https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/4445a46db641b6dcd45ec6be2bfbaf14.pdf 25b9b598b31c1717bc3d564aaed470d3 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Accesslo Information Act - Document k d\vu\gti$-^mmW$amcmffi$$mation . - . - * . EXTERNAL AFFAIRS TO A Mr, U. N. Bow FROM De Mr. A. Bernier AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES SE C U RfTY,-, r. n JJ rs m Sfeurite O & W t t g : ! December 13, 196# UMBER Numero « REFERENCE Reference FILE SUBJECT Sujet ENCLOSURES Annexes DISTRIBUTION Canadian Participation in A M Defence. DOSSIER MISSION A meeting to deal with the above subject was held in December 11 in Mr. J. S. Nutt»s office. Besides Mr. Nutt and myself, the participants were: J. G. Harris and C. J. Marshall of the North American Defence and KATO Division; and Mssrs. 5. Lindsay, J. Riddell, Vigder and Kaye of DND (Operations Research Division). The immediate purpose of the meeting was to discuss the preparation of a briefing, to be given next Monday by Br. Lindsay to the Defence Council, on Canadian participation in the anti-ballistic missile defence of North America. The discussion centered on a chart summarizing the various implications for Canada and the United States of Canadian participation in ABM defence. (Attached is a copy of the chart with the corrections made during the course of the meeting.) As it turned out, the discussion also touched upon the long-postponed briefing of the Cabinet Committee on External Policy and Defence to be given by Lindsay. This briefing is tentatively set for Friday, December 20.* 2. The briefing to be given to the Defence Council is to leal exclusively with the technical aspects of Canadian participation in ABM Defence, leaving to a further time all political implications. However, since the original chart handed out by Lindsay sas divided along the lines of "advantages" and "disadvantages" for Canada (and the same for USA) resulting from participation, and also because some headings1- under each category were politically 'loaded" (e.g. "Sovereignty"^ , the discussion foeussed mainly an political considerations, in the end, it was unanimously iecided that this chart, to be used in a "recap" at the end of the "technical" briefing, would not imply, directly or indirectly, any value judgement and would exclude any consideration of policy. Thus, the words "advantages" and "disadvantages" would be dropped and replaced by the more neutral term "implications" for Canada (or USA). In Order to acknowledge that there would political Implications to any Canadian participation, Lindsay would simply nention this at the end of his briefing without discussing it further. • •. *-• <=&Ext. 407D/BN. (Admin. Services Div.) f^^^xL^dA^^4 ~7 I iiOvU^.' 000279 �7 Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information -23. One of the first major points to be discussed was whether the ABM system v/ould be more efficient from a Canadian point of view if Canada took part in it. DND experts agree that Canadian participation in "planning" and "control and command" would increase the planned protection of Canadian targets (however, the incidental protection afforded to Canadian cities close to the border, e.g. Windsor or Toronto, would be the same v/ith or without Canadian participation.) Some other technical advantages were dealt with rather quickly: control over risks from "friendly" ABM bursts; access to intelligence and technology; participation in future planning. The other side of the coin is that Canadian participation would be costly (for the defence budget), that it would bring a certain inflexibility in our military commitment and that it would most likely result in an increased U.S. military presence in Canada. While these last three "implications" were considered by most as disadvantages, it v/as agreed that, during the briefing, they would simply be stated as facts, without qualifications, leaving it to the listeners to decide what in their mind was desirable or not* 4. Although they were in the end struck out of the chart, the political implications v/ere the ones most discussed by the participants. Most of the discussion centered around two likely results for Canada of its participation in the ABM system: (a) closer and better relations with the USA, with possibly, more influence over US disarmament policy; (b) reduced international flexibility, with at the same time a reduced effectiveness (and independence) in disarmament negotiations. 5. Leading off the discussion on this point, Nutt proclaimed that ABMs..were really a good thing for disarmament, that we should encourage at the same time investment in ABM systems everywhere, and a reduction in offensive missile capabilities of the major powers. In that way, everybody would be well defended but would have less offensive capacity to start a war. When, as an example, he proposed the deployment of ABM in the Middle East to keep peace there, I reminded him that short distances there would make ABMs rather dangerous offensive weapons. So much for that. 6. Marshall then stated that our position in disarmament negotiations v/ould be reinforced by participating in the U.S. ABM system, since we would then be insiders and not talk as a country v/hich was not involved at all in the possible consequences ...3 000280 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information -3* of SALT, I replied that it would look strange for us to take an active part in a further step in the nuclear arms race after having advocated forecefully an early start of SALT. Surely this would create a credibility gap. When Nutt said that ABM were not a further step in nuclear arms race, I quickly disagreed; my point was that ABM systems were not an escalation JX. , Jr^ c if looked at as a protection of populations. However, as a Y^ J v/ef!> ' i shield for the second strike offensive capability they were \ <** ^^y ., Im sureUgafurther escalation in the arms race. Harris agreed witn !*• .&$**•*, t0y position and proceeded, *?ith a very convincing argumentation, x, ^ ^ ft show how we might be considered like hypocrites if we advocated f*E,«A< ^e*c SALT and joined the U.S. ABM system,; which he considered to be y^-jj r a dangerous upsetting factor in the actual balance of forces* &/ \ 7. Under the persistent influence of Nutt and Marshall$ Lindsay eventually came to the view that in considering whether Canada should participate or not, the overridii^ factor should be our relations with the USA, This factor should weigh much more in the balance than the effectiveness in disarmament neg« otiations. Marshall agreed that there was not much use anyway in retaining the liberty to make "pompous and pious" speeches about the need for disarmament, and that what really counted for Canada was v/hether or not we could talk persuasively to the Americans. I reminded Marshall that other people in the Department v/ould disagree with this, and that we could not let such one-sided views be expressed in any Cabinet briefing as representing the Departments general opinion. It was then agreed that before the technical presentation is made to the Cabinet Committee, a paper, prepared jointly by NAD and NATO and Disarmament Divisions, dealing with policy implications of Canadian participation in ABM defence, be sent to Mr, Sharp for his use in replying to any questions from his colleagues* 8. It was agreed at the end of the meeting that another meeting between representatives of DND and External be held shortly to discuss the technical implications of SALT. I insisted that this be done early enough (possibly next week) to give us time to prepare a coherent position before NATO discussions on this subject. A. Bernier *fc~ Qs^r>~^>3^J^&Uy{ j^Y^r^Jr^ . / 000281 � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDBM00187 Title A name given to the resource Letter from Bernier to Bow (External Affairs) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 12/13/1968 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-c, file 27-11-7, "DEFENCE - CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS - ANTI - BALLISTIC MISSILES (ABM) = DEFENSE - ARMEMENTS DE TYPE CLASSIQUE ET NUCLEAIRE - ENGINS ANTIMISSILES (ABM)," vol. 10357, part 4, Library and Archives Canada, (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Anti-ballistic missiles Description An account of the resource Canadian Participation in ABM Defence Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en