https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/b8b7fb88708d717ccb3246ef7b0c9a11.pdf 6466641102376ff0e657dc03a31e3306 PDF Text Text 1 . '_;,.,- . ...,, , TRANSMITTAL SLIP .;___ ~,, TO: ·The." ?ar.tment ..of .. External. .Affairs.,.. OTTAWA. '. .·•••L·••,1•••0••·••uOOOO&O••··••<••···~·······••uno~•-~·~••····~ .. ' ·FROM: 'l':~Canadi Security,. Unclassifi.ed Date .. .March. an. Emhas.sy., .. WASHINGTDN., . D. C.•.... 24., .. 195.4 •........... Air or Surface ... · ..... Despatching Authority .. .'. J.• J .•McCar.dle/jf ................... . 5 Department of State 1 • •••••••• i2'' // ~_: __ L~:-~o L_~~,2::-::: Also I referred to: 'lfn~ Press } Release No. by the ~~.r c:::£,,fl. Honorable John Foster Dulles before the ]_,-:;;_,__ l,l,S .., Senate Foreign Relations Committee, -...-r.\Friday, March 19, 1954.' 149 of March 19. 'Statement -Reference: Subject: Our Telegram WA-481 of March 20. Dulles States Testimony Defence. on United (Instruction D·~· e~ > ~V.,~ . ) II yl C>k ' JI.N. {) ~· on Reverse Side) \\ v,.r;--~<~' \1 ,}"',:,,.. -~Fb .1\~ i~~\ ,tN · ~? ., e,~O J{) , LY.~~·-----·-·--··••.~------·-\! Description .S:opies D-1 i below are for your information. -~ ........... ;l. No. · of enclosures. The documents described ... , ..... . 0 0: 1J ..•.• • 000048 _ �...\. ,-:~:"'·T ( }\9~?f :F .®.~~)~~Vi~1i'. @W. ~,r~~-~t..-•: MARCH19, ~rn ij •·-'.•w®oo ~oorn~·: .;,__ ·.:; -.::. ,i.ir9 '. 1954 ,..... ' ':':: :·,.•'• ..-:..:-.:··, .. '·•' : . ·-: , STATEMENT BY THE. HON(YRABLEJOHN .FOSTER DULLES . ·_ ·. ·. SECRETARY OF STA"TE ., - - , - _BEFORE THE .SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS. COMMITTEE. .. ,FRIDAY; MARCH19; 1954 < . :, · . ·.·· .... '/'; to. I am glad: discuss with you the ·pres_eni;·.·sta'.te of: .i'.. ;, our fore:lgn policy and its relation -to but' iµi1_ita,ry p:r1ograms.,-_.:•·.:: ·,.' ... ! ·I The central goal -of our .policy I::f ·pea~~- with freedom .. and security. Tl:le: menace of sovi~t :ploc ,de;spo.tism.i ·which:·.:·· . .·: .. now holds in its' grip one-third of the· world Is peoples; . _<_-,,. presents the most·s~rious danger· th~t·has,ev~~ copfjbnted us. The main aspects of this. . thr:·eat are apparent-..!' ...:.: ::• · . · ·_ i'... . . ', '• ' 1. The· "sovi·et r\ilers· .seem to feel se~ure on:iy' :i:n a· .-· world of conformity d0minated :by therri·~··· Partly.i, no. doubt, they are drJven by lust for_p9wer,. But to a 9onsiderable 1 • extent, I believe; ·they ..· are d•riven by'.'fear. of\ f.reedon:i To.' ,·,.;:_··,; :·~:> .!..,::. them freedo!J}: -~s. }?:. t~reat· to>~e:_J~P.mp:fcl ·out, wh,ef,e:V:\~r,,,:;t'.t:, · approaches th~i_tt:;vior1.d •.' .... -:,·_;;_,;:" ... _;•,.;::,}•:,~_°':'i<H: , ,, ... :ir: 1 0 2. The ·S-ovi~t bloc; ·p;~:ss·es;'es 1:What:_:;18°· ..tn: ~ari'y ~¼a:fs· the i..::-:~ '.;, most formiclabl~i:.mr~t tary :es tabl i~hm~nt the worid' 1-i'as e\reri. , . ,_'. :i, 1but known. · Its gre.:9:t. -str-eng,th .:i,.Eifna'.hpotye"±-•'j, al_:;rn....i t. i:;:i strong in term~'.':°9:f:'planes.,1;·. s-upmarine~. and:; .atorri:Lc::: o,apti1;Hli ttes. This vast. empir.e :cfofo:i'.hates,,the. 'c:e·ntra·l Eur.aS,ian l'~hd'mass.; ,-. '';'. extending from ;the Ri\ter., --Elb~.- ":i'.n'. GeTnia:hy.,tO,i thel ·:eti.c:L'f:tc'-. ' ::·,_:::; From within ·qf1,1~ ?f'._29~:9.9P: 'mi,l'.es;::-1t,,;;a(;)uJ._<i'.>~itJJ~e'·by ,. ' '..::-: land at any one· of appro:1ama.tely. 20 _3tates :;Qf,:-Eu.r9J?e, the -' :::-:(::l:: Middle East and AsiaJ and by air it Could st~i~e· Jh~ .N6rth,<:;:;:,r:i American: con:tinent. · · · :__ ,_. ..,.,:: .-,_,:.'.,- ari ~, ·1 ,·, .. , < ~... • ::; - ; •. '·· ... ::(•:.(ft·~~: .i .- ~; I •.. ::-,, I·.,> .. . ; .' . ,.. .: :. ; ,,; '. . .. . ,: ... i ' •: .•· .. :·,~.{ ...... :r· • I :·•·' ~: ~: ·.. :· ,:",' :·:·-'·;· ~. ( .. ' .:.·/. ·:_·~.: . ''·- .. "·, ·,* : 000050 .... · ! �... ·2- 3., Nor is the threat only 'militaryIt a political apparatus which operates in every world 1 seeking to capitaliz~ upon all of the unsatisfied ambitions ~hich inevitably· exist less degree throughout the free·world. · PR 149 also command country of tt _ discontents and in greater or .. · 4. The threat is. virtually. unlimi t.ed so. far as time is concerned. Soviet communism·opera.tes not in terms of an individual lifetime so that the threat will end with someone •s ··death •. It operates in· terms of what Lenin and Stalin called 11an ent.1re: histor.:t¢al: epa.!" ._..II To meet thatrnilita.ry·threat .requires on·our side a strategy which is both well-conce:tved:atid well-implemented., This military defensexrnust. be: w1.th1n.:t·he capacity of the free world to sustain ··1:t.'fot<an :indefil'tite · time without such impairment of its economic and social fabric as would expose 1t to piece~meal seizure.'from within-by the political apparatus .of comrnun:I:smo ' : •: : : .'.··,., · This calls for thinking and planning which is imaginative; which takes maximum possible advantage of the special resources of :the :e:ree-n,ations; and,wh1ch is steadily developed and.:ad~pted .to changin:g,cond1tionst The fundamental ·aim •of ,,;.our··national• secur1ty ·policies 1~· to·• deter aggre:ssion·.and _there'by· avert a:new-:waro.. :The essentials of this proble,m, may be ;:.br1e•f.ly summatiizecl::as_.fol1ow.s: · . l.: The free :nat:tons. can Jtchiev.e: ::security :Only by a collective syste.m .of defense. · No. single nation can develop alone adequate power to· deter· Soviet blo·c agg~ss1on against 1 ts vital inte.rests o · By_providing Joint fac11i t:1.es and by combining. thelr resources, the free nations can achieve a:, ... total strength and a flexibility whieh.c.a.n surpass that·o:f-. any potential enemy and can do so at bearable cost. This collective security concept is the. most highly developed in NATO.· But it is also embodied.in.the Rio Pact of 19~7 and, in more limited form, in various security arrangements· in .the Far East. The Turkey-Pakistan agreement maI'ks the. beginning. of applying the. collective_ security concept in-the Middle East, The Unite.d Nations 1s mov.ing in the-same direction, as· shown py its "Un,iting for Peaee 0 · Reso.lution. - ~2. In organizing their collective defense, the free nations should not attempt to match the Soviet bloe man for man and gun for gun. The \;>est way to deter aggression 1s to make the aggressor know in advance that he will suffer damage outweighing what he can hope to gain. Th\lS an aggressor muat not be able to count upon a sanct.,.ary status for those resourcea which he does not use in eomiµtt1ng aggression. 3. To apply 000051 �,; • j_ -3- ,. . PR 149 -·)" 3. To apply this deterrent principle the free world must maintain and be prepared to use effective means to make aggression too costly to be tempting. It must have the mobility and flexibility to bring collective power to bea~ against an enemy on a selective or massive basis as conditions may require. For this purpose its arsenal m~Jt include a wide range of air, sea and land power based on both conventional and atomic weapons. These new weapons can be used not only for strategic purposes but also for tactical purposes. The greatest deterrent to war is the ability of the free world to respond by means best suited to the particular area or circumstances. There should be a capability for massive retaliation without delayo I point out that the possession of that capacity does not impose the necessity of using it in every instance of attack. It is not our intention to turn every local war into a general war. 4. The magnitude and duration of the present danger and the need for flexibility of means to deter that danger makes it vital to the United 3tates, as never before, that it have firm allies. A firm alliance depends not merely upon documents, although these may be important. There must also be trust, understanding and good will as between the free nations. This implies not merely military commitments, but good economic and cultural relations as well. It is not charity on the part of the United States to be concerned with the economic health of other nations which help to support the basic strategy I describe. Neither is their good will a matter to which we can be indifferent o. All of this means that foreign policy has assumed, as never be~ore, a vital importance for the security of the United Stateso In the long haul the United States has a profound interest in insuring that its allies and the uncommitted areas of the free world are able to maintain viable economic and political systems~ That is why our foreign economic policy means so much to our own security. * State -- PB, Wash., * * * D.c. 000052 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Deterrence Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource New Look / 24 MARCH 1954 / DEPARTMENT OF STATE PRESS RELEASE Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954-03-24 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00026 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Canadian Embassy, Washington to Department of External Affairs, "Department of State Press Release No. 149 of March 19," 24 Mar. 1954, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 2. John Foster Dulles Senate Foreign Relations Committee Soviet bloc