* /a / 1If Soviet perception of this point is obscured (i.e. the ^ - ^ ^ x ^ j -<fl * A deterrent is no longer "credible") the basis of deterrence A ^yuSAfitsAfaen-is undercut. Soviet strategic doctrine was originally quite k <"* "~/-?\ different (I must rely here on my recollection of discussions in C&Ayt^^A books by.Garthoff and Wolfe). Soviet military writers criticized the counterforce or, as .they called it, "citysparing" doctrine and from this alone, coupled with.the necessities imposed by the number and characteristics of . their early missiles, one can infer that their own doctrine was of the countercity variety. It was also implicitly and necessarily first-strike, but the.attack was deterred by the fact that it would leave the US strategic forces intact v/hich could then carry out their "massive retaliation". Provided the foregoing summary is an.accurate account of.the two Strategic doctrines (this is where the research and verification is most needed), we now arrive at ABM's. /f. The principal strategic argument advanced against "Sentinel" (the Johnson-McNamara November 1967) system was that because it was an "area" defence i.e. defended cities it would (a) despite its initial "thin-ness" undermine �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'informatio M Soviet confidence in their own "assured destruction capability" and (b) raise the possibility in Soviet minds r- A At-^^pu^r^ ^th&t the US might eventually contemplate a countercity /fa 0»*y /^^t<A first-strike in the absence of Soviet conventional <- ^ w7>*A///~ •-. aggression because it could limit casualties to "acceptable" i^^TfiM tt/*AjAA) l e v e l s « (MIRVs fitted here because with them the original . count •U^^yAfAA'AyffA^ erforce capability, now being undercut by hardening f A ^ ^ w of Soviet missiles, could be regained i.e. the US could ft**^ with MIRVs have both counterforce and countercity capability and (c) therefore lead the USSR to produce more missiles to restore the confidence mentioned in (a) and perhaps also ir expand its own ABM system (so far slowly being installed only around Moscow; it must be noted that there are many other areas in the USSR which are almost equally important. Saving Moscow and losing e.g. Leningrad, Kiev,--a-nd thereforeprv5e-i-t-.fi-aviia.t-.A-BM doploym&H'fe^ek'reFS'^ot"' juatigy—a'*-US- r^sportse an( and Krivoy Rog does not make sense and therefore present /yyyctf "oviet ABM deployment does not justify a US response)* In So1 / f~A/**fiAjAh " ese terms "Sentinel" was unambiguously escalatory (this s probably,the reason for the unconvincing anti-Chinese rationale) and i t could be argued, speculatively, that t h i s i s hov; the USSR viewed i t and saw the best method of halting .the upward spiral to be SALT, i . e . "Sentinel" contributed to the finally favourable Soviet response, this,favourable response JV/ 0CCurr:i n "< idy>t&i*/VTV 'f? ,A^ * & because of, not despite "Sentinel". This could mean t h a t on SALT y^]yJJ/i^^7y' y jh/tfbfMS- - , V. j - m e c U - O l i d . arguments cli. £,U_il«l_<-_> about d U U U i j the 0-i.fc; "Safeguards" •QctX t - g U e l i U_>" effect to^^fftfSAfar* on the analogy of "Sentinel" are misleading This leads to AvA^yy :_*«•/\\A- "Safeguard" (the Nixon system) against th*. •Rus; ' y Jjterf'.&***,' Jt/,yiru believe President Nixon-eHtpbaoiHod'-thioi *__£-$. AAAA fM"4^ 5. "Safeguard" i s explicitly designed not to defend / -J-i c i t i e s . I t i s true t h a t ^ e n t i n e l " could not defeat a y £rt"<vT(£ determined Soviet attackVeither, but i t s deployment pattern ^-? - jy.7Ay~Ant required the Russians to be "determined" and, hinted at sfaj/h. #y ys« ' f u t u r e "thickening". The deployment pattern of "Safeguard" ^yAe&yc&yiA &"0* —tloes not carry t h i s implication (perhaps technical facts of v* which I am unaware v i t i a t e this argument) even though i t i s supposed to be able to handle light Chinese attacks. (I suspect these would have to be rather feeble or else A&AAuAf«*"j unintelligently targetted for the system to work.) an/ ^ - J AA&yAvAto. "Safeguard" i s a "point" defence and i t s effect on the yyyCAtoAi/ ^ y strategic equilibrium i s therefore no different from passive yAjeAs/u***" iMs*™' measures such as superhardening because i t leaves US c i t i e s Cfxsu^y } unambiguous hostages to a Soviet second s t r i k e . ( I t may be true that the same effect i . e . protection of the US second-strike force, could be better achieved elsehow. This i s a technical problem but i t has strategic implications, because if such protection i s feasible, the true reason for •yy^' A "Safeguard" becomes uncertain. This i s a point which sA^vaznAZyAj *^* requires investigation in d e t a i l . ) In other words "Safeguard" "~" does not, in the logic of deterrence, oblige the USSR to 'IJaAi'U yy • ••**- / 000044 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information expand its strategic offensive forces specifically to counter it. If the USSR did so expand its forces, it could only be.contemplating a possible counterforce if^JAjA disarming first-strike and this expansion vsrould therefore (this is the paradox) justify the deployment of "Safeguard". There are several flies in the strategic ointment however.. One, already mentioned, is the impossibility of demonstrating specific connections between US and Soviet actions; the second is doubt about whether Soviet thinking proceeds along the same kinds of lines as sketched in this paper. • In other words, "Safeguard" could exemplify the precept •*Ay//&*****'"/that strategic decisions sometimes precede or even produce &y proof of their own justifiability. Nonetheless on 1 f ely military-strategic grounds, I do not think "Safeguard" tyjzA"" ^^ pur< can easily be labelled as "escalatory". It may of course y6Aeyuj be "escalatory" for other reasons, but it.seems to me that in terms of the logic of deterrence it is not. On the iwhole l would, therefore, tend to regard the ^Safpg-iar-rj'jx rytyX I decision KioA^y-^ decision as as defensible derensi-oieon on these (theoretical)Tgfounds (which V |bareadmittedly intricate and affected by uncertain factors), ut s? A*JISIA«<AA J^—~ this is a narrow base upon which to defend aidecibion of j ^ yiy>osi*yy> such/jnoment and it is equally narrow and slippery a AtAAj^/y promontory from which to criticize it. My own preference >^. xvould be to begin by examining the issue in a trilateral <^7' (US, USSR, PRC) context and consider the effects on the •^fjAUA<LyA^A*\ AVI"** diplomatic constellation over the next two decades. But (jyi^f /y*^ JA+^A that would require another paper, and it is perhaps already /yijrnjjyAyy* too late for that. We shall once again not be forecasting A j A AfjAAt/o*J the future but merely observing it unfold. $d* A&A> t /yd^ n A>-A1: � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDBM00210 Title A name given to the resource Letter from Morgan to Bow (External Affairs) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 3/26/1969 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-c, file 27-11-7, "DEFENCE - CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS - ANTI - BALLISTIC MISSILES (ABM) = DEFENSE - ARMEMENTS DE TYPE CLASSIQUE ET NUCLEAIRE - ENGINS ANTIMISSILES (ABM)," vol. 10357, part 5, Library and Archives Canada, (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Anti-ballistic missiles Description An account of the resource ABMs Is "Safeguard" Escalatory? Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en