https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/3c298d60363b655e5004361309c99129.pdf 09e9b6e0db13957830e76a8a70f0aa13 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to information Act Document dtvulgue eifVertu de te toi'svr facets a {'information i /i ty.J 11-11- 0* on Briofiag Qirea by tb* United state* Seotloi <z?xll; 7 AL tbat a doaiateB by tha USA to deploy aa ABM ay stea vajuld hare aofld '*flrta iaplloetlOB* aad would stlaulate of a rm* phase in tha taken at tb* .JE toe IntttntUn tha United State* initiative a, ia October 1966 ta brief tb* ^"Hi'n tathtrltlor oa tb* broad political implication* of a ^oaalble United state* rtnlatoii ta ifiplay aa AM systea. v* are grateful to bar* thia useful anal/sis and to hare tbe opportunity it. 2. Xa diaouaalng tb* pitalM* off eota of a daoiaian to deploy ASK9* tb* aajhaala of ta* Uni ed State* btiofiag U oa So*lot-Q3a relation*, ada* aad Asia. w* aasua* that a >Us*aul*n of tbo lnplioatiens for oar AUiea vdll tab* plaoe ia tbo *e*loar Plaaatat Qroup of HATO aad tbat tho apedfio a deoiaion for Canada will bo def Bf bilaterally iata* context of Berth For our part aa ara open to any further United State* aaajooilon for ooaeultatlon which too dorol*pt*g aituatioa eight warrant, 3. Tbo Gnitad state* briefing doe* art attoaot ta foraalate explicit bat rather aet* oat la a aad factor* bearing oa a decision to deploy or art te deploy aa AM ayatea! 000236 j �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de ta Loi sur tacces a I'information ^Tellowlng r*T*^ftn oaaaaate aro addressed to eese of thee* palate sad thoir lapUoitlon* without attempting te provide a full exposition of tha Canadian position. ftottdthstandlng, i t ia th* Canadian Qorernaant** hop* that i t v i l l bo pooaihU for tb* Bolted State* and tbo Soviet Union te reach an to deploy Aatt-bollistic raoeile defence. k. Wo oonour ia tbo via* tbatrtsp1*y**atof ASM** would aot offer tbo prospoot of a -perfect" defence. Aa stated in tho briofiag tboro sees* te bo a* in whioh "sither country could bo confident of pt»Teatlng rtgatfloaat ossualties oven i f thoy opoat largo saa* oa AM'*". Therefore, a dsasge*limiting policy of active defence would not offset aaterially thortOfoadonniof either eouatry oa it* dootraotto* ••amring a starrest forcee (•<Mood strike capability) te prevent a fuilsealo nueloar exchange. Oar inference froa tbis • aotion ia thst for tho tiao being st least there is l i t t l e baste ia 1toras of deterronoo for tho ilsplaj—at of sa ABM ayHaa by either tbo USSR or tho SSA. Thia oonolasioa i s aot substantially affected by tbo answer* offered te say of tbo foar hay '|Bo*tl*i*i oa pp > ? • Aa far as tbo B3SR activation i s oaaseraod. \)m briofiag pspoaassaia** tbo reasoning behind tbo Soviet deployment which i s now taking plaoe ead tbio i s discussed bolow. Bat tboro has also boon considerable aaa port expressed for OSA dsjileyaeoJ sad wo 000237 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de ta Loi sur I'acces a I'information think that tho paper would hare prefltted froa some attenticn te thio point JJt fer ao other rseaon than to illustrate tho wosrn—ssi of tbo oasa for early aad extensive deployment?. 5. Another pods* about BBA deployment against tbo Soviet Union io that tho oaotees listed aa a) te o) oa page * would aooa te apply os aaaa te strategic Planning la th* DBA a* la tha BBS** Tha rospoaoo te deployment by tha Soviet Union need aot bo equal aad opposite (AM •metohiag") but ahould bo tbo ate of "offensive" aad "defensive" weaponry whioh best sstisftes tho oost-offectiveaces, psychological and sdlitery criteria asntionsd on p. 5. 6. Finally, w* wonder whether the ceoo for USA deployment eight not bo i rtiTtHnrl la tea diffarias situationot tbo tfr1«tlTBT oa* in mates, tha BBSS ooatinsed Ii efforts te seek s satestismg aad a aeoead aituation in whioh tho BBS* began sore rapid deployment of a more advissul system* It soma* to us tbat BBA roses*** in tho te* oases sight bo snmsidsrshly different. ?• This paragraph deals with point* hraagH out ia thro* SBstlon* ef tb* i briofiag pspor, "strategic balance", "oommantestlng latsnttene to adversaries* aad •Soviet thinking" which ere clooely inter-related. To answer tbo query about i Soviet polioy which tbo paper makes oa p*JO« wo must say thst oar discissions with i I Soviet loaders have not revealed amy hitherto unknown Information or visa* a* 000238 ...4 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a I'information U. - H * SECRET Jtrategic objectives or plans. We can only speculate on the basis of observation of Soviet developnents and indications of Soviet thinking on related issues. Perhaps it would be helpful, however, to set down the possible reasons whioh have led to Soviet deployment of ABM's on their present limited scale* (1) It might originally have been the Soviet's hope to develop damage-limiting system which would be so effective as fundamentally to upset the strategic balance and make the threat of a first-strike credible. (2) appeal of new weaponry. There might have been some attraction to Soviet leaders to deploy a system which they loudly claimed could "hit a fly in the sky". (3) internal considerations, while it is possible that ABM's have been installed in order to re*oe*me Soviet citisena about their security in a way which seems more tangible than missile farms located away from the cities, this motive is inconsistent with the fact that almost nothing has been printed in the Soviet press about ABM deployment. (*0 defence of the heartland. An important element of Soviet strategio thinking, as mentioned on p.21, is to safeguard to the best of their ability the Soviet heartland - regardless of cost, effect on Soviet economy or dangers of USA reaction* ... 5 000239 �Document disclosed underthe Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Lot sur faeces a fit.for mat -5- Mat (5) inevitability of deployment. While i t may be two that tho USSR saw AM** ao aa inevitable "fast of life", wo would not give thia factor th* same weight as Is apparoatV given on p.21, particularly if "no evidence of internal Soviet debate" lo available. If this catalogue of possibls reasons reflects tbo motivation for Soviet AM •splejmooi. our tentative assessment about tbo "single generalisation" nsaoribtng Soviet attitude* would be one of uncertainty. Thoy may have begun deployment hoping to upset tbo strategio balance bat their actions ln the peat two year* do art suggest, that tha systems thoy have ba* fulfilled thoss hopes. Even tho exaggerated claim* for defensive ml—ile* have boon watered down since tbo abruaebov era. Soviet military planners may bo sb**ss*d with defence of tho heartland, bat tbooo emotional faetera hav* not led te more than a vory alow and limited deployment of A3M»*. At tbo earn* time, although tho Soviets have beoa exposed te tho politioal -strategic argument* agaiast ASH'o, thoy hove not, as th* briefing paper pointa eat oa p.2), r*s*ted by sii*intoning tbo project. Aad finally, although thoy ar* credited with being aware of tho debate in the USA •a possible deployment as a result of thoir awn deployment, tho Basaiss* do art so far ism te have learned the lessen af tbo "mtesilo goo" controversy whioh left them relatively weaker through USA action. The oanslnslon vtoleh we drew from this set of ooaflict of ideas is tbat i t U extremely difficult to predict 000240 »».o �£s em Q * Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de ta Loi sur I'acces a {'information ' \Zf**Z E*1* em> ho way la which tho Soviet Union will respond to overture* by tbo United State* in tbo coming months. It is even more hazerdoua to predict what tho QBtt mould do in response to even limited USA deployment. Would thoy simply consider this •top so paralleling thoir own* thereby requiring a* specific fsspaaos, or would thoy apply a double standard? Would thoy bo concerned that the USA might aobiovo tho iUoeory "perfect defence" whioh mould upset tbo balance aad ss react by o vastly expaarlorl AH pl'QglssBoT Would thoy coolly calculate the oost-eff ectlvones* of further AM deployment against tbo othor option* outlined oa p.* of tbo briefing pep art Weald tbo penny drop finally about tbo desirability of arms oontrol to prevent dostablllsatlon, and thus lead to agreementt V* do art know bat wo com idem the possibility Of undesirable answers to th* above question* Sufficiently likely to hop* that th* USA will be able to reach accord with the Soviet Union before a situation is created in which tho Soviet Union will hove te make choices. TaL w .Vf ci,mng3T 9. 9K«A Given available intelligence mo consider i t prod sat, as is the case ia tbo paper on p.6, te ^eave open any Judgements shout tbo msgaltmdo of Chinese aaoloar forco* in th* coming decade. For example, i t appears that resent Chines* progress in missiles, fissile material prodoctloa oad possibly else ln warhoad tinhWIsgy has exceeded the rate predicted by cetera observers. Would It bo realistic te bee* oar oalomlsttem for tbo aid-19?0»a on a maximum of mare than 000241 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'informathi . 7 . gjgg£ w the 25 Chicom wistiles nontianed on p.S? 10. Tho emphasis in th* argument! forrt*n1oyamatagainst China is en defence rather than deterrence. • lthcut for tho moment oaBaoatlag oa that distinction, we suspect that ths defensive benefit* of tbo AM would bo confined to a very abort period. As stated oa p.B. tbo Oilnass "cannot mount amy aanlear threat against /th* nsjj today". By tho I96OU, th* Chine** nuclear armoury eight asm* become 00 odvancod sad strong that tho same factors whioh pertain to tho Soviet Union today would alao apply te China: an ••effective" defense would s t i l l permit casuaUtes aumbaring la tbo teas of million*. 11. Walla realising tbo limitation* of *p*oe in tho paper, wo think that aero attenticn might have boon devoted te expanding tbo points oa p.9 that "tho chance of effective def ease •gainst /nuclear attaok by OiineJ seems very good" aad later on the seme page that tbs BSA has "a formidable range of capabilities and opticas te moot tbooo various problems", Tbo asters of tbo "capabilities aad •ption** sad tb* -chance ef effective defence" would krgely determine ths efficacy of deploying o light AM system in ths near future. Ia tbe sbsmoas of oath oa exposition, wo find i t difficult to aasese the esse for deployment against China 12. Wo would be particularly osnosrasd te have full arioso** of this aspect of the problem If deployment against China wore to serve aa a compromise beter^ 242 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a I'information 8 - - j - . - - - ,. -' % w*upport*r* of a f u l l defenoe against the Soviet threat and these who oppose any AM deployment in tho present circumstance*. I t would be our fear that sash * unmpramlse would facilitate extension of the system to levels whioh would not originally have boo* considered desirable. In our view, the decisions oa this v i t a l setter •hould be taken on their merit* not aa a compromise but ss the result of tbo best strategio, politioal aad sssnisdn analysis available. 13. Wo note a difference ia tb* treatment of tb* AM as a deterrent in tbo Oaoo of Chins from that af tho USSR, aot only in tens* of capability but also in terms of Intention. JBypMsHTy because of com* yoar* of relatively respoailVilo behaviour with aueleer weapon* by tbo Soviet Union, tbo paper aaaumo* that i t wishee to svoid direct armed conflict, whereas in ths oaoo of China, this •someptton i e net mad*. As ths briefing suggests oa p.8, China's nuclear weapon Bffigfiasi will art automatically leed te tbo adoption cf a polioy of military reokl—smees la general or nuclear re*k1e*»noss l a partieular. At tho oame time tbo psper suggests thst tho Chineee may set always prssstd oa the basis of rational whatever decision. Ao o r e s u l t / their reaord of Action and statement in tho pest, wo can onlytamerwhat tb* Hrtmoes approach will be when they actually p—s*s nuolear weapon*. In tho meantime, for strategic pleasing purposes, tbe most dangerous •"000243 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information As s deterrent, even If i t were decided that off*n*iv* capabilities % in general preferable ta active defence, an ABM systea could Iced to a lowering of Chins** aggressiveness in some situations aa ilassiiboJ on p.9. 15. a *-ro& that • IftyftgjBsssJk oOOjgte to* ir.crer.se fee, a***, ejpj af ort rotiuired te maintain th* Chine** threat to tbo BBA. would probably art dlecoarogo Gblaa froa devoting i*s*me** te tha acquisition of a nueloar capability, a* soo their weapon* prograas* largely the result of the pceoession by the OSS* aad BBA of large nuclear arsenals - aet of the particular "six" cf those arsenals. As long a* tboro i s no nuclear disarmament bote*** tho super-powers (sad ao hiadamsntsl internal changes), tbo Chineee will in a l l likelihood thoir nuclear progress*. 16* On ths ether hand i t ia worth considering whether early deployment by tho United State* might aot load ^essaiiilstnilim te acquire a* more than a token IC3M capability against Berth America but increase l t e efforts te build o sore powerful sodium range nucleer capability whioh could be deployed against I t s Asian neighbours, including tho vital areas of tbo BBBR ln sia. Assuming that tbo Aslaa allies oftho United state* oould sot be supplied with an effective defence against MBB>'»s the Chinese could thereby better exploit tbo oomplor attitudes of Asian neighbour* toward tbofuture dependability of the United Statee aa an ally. I t i s morth in wall if lag ia this ooanootio* that in ths long p w i ^ 0 2 4 4 ...10 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Lot sur faeces a I'information . 10 - jfcp to tho sdd-1960»s, before tbe Soviet Union hod a worth while nmsleer delivery capability, i t inveatod in malear capabilitia* against Europe. Tbe concept of "hostage Europe* was an Important part of Soviot strategy until a significant part of tho papulation of Berth /.merle* oould alas bo soda their "hostage". A similar polioy might appeal te Communist Chios* 17. RvpswHng oa the commas** st tho bottom of p.10 of tho paper concerning "Soviet Aspects" we would saggsot that USA deployment against China ahould be aeeesaed as though i t wore really against tbo USSR bscsuss of tho f ollowiagj (*) th* reason for deployment oould only with difficulty bo eemmanloated te tho Soviot Union. As rtlssnssml in ths ssotlon on the strategio dctsrromt sad noted on pp. 22 and 23 of ths paper, many salient point* about ABM**, although understood, do aot seem te have struck boas te tb* BSStl. Wo could easily foresee Soviet doubt about or disbelief In USA intentions, despite announced policy aad private assurance* as described en p.l6. (b) this is reinforced by tho physioai nature of a light AM systea. Although directed against China, a thin system would not be oaaaaBtrated along tao west coast. It would have to be deployed la suoh o way aa to def and against missile* which oould reach all parts of th* USA and whioh would strike from tbe north rather than from tbo Pacific. Psisaosbly also, tbo •belter progyssa* chosen for e light defence would bo appropriate to, if 000245 �Document disclosed underthe Access to Information ActDocument divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a Cinformatior e'eim S£Ci£T ast a* extensive as, a programme directed against a Soviot thr*at. (c) i t would not bo possible for tho USSR to know whether tho initial thin BBA deployment was ths first stage of a full aystem but thoy would have te •omum* the worst. Wo support te* answer on page U to tho question of whether BBA deployment aight moderate the Chinese position vis I vis the USSR. I t would bo mar* likely that reciprocal deployment by the Soviet Anion sad tbe USA would be interpreted by China, not aa steps against sash other, but as collusion against i t . emcrs i:< asiA 19* A& T.IE r i q n q cr UMIX>T STATLS ABK L&I&IHSX Wo ore aot entirely clear what tho paper spans when i t speaks of Asian fears of the USAte "opting out". The idea ia advanced in two form*: on page 12 th* pap*r refers te possible Asian fear* arising out of "greater freedom of tbo U.3. to opt out of future nsoflmer conflict"; oa page lh in connect Ion with Japanese reactions i t refer* to ''freedom te opt out of future elan conflict*"• We would tbtekii useful te clarify what kind cf "opting out" by the USA i s likely te be feared by l t e friends and allies aad then try to determine bow B.8. deployment of AM** against China sight affect auoh fears. Oas form sight bo o complete departure from Asls, booed presumably oa the precise tbat United states pr***noe sad interests in Asls are primarily a f i r st Use of defence for the 000246 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information • 12 - :iiCr. ; United Statee, ths value ef whioh aight decline or even disappear by the deployment of AM**. Th* other for* of "opting out" whioh Asians might fear i s baaed on the possibility that ths United States eight net support then ln a specific dispute or conflict with China. If ths refusal ware based on politioal factors, the existence of AM defenses in tbe BBA oould be considered as irrelevant; refusal on etrategie grounds, however, would bo effected by the existence of ABK defences. The degree of Aslaa fears arislag sat of a greater freedom for tho United Stateo to "opt cut* would depend to o largo extent on the interpretaticn whioh ths Asians themselves ••crib* to U.3, lnvolv*o*nt in Asia. .... 13 �Document disclosed uni Document divulgue en v< -13 •-. r \- A 7 , .. .-•• • -AA- .... ..:. Eb.-...: Thio section concludes with the pertinent judgment thst, gsaorally specking, tbo reaction* of non-aligned uounUUs will neither bo intense nor particularly relevant, te think, hcwovor, that greater w*ight sight te given to tho effects of AW deployment referred to ln tb* dieousaloa oa •Oeaoral Bffoots" (psragrsphs 1 sad 2 of pago 13). Any upward stop to tha arms race. Bad particularly one of this xoognltude, may te expected to have aa impact on int.r-^t tonal opinion. ?o quote the paper "decisions ^Fsgording wo span* doaUuumsidJ based oa . . . national interests ar* Inflaenoed by tbo international environment". while tte deployment of oa AEM system ia not likely to hav* any direct laflnonoo j ! OB the standpoint, for Ins tones, of Middle East countries with respect te tb* development of nueloor weapons, i t sight contribute to a climate ef opinion in which farther dsstabll 1st ng military development would bo mors likely. 21. Ao to tho possible attitudes of potential nuelsar lower* as a^ree tbat United States deploy**** of on AM system against China could soke tb* Baited States more reliable ia Indian ays* urorldod suoh deployment did not load to a deterioration of relations between the U.3. aad tbs Soviet Union (page lit)* On tte othor hand, tte Indians, like tbs Jeparwss sad tbo other 000248 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de ta Loi sur faeces a I'information - li* - BBBBJIT Asian slliso of tbs U.S. might feel thst a U.5. doployment against Chins would give nor* fr»*0OJi to tb* United states with respect to future Asian oonflicts. 0* bate***, however, ws ogres that to ths Indiana, tha Ualted State* would probably appear more rather than low reliable! this te tarn would mot naeoeoeriJy abate Indian oimminrn about their seourity aad oould (if tboro aero no nonproliferation treaty) accelerate aa Indian decision to develop nueloar weapons. 22. Tho prospects for s rxMV-proliferation treaty algnificantly offset most of ths aoosidsrotions in pp. 13*16. USA AM doployment, following ths sonolwslnn of * non-proliferation treaty would not, of course, eliminate ths desire of tbs U.S.'» allies for aossTBBoas of thslr security, but tho available option* would hav* boo* affected. Far cMtsple, tte pressure* might increase from ooo* countries as Japan sad beat Oermeny, having denied th—mslwss national oontrol of wsspons, te hav* tte BBA oatablloh sa AR* ayatea oa tteir territory water USA iia**riii1p and control. It would have te bo oomldorod, however, wtethar such deployment - if i t were over contemplated - aight aot load te withdraws! fro* ths nun smell for st inn treaty by tbo USSR. Alternatively, ASM doployment ln tbo BBA ia post-treaty circumstances would focus sore attention on tbs need for BMwrsaass along ths line* of th* tesygia or Johnoon proposal*. Finally, AM 000249 �Document disclosed underthe Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de ta Loi sur faeces a I'information % w deployment might strain th* noh-prclif*raticn treaty for those near-nuclear power* whoso reluctant signature a** based oo th* empoetation tbat there would te naolaar disarmament or ot least s *ign of nuclear restraint on tbs part of the super-powers. BtTZCf OP AM DgFLOntteT 23. v* weuld *upport th* view **pr—**d on page 16 "that AM deployment . . . could adversely affect tte negotiating climate for are* oontrol esssiiios". IB fact, ws think that deployment would almost certainly work prejudicially in this are*. 2U. Bet only would doployaeat reflect on unwillingness to work seriously for arms oontrol measure* involving nuclear weapons bat i t mould also represent a movement away from tte desired reduction of ore*, We do not consider ths possibility saggostsd ln ths fteal two s*ntonce* ao very likely; if th* realisation of coot sad look cf advantegs to te derived from another spiral is not sufflatently appreciated before deployment, auoh o realisation would come too late to prevent dsloterious effects on eras control prospects. 25. It aight te questioned abetter, ao suggested oa page IB that ATWo would oalj hsvs tb* effect of "any otter major now weapons urogram*, te haw* wo reservatior o stra the other pe;v*hotegJeul. 000250 . . . 16 ^^^^ai �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a {'informatio Xn strategic tors* i t os* to argued that a dsfsasive deployment mould toad to generate « greater spiral of procurement by both tho USSR and th* USA tha* would tte expenditure of the seas amount of money on ICBM's. In psychological tor**, ABM deployment would appear to hav* a much stronger impact on tho ansa control scene than othor systems. Tte recent USA sitiiimnsassiit, to develop Ktoate Nan III aad Foooldon haa evoked relatively little public reaction and doss aot appear to hav* interfered with tha possibility of arme oontrol agreements. Thase proonrssjsat programs will involve very largo eayratf 1 tunw comparable to martial AM doployment. 'do ore already witnessing, moreover, th* initial public impact of tbo revelation of AM doployment around RB**av and a decision by tha BBA to deploy ABH** would have a special effect on both government* and people of test sad west. For good or i l l , ABK deploymsnt mill te considered aa more the* "any major weapon* program", not only because tbs publicity which baa already teen fooaaaod on i t , but also far tte personal involvement which i t would entail. Tte effect of constructing a vast bomb shelter sotoorh • whioh, it appears, is an integral part of aa AM ayatam - are incalculable. Tho only Otgiamnt against thoss are* oontrol ooaaldoratlon* could b* that arms oontrol •grsimsnt* are ao unlikely whatever happen* in tte ASK field that oo* sea 000251 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information * V 1 7 " | • •-.;-; safely ignore this qasatlon in evaluating ths necessity to deploy. •.« do aot subscribe to this argument, especially to tho light of recent movements on To revert mors cpocificolly to tho four partioular ate* oontrol related to the A^ quostioni (1) s*B-FroliferstiOB. te would tend to agree with tho final judgement in the paper tbat svon with th* prospect of th* USA aad USSR —««—•*««*; their nuclear foroes, most countries - probably all which would otherwise do so *> would s t i l l sign a ron-proHferation treaty, to resngnlae tost the paper was written before tbo current bilateral negotiations had begun: coB*semmatly, tbs perspective sad the tins table Implicit in ths paper sr* somewhat different. If th* bilateral USA-USSR talks load to early on treaty language, the choice of signing or not *>^gM^,*ji will nrirtiBlny arise before i t becomes apparent whether tha USA intends to deploy ABM's. '»*> would hop* thst any USA decision to deploy - if one war* to te taken - would ba held back so aa not to interfere with adterenso to a BOB* proliferation treaty. (2) Comprehensive Tost Baa. Th* paper deals with this problem fro* tho point of view of ths sf foot which a baa mould have on AM deployment. wo largely 000252 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'informatio - 18 oaaaar with th* eosmsnta a* they stood but wa think tbat sans attention Should be paid to tb* opposite relationship* that te, to th* effect of ABK deployment on either negotiations for an undergteasd teat baa or tb* existing atmospheric baa. if a major decision is taken to proceed with doployment wo consider thst tho prospoote for a comprehensive teat baa would diminish. Th* climate of opinion bringing about deploy sent might els* lead to strong pressures for further testing to issaovs the efficiency of tte weapons systea. In suoh circumstances, oven if tbo illaa^isesmjiit over verification (on-cite inspection*; mars aattted, i t would probably ba more difficult to stop testing, Thare would oven exist the possibility albeit remote - tost deployment of ABM'* might engender pressures for renewed atmospheric testing in order to demonstrate ths effectiveness of ths Bmjrioemos ssB^temmj ii, bel ssmj**jB> -Off. B*ro a ain, we would point out that, while not questioning the points mads in the paper, i t is equally important to aeasas tha effect which AM** would have on tbs cut-off proposals. It can bs argued that any hap* of achieving * cessation of f toaile aatorial production, (at present admittedly not bright), would diasppaar if A?J4 progiem* went ahead* In a "matching" of defence deployment, the USSR mould wish to 000253 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a I'information - 19 - •="-»-« ••' •savor* toot i t Hod * *uf ficient supply ef material far tho several rlsaged in a large scale ABK system sad would be "responsive than now to accept a cut-off cf production. SBCV'a. I t i s logical te include ABM's te say "freese" proposals snd aot te dlatlngstoh between "offensive" and "defensive* strategic system*. Attempts tc make the latter dtetlaotion hav* proved uuauscssaful in the psst and probably rightly so *s both elements oak* up tbe 'balance of deterrence" in to* nuclear ago* 2?. We agree vlth the paper** point thst ABM deployment would "sosplisste efforts to achieve an over-ell SBCV free**". Wo would ada, however, that whereas i t does not make much saawe te talk about a "freese* on -offensive" SJ£V** white leaving sat ABM**, tho icsoioe io aot trust igfioasMt oould realistically te •ought on ABM** without including a oowslats "freese*. If attained, however, i t could provide a useful evsmpls sf mutual restraint in nuolear weapons ead oould perhaps facilitate seme progress in tho "frees*" sf th* 's aa a whole. To reiterate! we think that ABK deployment would adversely affect tbe futaro ef araa control through tbs negative climate created and through tbo speciflc pressure* on •pecifie agreements, whioh would thereby brake to* being built up by the outer apace aad aon-prollf •ratten treaties. 000254 � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDBM00061 Title A name given to the resource Draft Comments Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1/25/1967 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-c, file 27-11-7, "DEFENCE - CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS - ANTI - BALLISTIC MISSILES (ABM) = DEFENSE - ARMEMENTS DE TYPE CLASSIQUE ET NUCLEAIRE - ENGINS ANTIMISSILES (ABM)," vol. 10357, part 2, Library and Archives Canada, (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Anti-ballistic missiles Description An account of the resource Canadian Comments on Briefing Given by the US Section to the PJBD Meeting of October, 1966 on ABMs Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en