https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/f303a339b9784b70504aee36ddb2d058.pdf 6597901f5f299595330d021541e08865 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces j DtV.< FM WSHDC MAR14/69 TO EXTER 933 PRIORITY INFO CANFORCEHED DISARMDELGVA*~CANDELNATO MOSCO LDN PARIS BONN BRU ( V HAGUE ROME # '' BAG BGRAD WSAW PRGUE DE LDN AIRMAIL OSLOHCOPEN ATHNS ANKRA LSBON y J a? <Y REF OURTEL 932 MARS4 ABM DEPLOYMENT 9 TO SUPPLEMENT STATEMENT IN REFTEL,FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF PRESIDENTS ORAL STATEMENT AND REPLIES TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING ABM DEPLOYMENT AT NEWS CONFERENCE HELD AT NOON TODAY,COMMENTS WILL FOLLOW IN J. SEPARATE TEL. 2«PRESIDENT DESCRIBED DECISION HE HAD TAKEN ABOUT ABM DEPLOYMENT AS VITAL FOR SECURITY AND DEFENCE OF USA AND IN INTERESTS OF PEACE THROUGHOUT WORLD,INSTEAD OF DEPLOYING ABMS AROUND 15 MAJOR CITIES, DEPLOYMENT WOULD BE SHIFTED,INITIALLY TO COVER TWO MINUTEMAN COMPLEXES IN MONTANA AND NORTHDAKOTA.NEW DEPLOYMENT WAS DESIGNATED AS QUOTE SAFEGUARD PROGRAM UNQUOTE, 3*PRESIDENT SPOKE OF A PHASED DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE AND SAID SYSTEM WOULD BE REVIEWED ON AN ANNUAL BASIS IN LIGHT OFCA)MAGNITUDE OF THREAT PREVAILING AT THAT TIME.WHETHER FROM USSR OR CHINA CB>EVALUATION OF ANY ARMS CONTROL TALKS WITH USSR THAT MIGHT BE IN PROGRESS*C)TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS, 4,PRESIDENT SAID HE HAD DECIDED AGAINST FOLLOWING OPTIONS,(A)MASSIVE t-"\ 'Tt ik i H->. ? �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information PAGE TWO 9 3 3 CITY DEFENCE,ON GROUNDS THAT IT WAS NOT/NOT FEASIBLE.EVEN ON MOST OPTIMISTIC POSSIBLE PREDICTIONS,MAJOR MISSILE ATTACK ON USA WOULD TAKE AT LEAST 3 0 TO 4 0 MILLION LIVES,MOREOVER DEFENCE OF CITIES BY HEAVY DEPLOYMENT COULD BE PROVOCATIVE IN SENSE OF QUOTE MAKING CREDIBLE A FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY AGAINST USSR UNQUOTE,<B>DELAY OF DEPLOYMENT FOR 6 TO 12 MONTHS OR SOME INDEFINITE PERIOD WHILE CONTINUING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT,SYSTEM AS PLANNED AT PRESENT WOULD BECOME OPERATIONAL IN 1 9 7 3 BY WHICH TIME IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL IN ORDER TO COUNTER THREAT USA BELIEVES WILL EXIST BY THEN.HENCE DELAY OF A YEAR OR SO MIGHT MEAN SYSTEM WOULD BE TOO LATE IN COMING INTO OPERATION,CO INCREASE IN USA OFFENSIVE FORCES SUCH AS POLARIS SUBMARINES,MINUTEMEN,OR MANNED BOMBERS,SUCH A STEP COULD BE PROVOCATIVE AND HAVE EFFECT OF ESCALATING ARMS RACE,BY DEFENDING USA DETERRENT FORCES ONLY,PROGRESS TOWARDS STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS WITH USSR SHOULD NOT/NOT BE PREJUDICED, 5»REGARDING PROSPECTS FOR CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL PRESIDENT SAID HE EXPECTED QUOTE A VERY SPIRITED DEBATE AND A VERY CLOSE VOTE UNQUOTE, HOWEVER THIS WAS A MINIMUM PROGRAM WHICH PROVIDED OPTIONS TO CHANGE DIRECTION IN LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS,AND PRESIDENT THOUGHT THAT AFTER CONGRESS HAD CONSIDERED MATTER THERE WAS A GOOD CHANCE IT WOULD GIVE ITS APPROVAL, 6,USSR REACTION:PRESIDENT SAID USSR SHOULD INTERPRET HIS DECISION AS OPPOSITE OF ESCALATION,SINCE USA WAS SHIFTING DEPLOYMENT AWAY FROM CITIES.USSR WAS WELL AWARE OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OFFENSIVE AND 000334 �p~*c~^& Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information m PAGE THREE 933 DEFENSIVE POSTURE,PRESIDENT ALSO REMARKED THAT USSR HAS 67 ABM SITES AROUND MOSCO AND THAT USA INTELLIGENCE INDICATED SYSTEM WAS NOW DIRECTED AGAINST CHINA AS WELL AS USA,USSR DID NOT/NOT WANT TO BE UNPROTECTED AGAINST CHINESE THREAT ANY MORE THAN USA DID, 7oSALT«WHEN USSR HAD DEPLOYED ITS OWN ABM SYSTEM IT HAD REJECTED IDEA THAT THIS CONSTITUTED ESCALATION OF ARMS RACE.USA DECISION TO PROCEED WITH SENTINEL HAD ALSO NOT/NOT PREVENTED USSR FROM INITIATING SUGGESTION FOR SALT LAST SUMMER,REGARDING PRESENT STATE OF PLAY,PRESIDENT DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN NEGOTIATIONS AND TALKS.USA WAS CONDUCTING TALKS WITH USSR ON A NUMBER OF SUBJS BUT POINT HAD NOT/NOT BEEN REACHED WHERE PRESIDENT THOUGHT A SUMMIT MTG WOULD BE USEFUL NOR DID HE THINK SUCH A MTG WOULD TAKE PLACE IN NEAR FUTURE.WHEN STRATEGIC TALKS WERE UNDERTAKEN USA WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER BOTH OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WEAPONS BUT IMMED PURPOSE WOULD BE TO REACH AGREEMENT TO FREEZE WEAPONS LEVELS RATHER THAN TO REDUCE THEM. 8.NPTtPRESIDENT SAID DECISION TO STRENGTHEN CREDIBILITY OF USA DETERRENT SHOULD HAVE QUOTE AN ENORMOUS EFFECT UNQUOTE ON COUNTRIES THAT WERE THINKING OF DEVELOPING THEIR OWN NUCLEAR WEAPONS, � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDBM00196 Title A name given to the resource DC to External 933 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 3/14/1969 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-c, file 27-11-7, "DEFENCE - CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS - ANTI - BALLISTIC MISSILES (ABM) = DEFENSE - ARMEMENTS DE TYPE CLASSIQUE ET NUCLEAIRE - ENGINS ANTIMISSILES (ABM)," vol. 10357, part 4, Library and Archives Canada, (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Anti-ballistic missiles Description An account of the resource ABM Deployment Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en