https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/9eaf19f6bdd2e78ad318e808d8bd0e96.pdf 610e36b1bb5b057406cda7bb8a99ee56 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document div^gu'ifiajtt.dU^'MJshUu*^ I'information I EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES MEMORANDUM D.L.(l) Division (Attention: Mr. C.J. Marshall) TO A SECURITY CONFIDENTIAL SfcwrM FROA Os Disarmament Division DATE September 22, 196?. NUMBER Numero REFERENCE Rifirence DOSSIER Flue SUBJECT Sujet Your Draft Paper on Implications for Canada of United States ABM Deployment OTTAWA ^/A7 MISSION ENCLOSURES Annexes DISTRIBUTION You hav© invited suggestions on the above-jfcentioned draft paper, which we understand will be the basis for a document to be considered either by the Minister or by Cabinet. The comments which follow are neither exhaustive nor fully developed but are intended rather to suggest trends of thought and areas for exploration with other interested Divisions. 2. MY first point is that in its present form the paper seems to be very narrowly based in that it presents the subject almost exclusively in terms of Canada-U.S. relations in the context of North American defence* In my view, the issue confronting ua is serious and important with far-reaching implications for several other aspects of our foreign policy. It seems to roe important that some discussion of these and of various adjustments of policy to meet the changed situation should be included in a document on which Ministers will presumably take a decision. As I see it, there are three areas of policy which appear to be affected in particular. These are (1) arms control and disarmament, (2) our hopes for detente in Europe, and (3) our China policy. Some thoughts on each of these are set out below. Arms Control and Disarmament Policies 3. The first and principal point is that the U.S. decision to go in for anti-ballistic missile defence has been taken and has been announced. Whatever suspicions we may have about the reasons underlying the decision or fears about its probable effects on current negotiations (the non-proliferation treaty) or future negotiations, the plain fact is that from now on we must live with American ABM deployment. The immediate problem which confronts us is how Canada should respond to the American invitation to participate in the ABM defence of North America. h* From the point of view of an arms controller one interesting feature of Mr. McNamara's San Francisco speech is tte amount of attention devoted to discussion of ISA and USSR strategic forces and the nuclear deterrent* The following points are of particular note: (i) Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union now have nuclear deterrent forces in excess of their needsj (ii) Both would benefit from an agreement to limit and later to reduce their offensive and defensive strategic forces; and Ext. 407D/BII. (Adm"n*5er"?ices Div.) •••'000124 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de^aLQimrXatjces a Tinformation - 2 (iii) Both would benefit from an agreement which would prevent the continuation of an arms race which has resulted in nuclear arsenals in both countries greatly in excess of those required* • These highlights are accompanied by a firm warning to the USSR that the U.S. cannot and will not be outmatched in the development of strategic forces and by an explicit invitation to begin talks about a limitation agreement which is stated to be in the interest of both countries. It seems obvious that one American purpose is to increase pressure on the USSR to begin negotiation of a limitation agreement. At the same time, of course, the U.S. is attempting to get across the message that its ABM deployment is not directed against a threat from the Soviet Union; Soviet reaction would therefore be unjustified and unwarranted. £• In the short run, by continuing to call for talks aimed at limiting and controlling offensive and defensive nuclear forces and the eventual reduction of such forces, a prominent point in our arms control policies, we will not therefore be taking a line which conflicts in any way with declaredtf.S.policy. On the contrary, we will be reinforcing a line of argument carefully and explicitly set out by Secretary McHamara. 6. Xn the longer view, if American pressure leads to negotiation with the USSR, then we have one situation, the consequences of which cannot be foreseen. In the more likely situation that there are no talks, and as ABM deployment proceeds and after a period of time thickens in response to the increased Chinese nuclear threat, it will come to be accepted as a fact with which we must all come to terms and with which we must learn to live. Insofar as our arms control policy is concerned, X would judge that over a period, inevitably the ABM issue will diminish in Importance. Two things appear to flow from this: (1) We should begin to cast about for other arms control issues to advocate (there are several available)j and (il) Arms Control policy is not a substantive factor one way or the other in the decision which confronts us. ?. A second matter of serious concern Is the effect which the U.S. decision may have on the non-proliferation negotiations. While it is too early to discern the attitude of the non-nuclear countries, It Is easy to imagine that their immediate reaction may be increased exasperation with the United States and cynicism about its disarmament policies. The timing is particularly unfortunate: the announcement comes just when the USA proposes to sign a treaty stating inter alia that "the proliferation of nuclear weapons seriously enhances the danger of nuclear war" and is strongly urging non-nuclear countries to renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons. At the same moment the United States is announcing decisions which certainly in the short run, and probably over the longer term, will result in a substantial increase in its own nuclear weapons and launchers. Such a reaction, .3 ' 000125 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu cU^^^»HfJ,'ffcees a I'information - 3* ~~ if it occurs, could lead to increased pressure fron the Europeans for their own ABM defence, and to etiffer demands from the non-aligned for concessions in the NPT negotiations or outright refusal to sign the non*proliferation treaty. 8. The Americans have obviously foreseen this danger and McNamara?s statement, as well as the guidance given to U*S. diplomats* argues that the decision should not contribute to other countries' desiring their own nuclear weapons. The Americans also stress that by providing defence against Chinese nuclear attack, ABM deployment will enhance the U.S. ability to come to the assistance and support of Asian countries threatened by China. Regardless of what we may think about the timing or the accuracy of U.S. forecast about the reaction of the non-aligned and particularly the Asians it would seem that it is clearly in the Canadian interest to support the U.S. arguments and to do what we can to minimize adverse reaction among our allies in the non*aligned world if the non-proliferation negotiations are to be saved. Detente in Europe 9* As you have pointed out in the notes prepared for the background information of our delegation to the Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Ankara, another area where the U.S. decision is likely to haye a marked effect on the general political climate and possibly on the decision of our allies, is in respect of detente in Europe* As you know, during the past year there has been a pronounced trend to study seriously what might be done to relax tensions in Europe and to move from the present situation of rather ritualistic suspicion of Eastern Europe towards a condition of genuine detente. It is generally agreed, of course, that during this process we must continue to maintain NATO's defences in a high state of preparedness and to continue their modernization. Among measures being studied are ways of maintaining effective deterrence at lower force levels by balanced mutual force reductions, and a range of other arms control measures. Proposals are being advanced to strengthen NATO machinery to deal with such measures. Simultaneously, In the Nuclear Planning Group, NATO is studying the question of an ABM defence for Europe and the U.S. decision Is almost certain to have some effect on the attitude of our European allies* While the outcome of this study cannot be foreseen, it seems safe to predict that a decision by our European allies to establish an ABM defence in Europe would have a strongly adverse effect on the prospects for some relaxation of tension and genuine detente on the continent. While Canada's voice In the debate dn European ABM defence will be marginal, nevertheless, our reaction to the USA offer will be noted with interest by our allies and may have some indirect bearing on their own attitude and consequently on the prospects of moving towards European detente. It seems to us that this is also a matter that should be brought to the attention of Ministers in their consideration of this question. China Policy 10. It also seems clear that our reaction to the U.S. invitation is bound to have some implications for our China policy* X think that • **t* 000126 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation CONFIDENTIAL Canadian participation in a light ASM defence of North America specifically oriented against the Chinese nuclear threat would not go unnoticed in Peking. It might well be viewed try the Chinese as a hostile act and In concrete terms might have adverse effects on our wheat trade with China* In the more nebulous area of foreign policy, it might seem as though Canada were becoming more closely aligned with Washington with consequent negative implications for whatever hopes we may still have of seeing China brought into the UN and into the international dialogue on disarmament and other questions. No doubt you will wish to canvass this matter more fully with Far Eastern Division but at first glance I think Ministers might also wish to weigh this element in deciding on our response. ORJG.'N'AL * " - • D -> - / - Al. C o ^ . u V Dlsarraament Division 000127 � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDBM00137 Title A name given to the resource Memo from Disarmament to DL (1) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 9/22/1967 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-c, file 27-11-7, "DEFENCE - CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS - ANTI - BALLISTIC MISSILES (ABM) = DEFENSE - ARMEMENTS DE TYPE CLASSIQUE ET NUCLEAIRE - ENGINS ANTIMISSILES (ABM)," vol. 10357, part 3, Library and Archives Canada, (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Anti-ballistic missiles Description An account of the resource Your Draft Paper on Implications for Canada of United States ABM Deployment Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en