https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/94d083665f34e7dbbefbb89acbc10150.pdf ec4a13699a1f4e92ee9d0da2d8565898 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under t ocument d i y ^ l g l ^ e r i ve tion Act 'information sarmament/RDJ c AFFAlfejjxiERIEURES TERNAUA MEMORANDUM TO SECURITY H. B. Robinson A SECRET September 14, I967 FROM De Disarmament Division REFERENCE Reference UMBER Numero l o u r Memorandum for the Minister of September 12, 196? SUBJECT Sujet FILE OTTA ABM Deployment and Arms Control IV^ ENCLOSURES Annexes jy^ /E^ , DOSSIER yy>;A 7 MISSI Following are some comments on your memorandum under reference. DISTRIBUTION 2. An arms controllers immediate reaction to Mr. McNamara's impending announcement of USA deployment of a "light" ABM system might be to argue that the USA is putting pressure on the USSR to begin discussions on the question of limiting and controlling offensive and defensive strategic missiles. As you will recall, President Johnson expressed hopes for a USA-USSR agreement to limit ABM deployment in his State of the Union address in January of this year and there was a diplomatic follow-up by Mr. Llewellyn Thompson in Moscow. While the Russians, and indeed Mr. Kosygin himself, agreed to talks in March, provided they embraced the whole range of strategic missiles, both offensive and defensive, discussions have not proceeded beyond a rather fruitless preliminary exchange between Messrs. Gromyko and Thompson in April. The Americans have subsequently attempted to .prompt the Russians through private and public channels, but without any success. During his visit to the USA in June, Mr. Kosygin played very coy, and even went so far as to suggest that ABM deployment in the USSR was a justifiable "defensive" measure. Meanwhile the ABM debate in the USA has been waxing ever louder and pressures on the Administration to undertake deployment ever stronger. DL (1) Div. European Div. > 3. Since private and public warnings that the USA is seriously considering ABM deployment have so far failed to elicit a forthcoming Soviet response, it might be argued that only an American decision to deploy on a limited scale would goad the Russians into negotiation. However,this^argument loses force when placed against Mr. McNamara*s apparent feeling that, "if only for psychological reasons, it might not be possible to prevent half pregnancy from becoming full." Whether this reflects a deliberate calculation by Mr. McNamara or merely a sense of resignation is not clear. ^ o* /LJ I*- cO-"" » > /I x ^ k-. It is not hard to surmise why the USSR is reluctant to begin discussions. To begin with, for it to seek an accomodation with the USA x-xhen it is assailing USA policy in Vietnam and the Middle East would open it to criticism of "hypocrisy and connivance in imperialism" from both .within and without the communist camp. Chinese charges of Soviet \i>^\ • * • <c *•*** Ext. 407A/BII 000059 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation - 2- SECRET "double-dealing" on the non-proliferation treaty have been savage enough. An ABM agreement would provide even more ammunition for attack. Probably of more relevance to the Soviet position, however, are traditional Soviet strategic ideas, which tend to be orientated towards simplistic concepts \J of "maximum national defence" and to take little account of more sophisti- [ cated concepts of global security and the complex interplay of international strategic factors. In other words, the Soviet general staff tend to demand the best available weaponry in impressive quantities, regardless of the international consequences, (cf. the events leading up to the "missile-gap" crisis in the USA in the 1950*s, which probably resulted in the USSR*s being put at a greater strategic disadvantage then before.) Even if these dated concepts are now giving way to more contemporary and apposite ones, it is reasonable to assume that an active but covert debate on the ABM question yt is being conducted in the USSR and that, for the time being at least, the [ZX* Russians are going to be reluctant to commit themselves to any limitation of "defensive" missiles, even if it will obviously lead to a new round in the nuclear arms race. 5. It would, at all events, be interesting to have a frank USA appraisal of the prospects for at least a USA-USSR modus vivendi on ABM*s, ! sigi,ee the issue is likely to have an important bearing not only on USA-USSR -{u^ v E*^^^ *JLHfelations, but also on the arms control debate in Geneva and, more immediately, ^ J Q J S U ^ ' <•*) the non-proliferation treaty negotiations. The non-nuclear members of the J^J? " /i/ ji t & A J ^ ^ E N D C , and more particularly the non-aligned members, have become increasingly j,i/-|f lA*rJ jjA^vociferous in their demands for a "mutual balance of obligations" under a /H^"*"' ****&" treaty, among other things, some specific commitment to nuclear arms control glXi'J" fjj^ . and limitation. Any suggestion that the nuclear arms race is about to escalate; ^ j f *" k*^ JJS$11 almost certainly make many non-aligned countries, and among them those ^tL-^is i*** eoun tries whose accession to a non-proliferation treaty will be vital to its v s/' Vt*J£*^^ effectiveness and durability, more resistant than ever to the "discriminatory /•~° ^h'srfytfk aspects" of the treaty. 6. It is hardly likely that Mr. McNamara's announcement will have a major impact on arms control attitudes of the Canadian public, although it might be fair to say that it will stimulate whatever latent interest there is in seeing the nuclear powers accept restraints on the size, character and use of their nuclear arsenals, particularly as UoA and USSk ABM deployment, even s . on a limited, national scale, will have direct implications for Canadian defence, s~. I [fc»-*<- I foreign policy and sovereignty. In this connection, however, would it not be Utf*1 j-Z I reasonable to argue (in contradiction of Mr. Hellyer* s assertion in Para 8) that whatever misgivings there may be in Canada about USA-Canada defence links, especially NORAD, will be accentuated bv the USA decision? A reminder that 'IT /rltj&*J's\f/nuclear warfare is in effect the exclusive preserve of the nuclear powers, /v^ijjj^J^' whether or not it affects other states, might rally those increasingly vocal A A , A loi< elements of the Canadian public which are inclined to "opt out" of the Easts^ T&T r * * V W ' t o * * ' v^E e s ' t s t r u g g l e . \jW*J}< &(yy> 7. In conclusion, we should like to say that the decision comes sooner vfiJt-i' / w^ than we had anticipated. Although at his press conference last xreek Mr. Rusk that tbe U3A c ^ J f c *•** J\SUwarned ° uld not wait indefinitely, our impression was that there 0 A L ^ ^ LJ ^*' was still considerable public opposition in the USA to deployment and that the a o > debate i n the Administration was f a r from resolved. Disarmament Division / ***" Q *^n yxy i / ) d e b a t e y i n t h e * - 3 ~ * - - " + ~ ~ " - - « ~ ~ "«<=• ? • » • " - P - » « ™ •*•*»«=,->"!-n-a^. x ^i^Jx.'^ fy&iW* 000060 � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDBM00121 Title A name given to the resource Memo from Disarmament Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 9/14/1967 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-c, file 27-11-7, "DEFENCE - CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS - ANTI - BALLISTIC MISSILES (ABM) = DEFENSE - ARMEMENTS DE TYPE CLASSIQUE ET NUCLEAIRE - ENGINS ANTIMISSILES (ABM)," vol. 10357, part 3, Library and Archives Canada, (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Anti-ballistic missiles Description An account of the resource ABM Deployment and Arms Control Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en