https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/9d683efdcd34e7414fbd2dde6fed3371.pdf 524b2858548082e66fc719832b40c3d1 PDF Text Text 1/J..H.. tmts..,\£ii}.£0\~D.L*.00Sslu*j -,A Document disclosed underthe Access Jo Information Act * *4 Document divulgiie eri vertii de. la io&ur Tacces q I'informatio y •A AFFAIRES EXTERIEURESi EXTERNAL AfFAlRS TO A SECURITY Sicvrtt* t h e Cndcr-Seoratary DATE E.L.K. Bourns FROM De O0WIBW0WS0 D«©«rib«r 30, i$&» NUMBER Vumiro REFERENCE R&f.ranc. SUBJECT Su/ef FILE OTTAWA B-iearsstmeHt Prograamse After S o n - P r o l i f e r a t i o n Treaty MISSION DOSSIER -^- 3 i^r ENCLOSURES DISTRIBUTION I forward herewith the aemoran&ote oa th.* abore noted cub^oet on «hich I spoke to you this mrning for transmission to the Minister on his return, if you »*• no obj©ation. Kr. Cornett has seen th* memorandum and agrees witfc it. ( $4t^7 > E.L.M. Stums E*t. 407D/B1I. (Admin, Services Oiv-1 000177 �Document disclo|feidfeain*»nt*Hl^£|giori^tb&e»'o/T Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information. G.C.: O/SSEA O/USSEA PARL. SEC. P&L DIV. A>X-A7--3 Decejaber 29, 1?66* HEHORAKBUK FOR TBS fflOOSTSS Disarmament Prograrassa after Eon-Prolifaratioa treaty* Distant Prospect ________ Assuming tbat a non-proliferation treaty will k® egraed upon within the next few aonths, what further aoasura3 leading towards disara&ssnt should bo taken ander negotiation? Rations without nnelear armament, and particularly those capable of making i t , baue bean enphatie that non-proliferation ahould ttot - indeed cannot - stand by i t s e l f # bat should be eeen aa only a f i r s t step in a japograrsn» leading towards r e a l dlasmsaasnt. The principal reeasures which they nrge should be adspted by tho nuclear powers, as a balancing obligation t o non^roliferation corasli-ssntsj are f i r s t , as agreeraent to stop underground testing, and second, cessation of production of f i s s i l e m t a r i a l a for warlike purposes - the Cut-off pins Seconwrsion* These measures have hsd considerable study^ aad views concerning thesa have fceen foswalated iii other departmental papers, so they will aot be fully discussed here* A point to be sentioned* hows—sr, is tfeat there is a t i e between underground testing and tbe developiaent of a n t i b a l l i e t i e missile systeffis. I a fact, tbe need to t e s t ccspGnantcf of projected JEM systems i s given by USA spokesmen as the principal reason for continuing with underground testing* If there could be an agrreeiaent between the WA and the ESSS not to develop ABM systems, i t should f a c i l i t a t e agreeiaent on the cessation of underground testing* If the nuclea** arass race i s expanded by tbe development of AB8 systems, i t is highly probable that Canada w i l l be involved. Sites for the 03 HIKE rocket and ancillary installations on Canadian soil d i l l doubtless be sought, with a l l and perhaps aeare of the difficulties aad ccoqslieaticms of tbe Boaare arrangessnta. I t i s to Canada's interest tbat t h i s should not occur. I t seesss unlikely, however, that the Russians will 8gre& to stop establishing A3& systems i f the develcfaent and production of IGWa i s not halted, or indeed if i t i s halted •**••<. �y .,*J— Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de lalo/ sur {'acces a I'informatio ~ under coisiitieac which raaaerical saperinrity. "balance of terror" at eenvisee the directors will leave tbs CS* with I t s present Jseg> Sophisticated srgueenfcs abctet « stable exLstisi£ levela seem jaout snlifesly to of USSR Edlitary policy* •Jbe proposals for the ^Freose" advanced by the US& therefore do not, as they stand, offer jauch prospect for successful negotiation. Map have the USSR shown any interest in th© idea of balanced e© 3traction of obsolescent nuclear weapon vehicles — boaberc, missiles, or other arffia»8nt3. In view of the extensive ass of besabers Bin the tfietnas? war, i t is improbable that the USA BEST ORIGINAL AVAlLABLEwiU press i t s bCEsber bonfire" proposals while that war i s goiag ME1LLEUR ORIGINAL m * $bat the USSR will advocate in, regard to tbe redaction of nuclear weapon vehicles will presumably continue to be th© socalled Ch?csgi?o offlbrella plan; that i s , that a l l mNa should be destroyed, except a ssnall auafcsr cf ICBKs and ASHs to be retained in equal nrjs&ers by the USA and USSR as a deterrent. I n the EIS3C varions suggestions have been ciade for a detailed si&dy of «faat the third-stage level of nuclear ansaraents should be. The purpose ef such a study would be to reconcile the USA and USSR positions, at least to the extent that some freece on production and a beginning of reduction in l$#s could be agreed apon. I t i s uwierstocd that studies on a »inte_a deterrent have be*n carried out under the auspices of USAC8A. I t would be desirafefe for us to find oat how far such studies have progressed, and generally, to learn asst USA thinking ie cn this subject. Any kind of a freese aad redaction of W&ta and nuclear weapons would a t seeae stage have t o have the participation cf France and China. This would considerably ccEplieate aa already highly complex probleau President deOaalle has said that n a n ce would be prepared to negotiate with a l l other nuclear powers on the elimination of ftsclear weapons and their vehicles} the Chinese position i s that they would be prepared t o ta&s part In a world conference for the parpos© of prohibiting and destroying a l l nuclear armament, theoretically* therefore, i t is possible to conceive of negotiations including a l l the present nuclear powers at sera2 l a t e r stage. One could imagine such a conference on nuclear araaaents as a nuclear~age successor of the conference ahich ia the 1920s led to the Washington freaty lizsiting navies, though easy t i m e ROTS crasrplex* To think of such a conference in Hie present stat e of international relations siay seem visionary, but sorae such negotiations will eventually have to be undertaken Ut the nucleer eras race i s to be halted, ami the dangar of nuclear war i s to be warded off* .....3 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act • Document divulgue en vertu de fa JS&fiW'1iSSS^9l£lnformat'on «& thus have a sort of linted •e%ain of disjuroawant subjects for possible negotiation after non^^roliiferntion has been disposed of. Cessation of underground testing; halt t o ABH dsvslopasutj the Freeze of long-grange missile production and dewopssentj reduction of present nassive deterrence systems to aiaissuB deterrents, t&at Canada could contribute to tive negotiation ou such aeasures i s uncertain, but we should bs essoining the p o s s i b i l i t i s s . A f i r s t step would be to obtain iaf oraatioR on the l a t e s t USA thinking and positions en such problems, as well as information about any studies t&ich nsay be undsr -Kuy in ths UK. r ) BEST ORIGINAL AVAILABLE MEILLEUR ORIGINAL V / y? i, . E#Jj.K. 1SaTm . • KAA •'- DiBax~aBent Adviser 000180 � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDBM00043 Title A name given to the resource Memo for the Under-Secretary Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 12/30/1966 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-c, file 27-11-7, "DEFENCE - CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS - ANTI - BALLISTIC MISSILES (ABM) = DEFENSE - ARMEMENTS DE TYPE CLASSIQUE ET NUCLEAIRE - ENGINS ANTIMISSILES (ABM)," vol. 10357, part 1, Library and Archives Canada, (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Anti-ballistic missiles Description An account of the resource Disarmament Programme After Non-Proliferation Treaty Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en