https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/f1637f2ef4d619895b9c0e918bfd56aa.pdf 4b9864d7fadf4cf0180ae93a956caaf7 PDF Text Text ~/ / ~ 1st Session 22nd Parliament 1.hn.ume 96 Number 81 House of Commons Debates Official Report Tuesday, March 30 1 1954 Mr. H.W. (Kootenay Page 5:480 Herridge West) (CCF-) ' I listened most carefully to the minister's explanation of Mr. Dulles' exptanation, and' while I fully ,appreciate, and I know the house appreciates, the stand the minister took in the speech he made in Washington, I must admit that when he finished I was just about as foggy as when he started. I am of the opinion that .when Mr. Dulles made the first speech he intended to say what he did say and · later tried to explain it away. My conviction. is somewhat strengthened by reading a speech Mr. Dulles made at the American Legion convention last September which l think dearly indicates the frame of mind with which Mr. Dulles approaches these questions. He addressed the American Legion convention in St. Louis on September 3 last year, and with respect to relations with the world at large he went on to say: I I There is much talk these days about the increased responsibility that now devolves upon the United States. That responsibili_ty ·is a reality ... we do not now have to be constantly taking international public opinion polls to find out what others want and then doing what it seems will make ·us popular. Leadership won that way is shabby and fleeting. Our present duty is rather to adhere with increased loyalty to what, in our past, has been tested and found worthy. Mind you, the past has been one of lackof consultation in these matters with the rest of the world. For more than a century our conduct and example won for us world-wide respect and prestige. That is the only kind of leadership worth having. I think these remarks indicate Mr. Dulles' rather independent attitude toward this question of consultation with allies before making statements and important decisions. As far as this group is concerned, we are of the opinion that when Mr. Dulles made that statement he intended to frighten the Soviet Union, but all he has done is to frighten most of his allies. We do urge that strong repre-, sentations be made to indicate the repercus- ' sions in this country following a speech such as -Mr. Dulles made with respect to massive ' retaliatory action and so on in case of certain/ circumstances. [Mr. Herridge.] ------:.::.-:.-:.:.:.:_:_-:_:_:_:_::_ 000009 �) 1st Session 22nd Parliament ··--olume 96 ,.., Number 81 House of Commons Debates Official Report Tuesday, March 30 1 1954 Pages 3476-77-78 --·- -- The Secretary, of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) in his speech said that in the Atlantic we want collective action, and we want consultation. Apparently all these things are necessary in the Atlantic. But in the Pacifi.c what system is there for united action? Such a system was not even mentioned by either the Prime Minister or the Secretary of State for External Affairs. There is no clear-cut policy. This su_bcommittee 7 - ... of the House of Representatives dealt with that too in their recommendations published yesterday when they stated: The· United States and free world lack a "clear and firm policy" on Asia and should draft one quickly. Asia today is the key continent. I have as an authority for that the Secretary of State for External Affairs. In 1950 upon his return from a trip to the Far East a report was issued the heading _of which is, "Asia, not Europe, Key Continent Now: Pearson." The article continues: Freshly returned from the trip today, Mr. Pearson said there had been a shift in the centre of gravity in international affairs from Europe to the Far East. He went on: Soviet imperialism, for the time being, seemed to be contained in Europe by two factors; the military alliance created by the Atlantic pact and the ,economic progress which had been attained. In the Far East, however, the Soviet brand of communism appeared to be making great progress, he noted. There was a danger it might overrun the whole of Asia. Its most dramatic success had been in China. That was on February 10, 1950. Yesterday the same hon. gentleman was quoted as saying here in Ottawa in a speech on Sunday, March 28: Mr. Pearson said that in his view there was nothing more important in the world today than the -1100million people in Asia. The Pacific area is obviously far more dangerous than the Atlantic and has been for some years. There has been a real war going on in the Pacific for some years now. Red China and the Soviet are together in Asia. It is not a case of just the Soviet Union. You have these two great nations together. Just think of the reserves of manpower available with which to make trouble in Asia. Red China is communist. We hear a lot of talk about this being an agrarian movement in China. I have here the latest publication of the "Behind the Headlines" ,, series of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. In an article entitled "China under Communist Control" the author, Dr. A. Stewart Allen, who was a medical missionary with the United Church of Canada in China from 1929 until he was deported in 1951, and who should know what he is writ• ing about, states: A large number of people still do not realize that the present changes there are not mainly the result of an agrarian reform movement, but of Russian communism which is the basis of the present government. He goes on to describe how the Chinese have tried to indoctrinate prisoners and people there who are in their control. He states: In indoctrination classes it was very plainly stated that the Chinese ·plan to assist in ushering in world communism. They state they have no need to worry about their northern borders which are friendly. But on all other borders, and especially to the south, they must assist in "liberating" their "friends" from their "colonial and oppressed status". Indio-China, Thailand, Malaya, Indonesia, Burma, India are all in the next line of threat from China. In Toronto a few weeks ago,· the date was January 25, Lieut. General A. C. Wedemeyer of the United States dealt with the same question and he said in part: However, many of our leaders were influenced after world war II by communist propaganda to the effect that the Chinese reds were peaceful agrarians-democratic and friendly to the objectives of the west. We have been paying for that false judgment ever since. He was addressing the Toronto Board of Trade. He pointed out that he had known Mao-Tze-tung and Chou En-lai for some years before they came into power. He stated: They owe everything to the Kremlin, from which they received their training and support. They are still receiving· liberal assistance from the Soviet union. So long as the communist oligarchy is secure in its rule of the Soviet empire, in my judgment, the Chinese reds would not dare desert it. Canada, our own country, is directly affected. Canada is a nation on the P<acific. Sometimes people think Canada only faces on the Atlantic, but Canada also faces on the Pacific and the Arctic and we would be wise to remember that in this house. If J,apan or Formosa or the Philippines go red then the first line of defence for this nation will be on the west coast. Make no mistake about ,that. If North America is ever invaded it will be from Asia, not from Europe, ,and it will be by the red Chinese. Let us not forget that fact either. Earlier today we had questions about the results of the "H" bomb tests at Bikini. On our west coast a few days ago they were using geiger counters to see whether a shipload of tuna fish caught by Japanese fishermen was radioactive. Our west coast is vitally concerned as regards the Pacific ocean and it should be remembered, Mr. Speaker, that the Pacific is not yet an American lake. These things -affect Canada on the Pacific but very little has been done in that ,area .to build a cohesive defence. The United States has a series of agreements. She has a defensive agreement with Australia and New Zealand known as the ANZUS treaty; she has another with the Philippines; and •• 2: 000010 �.. 1" - • 1st Session 22nd Parliament Volume 96 Number 81 House of commons Debates Official Report Tuesday, March 30, 1954 another with South Korea and she has a treaty of a little different sort with Japan. But Canada has been standing aloof in the Pacific. Canad.a has been following a· no commitment policy in so fiar as entering into any defence treaty has been concerned. Mr. Pearson: We have had 30,000 men in Korea. Mr. Green: I am aware of that, but Canada has not seen fit to take any part in any of these treaties in the Pacific. An hon. Member: Except in Korea. Mr. Green: Canada should take .a stand. Canada should have a policy for united ,action in the Pacific, a policy ,such that she will be consulted. We should be consulted about what is to be done in the Pacific, and we should have a policy of such a nature that the freedom-loving nations could work together in that area. The present government has never agreed. The Secretary of State for External Affairs has rather pooh-poohed my suggestion along these lines now for several years. I suggest the time has come for Canad~ to take some action. My suggestions have been that there should be worked out in ,the Pacific a defence pact similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and that in the meantime the ANZUS treaty could be extended ,to include some nations such as Canada and the United Kingdom. T,he Secretary of State for External Affairs replied with: "Oh, well, Canada has not been invited so how could we get in?" I am afraid Canada has never taken any· steps to ask for an invitation. There has never been any suggestion from the minister · or the Prime Minister. that Canada was a.nxious to get in or tha.t she would ever lift one little finger to bring about that result. Senator William F. Knowland, the majority leader in the United States Senate, upon his return from a trip to the Far East last November made certain suggestions. I have here a press dispatch dated November 17from Washington, in which he had some very interesting proposals to make. It reads in part as follows: He expressed the hope that the new Philippine president Ramon Magsaysay would call a conference of free "non-neutralist" Pacific nations as soon as possible to consider widening the old Australia, New Zealand, United States pact, which he said was too narrow a base, savouring too much of the outworn colonialism, to build a general Pacific security system on. Then the report continues: Senator Knowland envisaged the conference as including, besides the English-speaking nations of the Pacific, the Philippines, South Korea, Japan, Formosa, Thailand, the Indo-Chinese succession [Mr. Green.] ---- ------ -- -- ·- - -- states of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, and went as far west as Pakistan, where the United States is considering establishing American bomber bases. He was asked about Canada, and whether he thought Canada should be a party. The report states as follows: Asked whether he thought Canada should be included in the proposed conference, Senator Knowland said: "If a conference of free nations were held certainly I would think Canada would be included." Canada, although a major Pacific power, is not a party to ANZUS or any other Pacific regional pacts created by the United States. Senator Knowland said he thought it was imperative to get the conference under wa·y soon, "Time is of the essence", he said. I asked' the Secretary of State for External Affairs about that matter in the house in November. As reported at page 151 of Hansard he replied as follows: ·Mr. Speaker, I am not aware of any such negotiations taking place at the present time or of their imminent likelihood, . I am aware that certain proposals have been made in Washington by members of the congress looking toward the extension of that pact. However, there have been no governmental negotiations as yet to this end, Other suggestions have been made. Why would it not be reasonable and perhaps vital to encourage natural alliances of the Asiatic nations, to extend the ANZUS treaty, and to make a real attempt to build in the Padfic a defensive alliance? I should like to hear from the Secretary of State for External Affairs, when he answers, why it is not ,possible for something like that to be done. My suggestion may not be the best one, but we just cannot -continue to have a vacuum in the Pacific. Something must be done to meet the situation in· that area. To me it is strange that the Prime Minister of this country, in thinking of the future in the Pacific, seemed to think that recognizing red China would end all the trouble. I regret that, while he was in the Far East, he did not direct his efforts to promoting a. policy for united a•ction by the freedom-loving nations in the Pacifrc area. I hope that the Secretary of State for External Affairs, when he replies, will be able to tell us that Canada is now adopting a policy which\ will bring about that end. We have waited all too long for leadership from the Canadian government with regard to Canada's interest in the Pacific. On this question we have had altogether too much soothing syrup from the Secretary of State for External Affairs. I hope he will now tell us that, for our own protection and in the interests of our fellow-nations associated with us in trying to save freedom for the world, Canada must adopt in the Pacific area a policy which is more realistic than any she has ever had. ------------ 000011 �Volume 96 1st Session Number 80 Mr. E. D. Fulton, 22nd Parliament House of Commons Debates Official Report Monday, March 29, 1954 Kamloops ( P.C.) - I should -, like now to discuss ·this matter of consultation in its international aspects. I think that in addition to a clear explanation from the minister as to what the policies of the Canadian delegation will be at Geneva, we are also entitled. to a clear explanation from the minister and the government as to how, in their view, the international consultation that he referred to as being so necessary, and to which he referred at such length, is going to be achieved. I am not going to follow him in all the tortuosities of his interpretation and his misgivings, and his subsequent reassurance as to the meaning of a speech made on January 12 by the secretary of state of the United States. I must say that to me, at any rate, it seemed that his belief that he had received an undertaking that there would be consultations is like a certain form of hypnosis, that is to say it was self-induced. I can see nothing in the various statements of the minister, and the subsequent statement by Secretary Dulles, which would entitle the government, this House of Commons or the nation to believe that it had an iron-clad assurance any more after the minister had spoken in Washington on this matter of consultation than before he 'had spoken. The minister himself has totd us that he took exception to three words in the speech of Mr. Dulles, when Mr. Dulles was outlining what is sometimes called the new concept of defence policy. Those words were "instantly", "means" and "our choosing". Using those words in the full context of the sentence, we find it reads in this way: The basic decision was to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing. will as a general rule consult you before acting in any international situation, and we will consult you wherever possible. What other answer could be given? But I think we are entitled to ask: What sort -of assurance is this? Here is one of the sen-· tences used by the Secretary of State for the United States as quoted by our own minister at page 3330 of Hansard: In no place did I say we would retaliate instantly, although we might indeed retaliate instantly, under conditions that called for that. Well, that is just the point; what sort of assurance is that? What is the difference after that statement was made from what it was before it was made? In fact, it seems to me that it is pretty fatuous to say that we now have an assurance that there are ways of consultation, and that we have any right to be more reassured now than we were before. I think the fatuity that would there apply is made clear by the minister's own summary. as it is set out at page 3331 of Hansard, where he said: Mr. Speaker, I think the effect of this exchange of views, this conference, these statements and these clarifications has been that we ·now have a fairly clear and reassuring idea of what this new strategy and this new planning for defence is. One thing this interpretation does make clear is that diplomacy and consultation, which is part of diplomacy, is under this doctrine not Jess important but more important than ever before. Well, the whole atomic age and the speed with which things ·move, as well as the terrible and devastating results of atomic attack obviously make consultation more important than ever before. Then the minister goes on to say: Any decisions must surely be collective, whenever that can be done, before action has to be taken. Well, of course they should be collective. The Secretary of State for External Affairs told us that in his view, after he had made But the great question is-and it is the great question; and until it is his statement in Washington, all three of and unanswered answered I cannot see how we can accept those words had .been satisfactorily explained; so · that he now felt, he said, very much the minister's feeling of reassurance-when reassured that American policy did not mean · can that be done and what means are being worked out to ensure that it will be done? that there would be instant action or reaction Until we have that answer it seems to me on their part without consultation with their that a statement of that sort-"Any decisions allies. · must surely be collective, whenever that can But, Mr. Speaker, if the minister was be done, before action has to be taken"worried before he went to Washington, I can leaves us perhaps even in a more uncertain see no reason for his satisfaction now. The frame of mind than we were in before. problem -of course is, and always has been, The next question is: What decisions are one of ,consultation. Well, what did Mr. meant? Is it decisions as to general objec- ' Dulles say about this matter of consultation which would justify the minister in that feel- tives, or decisions as to methods of retaliation, ing of reassurance which he says he has? The or decisions as to circumstances under which minister did not summarize the effect of Mr. any sort of policy or retaliation will be folDulles' subsequent reassuring words. As I re- lowed; what sort of decisions are meant? call them, it seems to me that the effect of Then the other great question is: When what Mr. Dulles had subsequently said was can and when will that be done? What meassomething very much like this: Certainly, we ure of agreement between nations is there [Mr. Fulton.] 000012 �- 2 f. as to when it can and will be done? And so information, if you like, between the Canawe are left with the essential problem on dian government and the Canadian parliawhich I maintain we are entitled to be ment. That it seems to me has become a very informed by the government: What does this immediate problem in the light of the developgovernment intend to do to assure that there ments which have taken place in our foreign will be brought into existence, if it does not policy, and particularly in the light of the exist now, adequate machinery so that there fact that Canada has now undertaken comwill be prior consultation, and that there will mitments under a treaty of alliance, which is be agreed courses of action before those a relatively new departure in this country,. It courses of action have to be implemented, in is interesting to note that the minister made other words before the event of any Russian an implied condemnation of Mr. Dulles for attack. Because, as I see it, there is not what he said by almost a suggestion-that is, anything now in existence to· ensure that before it was satisfactorily explained-of a there will be always that prior consultation return to a continental secur,ity ·complex. and those agreed courses of action which can Here I read what the minister said at page be set in motion immediately. 3329 of Hansard of his statement on Thursday. It seems to me that no country, least of After analysing what Mr. Dulles might have all the United States, can contemplate the sort meant in his January 12 speech, he said: of delay that working out an agreed course And yet, if we relied too much on that· arid depreciated the importance of local defence. that would of action might entail, after an attack against be interpreted in many countries as meaning that the west had been commenced. Therefore some countries were expendable. And I doubt in the absence• of evidence that there exists if we· could maintain a coalition. even NATO, that consultative machinery now, which will very. Jong, on that basis. Inevitably there would enable us to arrive at an agreed course of be a retreat to isolation. action before attack, I cannot see any reason Therefore, Mr. Speaker, this was by inferfor reassurance, or any reason why the min- ence, as I read it at any rate, suggested by ister should be more satisfied after he was the minister as being a possible interpretation in Washington than before he went to of Mr. Dulles' speech. The minister went on: Washington. There would be a move towards what sometimes security, ·both in North I should like the minister to tell us what is is· called continental this is sometimes forgotten-in the Canadian policy, because certainly no America and-and Europe itself. country has a greater stake in this matter But security of this variety, continental security, than Canada. What is .the Canadian policy? is a delusion, because, and I think the house will What courses are we going to urge upon our agree with me, there can be no continental security without collective security. And there can be no allies in the North Atlantic treaty organizacollective security without collective arrangements tion to make sur,e that that organization for collective action. becomes and is used as a •consultative Well, as I say, it is interesting to trace machinery to enable us to work out those great courses of action in so far as that is developments in this country, and it is interhumanly possible in advance of a Russian esting to contrast that with what was Canada's policy just four short years ago when, attack? I say, "in so far as that is humanly in the dearest possible language, the Prime possible" because it seems to me that where Minister himself outlined the policy of conit is not possible-and we cannot anticipate every potential attack that may be made and tinental security, that particular policy which where it may be made and when it may be the minister has said it would be so wrong made by the Russians or by any other aggres- for the United States or anyone else to ·put sor-there has to be good faith and not all forward today. I am reading now from page 680 of Hansard for the second session of 1950. this trouble and to some extent these unrealistic misgivings that our allies intend almost You will recall, Mr. Speaker, that this session to react or to act without consulting with us. .was called not. very long after the outbreak of war in Korea, and the Prime Minister was But in those acts which cannot be foreseen and where even general principles cannot be discussing Canada's position with respect to sending forces to Europe under the North worked out in advance, then we do have to Atlantic treaty organization. He said that r,ely upon good sense and mutual underwhat we .were going to do was to make .$300 standing. million available. We were not going to make I should like to return to another aspect of any commitments to send troops to Europe this whole matter of consulting which seems 'under the North Atlantic treaty organization to have worr.ied the minister so much, but on because he said: which he has also left us, or in certain very I say that because it seems perfectly obvious to important aspects of which he has left this me that if we are to get the · greatest possible strength in Europe for the money and house, this parliament, in the dark. I refer effective resources we devote to national and international there again to the matter of consultation or security, $300 million spent on the equipping and 000013 �r .,,. 3 .J ,' ' The parties agree that an armed attack against arming of men already in Europe, men who are one or more of them in Europe or North America there, who have to be fed, clothed and lodged even shall be considered an attack against them all; if they are not armed, is going to provide much and consequently they agree that, if such an armed larger forces than the expenditure of the same amount of money in raising, equipping, arming, • attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized training, feeding, clothing and sheltering young by article ·51 of the charter of the United Nations, Canadians who would, under the present condition will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking of full employment, have to be drawn from the forthwith, individually and in concert with the other productive stream of this nation. parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and mainAnd the Prime Minister at another point tain the security of the North Atlantic area. on that same page said to an hon. member who had asked him, a question: I will· say to him at once that the government of Canada at this time is not considering the raising of Canadian forces to dispatch to Europe as a deterrent to aggression in Europe. So that we can say that just four short years ago no country was following more clearly and laying down more clearly a policy of continental security; that the job 'Of European defence is a job for the Europeans. · Surely, we shall help them with money and s'o on, but we are not going to help them with armed forces because· their defence is primarily ,their own problem. And four short years later, not even four full years later, our Secretary of State for External Affairs condemns what he says is the implica tiori in .Secretary Dulles' .speech of the return to continental defence policy. It is · interesting to see how far ~e have come in those four years along lines which I think we now all agree are correct; and the development which is important there is that we now have forces in Europe. We have a brigade groµp, we have an air division. The question now before us and the question with which most hon. members will agree with me is one that we are entitled to demand · that this government shoul'd answer is: What happens under these conditions to the concept which has always been the accepted principle in Canada that there shall be consultation, not only between governments but between government and parliament before Canadians are permitted to act? One recalls the history of discussi:ons of this type. One realizes immediately -that it has always been the accepted principle that the government will consult parliament, not only. before there shall be declaration of war particularly but even before committing Canadian troops to military action. We can remind ourselves of what the Secretary of State for External Affairs said in March 1949, when he was discussing the N'Orth · Atlantic treaty which had then just come into effect. At page 209'8 of Hansard of 1949 the Secretary of State for External Affairs is reported to have said: I need hardly add that if, in spite of our efforts to keep the peace, some member of this alliance is attacked and we are called upon to fulfil our commitments, this country, 'this parliament and this government will act with the necessary determination and dispatch. So far as this government is concerned, Mr. Speaker, in the face of a national emergency so grave as to ca!l into force our commit~ents under this pact, it would immediately desire to consult parliament. This has now become a regular procedure in our history, and no one of course would wish to depart from it. No government could fulfil the responsibility which action unde: this treaty would impose without being certam of the support of the people of this country expressed through their representatives in parliament. There we have the principle enunciated by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in the first discussi'On of the North Atlantic treaty that before committing our forces to action we would consult parliament. If that were not definite enough the minister repeated himself on September 6, 1950, at the special session, where his remarks are ,reported at page 351 of Hansard. May I just remind the house that article 5 of the North Atlantic treaty states: It was in the light of that commitment and speaking on this subject at a later date that the minister said as reported at page 351 of Hansard for September 6, 1950: If there is an · attack made on a member of the North Atlantic group, that is an attack on all the members of the group. He was then asked by the hon. member for ~ancouver-Quadra (Mr. Green): Including Canada? And the minister Including answered: Canada. After some further change the substar,ce minister said: words which do not of the quotation the Parliament would then decide whether an attack had or had not been made on Canada. If parliament decided that such an attack had been made and we were at war, it is the custom of Canadians when they are attacked to fight back with materials and with men. Then a little later he said: I thought I had made that clear. An attack on western Germany which involved Canada by the decision of its parliament and its obligations under the North Atlantic pact would be met by materials and men. What then is the position in the light of the fact that we have a brigade in Europe? Supposing the Russians attack in ·Germany or in Austria. What is the position? What is the relation between the government and parliament if that development should occur while Canadian troops are in Europe? Are they to wait there until the government consults parliament? The minister has laid great stress on this matter of consultation in the international sphere, but he has left us in the dark on the question of national consultation. The minis- / ter said on Thursday last as reported at page 3330 of Hansard: I There is a second word to which I devoted some attention in my Washington speech, and that was · the wcrd "instantly". That word, in connection with the strategy we are discussing, involves no probl,em, as 1 see it, if there is a direct attack on your own territory, or indeed pornibly on the territory of your neighbour, because then it becomes a question of self-preservation and quick, effective, and instant action is essential and would be taken by any country attacked. No one, I believe, would take exception to that. · What happens then in the light of those statements and in the light of the present position in Europe with Canadian forces there in an atomic age with· the possibility· of atomic attack? What happens to the principles enunciated in 1949 and 1950? I conclude, sir, by repeating my position. This parliament is entitled to demand from the government a statement as to government policy on these issues. We are· entitled to know from the government what they would do with respect to the matter of consulting parliament in this sphere in the event of an · attack in ·Europe. ---· -· ... --- s - -------~! 000014 �• Volume 96 lat session 22114h.rl1ament Humbel"80 !louse of CommonsDebatoa Off1o1al_Rop-ort A.J1 Mr. Fraser.I St. John's East Uond.aJ',,r.taroh 99• 1954 [ 1-..)·__ , I was g7eatly surprised to hear the hon. member for Kamloops (Mr. Fulton) assert in this house tonight that the speech made by our Secretary of State for External Affairs to the national press club in Washington and the statement that followed it by Mr. Dulles in his article in Foreign Affairs has shed no light on the original statement by Mr. Dulles. I certainly cannot agree with that estimate. That statement of January 12 by the United .States secretary of state I have described as momentous. I think it was momentous for several reasons. First, it gave a dear and unequivocal warning to potential aggressors; .second, it seemed at first sight at any rate, to place great emphasis upon the utilization by the western powers of those resources in which they have the greatest advantage such as, for instance, their scientific svpremacy, -their technical know-how, their industrial .skill; all of which may be regarded as offsetting the vast, almost unlimited manpower ,of the Soviet bloc. But nevertheless, Mr. :Speaker, that statement inspired serious mis_givings. What were some of the causes of the uneasiness produced by the Dulles new look statement. First ·of all, of course,-as the .Secretary of State for External Affairs clearly showed in his speech on Thursday in this house-there was ·the question as to whether there would be prior consultation between the United States and its allies before resort was had to this policy of instant and massive retaliation. Fears were expressed in many quarters that the United States might be lapsing into a Q)olicy of continentalism. I have before me here extracts from Mr.Dulles' article in the April issue of Foreign Affairs, an article which followed the speech by our Secretary of States for External Affairs in Washington. I quote from Mr. Dulles' statement as follows: The cornerstone of security for the free nations must be a collective system of defence. They clearly cannot achieve security separately. No single nation can devel_op for itself defensive power of adequate scope and flexibility. In seeking to do so, each would become a garrison state and none would achieve security. And Mr. Dulles went on to say this: This is true of the United States. Without the ,co-operation of allies. we would not even be in a I position to retaliate massively against the war :industries of - an attacking nation. - ·- 1 __, Then he added a reference to the use of bases of the United States in foreign countries: The free world system of bases is an integral part of its collective security. At the recent fourpower conference in Berlin, Mr. Molotov repeatedly attacked these bases as evidence of aggressive purpose. Actually ·these bases on the territory of other sovereign countries are merely a physical expression of the collective security system. Then he went on to say this: They were constructed only at the request of the host nation and their availability depends upon its consent, usually as a legal condition and always as a practical one. The requisite consent to the use of these bases would never be accorded unless it was clear that their use was in response to open aggression, and reasonably related to its scope and nature. This gives assurance of their community function. Mr. Dulles said in his article in Affairs he restated, perhaps even more emphatically, in a press conference which he held in Washington on March 16. I quote from the report of that conference as · it appeared in the New York Times of March 17. This is Mr. Dulles answering a question, and he said: What Foreign -mnt-r--f)I I _7~ges/ It is, I think, well known that the bases which we have in foreign countries are in general not usable as a matter of law, and as a practical matter are not usable except with the consent of the countries where the bases are. For example, the bases which are available to our strategic air force in Great Britain ,are not usable as a ibase of attack except with the consent of the British government. The same is true in general with all our foreign bases. Therefore, it is implicit in our security system that it operates with the consent and acquiescence of the other partners ·who have helped to provide the facilities which create a sort of international police system . Later in that same press conference when asked if there would be consultation Mr. Dulles said: Yes, there would certainly be consultation most of the cases that I can conceive. of. in Now, Mr. Speaker, admittedly Mr. Dulles' statement does not say that there will be consultation in every · conceivable case, but it does say that there be consultation in most cases and · that there could not be use made of United States bases in other countries without the .consent of the host country. That, I think, is important for us to know in Canada, particularly for those of us who live in parts of Canada where the United States has military bases as, for example, in Newfoundland. · Another question which the new look statement of Mr. Dulles on January 12 raised in the minds of many people is this: Would the apparent reliance upon massive retaliatory action necessarily mean a general war? Would it mean that whenever aggression of any kind, even ·of a small kind, took place in any will part of the world retaliation would be atomic? W oµld the effect of this new look policy be exactly the opposite of the effect which the United Nations strove to achieve in Korea in · 1950, namely, to confine and localize the conflict and to prevent the extension of a local conflict into a world conflagration? Here, too, I think the statement of our Secretary of State for External Affairs led Mr. Dulles to give us clarification because in that same article in the April issue of Foreign Affairs Mr. Dulles stated: To deter aggression, it is important to have the flexibility arid the facilities which make various , responses available. In, many cases, any open assault by communist forces could only result in starting a general war. But the free world must have the means for responding effectively on a selective basis where it chooses. It must not put itself in the position where the only response open, to it is a general war. Again, he said: This calls for a system in which local defensive strength is reinforced by more mobile deterrent power. He added: In every endangered area there should be a sufficient military establishment to maintain order against subversion and to resist other forms of indirect aggression and minor satellite aggressions. This serves the indispensable need to demonstrate a purpose to resist •and to compel any aggressor to expose his real intent by such serious fighting as will brand him before all the world and promptly bring collective measures into operation. He concluded: That does not mean turning every local war into a world war. It does not mean that if there is a communist attack somewhere in Asia atom or hydrogen bombs wiH necessarily be dropped on the great industries of China or Russia. There, Mr. Speaker, is another very important point that has been clarified as a result of the questions put by our Secretary of State for External Affairs.· Yet another misgiving has been removed by the same cause. One question which I think suggested itself to many of us after reading Mr. Dulles' January speech was whether the new look policy would involve United States withdrawal from western Europe, whether it would mean a retreat into continentalism. There is no need for me to emphasize how serious that would have been, particularly in its psychological effect upon the continental countries of western Europe, and more particularly France about whom I propose to say a little more in a few moments. But here again we have an assurance from Mr. Dulles as found again in the article in Foreign Affairs. He says: Moreover, the program does not mean that we intend to pull our forces out of Europe. It is, of course, essential that the continental nations themselves provide a harmonious nucleus of integrated defence. If they do so, the United States would expect to maintain substantial forces of its own in Europe, both in support of the forward strategy of defence and for political reasons. 3461"'62 -- ..·--- --~·-..--- 1 �J; • •. countrieii wiilii:iut·"tr,e--consent of the liost country. That, I think, is important for us to know in Canada, particularly for those of us who live in parts of Canada where the United States has milita.ry bases as, for example, in Newfoundland. Another question which the new look statement of Mr. Dulles on January 12 raised in the minds of many people is this: Would the apparent reliance upon massive retaliatory action necessarily mean a general war? Would it mean that whenever aggression of any kind, even of a small kind, took place in any I �vo~• NU1ii( Session ParliWnenb 96 79 Mr. Cameron ~ Nanaimo 1 House of Commons Debates Official Report Friday, March 26 1 1954 ~C~t-=) I suggest, sir, fha.t""th;"'time has come for calculated risks. There are times when caution is the most reckless and dangerous course to follow. I suggest that this is one of those times. Let us for a moment consider the recent developments in United States and British military policy, and see how they fitl into our role in the world scene today. We, are spending some $2 billion, presumably for defence, and yet every report from the United States and Great Britain suggests that the United States is now retreating, if one may use that word, to dependence upon peripheral strategy; to dependence upon the very thing of which Mr. Dulles spoke in the United States and to which our government took exception. They are depending upon the power to drop atom bombs on actual or. potential enemies any time that they consider it -necessary. I suggest, sir, in that case we may well questioill the value of many of our defence expenditures today. This afternoon I heard the Minister of National Revenue (Mr. McCann) state he had been investigating slingshots. I would suggest it might be a good idea for him to investigate some of our conventional weapons to see if they are very much more valuable in an atomic age. I would suggest a careful examination of this expenditure in the light of recent developments, and in the light of the recent horrors in the Pacific, because it might well indicate a large part of these expenditures are useless burdens on our economy. Such an examination may indicate that now is the time for decisive action, a reduction in our defence expenditures and the application of -those funds to aid those parts of the world which may very well fall victims to communism throuJ;!h internal collapse and disorder. . -- - ----. 000017 �Mr. L.T. Stick Trinity - Conception Page 3400 f"~IB~iso-ttiat;-inview of the-, danger which threatens, local defence is not sufficient. In other words that we must have collective security if we are to survive. He said that collective action is needed on instant retaliation. May I comment on that last note which I took. Much has been said before by way of criticism of Mr. Dulles, secretary of state for the United States, when he announced the policy of instant retaliation. As on a great many other occasions in the history of this cold war in which we are engaged, the people in this and in other countries took counsel of their fears and wanted to know from Mr. Dulles what he meant by his statement. They wanted to know' from Mr. Dulles what he meant by it. Anybody who knows the United States and the foreign policy of the United States knows this. It has no aggressive intentions against anybody. When he made that statement he implied, if he did 1 not specify it at the time, that instant retalia- I tion meant only if we were suddenly attacked. '. With that statement of Mr. Dulles I agree. \ All military experts here and abroad tell you that if we go into a third world war we are not going to have a declaration of war; that it will come suddenly and possibly overnight. If we are going to call the United Nations into session to decide whether we will hit back and whether we are going to consult the United States and whether they will / are going to con~lt us, we ~a;,. lose the war overnight. We have to be reasonable about this and use our common sense. If the U.S.S.R. strikes at us suddenly, . through the air, are we going to wait to know, what Washington is going to do, or are we going to tie their hands by waiting and wasting precious' time so that we shall be handicapped to hit back? Because the expert .military. opinion today is that whoever gets in the first blow; and the first heavy blow, has a very good_ chance of winning the war on that.basis. I am with Mr. Dulles. If we are suddenly attacked, arrangements should be made so that the United States' hands are not tied and so that the strategic air force of the United States can hit back at once without any waste of time; otherwise time will play into the hands of Russia and not on our side. 000018 �.e96 .. r let Session 22nd farl1ainent 79 Hous$ ot CommonsDebates Otficie.l Report Friday, Mr. Phillippe ---·-5o·u6':l}-lo Xareh 26 1 . 1954 ~ti C Pages 3385-86 Picard ~ ·-=.;~,( Bellechasse (L) ,-Let us talk now of the line of defence 'in the . Far East should there be any attack made by the communist countries. As I just / said Japan is the first and northernmost point, then Okinawa, then Taiwan, then the Philippines. If the United• States hav.e come to the conclusion, as they apparently have, that any threat to Southeast Asia may come from communist China it is reasonable· that' they should try to establish such a line of defence. It is understandable that they should help and contribute to the armament of Japan so that it may insure its self. defence. It is not surprising either that they I made of Okinawa the strong arsenal it is at the moment. I am not revealing any secret when I describe Okinawa as a stronghold and evidently the formidable base from which could start any retaliation in that sector, action as envisaged by Mr. Dulles. It is known that the Americans have spent hundreds of millions on its defences. The next natural base is Taiwan. To leave an empty unused space between Okinawa and the Philippines would be unthinkable if we carry on from the same premise of the potential attack from the north. How can the U.S. recognize communist China and yet maintain bases on Taiwan that is under the control of the legitimate government of China that was expelled from the mainland. If Taiwan is part of a first line of defence how can you turn your back to the Chiang kai-shek government. When we come to consider the Chinese problem we . realize that it is more complex than most people seem to realize. 000019 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Deterrence Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource New Look / 30 MARCH 1954 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954-03-30 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00028 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Canada. Department of External Affairs. Excerpt from House of Commonds Debate Official Report. 30 March 1954. Record Group 25, vol. 2, file no. 50115-P-40, part 2. Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa. ANZUS John Foster Dulles Lester Pearson Red China Soviet imperalism