https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/dafc25a425ed3e1802065dd2f2e5e7dc.pdf 35c987ab99113973f5b23f79edc941f2 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Dis-tr-mftBeBmeBiVlflAgBf/tot NertlQEfeta-,/ sur I'acces a I'information EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AFFAIRES EXT_RIEURES p F I C E OF POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS NADS-NATO DIVISION DATE FROM * S f DiaLR_-_M-HT DIVISION SECRET MARCH 2 0 , 1969* NUMBER Num.ro REFERENCE Reference SUBJECT ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM 5u;er J2 7-//-7 / s ENCLOSURES Annexes DISTRIBUTION Tou invited our comments on the draft brief on this subject for the Prime Minister1s forthcoming visit to Washington. Our main criticism is that it does not treat the implications for arms control and disarmamentj nor does it answer the Prime Minister's question concerning the possibility of escalatory reaction to the United States decision to deploy the Safeguard ABM system* In order to cover these points we have drafted the following paragraph which could be added as paragraph six of the brief. "Another important factor in deciding whether to accept the implications for Canada of the Safeguard system is its impact or potential effect on arms control. From this point of view, the reasons for deploying an ABM system are not entirely convincing: any increased protection it provides for the United States nuclear deterrent forces may be offset by Soviet counteraction in additional defensive or offensive deployments* Soviet reaction will determine whether an escalation in the arms race is precipitated and whether the ABM systems on both sides are "thickened" but fortunately, this is unlikely to occur if strategic arms limitation talks between the United States and the Soviet Union are opened without delay. In announcing this decision to deploy the ABM system, President Nixon declared the United States' willingness to discuss limitations and reductions of defensive as well as offensive missiles." 2. In addition we have redrafted the talking points concerning arms control in the form of the annexed three questions which the Prime Minister or the Minister may wish to ask* 3« Finally, paragraphs 2 and 3 of your draft appear to make certain statements as components of a Canadian position, whereas the intention seems to have been to attribute them to President Nixon. This could be corrected as follows: Paragraph 2—the second sentence would read: "The President announced on March Uj that after careful review of the defence and disarmament implications of deploying an ABM system, a modification of the original programme...etc." In the last sentence after the word "Safeguard" insert "he said". Ext. 4070/Bil. (Admin. Services Div.) 000022 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'informatio - 2 - Paragraph 3—The f i r s t sentence would be preceded by the words "President Nixon said that"* Paragraph l;—Delete the l a s t sentence which has been included In our new paragraph 6« IpT-titNA- s. '" . !'.' VH.N . Disarmament Division 000023 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act DlS-UrnC-^-Mf JJiW-BdJanfetig <&0*Bilmti/ll/L_oi sur I'acces a I'informatio Harcb 20, 1969. Talking Points 3m The Presidents recent decision to proceed with a Modified ABM progras_M centred on providing protection for the United States nuclear deterrent has important potential implications for the £aat-&ast squlllbritso, for arsis control and for Canada. Row does the President envisage that it -fill be passible to prevent an escalatory spiral of offensive-defensive proportions if the Soviet Union reacts by deploying additional offensive weapons? Will the result not be to de-stabilise the present equilibrists of nuclear deterrence? U* What purpose would be served by Canadian participation in the command of an ABM system through HORAD? Would this be regarded by the Soviet Union as an extension of the Safeguard prograESM announced by the President and if so, as an escalatory or destabilising stop? 5. Could Canada contribute more helpfully to Horth American defensive arrangements through collaboration in other fields or in the development of araa control or disarn-aaent detection techniques whioh nay devolve fros any agreements on strategic arms limitations and rot-factions? � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDBM00203 Title A name given to the resource Disarmament to Office of Politico-Military Affairs and NATO Division Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 3/20/1969 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-c, file 27-11-7, "DEFENCE - CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS - ANTI - BALLISTIC MISSILES (ABM) = DEFENSE - ARMEMENTS DE TYPE CLASSIQUE ET NUCLEAIRE - ENGINS ANTIMISSILES (ABM)," vol. 10357, part 5, Library and Archives Canada, (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Anti-ballistic missiles Description An account of the resource ABM System Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en