https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/395ba30a5cd2c6d722d1001cd2a9cd98.pdf 372012dff89df200499f0eba1c4930d4 PDF Text Text . Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Docum^AWHS^^h v ^ r & W i ^ S ^ j t c e s a I'information '&• Canadian Delegation -to^ the Conference of/the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament CONFIDENTIAL June 9, 1967 The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, OTTAWA, Canada USSR and Arms Control N-149 27-11-7 On June 7 at his request, the desk officer for international organizations at the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, Mr. G.D. Foursa, paid a rare call on Disarmament Division. Moscow London Washington NATO Paris European Div. DL(1) Div. Economic Div. A. Non-Proliferation Treaty 2. Safeguards. Foursa said his main purpose in calling was to clarify the Canadian position on the non-proliferation treaty safeguards article, particularly in the light of General Burns' reference to it in the ENDC on May 25. He also asked about the Minister's assertion on February 27 that the safeguards system "must be acceptable to the great majority of states which sign the treaty". Did it mean Canada wanted a treaty in which some accepted safeguards and others did not? He wished to know where we stood on the various safeguards formulae now under consideration. The USSR, he emphasized, considered that the overriding objective of a treaty was to prevent a further spread of nuclear weapons and to ensure this objective safeguards need apply only to non-nuclear signatories. He rehearsed the well known Soviet line that safeguards must not be self-administered, but must rather be applied by a genuine international agency. Volunteering no new information on the Soviet position, he said that Mr. Roshchin (his former chief in Moscow) had already made it quite clear where the USSR stood. 3. We esplained that ever since the treaty had become a serious subject of debate more than two years ago, the Canadian position had consistently been one of support for effective, equitable and internationally administrated treaty safeguards. Our position was thus not a recently adopted one. We may have been a little more articulate in asserting our position of late, but this was because we were approaching actual treaty negotiations for the first time. The basic purpose of a treaty, we agreed, was to prevent further nuclear proliferation and we recognized that the application of safeguards to the peaceful programmes of the nuclear powers would not be meaningful in terms of the controls they entailed, because the military programmes of the nuclear powers (or for that matter any other nuclear activities they chose to designate as military) would be exempt from safeguards. However, important points of principle and presentations were involved. If, as the USSR argued, safeguards would impose no limitations on the conduct of legitimate peaceful nuclear activities, then surely the USSR could not object to them itself. What is more, many non-nuclear states, including several of the prominent non-aligned, had become insistent that a treaty should reflect a fair balance of obligations and this was one of the areas in �- 2 - Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divu'E^gajjfBfl^rjrjflJa Loi sur I'acces a I'information which they felt the nuclear powers themselves should accept specific responsibilities. As a non-nuclear state, Canada shared this view. We therefore had reservations about any discriminatory safeguards formula and were not committed to support any formula now under consideration. Nevertheless, we thought that the USA formula had several laudable features, such as the provision to accommodate the Euratom safeguards system and the clause on peaceful uses, and that it was a useful basis on which to begin negotiation. In speaking of an "acceptable" safeguards system, we were certainly not suggesting that safeguards standards should vary among the signatories; rather we meant that in the general negotiations we should seek a basic formula that would be both fair to and acceptable by the great majority of states we expected to sign the treaty. 4. Treaty Prospects. We noted that the bilateral USA-USSR negotiations were dragging on longer than we had anticipated. While we were pleased to see that the USSR was devoting little attention in the ENDC to issues lying outside the Committee's sphere of interest, we were concerned lest issues, such as the Viet Nam or Middle Eastern situations, complicate the negotiations. Foursa said he doubted that such issues would interfere. The methodical pace of the negotiations was due in part to the careful examination Moscow was giving the proposals for possible "loopholes". Asked if we thought there were now any major obstacles to a treaty (here he made an oblique reference to West Germany), we suggested that the ENDC negotiations might prove difficult, but that we were reasonably optimistic about the eventual outcome. B. Other Measures 5. Foursa enquired what we envisaged as the next step in Geneva, assuming a non-proliferation treaty was concluded within the foreseeable future. We said we had been giving thought to the matter and among those subjects on which we would like to see progress were a comprehensive test ban, a moratorium on the deployment of anti-ballistic missiles, a freeze on the production and reduction of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, and a diversion of fissionable materials from nuclear weapons production to peaceful purposes. We realized of course there were fundamental differences of position between the USA and USSR on each of these subjects. We thought, however, that they deserved serious attention and that agreement on any one of them would, as a major step to nuclear arms control by the nuclear powers, represent a logical and important corollary to a non-proliferation treaty. 6. Anti-Ballistic Missiles. When we suggested that we were not exactly dazzled by the pace of the USA-USSR talks on an anti-ballistic missile moratorium. Foursa said that we might not have the fullest information. Serious discussions were now being conducted at the ambassadorial level. The USSR was genuinely interested, but wished the talks to include offensive as well as defensive weapons. This had been put to the Americans and some positive reaction was now required from them. He assumed Canada was anxious to see some positive results because it did not want to become involved in missile arrangements. ,We said the question was rather academic but we found the arguments for a moratorium to be convincing. 7. Foursa did not expatiate on the other subjects we mentioned, but asked if we would see any value in taking a fresh look at such proposals as the elimination of nuclear alliances and general disarmament. We said that 000028 �- 3 _ Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue e^NPffiBBttfl'l/tP' sur I'acces a I'information our objectives were certainly disengagement, detente and disarmament. However, we were dubious of sweeping proposals seemingly designed to accomplish these objectives overnight. In our view, they tended to be exercises in propaganda rather than attempts at realistic arms control. We were more attracted by the collateral approach to arms control, which we hoped might lead to a series of limited agreements and eventually a broader mosaic of disarmament. That was not to say we would not examine all proposals seriously, but we believed that they should be consistent with certain principles, namely; (a) that arms control agreements should make provision for appropriate verification; (b) that they should not tip the balance of power in the favour of one party; and (c) that they should be linked to the resolution of outstanding political problems. 8. Nuclear Alliances. Foursa gave a familiar discourse on the anachronistic character of nuclear alliances and how they could be used by individual members (again it was apparent he had Germany in mind) to realize aggressive national ambitions. We replied that we considered NATO to be of unquestionable strategic and political benefit to Canada and to have even wider positive ramifications. (He was amused by this). We felt, moreover, that, if anything, alliances hajd a restraining influence on their members. We did not maintain that measures should not be taken by alliances to defuse international tension. We were certainly prepared to examine seriously any proposals for a balanced reduction of troops or armaments, provided the principles mentioned in paragraph 7 above were taken into account. 9. General Disarmament. We said that we doubted that there were any immediate prospects for making progress towards general disarmament. As between the USA and Soviet plans, we preferred the former, since we thought it was more realistic. We conceded the USSR might see some strategic disadvantages in the USA plan, but we saw definite strategic disadvantages in the Soviet plan. If common ground was to be established, it could only be done in quiet and careful negotiation. 10. We would certainly not be inclined to infer from Foursa's remarks that the USSR is contemplating an important new or renewed demarche in the arms control sphere. Foursa did not give the impression of being fully abreast of recent developments in the arms control sphere or even of being fully briefed on background matters. However, he appeared to have a good general grasp of the subjects under discussion and indicated that he would like to have further exchanges. D.M. Cornett Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (Retyped^/.) (Checked.'^EX) � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDBM00107 Title A name given to the resource Memo for the Under-Secretary Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 6/9/1967 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-c, file 27-11-7, "DEFENCE - CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS - ANTI - BALLISTIC MISSILES (ABM) = DEFENSE - ARMEMENTS DE TYPE CLASSIQUE ET NUCLEAIRE - ENGINS ANTIMISSILES (ABM)," vol. 10357, part 3, Library and Archives Canada, (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Anti-ballistic missiles Description An account of the resource USSR and Arms Control Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en