https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/97cf44e7950ca9a428e065183733ac99.pdf b0c94ff5f90b5954853ff68619aba5e6 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ^»xlBm&^eJ^^^^f^rt^^Ai'liAi sur I'acces a I'information Ii EXTERNAL AFFAIRS „° OFFICE OF POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES SECURITY DATE £ OM DISA-tt-lAMENT DIVISION REFERENCE Reference CONFIDENTIAL SiairiH MASCH 1 8 , 1 ? 6 9 . NUMBER Numero sSi ECT ABM SYSTEM IN TIE UNITED STATES ENCLOSURES Annexes DISTRIBUTION Hr. Robinson European UK USA DOSSIER FrLe OTTAWA 21-U^ MISSION «-. ^^A~- As you know I agreed with you that in preparing briefs for iie forthcoming visit to Washington of the Prime Minister and the Minister, ;;he connotations for arms control devolving frcm President Hixon's announcement of the decision to continue deployment of the Sentinel or Safeguard antiballistic missile system need not be treated because (hopefully) this decision irould not affect the prospects for SALT as outlined in our brief on this subject. nevertheless some of the implications for Canadian interests Mere explored In he House of Caamons yesterday and the Prime Minister is reported as having ( ommitted himself to enquire when he goes to Washington about the effect of the iJSK programme. You may therefore wish to have our views for incorporation in any brief you are preparing on the problem* 4. The editorial In this morning*s GLOBE AND MAIL penetrates the crux <f the discussion in the House when it states that the Prime Minister*s comment < oncerning the relative unjjnportance of protecting Canadian cities In the event <f a nuclear holocaust is pertinent only if the ABM system in the United States till lessen the chances of a nuclear exchange. In this context, we have repeatedly I ointed out that from an arms control point of view, ABM systems increase rather ihan decrease the possibility of a nuclear exchange because: (1) A "thin" ABM system is not a credible means of protecting a second strike capacity* (Moreover, it is incredible to believe that the United States second strike capacity is as vulnerable as this would imply or that it can be made invulnerable by deployment of a "thin* ABM system)* (2) Ary additional protection purchased by a n thin R ABM system can—and almost certainly will—be overtaken by deployment of additional offensive missiles or warheads to supersaturate the additional protection; this would be the beginning of a new spiral of escalating armaments. (3) The introduction of such successive elements of defensive and offensive nuclear uncertainty would tend to de-stabilize the present equilibrium of nuclear deterrence. (It) These considerations and the demand for protection of populations rather than nuclear hardware would almost inevitably lead to a "thickening" of the ABM system, the more forward deployment of radar installations and sites, etc. in Canada* (These prospects were manifest both in President Nixon's statement and in the preoccupation of members of the House of Commons.) 000015 Ext. 4 0 7 D / B i l . (Admin. Services Div.) �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information uThe above points should be projected in any outline of Canadian interests affected by the deployment of ABMs in the United States. 3* preceding President icipating indicated Fortunately, none of the developments oontemplated in the paragraph may occur because there is substantial evidence that Nixon's announcement will not deter the Soviet Union j_rem partin strategic arms limitation talks. Further confirmation is today in PARMISNY telegram 689 and Moscow telegram 681 of March 17» hMay I add gratuitously, that I see no need for us to be apologetic about our attitude on the ABM question* It seems to me eminently defensiblet The United States did not consult us about questions that did not' involve immediately—and (hopefully) may never involve—Canada or Canadian air space* However, we were kept informed and we were invited to participate in command through CINC NORAD of North American "aerospace" defence. We did not accept the latter invitation because we believe that the implications for continuing defensive arrangements in this field should be assessed in the light of progress on SALT, which has not yet been convened* Meanwhile, we have seized every opportunity to urge the opening of SALT at the earliest possible date* -^'Sir-JAL. 'SKSN**-.** V. VI. N, BC Disarmament Division 000016 � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDBM00200 Title A name given to the resource Disarmament to Office of Politico-Military Affairs Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 3/18/1969 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-c, file 27-11-7, "DEFENCE - CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS - ANTI - BALLISTIC MISSILES (ABM) = DEFENSE - ARMEMENTS DE TYPE CLASSIQUE ET NUCLEAIRE - ENGINS ANTIMISSILES (ABM)," vol. 10357, part 5, Library and Archives Canada, (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Anti-ballistic missiles Description An account of the resource ABM System in the US Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en