https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/a3cbe4ef1508dd809248e773ccfeac8d.pdf fa77ed6a445d3544de34d8a6fcd9044f PDF Text Text ur/che/if^e Access to Information Act vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information « * out by John T. McNaughton, AsI si statu Secretary of Defense for Arms Control, in a speech at a .symposium ai Ann Arbor, Michigan, in DeceniU-i. 11)02. He said: ' Wc iiu.st, in every decision we make, concern ourselves with the f NORMAN MOSS factors of stability and of the dynamic effect of the arms rare. This EHIND the argument about wheth- 7"hcir chief mentor., .p_sxb.ii.ps-- nd is so whether the decision lies in the er we should match the Soviet one of the most influential academic area of strategy, force structure or anti-missile-missile system lies a seri- specialists in defense .strategy, was research and development. ous blow for tlie policy o{ Secretary Thomas Schelling, a RAND alum"That is, when faced with the of Defense Robert B. McNamara: the ndS^rnTT - 'Har v ;< rd professor of need to make decisions in any of failure to persuade the Russians economics who published The Strat- these three key areas, we should to accept a common view with the egy °! Conflict in I960. In this and have two questions in mind: United States of strategy in a other books and articles, he con"How will the action affect stanuclear-armed world. structed some elegant metaphors for bility—stability against technological surprise, against accidents and If the Russians saw the world in competitive bargaining. McNamara's terms, in their own unexpected or misleading events, CH£L!,ING sees most international interests they would not be buildagainst a tendency for every conconflict as, in game-theory terms, frontation to spiral upwards into ing an anti-ballistic-missile system. All the arguments that he uses "variable-sum games." These are violence? | against an ABM in his disputes with games in which the amount to be "And how will the decision con-, those American military chiefs who gained by one side or the other is f favor it apply with even greater not a constant, so that a gain for one ((tribute to either quickening ori weight to a Soviet ABM system. On is not necessarily a loss for the other. . .dampening the arms race?" this and other strategic questions, he Since it is a game in which both sides The Threat of Shelters and his chief civilian advisers have have shared interests as well as com- This represented a sharp break been hoping that the Russians would peting ones, the immediate problem with the traditional value scale of heed their arguments on nuclear is communication^ Significantly, one national defense. In this scale, our strategy. On most issues, the Rus- of Schellings major essays on the weapons arc a plus, the enemy's a sians have rejected the arguments or subject was entitled "Signals and minus. In the new outlook, weapignored them. Although this is not Feedback in the Arms Dialogue." He ons however powerful that weaken the first such rebuff, it is the firmest discussed methods of communicating stability.have a minus value; weapso far because it is formulated not these interests by gestures, demon- ons that contribute to stability have strations, or commitments, and a plus value, whichever side has in words but in costly hardware. showed how a dialogue of a kind them. Washington's disappointment goes could be established in this way, 'X'C first-strike-only weapon, which to the heart of the historic novelty based on mutual interest. can be destroyed in an enemy attack of the strategic discussion today, of which the most startling new feature Actions too would play a big role and must be used in the first mois the universality of the recommen- in such a dialogue. As in Freud, ments of a nuclear exchange if it is dations. T o put it another way, every action is seen also as a gesture, to be used at all, is obviously deMcNamara is the first Secretary of and an action taken for the most stabilizing. A second-strike weapon, Defense to prescribe strategies for immediate and obvious goal can be "sulticiently shielded to survive a tliis country's potential enemies in viewed primarily in terms of the , nuclear attack, can provide time for the hope that they will adopt them signal it sends. For instance, Her- evaluation and judgment, and is for their own sake as well as ours. man Kahn has said that one reason stabilizing. When McNamara took office, this we should have the ability to evacuHence, when McNamara was ! country's military power was pre- ate our cities is that this is the asked by Stewart Alsop, in a Saturdominantly nuclear. Yet a rigorous only convincing way to communi- day Evening Post interview pubanalysis that he made of super- cate a nuclear-war ultimatum. lished in December, 1962, when he power capabilities during his first Such concepts helped to provide thought the Soviet Union would weeks on the job convinced him that the Defense Department with a ra- have invulnerable second-strike misit was impossible to win a nuclear tionale for trying to deal with the siles, he replied.,that it boils down war in any meaningful sense. The thermonuclear dilemma. With both to "the sooner the better." Then intellectuals, many of them from the sides sharing an interest in stability, Tbinus 1'auTing drew the logical conRAND Corporation, who came to the" objective was to design forces elusion and told a friend in the Dethe Department of Defense in 1961 primarily to achieve stability rather fense Department that the United could not ignore this contradiction. than victory, and to influence the llStates should build some Polaris Indeed, most of them had been other side to do the same. ^submarines for Russia. "= ~ " deeply concerned with it even ~Ih McNamara's view, a major cityT h e implication of all this for before joining McNamara's staff. U.S. strategic planning was spelled defending program, whether active McNamara's ABM Policv: A Failure of CoimmwMoaAkHi*v ¥T B S 34 THE REPORTER 000282 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur Tacces a I'information e^Rss (ctefensive^Kissiles) or passive (civil defense) ^ ^ V have to be considered destabilizing, it would imply prepara tions for nuclear war and would try to deny cities to the other side as hostages; hence it would be provocative, and likely to accelerate the arms race. Indeed, a senior Pentagon official told me recently that an ARM system is considered a first-strike •weapon, since it works optimally only when the side po55ejisi!ig~Eu strikes first anr| damages the other side's offense. He admitted that one v could extend this evaluation, logically if somewhat metaphysically, to the point where shelters could be called a first-strike weapon. The Pentagon strategy called for all kinds of barriers to be erected this side of all-out nuclear war, including even the option of limited nuclear war. i ne major deterrent, of course, has taken the form of a counterforce strategy, in which an attack is concentrated on the.enemy|s. forces rather than his cities, holding _ his cities hostage for yours. But this kind of barrier, like a bridge, must \ rest on both sides of the chasm. The Russians were expected to acquire an understanding of all this by observing the American defense posture, by studying the literature and arguments on military strategy within America, by noting the significance of occasional gestures in (heir direction, and by private meetly ings with U.S. scientists and strategic | analysts. Communication was to be | subtle, and agreement tacit. preted. Schelling says this indicates a sharpened Soviet interest in what American strategic analysts are saying, and he draws from the episode a maxim on communication: "If you want to get somebody's ear, listen to him." Do They Read Ue? In the Defense Department view, the United States defense posture has been clearly delineated by a succession of signals. There was for all the world to see an emphasis on second-strike weapons like Minuteman and Polaris. In 1963, McNamara canceled the B-70 program (bombers are always first-strike) in favor of still more missiles. The United States dismantled the firststrike Thor and Jupite¥~Tc-ckets, p*oise3~and exposed on their launching pads irTTSntain, ttafy^and T u r k e y It had also consistently abjured evacuation programs and ABM deployment. The significance of these moves has failed to get through to the Russians delighted to see them take such an in the way the Defense Department interest in it. I'm as proubd of the planners hoped it would. As one effect this report is having as any- government official said, "If you told a Russian general that you hoped thing I've done around here." There has also been communica- Russia got invulnerable, missiles tion on less official levels, rol' in- soon, he would simply assume that stance, in the course or~trie Pugwash he had a lousy interpreter/' Conferences between scientists of There is no equivalent in Russia East and West that have been of the Amei ican*~civUiah defense held over the last ten years, intellectual. Soviet strategy is fashAmerican scientists have discussed ioned and debated almost exclusivesophisticated ideas of nuclear strat- ly by military men who have a egy with Soviet scientists and suc- simple, fixed-sum-game view of the \ ceeded in putting across some of the world, which they share with most American points of view, by no means American military men: what's good "JITCNAMARA himself paid unusual •*•'-•• testimony to the importance of always the same ones. But while for the other side must be bad for this kind of oblique and provisional many of the American scientists have ns, and vice versa. Soviet military commentators have communication in the course of an been men close to or directly ininterview with Richard Starnes of the volved with Pentagon planning, few said that counterforce and limited Scripps-Howard Newspapers that if any of the Russians have an equiv- war are devices by which the Americans hope to wage aggressive war ap|5eared on January 25. Referring alent influence in Soviet policy E TITis is not to say that Soviet and escape nuclear retaliation. Soto the annual statement for Congress on defense policies, McNamara said: military men do not read the Ameri-* viet leaders have said several times "This one is the classified version, am journals in which strategic dis- quite pointedly that any kind of but we also put out an unclassified cussion goes on, not to mention the attack on the Soviet Union would version that I believe has done more annual Defense Department state : bring down on the attacker's cities i to dispel Soviet misunderstanding of ments. Schelling has pointed out the full weight of nuclear _ retafi. /American policy and aims than any- that the authoritative Soviet text- atioTTTTntleecrrEvTaisiial Sokolovsky's / thing else we've ever done. As soon book Soviet. Military Strategy, ed- boo IT" rejects counterforce doctrine / as (be unclassified report is pub- ited by Marshal Vasily Sokojovsky, as "some sort of suggestion to then / lished, the Soviet Embassy grabs contained revisions in its second Soviet Union as 'rules' for the con-l [ dozens of them and ships them edition that took account of Amer- duct of nuclear war." ican comments upon it, clarifying home. T o be sure, Soviet deployment has "We don't publish them for their some points that the authors felt not run counter to all the Defense exclusive benefit, of course, but I'm the American writers had misinter- Department's prescription for it; February 23, 1967 t 000283 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a Tinformation t some Russian reactions to the situa- MK.s that weie useless as night fighttion in which we all live are bound ers, they are drilling the population to be the same as Washington's. in civil defense, am! now they nre They have, for instance, hardened deploying an AIVM systt-m. They their missiles, converting most of tend to feel (hat a in A met it an uhn them into second-*«like weapons. tells them how to defend thru counBut this is old-fashioned military try has got one hell of a nerve. common sense. They have been even Major General Nikolai Tulenski. more unequivocal than we have in the most articulate Soviet commenfollowing a non-jjroliferatioh policy: tator on nuclear strategy, has argued .> \f| there is no question of any kind of explicitly in favor of an ABM system nuclear-sharing arrangement between in an article" printedEtn the Soviet the Soviet Union and its allies. magazine International Affairs. GenThey have even begun to con- eral Talenski is^eirTftlormed on sider' a non-nuclear option. Thomas western strategic discussion, and has W._ Wolfe, the RAND Corporation talked with leading American deanalyst of Soviet military affairs, has fense intellectuals. His article shows noted several remarks in Soviet jour- k the gulf still dividing them. To him, nals recently that a war in Europe I defense is still defense, and cannot need not necessarily be nuclear, and I be provocative: the WafS3w Pact" maneuvers in the "Only the side which intends to .fall of 1965 involved fighting in use its means of attack for aggressive "Europe without the use of nuclear purjDoses can wish to slow down the weapons. But all the signs are that creation and improvement of antiI tiiese strategies have been arrived missile defense systems. For the at independently, and have not been jjeace-lovmg stales, anti-missile sysj influenced by American arguments. tems are reafly~a"means of building ~~ There was actually one moment, up their security." * B e went on toEay: "The creation however, when things looked as if they might work out according to of an effective anti-missile missile the Schelling book. In April, 1964, system enables the state to make its President Johnson announced that defenses dependent chiefly on its the United States was cutting back own capabilities, not only on mutual on the production of fissionable ma- deterrence, that is, on the good will terial for weapottir"SimuItaneousJy,~ of the other side." the SovieT^ovefnrhent. unilaterally The latest American message to and with no reference to the Ameri- the Russians, carried by Ambassador can move, announced that it was Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., when cutting back on prochicdoiEj>FT^ he returned to his post, goes beyond sionable niatenalC This was Tlie gestures, implications, and argukind of tacit agreement, non-nego- ments in scholarly journals. It makes tiated arms comro], that Defense an explicit, government-to-governDepartment intellectuals were hop- ment offer: a straightforward, olding to achieve. Unfortunately, it fashioned treaty barring ABM systems. didn't progress far. And in Novem- This is the equivalent of saying, ber of that year, the AEC stated that "If you won't listen when I whisjier, so far as it knew, Soviet production will you listen when I shout?" had not been cut back. It seems unlikely that they will. For one thing, they are already dejjloyMoscow's Defense Mechanisms ing ABMS; for another, even the The clearest rejection of the Ameri- leadership must by now have heard can strategic concepts has been the arguments, and turned them the Soviet emphasis on defense. down to act in the way they were Russian history and Communist taught. Most Soviet-affairs experts in ideology both emphasise fighting off Washington feel that defense of the attacks from without: the Russians frontiers with whatever weapons are will go through the motions of de- available is still an article of faith fending their territory with" what- with Soviet officials, and rational 1 ever they haverA"fih"dugh^ney~now analyses that could undermine thisjV il have on station"an impressive array Jpositibn are to be repulsed ratherj of ICBMS, it falls far short of match than answered. V ing the U.S. missile force. They The one aspect of McNamara's produced an expensive force of policy that the Russians have ac- ( cepted completely is precisely that which theyTmight seem least likely to accept: American numerical superiority in missiles. They have not -<-rio»sly challenged it; they did not even try to steal ;r march on the United States after their first sputnik. What their strategic posture amounts to is minimum deterrence, modified today, perhaps, by aEionnuclear option. While tlie United States emphasizes restraint, tight control over nuclear weapons, and the prospect of careful discrimination in their use, the Soviet Union threatens furious, spasmodic destruction in response to anyETttackE In terms of deterrence, it must be said, this is a more jilausible stand for the power with fewer missiles than is the position taken by the United States. If you carry a smaller stick, then it may not be a good idea to speak softly. On the other hand, this Soviet inferiority makes even less sense of their ABM systern. Th" military terms. It could proviHeeffective defense only against a weaker opponent, unable to overwhelm any single part of the system with the quantity and variety of his missiles. China could be such an opponent in the next decade, but the ARM system seems not to be deployed against that threat. rj^HF. FAILURE so far to achieve -*• much of a strategic understanding with the Russians does not imply any basic failure in American strategy. Nothing in the U.S. defense posture requires Soviet agreement, neither the controlled-response doctrine nor the absence of ah ABM system. Not everyone on this side is equally disappointed. Secretary McNamara himself feels that useful communication has been established, and he is prepared to exercise patience and wait for more. The strategic problem that we and the Russians face is, after all, still relatively new. McNamara has not yet persuaded all of the American military or Congress of the correctness of his approach; it is hardly surprising that he has not yet persuaded the Russians. The problem is, essentially, the coexistence of vulnerability to annihilation with national soveran i eigntyEand it will be with us for some time. " 36 p -— — THE REPORTER 000284 � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDBM00073 Title A name given to the resource Transcript of Article Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2/23/1967 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-c, file 27-11-7, "DEFENCE - CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS - ANTI - BALLISTIC MISSILES (ABM) = DEFENSE - ARMEMENTS DE TYPE CLASSIQUE ET NUCLEAIRE - ENGINS ANTIMISSILES (ABM)," vol. 10357, part 2, Library and Archives Canada, (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Anti-ballistic missiles Description An account of the resource McNamara's ABM Policy: A Failure of Communications Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en