https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/5fa4c341a2bbfd8712ab1f69c00692f4.pdf f343ee9ae9a4bf374c1bee4d32f68847 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation MDC/PV.331 12 27. Mr. FISHER (United States, of America): I listened with interest.to:the statement made by the representative of Mexico, and I will study its various aspects carefully. Of course, I was glad, as I am sure we all were, to hear of the action of the Mexican Senate in approving the Treaty of Tlatelolco (ENDC/l86). That is good news for all of us. 28. I should like today to discuss the character and purpose of the planned United States limited anti-ballistic-missile deployment announced by the Secretary, of Defense of the United States, Mr. McNamara, on Monday 18 September in his speech analysing the status of the strategic arms race. I should particularly like to discuss the relation between this deployment decision and the efforts on which all of us here are engaged to bring the arms race under control. By way of summary, I wish to stress at the outset that it is. my very strong belief that, while the United States anti-ballistic-missile deployment in no way poses technical or political impediments to arms control, the fact that the United States found it necessary to make this decision emphasizes the importance and urgency of our work, especially in regard to non-proliferation and the control of strategic nuclear armaments. 29. First of all, it is well to emphasize the very limited nature of the proposed United States anti-ballistic-missile deployment, even upon its completion, and our intention to keep the deployment limited. The deployment will consist of an "area" defence of the United States and a "terminal" defence of some of our Minuteman sites.. The United States deployment will comprise no terminal defence of urban areas and will not attempt to provide defence for those areas against a large-scale strategic missile attack of the kind the Soviet Union is capable of launching. We do not believe .that it is feasible for either the United States or the Soviet Union to provide real protection for our populated areas against the strategic striking power of the other. 30. What, then, is the purpose of the deployment? While the United States, through long public debate and deferment of a decision, has demonstrated its reluctance to initiate anti-ballistic-missile deployment, this decision was considered to be the prudent course of action in the face of an emerging Communist Chinese intercontinentalballistic-missile threat. . Concurrently,, such a system will have the effect of protecting our retaliatory forces against any threat which might result from a continued build-up of offensive missiles on the part of the Soviet Union. �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information ENDC/PV.331 11 fjfyf Castaneda. Mexico) international control system will be required which offers the maximum gu«(rantees of efficiency and absolute impartiality. The formula proposed by Swedenyfor article III (ENDC/I95), seems to us highly attractive. We hope it will provide/useful points for the negotiations now being conducted by the two co-Chairmen/&id the other countries concerned. We also believe that, as Mr. Burns hasypointed out (EKDC/PV,329, para. 8 ) , it will be difficult to arrive at an agreement on article III without a certain amount of give and take on all sides./Accordingly we shall maintain, a flexible position on this question pending submissi/fn of proposals to us by our two co-Chairmen. 24-. It might perhaps be useful to recall briefly'some aspects of the control system for verifying compliance with the obligations ymtered into by the Parties to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. Article 7 of the Treaty provides for the establishment of an international organization which shall be generally responsible for ensuring comn^iance with the obligations arising from the Treaty. This agency will commence ii/B work when the Treaty has entered into force for eleven States. Furthermore, article 13 provides that "Each Contracting Part/^ shall negotiate multilateral or bilateral agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of its safeguards to its nuclear activities". 25. The problem of the period which may elapse between the ratification by a State and application of the 2&EA safeguards is solved by article 13 in the following manner: "Each Contracting Party shall initiate negotiations within a period of 180 days af teethe date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification of this Trejeay. These agreements shall enter into force, for each Party, not laten/than eighteen months after the date of the initiation of such negotiations except in case of unforeseen circumstances or force, majeure." 26. It q/Hj remains for me to nrtcLthat T have haadpri y„ t.hft-SBcr^tar.lat-a.-ii'arking paper -/v-Jjieir-Summarizes the suggestions I have made in this statement. Circulated as document EKDC/I96 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation * EKDC/PV.331 13 (Mr. Fisher. United States) 31. The United States anti-ballistic-missile deployment will provide area protection of United States urban areas against unsophisticated ballistic-missile attacks, such, as conceivably could be launched by Communist China in the next decade. It is clear that the Chinese are placing a high priority on the development of an intercontinentalmissile force capable of delivering nuclear weapons. We now believe that China could have an initial intercontinental-ballistic-missile operational capability, albeit crude and vulnerable, by the early 1970s. Thus a significant purpose of the planned; limited anti-ballistic-missile deployment is to provide some prudential protection of the United States population against Chinese nuclear missile attacks. 32. For the foreseeable future we view a Chinese nuclear attack upon the United Stai1 or its allies and friends as highly unlikely indeed — particularly in face of our overwhelming strategic retaliatory capabilities. These capabilities should provide • a deterrent to any such irrational move on their part. We believe it prudent, • _..; : however, to invest in a system which will effectively neutralize that possibility. An important reason for our decision is the belief that our limited anti-ballistic missile deployment, designed against such a possible Chinese attack, will provide an' additional indication that we intend to make concerted efforts to deter nuclear blackmail. , 33. In so far as this decision relates to the current Soviet build-up and any threat to our assured destruction deterrent capability, the United States limited anti-ballistic-missile system will also have the effect of providing added protection for United States retaliatory forces. In this mode, it is not different from the hardening and dispersion of the United States offensive missile forces. Indeed, of all the ways in which the United States could guard against a possible future threat to our deterrent capability, the deployment of a hard-point anti-ballistic-missile defence for the United States Minuteman must be considered to be among the least provocative moves the United States could take under the circumstances, since it permits restraint in further United States offensive missile deployment. 34. These, then, are the main objectives of our anti-ballistic-missile deployment. I should also like to draw attention to a result which will not be achieved by this deployment. That is the protection, in the event of nuclear war, of our population against a major sophisticated attack, such as could be launched by an advanced nuclear-weapon State. The deployment will not have such capability but instead will help to deter nuclear war by affording additional protection for our assured •retaliatory capability. 000105 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information ORIGINAL AS IS ENDC/PV. 331 ^ u > " (Mr. Fisher, United States) 35. . We have not abstained from a decision to deploy large urban anti-ballisticnissile defences in the United States because it is not good to protect one's Deople from nuclear missile attack. We have done so because it does not seem feasible to provide such defences against a major sophisticated attack which could De launched by an advanced nuclear-weapon State such as the Soviet Union. Such a State has the technical and financial resources to offset any such defences and would Drobably respond to any significant threat to its deterrent capability by increasing .ts offensive missile capability. As Secretary McNamara has said: "If we in turn opt for heavy anti-ballistic-missile deployment — whatever price — at we can be certain that the Soviets will react to offset the advantage we would hope to gain." ?he countervailing offensive capabilities which would follow from such a deployment >n our part, by thus driving the arms race to still higher plateaux, would have 'endered ineffective the very defence of our cities which we had sought to achieve. ?he deployment now being undertaken by the United States i-zarrants no such response j. ind we have no plans which should have the result of stimulating any further Soviet iffensive force build-up. 16. Despite the limited character and purpose of the proposed United States anti- tallistic-missile system, we may properly inquire concerning its effect on arms •ontrol efforts, both here and in other forums. Indeed, we must be alert that dsconceptions about the nature of the United States antl-ballistic-missile eployment, wilful or otherwise, be not used to impede progress on important armsontrol measures. 7. As I indicated earlier, the limited United States anti-ballistic-missile eployment decision does not represent an acceleration of the United States-Soviet trategic arms race. The Soviet Union, which has already initiated an anti-ballisticissile deployment, has never indicated that a limited United States anti-ballisticissile deployment would be provocative to it, and we would assume that that view emains unchanged. We think it has now become vital that the United States and the oviet Union be able to assure each other of the limited purpose of both offensive nd defensive forces and be able to reach some agreement on controlling the nuclear trategic arms race. 000106 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation ENDC/PV.331 r. 15. (Mr. Fisher, United States) 38. Secretary McNamara made the position of the United States quite clear when he stated: "Let me emphasise — and I cannot do so too strongly — that our decision to go ahead with a limited anti-ballistic-missile deployment in no way indicates that we feel that an agreement with the Soviet Union pn the limitation of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive forces is any the less urgent or desirable." Mr. McNamara said more. He said: "We do not want a nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union — primarily because the action-reaction phenomenon makes it foolish and futile. • But if the only way to prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining .firststrike capability over us is to engage in such a race, the United States possesses in ample abundance the resources, the technology, and the will to run faster in that race for whatever distance is required. "But what we would much prefer to do is to come to a realistic and reasonably riskless agreement with the Soviet Union which would effectively prevent such an arms race. We both have strategic nuclear arsenals greatly in excess of a credible assured destruction capability. These arsenals have reached that point of excess in each case for precisely the same reason: we each have reacted to each other's build-up with very conservative calculations. We have, that is, each built a greater arsenal than either of. us needed for a second-strike capability, simply because we each wanted to be able to cope with the worst plausible case. "But since we now each possess a deterrent in excess of our individual needs, both of our nations would benefit from a properly-safeguarded agreement first to limit, and later -to reduce, both our offensive and defensive strategic nuclear forces." 39. I need hardly repeat that the United States is firmly committed to achieving an equitable non-proliferation treaty and does not consider that this limited antiballistic-missile deployment decision should in any \ray decrease the desirability of a non-proliferation treaty to other nations. To the extent that our anti-ballisticmissile deployment will affect the security considerations of other countries, I believe it will favour non-proliferation. The deployment will foreclose any possibility of a successful Chinese nuclear attack on the United-States and will thereby provide further assurance of our determination to support our Asian friends against Chinese nuclear blackmail. 000107 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information ENDC/PV.331 16 (Mr. Fisher, United States) 4-0. Finally, my Government wishes me to emphasize today that the United States limited anti-ballistic-missile deployment decision will in no way interfere with continued United States adherence to existing arms-control agreements, such as the limited test-ban Treaty (2NDC/l00/Rev.l) and the outer space Treaty (General Assembly resolution £222 (XXl))j and it will in no way interefere with our efforts to achieve progress on other important arms-control objectives. We will continue to work towards the achievement of the measures which we have presented to this Conference. The Conference decided to issue the following communique: "The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 3.31st plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Caracciolo, representative of Italy. "Statements were made by the representatives of Mexico and the United States. "The delegation of Mexico tabled a working paper containing a summary of the suggested additions to the draft treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/l96). "The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 21 September 1967, at 10.30 a.m."' The meeting rose at 11.20 a.m. � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDBM00127 Title A name given to the resource Transcript Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource N/A Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-c, file 27-11-7, "DEFENCE - CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS - ANTI - BALLISTIC MISSILES (ABM) = DEFENSE - ARMEMENTS DE TYPE CLASSIQUE ET NUCLEAIRE - ENGINS ANTIMISSILES (ABM)," vol. 10357, part 3, Library and Archives Canada, (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Anti-ballistic missiles Description An account of the resource ENDC Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en