https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/773a7c5239302a48e6732c2de8f1e402.pdf 3079c30ae1dc63b7638d2846afd9903e PDF Text Text Dlsarma*^ n -$$$.etf.u,$8I/t}& Access to ln rmation f° Act - j ocument divulgue en vertu de fa Loi sur I'acces a I'information EXTERNAL AFFAIRS ' AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES SECURITY t - n p S-CUr». *-> fi t» « ^OFFICE OF POLI_TCO-MII_tTARI JIFFAIRS DATE ofteARl-aMENT DIVISION p »i Jl 3, Harch 2 6 , 1969 . NUMBER NvmeVo REFERENCE Reference FILE OTTAWA DOSSIER •//- 7 .37MISSION SUBJECT s-jw ABHS CONTROL IMPLICATIONS ON THE "SAFEGUARD" AMT-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM ENCLOSURES Annexes DISTRIBUTION Hr. Robinson U.N. Dir* European Div. Hr. M-Qill USA Division Far Eastern Division At the meeting last week of the working group on AM policy, you asked us to prepare three or four paragraphs concerning the arms control implications of this question and of Canadian reaction to it. Our understanding is that these paragraphs are to be included in a paper for the use of the Minister and the Prime Minister when this question is considered by Cabinet and that they will be balanced by an assessment of North American defence considerations which the Department of National Defence is preparing; technical information concerning the weapons which DRB is analysing; and some political background material which you are assembling. We have prepared these paragraphs on the understanding that no specific reconciliation of Canadian interests and no recommendations are to be formulated at this time. ,0 ©$. M,N- Disarmament Division Ext. 407D/BII. (Admin. Services Div.) 000039 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de laSo&i/S/'Bce&s^ I'information March 26, 1969. Arms Control Implications of the "Safeguard" Anti-Ballistic Missile System One of the most important aspects of the Safeguard ABM system is the impact or potential effect it will have on arms control and on Canadian interests in that area. How the Soviet Union perceives this development and the simultaneous evolution of more sophisticated offensive missiles and warheads will determine whether escalation of the nuclear arms race will result* Unless the Soviet Union can be reassured about American intentions, possibly by the beginning of the strategio arms limitation talks (SALT), the Soviet Union may decide it must reciprocate in order to preserve its second strike capacity either by deploying more ABMs to defend its offensive missiles or by increasing its offensive capability in order to make sure that its nuclear deterrent remains credible. The latter decision could only be described as an escalatory step leading to a defensive-offensive buildup with resulting uncertainty and destabilizing effects which would increase the possibility of a nuclear exchange. 2. There are other ob-slous and specific implications for arms control measures currently under consideration (1) SALT-»Slnce President Nixon's announcement that he intends to proceed with deployment of the Safeguard ABM system under certain carefully circumscribed conditions, the Soviet Union has Indicated its continuing interest in commencing strategic arms limitation talks at an early date. Defense Secretary Laird1s statements that ABMs are needed to strengthen the United States bargaining position &&} however, neither conducive to productive negotiations nor credible In the context of President Nixon's claim that they are essential to protect the United States against a potential Chinese threat. (2) CTO—The ABM decision has seriously prejudiced the possibility of achieving agreement on a comprehensive test ban -treaty* Since President Nixon*s announcement of the Safeguard ABM project, the Pentegon has pointed out that it will be necessary to continue underground tests of nuclear warheads for the Spartan and Sprint missiles at least until 1973. (0) " C a t - o f f —B* the light of the United States decision on ABMs there seems little possibility of progress toward an agreement on the so-called "cutoff" in the produotion of fissionable material for weapons purposes. fl*) HPT—The decision to deploy ABMs places the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in Jeopardy because many non-nuclear countries will interpret the Safeguard deployment of ABMs as proof that the United States and the USSR are incapable of the restraint they are attempting to impose on others through the NPT and as a contradiction to Article 71 of the Treaty which oails upon the nuclear powers to demonstrate their good faith through measures to end the arms race. 000040 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 2 - 3* Canadian participation or co-operation in the command and control of the projected ABM system would involve additional implications for our vital interests.(four collaboration in this venture could be construed as an extension of the system and hence as an escalatory stepAAfibe eventual "extent and significance of our participation would be difficult to decipher immediately and this element of uncertainty would have a further destabilizing effect on the deteiTent/j/'Canadian participation in Safeguard would infer approval of the decision to deploy It and Canada's position as a_credlble leader in the field of arms control and disarmament negotiations would be undermined* Support of a project which is avowedly aimed against the People's Republic of China would not enhance the credibility of our efforts to bring the PRO iff-o the world community and to establish diplomatic relations with that country* Canada would also inevitably become involved in "thickening" of the "thin" Safeguard system and possibly in the guidance systems of a new generation of offensive missiles, with financial commitments which preclude increasing foreign aid rather than defends expenait*afe_f*— k» The potential "thickening" of the ABM system is one of its most escalatory and destabilizing features. Not only the % a d momentum intrinsic to the development of all new nuclear weaponry" (Robert S. McNamara's "The Essence of Security") is involved but also the demand which would probably originate in Ganada for some_protection of populations as well as nuclear hardware. Moreover, a "tl-in" ABM system is not ^-credible means of protecting a second strike capacity) it is incredible that the Ifoited States second strike capacity is as vulnerable as this would imply or that it can be made invulnerable by deployment of a "thin" ABM system; and any additional protection purchased by a "thin" ABM system would almost certainly be overtaken by deployment of additional offensive missiles or warheads to supersaturate the additional protection. Equally lacking in credibility are the other arguments advanced in justification of "Safeguard" as protection against Chinese missiles of an undetermined design or numbers and as a precaution against accidental launchlngs of missiles which are known to be equipped with self-contained "destruct" mechanisms to guard against this very possibility* Indeed it is very difficult from an arms control point of view to evaluate the Safeguard system—which would only protect % of the United States second strikeas anything other than the thin edge of a much more escalatory and expensive wedge. 5* The two super-powers appear to be on the verge of a "point of no ^ i«tui___L-t-----__salati<»l if bo**, of them deploy multiple warheads (MIRVs) "in order to~offget ABMs it will no longer be possible to ascertain with how many warheads each missile is armed or to verify any arms control agreement which might be contemplated; if this happened, the equilibrium of deterrence (or, more vitally, its credibility) would have been destroyed. 000041 � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDBM00209 Title A name given to the resource Disarmament to Office of Politico-Military Affairs Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 3/26/1969 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-c, file 27-11-7, "DEFENCE - CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS - ANTI - BALLISTIC MISSILES (ABM) = DEFENSE - ARMEMENTS DE TYPE CLASSIQUE ET NUCLEAIRE - ENGINS ANTIMISSILES (ABM)," vol. 10357, part 5, Library and Archives Canada, (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Anti-ballistic missiles Description An account of the resource Arms Control Implications of the 'Safeguard' ABM System Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en