https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/b78e20e93c338c4e972c09c10bcba54c.pdf da6f9a4b96d0a548298c77249feb77d9 PDF Text Text 0 **" «TVUL FM NATOPARIS MAR9/67 SE0RET T^XTERL 550 PRIORITY ys yj i i -1 Document disclosed undeil the Access to Information Act oCi i " '_• ^Document divulgue en \ ertupe la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformatii jtt^-'~< ^IE /if 5%-%—urE<=^L_ V c opy INFO DISARMDELGVA LDN WASHDC EM3PARIS PERMISNY BEEN ROME SRU HAGUE PRIORITY TT CANFORCEHED PRIORITY DE OTT 9.7-11-7 BAG COPEN OSLO DE PARIS MCOW DE LDN REF 0URTEL52S MARS PAC MTGS WITH DISARMAMENT EXPERTS-ABMS DURING EXPERTS EXAM OF ABM QUESTION,WHICH CARRIED ON FROM TUE MORNINGS DISCUSSION IN NACCSEE OUR REFTEL)PROBABLY MOST SIGNIFICANT ASPECT WAS OUTLINE GIVEN OF USA APPROACH TO FORTHCOMING TALKS WITH USSR. 2.ONE MAJOR POINT WHICH EMERGED WAS THAT TALKS WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE LTD TO ABMS PER SE BUT WOULD INSTEAD INVOLVE WIDE-RANGING REVIEW OF BOTH OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE MISSILE CAPABILITY ON BOTH SIDES. USA WAS HAPPY TO ACCEPT SOVIET REQUEST THAT OFFENSIVE WEAPONS BE INCLUDED SINCE THEY HAVE LONG FELT THAT TWO ELEMENTS WERE INSEPARABLE.OVERALL USA GOAL IS TO PREVENT NEW ESCALATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND INSTEAD TO RETAIN AND EVEN ENHANCE CURRENT BALANCE. IN SOME WAYS APPROACH WILL INVOLVE ELEMENTS CONTAINED IN USA 1964 FREEZE AND CUT-OFF PROPOSALS WITH CERTAIN 3ASIC DIFFERENCES.(A)USA IS READY TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO ANTICIPATED SOVIET DEMAND THAT TALKS NOT RPT NOT CONCENTRATE ON FREEZING EXISTING SITUATION BUT RATHER CONSIDER ACHIEVING REDUCTIONS.HOWEVER USA COULD NOT RPT NOT ENVISAGE SUDDEN OR DRASTIC REDUCTIONS IN NEAR FUTURE FOR BOTH • • • C. 000333 �PAGE T'»'0 5 5 0 SPCRET ''--• a Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation TECHNICAL AND POLITICAL REASONS.( B) ALTHOUGH MOST MEANINGFUL PROPOSALS WWLD NECESSARILY INVOLVE COMPLICATED ON-SITE INSPECTIONS, USA RECOGNIZES THAT USSR MAY NOT RPT NOT BE READY TO ACCEPT THIS TYPE OF VERIFICATION AND CONSIDERS THAT USEFUL AGREEMENT COULD STILL BE ACHIEVED IF ONLY OBLIGATIONS WHICH COULD BE UNILATERALLY VERIFIED WERE INCLUDED. IN SUCH CASE VERIFICATION WOULD BE CENTERED ON MISSILE LAUNCHERS,ANY SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN WHICH COULD BE DETECTED BY NATIONAL MEANS. 3.USA REP POINTED OUT THAT ALTHOUGH USSR HAS AGREED TO EMBARK ON TALKS IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THEY ARE GENUINELY .INTERESTED IN CONCRETE AGREEMENT.IT IS EXPECTED THAT BEFORE ANY AGREEMENT COULD BE ACHIEVED RUSSIANS WOULD WISH TO SEE CURRENT GAP BETWEEN THEIR STRATEGIC CAPABILITY AND THAT OF USA AT LEAST PARTIALLY CLOSED AND MIGHT,FOR INSTANCE,DRAG OUT TALKS WHILE CONTINUING CURRENT BUILD-UP OF THEIR ICBMS AND HARDENING OF S I T E S . I F THIS WAS CASE USA WOULD HAVE TO INDICATE AT SOME STAGE THAT TALKS COULD NOT RPT NOT CONTINUE IF PROGRESS WAS NOT RPT NOT BEING MADE.HOWEVER,USA SEEMED PREPARED TO ACCEPT AT LEAST SOME REDUCTION IN GAP BETWEEN -J THEIR STRATEGIC FORCES AND THOSE OF USSR.THERE WAS ALSO POSSIBILITY THAT IN OVERALL BALANCE AGREED ON USSR WOULD MAINTAIN ITS LTD ABM SYSTEM AS COUNTER TO SUPERIOR USA OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY.AS BARBER POINTED OUT PRIVATELY USA HAS IN EFFECT ALREADY NEUTRALIZED CURRENT SOVIET ABM SYSTEM BY INCREASING NUMBER OF MISSILES TARGETED i ON AREA IT COVERS. AS RESULT, IF THERE SHOULD NOW BE NUCLEAR WAR •• •0 000334 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation PAGE THREE 552 SECRET IT^/AS PROBABLE THAT MORE MISSILES WOULD FALL ON MCOW THAN WOULD HATO BEEN CASE IF RUSSIANS HAD NOT RPT NOT DEPLOYED THEIR ABM SYSTEM. 4.FOLLOWING ARE SOME OF FACTORS USA IS CURRENTLY WEIGHING IN ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH NEGOTIATING POSTURE FOR TALKS WITH RUSSIANS. ^DEPLOYMENT OF USA ABM SYSTEM COULD,INITIALLY AT LEAST,RESULT IN SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION OF USA CASUALTIESCFROM 120 MILLION TO 30 MILLION)BUT THIS WOULD ONLY BE TEMPORARY SITUATION BECAUSE SOVIETS WOULD GO ON TO IMPROVE THEIR PENETRATION CAPABILITY AND POTENTIAL CASUALTIES WOULD MOUNT AGAIN.IN ANY EVENT MINIMUM CASUALTY FIGURE WAS STILL UNACCEPTABLE. ( B) IF USA SHOULD DECIDE TO DEPLOY ABM SYSTEM SUCH MOVE WOULD VIRTUALLY RULE OUT OTHER ARMS CONTROL MEASURES,PARTICULARLY CTB AND CUT-OFF. (C) DEPLOYMENT OF THIN A3M SYSTEM IN USA COULD GIVE EFFECTIVE COVERAGE AGAINST SMALL THIRD PARTY THREAT BUT IN POLITICAL TERMS AT LEAST IT WOULD BE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO STOP AT THIN SYSTEM. ONCE COVERAGE HAD BEEN PROVIDED FOR SOME SECTIONS OF COUNTRY PRESSURE WOULD MOUNT TO PROVIDE COMPLETE COVERAGE(D)IT IS NECESSARY TO CONSIDER WHAT ELEMENTS OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES OF BOTH SIDES MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN AGREEMENT.INITIAL USA VIEW IS THAT IT SHOULD INCLUDE ICBMS, IRBMS AND SEA-BASED MISSILES WITH RANGE OF MORE THAN 100 KMS.IT WOULD NOT RPT NOT NECESSARILY INCLUDE AIRCRAFT. IN EACH CASE THERE WOULD BE NEED TO ANALYSE RELATIVE ADVANTAGE AND PROBLEM OF VERIFICATION.IN CASE OF STATIC IC3MS,USA HAD CERTAIN SUPERIORITY,SO THAT FREEZE OR REDUCTION WOULD BE TO ITS ADVANTAGE, ... 4 000335 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation PAGE FOUR 550 SECRET ALTHOUGH AS SUGGESTED ABOVE SOME CLOSING OF GAP MIGHT BE REQUIRED W O R E BALANCE ACCEPTABLE TO USSR COULD B E A C H I E V E D . A S F A R AS MOBILE ICBMS WERE CONCERNED, USA HAD NO RPT NO PRESENT PLANS TO DEVELOP SUCH WEAPONS BUT THIS COULD BE AREA IN WHICH SOVIETS WOULD CONCENTRATE FUTURE ATTN AND VERIFICATION MIGHT WELL BE VERY DIFFICULT. HOWEVER SINCE USSR DOES NOT RPT NOT HAVE ANY AT MOMENT,DETECTION OF EVEN ONE WOULD CONSTITUTE BREACH OF AGREEMENT.NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS COULD BE VERIFIED BUT IT WOULD BE COMPLICATED TO VERIFY PRODUCTION ACTIVITIES OR QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS SUCH AS MULTIPLE WARHEADS. IN CASE OF MISSILE-CARRYING SUB-MARINES,USA HAD CLEAR ADVANTAGE AND UNILATERAL VERIFICATION SHOULD BE ADEQUATE. 5.SECOND MAJOR ASPECT OF DISCUSSION DEALT WITH POSSIBILITY OF ABM SYSTEM FOR EUROPE.THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN SUCH POSSIBILITY ON PART OF EUROPEAN REPS PRESENT AND THIS WAS STIMULATED WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR DURING REVIEW OF TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF PROPOSED USA SYSTEM THAT IT COULD BE EFFECTIVE IN EUROPE AGAINST SOVIET IR3M THREAT.CFLT TIME OF SOVIET BASED IRBM TO EUROPEAN TARTET WOULD BE IN ORDER OF SEVENTEEN MINUTES WHEREAS INTERCEPT TIME FOR SPARTAN MISSILE WOULD BE BETWEEN THREE AND SEVEN MINUTES AND FOR SPRINT TEN SECONDS). 6 . IT WAS SUGGESTED BY ONE REP THAT EUROPEAN ABM SYSTEM COULD CONSTITUTE PRACTICAL AND ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE TO MLF,BUT MOST REPS RECOGNIZED OVERWHELMING ARGUMENTS OF TECHNICAL,FINANCIAL AND P O L I T I CAL NATURE AGAINST DEPLOYMENT OF ABMS TN EUROPE.TO BEGIN WITH, ftftft„e UUUoob ...5 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act PAGE F I V E 550 SECRET Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation B E C A - ^ OF HIGH POPULATION DENSITY,THIN SYSTEM WOULD BE OUT OF QUESTIONED IN FACT SYSTEM WOULD HAVE TO BE VERY THICK TO BE OF MUCH USE.COST WOULD BE .ENORMOUS AND FOR VARIOUS TECHNICAL REASONS OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS IN REDUCING CASUALTIES WOULD BE LESS THAN IN USA.. 7.DUTCH REP POINTED OUT THAT NPT WOULD PRECLUDE EUROPEAN CONTROL OF WARHEADS. BECAUSE OF SHORT TIME. AVAILABLE IN COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCESSES HE CONSIDERED THAT EUROPEAN ABM SYSTEM WOULD HAVE TO BE USA OPERATED TO BE EFFECTIVE.. BRIT REP AGREED WITH THIS ANALYSIS BUT USA REP SUGGESTED THAT THIS WAS NOT RPT NOT NECESSARILY SO, POINTING TO CURRENT ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCE SYSTEM IN EUROPE IN WHICH THERE-IS JOINT USA-EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION. 8.MTG RECOGNIZED THAT IF PROPOSED USA-SOVIET TALKS FAILED AND USA DECIDED TO DEPLOY ABM SYSTEM THERE WOULD BE IMMED DEMAND IN EUROPE FOR SIMILAR PROTECTION.HOWEVER,SINCE USA WOULD INEVITABLY PLAY DOMINANT ROLE IN EUROPEAN SYSTEM IT WAS APPRECIATED THAT THIS WOULD CONSTITUTE FURTHER COMPLICATION IN RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN USA AND EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF ALLIANCE.TOWARD CONCLUSION OF.THIS ASPECT OF DISCUSSION BARBER SAID BLUNTLY THAT WHILE USA WAS HAPPY TO DISCUSS PROBLEM WITH ITS EUROPEAN ALLIES AND TO SHARE ITS TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE, IT SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE EXPECTED THAT USA WOULD PROPOSE ANY 'SOLUTION FOR EUROPEAN ABM PROBLEM. 9.DURING EXAM OF TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF ABM QUESTION TWO POINTS OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO CDA.EMERGED.IN FIRST PLACE USA ABM SYSTEM ... 6 . 000337 �PAGE S I X 5 5 0 SECRET Document disclosed underthe Access to information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation AS CURRENTLY-ENVISAGED DOES NOT RPT NOT CALL FOR ANY INSTALLATIONS T-0>m PLACED OUTSIDE. CONTINENTAL USA.THIS IS RESULT IN PART OF THEORY OF QUOTE TERMINAL KILL UNQUOTE IN WHICH DESTRUCTION OF OFFENSIVE WARHEAD FOR TECHNICAL REASONS IS NOT RPT NOT EXPECTED TO TAKE .; PLACE UNTIL IT I S . RELATIVELY CLOSE TO INTENDED TARGETS IT WAS SUGGES-. •TED THAT IN AVERAGE SITUATION INTERCEPTION BY SPARTAN OF. INCOMING MISSILE AIMED AT USA TARGET WOULD TAKE PLACE 380 MILES AWAY AT ALTITUDE OF 100. MILES).I T WAS RECOGNIZED,HOWEVER,THAT IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE LATER. TO PLACE SOME RADARS FARTHER NORTH TO INCREASE TRACKING TIME.SECOND POINT WAS THAT EVEN THOUGH INTERCEPTION OF SOVIET WARHEADS AIMED AT USA WOULD PROBABLY TAKE PLACE OVER CDN • TERRITORY,ENGAGEMENT WOULD' BE AT SUCH HEIGHT THAT THERE WAS UNLIKELY TO'BE SIGNIFICANT FALL-OUT PROBLEM.THIS WAS TRUE FOR BOTH SPARTAN '. AND SPRINT MISSILES. 10.ONE OTHER POINT OF INTEREST-WAS POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN • USA-USSR AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC MISSILES AND CTB.IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT IF AGREEMENT INVOLVED ONLY QUANTITATIVE LIMITATION,MISSILES . . » RACE WOULD CONTINUE IN QUALITATIVE SENSE AND IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES THERE WOULD BE STRONG DESIRE ON BOTH SIDES TO RETAIN TESTING OPTION TO FURTHER IMPROVE WARHEADS.USA.REP SUGGESTED,HOWEVER,THAT RESERVE COULD BE CASE AND THAT IF THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO CONTROL QUALITATIVE AS WELL AS QUNATITATIVE ASPECTS OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENT,CTB COULD BE IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF NECESSARY VERIFICATION SYSTEM.IN ANY CASE I T WAS SUGGESTED THAT MOST POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS 000338 ...7 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a Tinformation PAGE SEVEN 550 SECRET F O R ^ S S I L E S WOULD NOT RPT NOT INVOLVE MODIFYING WARHEADS BUT WOULD COME RATHER IN ELECTRONIC AND ENGINEERING AREAS. 11.AT CONCLUSION OF EXPERTS DISCUSSION OF ABM QUESTION USA REP ASSURED OTHERS THAT IT WAS HIS GOVTS INTENTION TO CONSULT. CLOSELY ON DEVELOPMENTS IN USA-SOVIET TALKS. 000339 � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDBM00084 Title A name given to the resource NATOParis to External 550 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 3/9/1967 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-c, file 27-11-7, "DEFENCE - CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS - ANTI - BALLISTIC MISSILES (ABM) = DEFENSE - ARMEMENTS DE TYPE CLASSIQUE ET NUCLEAIRE - ENGINS ANTIMISSILES (ABM)," vol. 10357, part 2, Library and Archives Canada, (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Anti-ballistic missiles Description An account of the resource PAC Meetings with Disarmament Experts-ABMs Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en