https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/22ff32a0fa07bcc1662c094a54e573bf.pdf 521800db325e315295b4fa47a35820fc PDF Text Text \ ,.- - "' I) 0 ORIGIN AL TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATEf.OR ~XTERNALAFFAIRS,CANADA Priority __ System I_RP_O_R'r._!A_NT_. ____ ,. CYPHER•A'G'tO Oepamnental Cin:ufotion I No... I~~ WA-4:98 · · Rc?ferel'l(:e:· Your· telegram·EX-457· . .·• . : MINISTER 11 ·1 UNDER/SEC 0/UNDER/SEC · ,tlarch 24 11 19540 ·· of fiJa-~1-i·24!) 1954\Y\ . , \ \ Dulles. tes~imony-~on United ·Stat'es . \\ Sut,j~ 1 A/UNDER/SEC S ·. . ' . . ' .· defenc~ 0 --· policy. '\ / OUr telegram HA-493 of Narch 24 :conta3~a certain e~9erpts from the Du.lles testimony- 111h1chdeal~~1nly t'ii.1;h POL/Co-om,in SECTION reteP.ences 1n the hearing befo~~ the Senate For~ign Rtt:1at1ons Committee to your speech of lla~h 15. \:;'l!hey include Dulleso statement that the new United st~tea d$f'ence policy had been d1SCUS1?edat.the MATOCouncil meeting last December~ · rr-----n-1 ):>' 2: It 1aas only 111th\some diftieu.lty that we were able to arrange to see the rough transcript. He had it in our hande tor only about twenty mi11ute~i as it was on its wai· to t«r o Dulles for cheeking. It v1as to go from his off ic;e to the printers3 we can not therefore eend you an;v more of the transcript than that contained in WA ....q.93. 3. for what use it •Y be, however, we include below the summary of Nr. Dulles 0 s more significant remarks based on notes taken by an officer of the Embassy who attendea the meeting. ft1s summaey might be read toget..lter with the coverage of the Dulles• testimony by the 111re services and by the Hem York 'rimes of 1.tarch 20 which contains tai.rl7 lengthy quot'a!ions t'i'Om £he testimODYo '?he swmna:eyfollows Mr,., Dul.les11 own words as closel,- as hasty notes taken at · the bearing pe:mutt., R~erences C.C O~ 1)111,l)N J) Ii · ~ .Gk. ~{¼) I( A-fo1 ~ ~. ,, 1 rJ. _ • . j The noyeltf llff~ '' ,, h 4o Dulles echoed the Pres1.dent s s remarts ( at his press . conference on r.Jareh ll) t:1at nthe new look• t1as perhaps not; a happy slogan., Dulles said ansr sowid policy had to undergo a constant process of examination. There ~as no sense in a frozen policy o 'fhe development ot the Ac1ministrat1on I s defence policy ~as an evolutionary process which will continue and whieh will involve some adaptations of past policies and some shifts of emphasis. The Adm1n1stration~s . ~ p,,;.,, AAri. hu- ~---vl-:''7- ~ . V.L, (."2,,,) ,~. IA,/Y.·~ · ., ti· policy ;-_ · ~~~ v, ~'I. ·h / Done.iLaA,;.,...._-. 0me1l.:~ .'•l z tl2 ., Em. 230 (rev. 3/52) !!3 P, 'i70 of .~}?.eane'! .... look~. in this field tJas net based on a new philosopby of defence 1n tbe sense of a s1n~e,.a.1 e revolutionary acto lo policy 1n the defence or foreign fields could be successtul unless it had continuity t111th the past and v.nless it rested on firm biparti.san suppoi-t in Congress" .Possibly selectivity was the key-note of the Adm1nistrat1on•s =defence pol1CYo 0 0 0 ., 4 • • 2 000030 �• - 2 - The military were now free to select their own targets for the defence of the United States to a much greater degree than in the past. Dulles asked the Senators to take it on faith that new decisions had been taken by the National Security Council t1hich t1ere not on the recot'd two years ago {the clear inference was that one or these decisions related to the possible use of atomic ueapons 1n any circumstance affecting the security of the United States). Massi'!!.,,£ett!_l_~a_!!o_r- vs. local defences 5. Dulles thought there had been much mutilated quotation ot his January 12 speech. The t1hole emphasis 1n that speech had been on the necessity or building up the United States capacitl to retaliate. ~assive retaliation might not be the United Stai;es :rea,ction tn 11 every eircumst;ar1ce. f;tassi ve retaliation" t1aa not 11 necessarily "atomic retaliation ,; there had in raat been no mention of atomic retaliation in his ,January 12 speech. It would be utter folly$ however, to try to match Communist manpower with United States manpower under conditions chosen by the enemyo Flexibility must be maintained and 1t could not be maintained by concentra-: ting on one type or def'enceo The problem ot a proper balance ot the defence effort of the United States t1ould remain pe?'plex1ng. Masstve retaliation uas a supplement not a substitute tor local defensive power· which would alttays be important. Consultation Mre Dulles stressed that consultation by the United with its allies was essential to the United States security. The portion of the transcript which we s~nt you records some ot Ur. Dulles remarks on this acore t1hich are typical ot t1hat he said throut1hout the hearing. You also have th,? text of Mr. D-ulles opening statement to the Committee which sets out his views on the importance of' the alliance or. free nations against the potential aggressor. f!lro Dulles adm:1.tted in addition that his 011n consultation on the new defence policy ~1th the interested congressional committees mtght heve to be improved .. 6. States Con!!_.tJ_tuttona! er2,~l.<!1!~ 7. f.tr. Du_llesr views on the President's pot1er to order instant retaliation without consulting Congress ~as the subject ot searching questions by the Senators~ More·ttme was devoted to this matter in the hearing than to any other aspect of the problem -- a good indication of the Jealous guard Congress keeps over ~hat it regards as the pre~ogat1ves of the legislative brancho Dulles maintained in face of stiff questioning that while joint action by the President and Consress in ordering retaliation t.ras desirable, the c;on~t:J..tution did not leave the President impotent to act if consultation with Congress was impossible. It was obvious that'a ~ar could not be prosecuted without Congressional approval. In over a century, honever~ Congress had never declared war but had simply recognized ex post f'!,Ct~ that "a state of war exists". There was a twilight zone in constitutional practice tthich it was neither necessary nor possible to define in advance to meet every conceivable circumstance. Dulles thought that United States ratification ot the NATOtreaty made 1t more likely that 1n the event ot an attack on a BA'l'O ally the President would use the discretionary power·he possessed wider the constitution to order 000031 �- 3 United States retaliation without consultation with Congress if the time required for that consultation would further endanger United States security. It ~as a fact that under the NATOtreaty a.n attack on a NATOally l1as an attack on the United States. Such a tact ~ould obvtously loom large in the Pres1dent 1 s decision as to the necessity ot reacting immediately to aggression. Dulles stateq clearly that in his opinion the President would have exactly the same constitutional po~er to order retaliation against an attack on a MATOally as he had in the case of an attack on the United States. if he believed that the attack on the NATOally ~as the fi~st phase of an action against the United States. Dulles reiterated the Presd.dent•s oun assurances., however., that where-ever possible'Congress would be consulted. 8. Dulles refused to give his views as to t1hether United States military st1•ength was s~t'1cient to implement the defence policy which he was expounding on the grounds that this was a question which could beat be dealt 111th by the Secretary of l).etense and the Chiefs ot Staffo He refused also., rather lamely we believe., to be drawn into a discussion on the effect of McCarthyism on United States relations with its allies on the grounds that it would be an improper encroachment by the representative of the Executive Branch on the affairs of the Legislative Branch of the United States Government. 000032 �., (, v,•. F.v- :0 ' .., .. ,, .., .. B 51 000033 �INCOMING . " MESSAGE 0 ORIGIN AL Security Classification FROM: THE CAMADIAN Ar-IBASSADORTO THE t.mITED STATES. UNCLASSIFIED . . . ( . File No. s-o I Is- p .. 'f O TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA t /0 System Priority IMPORTANT EN CLAIR No. HA-493 Date ~arch 24~19540 Departmental Circulation MINISTER UNDER/SEC D/UNDER/SEC A/UNDER/SEC'S ReferenceJourteletype Subject: Dulles 'POL/CO-ORD IN testimony on United States defence policyo understand that yo\1 ttish to have for possible use on ~arch 25 the transcript of ~r. Dulles• testimony berore the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Aarch 19 CThich is mentioned in our telegram tinder reference. We ~oro able to get access to a copy or the uncorrected transcript for a very brief period today and the passages 1n which special reference ttas made to your remarks of March 15 are included below. We were told that because of the unusual interest tlhich has already been displayed in the hearing, a special eff'ort will be m.a6e,··, speed up the printing of the formal ~oJR'! and it may be avail\'Je SECTION - c.e,05 WA-481 of r-1arch 200 J/fVL DN]!, I 't% ~ 'tJ;~ i ·..: lln Se,(. ~'~. . ~ ~ able (4Q Don2'!om,.coMM's sEcr111·r Oate__ 4..;;·~---1 ,f:Al\14111..:2::....; References in a t1eek. The State Department was most helpful in arranging for us to see the rough transcript, even if only·br1efly. The hope was expressed that in any use you made of it immediately you would not indicate that you ~ere quoting the record, even though you might in fact use the actual words of the transcript. Thia is only a rough transcript and there may be changes in the text before it is printed in the final report. In addition, the Senate Committee Hill not itself have the record tor some days at least .. 2. 3. Text ot excerpts from transcript, Eegins; Senator Ferguson: r:ir. Sec:i:•etary, hot-1many of our Allies have expreased a concern about t1hat you had to say in Neu York on the question or retaliation, I m0an publicly hot1 many have expressed themselves? Secretary · Dulles: I am t1illing to cover it privately toe ... cI uould say none of them have. Reference has been made to the statement that uas made bore by the Canadian Poreign ~inister. He said to m0 that it oas not intended as any criticism at all. He said he had thought he was expressing himself in quite a complimentary way about my speech ~hen he aaid he thought it was a speech of historieal import. And he ~as rather surprised at its interpretation which he said to me ~as a misinterpretation. He bad not intended to express himself in a critical way. · ···········2 000034 ":-ct.230 (re¥. 3/S2> �I -2- Senator Ferguson; Being in agreement with your speech in New York I want to say the. t I 't-ras surprised at the interpretation that has been given to it, but I am wondering whether or not we cannot look at Mr. Pearson's speech in i;his light -- that Cnnada, I think for many years has been very jealous of its position in the Empire and has in a way considered that a decla~ation of war by Great Brttain itself was not to be considered as a declara•tion of war by Canada. That has been the history has it not? Dulles: Yes Sir. Senator Ferguson: Being from Michigan and a.neighbour so close to Canada I know that we feeJ. that that is true and therefore he did express concern that any one else could c1ctually declare war for Cana.els. A11dI think the United States stands in the same position, does it not? That no one else can actually declare war fol" us. Dulles: I think the Dominion of Cane.de. has a very proper concern th.at it should nc·t, if I might put it th.at ,;-ray be taken for granted either •.••• Sor1ator Ferguson: Yes: D~lles, (continuing): By the United Kingdom or the United Etates tha.t it functions in this matte:r as an independent fr,overe1gn state just as "t-1e do. :3enator Ferguson: Yes - (continuing). Now this you have never considered pe:rsonally, that Mr. Pearson's remarks were ones of fear or apprehension that what yoQ were doing could not be a.greed ·to by Canada. Dulles: No, Sir•. Senator Ferguson: And from your experience, Canada has been consulted as other nations, I assume that is true. Dulles: Yes, Sir. Senator Smith: I have on.e more question Mr. Chairman, if' I may,,and that is the question of the extent to which under these agreements we consult with our Allies. 1 As a result of your Janua:ry 12 speech, that is when you first spoke of this capacity to retaliate, there have been fears expressed, and notably, I understand, by the canadian Foreign Minister Mr. Pearson, that the United States would not consult OU!' Allies in the event of an attack. These fears are based on the words in your speech, 11 by means and at places of our choosing". Now I interpreted that when I read it to mean that you were referring to our choosing rather than to the enemies choosing. You would not say our choosing exclusive of our Allies? Am I cor1--ect in my interpretation? Dulles: You ar-e absolutely correct, Senator, Smith. The emphasis upon °our" was in te1 ..ms of the free world or whatever portion of it is operating in counte~-distinction to the Soviet world. I was pointing out that if ve only respond at places and by means of their choosing then we do not exercise a maximum deterrent Rower, and that the. differences between nthe1r 11 and "ou:::." was in terms of tn'3 free world and 1 ts potential enemy. . ...... 3 000035 J �- 3 - ' Actually, or course, of consultation there is a very high degree which takes place between the United States and its pril1cipal Allies in this area. There have been close consultations with Canada. Admiral Radford, the Chairman or the .·Joint Chiefs of Staff. has. had a very tull talk with Canadian officials within the last two or three weeks. I had a long talk at dinner the next night, where the Canadian Foreign Minister had dinner with Im!• and we had .a v~ry full discussion on this matter. or course it was discussed in the military staff of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It was discussed with the Council which is created under the so-called Anzus Treaty, the treaty between the United states, Australia and New Zealand, and consultation 1s inevitably an inherent part of this process of trying to build what I would refer to as community defenceA Senator Smith: Is it a proper question to ask you whether this whole policy or the capacity or retaliation, 1s thoroughly understood by our Allies, that is in any situation, I mean by the Higher Command# so that we are not putting over a new conception of it? Dulles: Well we have spent a great deal of time and effort Senator Smith, in exchanging views on this general subjecto Much of the time last year was spent 1n doing this. I had du:c•ing that year two meetings i.n Paris with the Foreign Ministers and Ministers of Defence of the NATOcountries, also Secretary Wilson was there, and the general conception that we were talking about was thoroughly tactical discussed at that time, including the use of new weapons which we are now beginning to supply OUI' Allies in Europe, subject to getting the necessary legislation authorization to give them somewhat more information about atomic weapons. But there has been a very considerable discussion of this general concept. Senator Knowland: The only thing that bothered me was where the question was as to the amount or consultation with our Allies and I want to have the fullest consultation possible. I would not ~ant the impression to get abroad that in all of these cases I have mentioned, and that type of a case, that we would be limited in talcing action until trans-Atlantic cables or telephone lines or discussions which might take place in London or Paris and other capitals of Europe had finally discussed the thing among themselves, which in effect might give them a veto power in taking action which would be essential to the security and the survival or the Uni•ted States or America and I think that there should be no misconception in the capitals of Europe that we would necessarily refrain rrom instant retaliation if our own survival was at stake. There has been no problem involved in our consultations which would limit or restrict in any way the capacity of the United states by 1ts Olm means to take whatever action it seemed fitting to take. There Dulles: is the question of the use, let us say, of a United states base in a foreign country~ where the use or that base might possibly attract a counter-attack and where • b • • • • e, 4 000036 �..., : .... - 4 - ' it is pretty nruch understood that we will in relation to action from that particular base~ but this act jointly foreign relates only as I say to foreign bases and I believe that in those circumstances we must expect a practical solution to be quite ready even though the theoretical formula in advance may not be easily found. You may say to some extent that the problem is similar to that which exists between the E.."l{ecutive and Congress. There ax•e twilight zones. I·t ls 11ever poss3.ble to have them all absolutely clearly defined in advanoe. Generally the act itself resolves the doubts. I am confident that in dealing t11'l;h our princ:'l..pal Allie1:: and those who have offered us facilities ror bases that the ffaets ~ould themselves resolve whenever- doubt cannot be solved by advance consultation. Ends. __.. \ .,. ,. 000037 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Deterrence Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource New Look / 24 MARCH 1954 / AMBASSADOR TO SOS EXTERNAL AFFAIRS Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954-03-24 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00027 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Washington to External Affairs WA-498, 24 Mar. 1954, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 2. continental defence John Foster Dulles McCarthyism US-Canada relations