https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/c3cb6c28adb69dca3d7d0efbcf903ca6.pdf 89d563b5da7eef351b092e229af09946 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information H i « : SECRET ' J., (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) .„ .~> „ / / ,*77 ~p~~ i .j •' .j Annex B to 116th Meeting PJBD > '* ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE BRIEFING 1 The United States has undertaken to study the broad political ! implication of a possible decision to deploy or not to deploy an ABM system, The following briefing sets forth our present thoughts on the subject. While . : : tentative they nevertheless are the result of intensive examination within the United States Government. We want at this point to share our thinking with other Allies as well. ' i j In presenting this material our thought is that , ] i. j others in the Canadian Government will also find it of interest, and we •".' : shall welcome any comments they may wish.to make on it. i There are perhaps three points- that should be emphasized at the beginning. First, we have made no decision to deploy ABMS. As Secretary McNamara's statements have made clear, we are keeping up a high level ' r, of research and development,- This has a bearing not only on ABMs as sj !1 such, but also on our ability to penetrate possible Soviet, defenses. We have been spending large sums on this research and development iJM effort. However, the cost of deployment looms even larger, and we haven't been in any hurry to make a decision on deployment. tl Second, if we haven't decided to go ahead with deployment, then neither have we decided to rule out that possibility. A decision tjj " l;\ ii either way would be a major decision. Third, we have been seeking to bring into focus the broad range !'• of issues involved in the deployment question. A central issue is' whether deployment would have "destabilizing" effects on the strategic balance, the arms race, and the political situation. Ne will go into ..* .. L ~ X • \ i these aspects with you, and at present, I simply want to stress the '] complexity of the problem. Strategic effects would depend on a variety I of factors induing the extent, and character of deployment, and on what SECRET (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) - 1 - §7 000138 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - -7-*-HM**!->~,"*»fc-^,V*"iii-' ^ i r w - r » > ' S E C R E T (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) the other side may already be doing offensively. Political aspects would differ as between a situation in which the United States was the first to deploy and one in which the Soviets had already initiated a significant deployment. THE ABM AND THE U.S.-SOVIET "BALANCE OF DETERRENCE" Before turning to the ABM question as such, there are two points worth noting about the way the "balance of deterrence" is now developing. First, the "balance" is dynamic. systems wear out. Technology changes, and old The Soviets appear to be engaged in a substantial effort to strengthen their strategic deterrent. For our own part, we are moving ahead with qualitative improvements such as replacing MINUTEMAN I with MINUTEMAN II and III, and developing POSEIDON as a replacement for part of the POLARIS forces. We are also, as you know, , replacing some of our older B-S2 bomber aircraft with the new FB-111. Second, we cannot now see the end of this process of change in offensive capabilities, '. $ In other words, even if the ABM question did not arise, we would still expect further changes on the offensive side of the coin. : The rate and extent of the changes would, of course, be influenced by any substantial ABM deployments. This is, in very broad terms, the general situation into which we have to fit the ABM in order to consider its potential effects. Four Key Questions About ABMs "" Against a large-scale, sophisticated attack, the kind of ABM we could deploy would not offer the prospect of a "perfect" defense. The prospects for future ABM technology offer no such promise either for us or the Soviets, Consequently, we can probably rule out of consideration the questions that \ would be raised if either the United States or Soviets were to believe that they could escape all or nearly all damage by relying on defensive systems. S E C R E T (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) - 2 - / 000139 �i ~T5oaffieTfiffiSc1c^^ At$r r | Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'informptidH S E C R E T (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) There are, however, four key questions that can be asked about the relationship of the ABM to the "balance of deterrence": (1) In the presence of ABMs, does the offense have to work harder to maintain deterrence? (2) What is the likelihood that some combination of offensive and defensive capabilities might place a greater premium on striking first? • (3) Would there be any increase in the possibility of miscalculation? (4) What other political and psychological effects on U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations would flow from the introduction of ABMs? Maintaining Deterrence .. ,.,,. ... We believe the Soviets have started deploying ABMs. We don't, know how far they plan to go or at what pace. Over a period of years, they could extend defenses to a number of major cities. We do not think they have a very advanced ABM, but they can be expected to work toward qualitative improvements. We have for some years been developing penetration aids against the contingency of Soviet ABM deployment. We have available penetration aids against terminal defenses; we have accelerated programs for penetration aids against area defenses. We have a broadly based R-D program to improve further our capability to reduce the offensive effort needed to penetrate the defense. To reverse the coin, we can ask how the Soviets might react to United State's ABM deployment. This would presumably depend in part on whether we had committed ourselves to a heavy or light defense program. However, even in the latter case, the Soviets would,' of course, have to try to measure any potential impact on the effectiveness of their deterrent. There are several types of actions the Soviets might take, depending i> on their assessment of the situation. These actions are not, of course, mutually exclusive and some of them may take place irrespective of any United State's decision on ABM deployment although the pace and extent would be influenced by United States actions, including ABM deployment.. The main possibilities might include: S E C R E T (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) - 3- 000140 1 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - .v S E C R E T (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) bj j I (a) Increasing tha number of their offensive missiles. Since they are . 1 already building up their missile force, we don't know how much this would add to the cost of what they may already plan to do. J • 'j " 4 (b) Introducing penetration aids. This kind of development is within j their technical capabilities. We don't know that they have been working in •• this area, bur it would be a logical response. The cost would be less than .-j I i that of multiplying missiles although none of these actions is inexpensive. i (c) Placing new emphasis on other types of delivery vehicles. For example, they already have a considerable number of submarine-borne cruise I missiles. •- j -j • -1 . •i r E| (d) Decreasing the vulnerability of their offensive missile forces. j Deterrence is measured, to some extent, by the ability to survive a first . j strike by the opponent with sufficient forces to penetrate his defenses. 1 Thus, the Soviets might react by decreasing the vulnerability of their j rj missile forces, using active defense or mobility. (e) Extending their own ABM effort. This would not represent a direct countermeasure against a United States ABM deployment, but they might find psychological merit in associating this with some change on the offensive side. . In considering possible Soviet reactions, we should bear in mind j that decisionsvested would not be based calculation of direct of are differing interests and on "lobbies" in Moscow whichinteraction would welcome b • military capabilities cost-effectiveness termsinfluenced alone. There probably any opportunity to seekinnew political decisions by the stimul'ation .. s- of a major new United States military program. In summary, it is probably necessary to work harder to maintain deterrence in the presence of ABMs although we would not expect major automatic |. *. "' i effects but rather a process of change over a period of years. How much j' additional effort this would mean (relative to what is already going on) would depend on assumptions concerning the anticipated level of deployment, the SECRET (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) \ 000141 �•v:;tx7X^r-^];.y-~r^r..~ Documentdisclosed under the Access to Information Act - — •A - -t S E C R E T (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) assumed effectiveness of the other side's ABMs, and so on. The choice among possible responses would depend partly on cost and psychological factors as well as on assumed military effectiveness. The "First-Strike" Question The Defense Department has made many calculations of strategic nuclear exchanges with various offensive and defensive forces postulated for the United States and Soviet Union. In none of these cases has there been a situation in which either country could be confident of preventing significant casualties even if they spent large sums on ABMs. In some calculations, casualties would be sub- stantially reduced, but significant casualties would still be incurred even by the side striking first. It is hard to see how the Soviets could reach a different conclusion. Whether the possibility of reducing casualties would be worth the investment required is, of course, a major question bearing on an ABM decision. We cannot foresee a time when it would not be very costly •-- and therefore very unlikely -- for either the United States or the Soviet Union to accomplish virtually simultaneously all the changes in offensive and defensive capabilities that would be required to yield a real premium on striking first. A combination of defenses plus a first strike would reduce casualties J .3 to lower levels than either of these alone. However, this is different than saying that there would be an incentive to'strike first except in cases where such an incentive already exists. For present purposes, the main point is that heavy casualties would continue to be sustained. As long as this is so, we doubt that United States or Soviet leaders would find it easier to decide to start a strategic nuclear war because the expected damage has been reduced from still higher levels. .. . At _ Miscalculation Although objective analyses suggest that ABMs would not increase the attractiveness of starting a strategic nuclear war, the question arises S E C R E T (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) - 5 - 000142 .. i t . -ffltiliA'^L^^^4.'V...iS,i-Tk- - *Tjiti»i*fc- . ;t;«y*dtijiaU-(.j ••-^i\.i^.m^,^&yr*sk.us\y;^::<i^jML<l^J--^i �Docjumen^djsclosed underthe Access to Information Act .-'?&&••-&$&**•&**•*• T3tJi^ehrd1vlTlglJe en v e r T u E a f l f T o f ^ • 7 7 i 1 SECRET (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) whether objective considerations might for some reason be less likely to prevail in the presence of ABMs. In other words, would there be.any increased chance of miscalculations? The introduction of ABMs, on the one hand, and penetration aids on the other, would make for a more complex strategic situation. Decisions would rest even more than now on the assumptions each country made about the relative effectiveness of such capabilities. It might appear that greater complexity and greater dependence on technical assumptions could, in a broad sense, open the way to greater risk of miscalculation. ; Although this cannot be completely ruled out, experience suggests : j that as the strategic situation has grown more complex, caution has.not ! j diminished. The awareness that there are many variables to take into account has a sobering effect that lessens any incentive for hasty judgments. The ] fact that calculations would rest very largely on unproven assumptions would ! h> not necessarily mean any over-eagerness to put such assumptions to the test, 1 One circumstance in which ABMs might provide increased stability | i would be in the event of a small attack — possibly an accidental or unauthorized attackj or a small attack by Communist China. An effective defense would provide i t j time for evaluating the situation and for determining a suitable, controlled I response. We recognize that there are many intangibles involved in questions of this character. Perhaps the main consideration is that both countries now seen aware of the problem of miscalculation itself and of the dangers it entails. This awareness should continue to work against recklessness. Other political and psychological effects In considering other political and psychological effects of ABM deployment, we find it difficult to abstract the ABM from the overall context of United States-Soviet relations (or, more broadly, East-West relations). SECRET (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ewttmte^dw^ue^ -•='1 -s •i :*- %*-*£>.n*l&***<**-< S E C R E T (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) If either or both countries were to undertake a very rapid ABM deployment program together with a rapid and substantial build-up of offensive forces, we suspect that suspicions might well be aroused and tensions increased. However, because these programs are all costly, complex, and take time to deploy, we would by and large expect the pace of change to be relatively slow rather than fast. term intentions. There might still, of course, be questions about long- However, such questions are pertinent today, and they are likely to be with us in one form or another for some years to come. If we should decide to deploy ABMs, we would necessarily want to make clear to the American public and other audiences what they should and should not expect. As suggested by the preceding discussion, this message would probably be not to expect too much. This should help to convey to the Soviets a realistic measure of our intentions. . In any event, the possible effects of ABMs have to be considered in the context of over-all United States-Soviet relations. For our own part, we would continue efforts to increase East-West contacts and trade and to take such other steps, including arms control, as might prove practical to encourage a favorable evolution of United States-Soviet and East-West relations. Whether results would be any harder to achieve than today, we find it difficult to predict. I: ' E ABM AND COMMUNIST CHINA .-. I Leaving aside the question of broader Asian reaction for the moment (this is treated separately), there are perhaps three main questions: (1) Will the United States need ABMs for defense against nuclear attack by Communist China? (2) How might a United States ABM affect Communist China's 1 attitudes and behavior? (3) How would the Soviets react to the situation, and would it have any bearing on the Sino-Soviet rift? S E C R E T (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) •( �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - yxyQ.QSJuaenl.&uiiIgiiE.en vertuA&^LaLsm^mr^ad'-H^rim^.0" I S E C R E T (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) 1. The ChiCom Nuclear Threat to the US '-•] We do not now expect a significant ChiCora nuclear threat to the United , | States to materialize before, say, the mid-1970's. '\ A token "threat" might appear earlier -- possibly late in the 1960's. ] Moreover, for political and psychological reasons. Communist China might wish '] to conduct a "demonstration", perhaps along the lines of the Soviet example j of employing a space launching of a Sputnik as a means of magnifying the j i j actual extent of its ICBM capabilities. is likely to take place soon. We have no evidence such an event J However, it is the kind of psychological ploy the Chinese might find interesting when it becomes possible. Communist China does have problems of resource allocation. We do not know what priority has been assigned to achieving a real capability to strike the United States. We have been inclined to believe they will first seek an MRBM capability, but that remains problematical. \ V •y In any event, we anticipate that bv the mid-1970's they will have at 1 ' < least a modest number of ICSM's, and possibly some(SLBM's,b Directed against United States urban areas, 25 missiles might result in, say, 12 million casualties. , In comparison with the Soviet nuclear threat, the ChiCom threat will be very limited. However, Communist China cannot mount any nuclear threat against us today. Its acquisition of ICBMs or SLBMs will change the terms of our i 1 \. security. We haye time to think about how to meet this problem, and there are several basic considerations: First, we do not believe Communist China's nuclear weapons program will automatically lead to the adoption of a policy of military reckless- | ness in general or nuclear recklessness in particular. ;" _ Second, as long as they proceed on the basis of rational decision, we ought to be able to deter the use of their strategic nuclear weapons I j t against us. S EC R ET (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) - 8- �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act E E E I E ^ S ^ ^ ^ verttrte*la«!!fc -E S E C R E T (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) j Third, we could, in an extremity, direct a disarming strike against their delivery capabilities. There are strong inhibitions -< I ) against such a course, but that option would be available, " Such factors as these ought to provide substantial insulation against j a nuclear attack by Communist China. However, if such an attack should take j place, then the chance'.of effective. ABM defense against it seems very good. • , i i i Subsequent growth and increased sophistication of a ChiCom ICBM force would | eventually confront us with a more difficult situation although some years '< would be required to accomplish this, . The cost of such light defenses would be less than that of the so-called heavy defense. Although $5-10 billion would still not be inexpensive, it might, in effect, provide an additional insurance policy against a hazard we do not expect but cannot completely rule out. Such an insurance policy might have other values as well. Communist China might become militarily more aggressive i f its leaders should come to '; believe that their nuclear capabilities lessened the risk that we would react to aggressive moves on their part at lower levels of conflict. Moreover, although a ChiCom threat to strike the United States would not seem credible, we cannot entirely measure the doubts that might be set in train among Communist China's neighbors as to our dependability. We already have a formidable range of capabilities and options to meet those various problems, and we have not arrived at a conclusion that ABMs would represent a necessary addition. However, we owe it to ourselves to consider whether that may be so. 2. Effects onthink ChiComdeployment Attitudes of and Behavior We do not ABMs would discourage Communist China from I 3 seeking some capability to strike us. They might still proceed with a token |j ICBM capability of some sort in order to. exploit such doubts as might be raised fj H (! among unsophisticated Asians. S E C R E T (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) . . . | 1 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information S E C R E T (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) However, the task of achieving a potentially effective capability would be more difficult, costly and time-consuming. They might try relatively short-range sea-based missiles in an effort to go under our defenses. They might, and probably would, try for more sophisticated ICBMs or SLBMs. might also claim sophistication before having achieved it. They They might turn None of these1 kinds of efforts would be as to unconventional approaches. evident, straightforward or effective as the kind of capability, they could acquire if We do not deploy ABMs. Apart from the question of technical-military response to ABMs, there is the question of what effect ABM deployment on our part might have on Communist China's outlook. We would not intend to aggravate any concern that we might employ our military capabilities except in response to aggression on Communist China's part. However, the chance of minimizing aggression will be improved to the extent that Communist China's leaders recognize both oiir capability and willingness to meet aggression. As we have already made clear publicly, we are prepared to go ahead with increased contacts between Communist China and ourselves. We would expect to continue such efforts although they have yet to meet with any'sign of interest on Communist China's part. ; 3. \ Soviet Aspects The minimum level of defense we might deploy against Communist China would have to be taken into account by the Soviet Union. This aspect of the problem is related, of course, to the over-all question of the "balance of deterrence", which we have already discussed. A related question is whether the Soviets themselves may in time feel j more comfortable with ABM defenses which might insulate them against Communist China's nuclear capabilities. Related to this, there is the psychological question of whether the Soviets may view their own ABM deployment in part as S E C R E T (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) - 10 - I000147 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act, Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) • useful in denigrating Communist China's position as an additional "nuclear power" within the Communist world. We can't really answer either of these questions, but they are worth noting. Finally, it can be asked whether Communist China's leaders might become so concerned about United State's intentions as to moderate their position vis-S-vis the Soviets. In effect, might they feel the need for Soviet support so strongly as to make the concessions necessary to heal the rift? This would require a major change in their policies, and we do not believe ABM's could affect the situation to that extent. . EFFECTS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC OF u's, ABM DEPLOYMENT Before considering possible effects of United States ABM deployment on countries in the Asia-Pacific region, we need to consider the effects — present and potential -- of Communist China1s nuclear weapons effort. That effort has set in train what will undoubtedly prove to be a ( prolonged reassessment by Asian and Pacific countries of their own political / and security interests. At present, the situation in Vietnam overshadows this longer-term reassessment, and it will be affected importantly by the. outcome in Vietnam as well as by other considerations. Nonetheless, a reassessment is already in evidence throughout the area from Japan to Australia to India. At present, United States and other Free World Forces, including those of the U.K., linked through SEATO and other treaties of alliance, form the basis of stability in the area. No Asian-Pacific country individually possesses a sufficient force to maintain this stability. While there are signs of a new spirit of regional co-operation, especially economic and political, it is not yet able to contribute to the needed stability. j The possible effects of the ChiCom nuclear weapons program have to be ^ t < K » / I viewed against this background. One question is whether countries in the V. r V / *+^r region may wonder about the future dependability of the United States, V-" ^ IN-V + V*''^'' >" JT SECRET ^^^UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) \sx^ ^ . >*" \ •"• c,v - y, 000148 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information S E C R E T (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED)Because of history, because of deep political and cultural ties, there is less reason for Europeans tc fear United States withdrawal than Asians. To the extent that Communist China's nuclear weapons program might create doubts about our dependability, ABMs might help reduce such doubts. On the other hand, ABMs might in some ways work in an opposite direction. This would be true if ABM deployment directed against a ChiCom threat to the United States enhanced the image of Communist China's nuclear strength and increased the anxieties of its neighbors. Such anxieties could be sharpened if a deployment of ABMs were viewed as a vehicle by means of which we would be freer than the Asians themselves to opt out of a future nuclear conflict. Similarly, if concern should increase about the likelihood of eventual nuclear war in Asia, the effects would be adverse. Finally, there is the question of whether any problem would arise from the fact that Americans (white and rich) could defend themselves whereas Asians {colored and poor) could not. Some Asian countries might press us for ABM defenses and might react adversely if this could not be done. We can't now predict how these factors would balance out. However, we would want to be as sure as possible that the undercurrents that might be set in motion would not eventually be stronger than the more visible reactions. We would eventually want to go into the ABM question with such countries as Japan, and we would like to have a better grasp than we now do of how they would weigh the question. Meanwhile, our own studies of the question of~ABM systems and deployments in defense of our allies are continuing. ATTITUDES OF POTENTIAL NUCLEAR POWERS AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES In considering possible effects of ABM deployment on the attitudes of potential nuclear powers and non-aligned countries, three questions arise: (1) > Would ABM deployment have any general effect on the attitudes of these countries? (2) How would the attitudes of specific countries be affected? S E C R E T (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) - 12 - ' i' 000149 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information S E C R E T (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) (3) Can we distinguish any effects on the attitudes of nonaligned countries other than effects bearing on proliferation? 1. i GENERAL EFFECTS In a broad sense, we doubt that ABM deployment by the United States and Soviets would automatically cause any other country either to "go nuclear" or refrain from "going nuclear". Such decisions are heavily determined by national political, prestige and security interests. These interests, in turn, reflect a variety of considerations going beyond the ABM question. At the same time, decisions based on such national interests are influenced by the international environment. From this standpoint, if United States and Soviet deployment of ABMs were viewed as meaning that the arms race was going to continue indefinitely and that no major steps in arms control were going to be achieved, this kind of change in the international environment might, in a broad sense, affect the way specific countries look at the question of acquiring or refraining from acquiring nuclear weapons. i It is conceivable that a few countries might consider "going nuclear" in order to acquire defenses, especially against Communist China. The highly advanced character of the capabilities required would militate against such a decision provided the technical difficulties and cost factors were appreciated. On the other hand. United States ABM (or the possible development by the United States of systems capable of defending our allies) could serve to strengthen guarantees. f In some cases guarantees may help to dissuade countries from . developing national nuclear forces. 2. ATTITUDES OF SPECIFIC COUNTRIES (a) India's attitude might be affected in the following ways: --An early United States decision to employ ABMs against f Communist China might tend to magnify the emerging ChiCom threat in India's eyes. S E C R E T (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) - 13 - .i : 000150 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information S E C R E T (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) --From the standpoint of security, the Indians have not yet displayed any concern about our being deterred by Communist China. They do seem to have been concerned about how the Soviet Union might react in a situation where the United States might take India's part against Communist China. This suggests that if the Indians believed competitive ABM deployment might lead to a worsening of United States-Soviet relations, they might be more concerned about their security, — I f this reaction could be precluded, then the Indians might feel that we would be more reliable in the future with ABMs than without them (although, as previously noted, they do not yet seem to have focused on the time when Communist China will have ICBMs). --Finally, since political and prestige factors are also r involved, we can't predict how heavily security considerations such as the foregoing would weigh in an eventual Indian decision, (b) In the case of Japan, the following considerations seem to be relevant. --Japan is not likely to take the lead among Asian powers in "going nuclear". However, India's decision would influence Japan's views. --Since Japan is an ally of the United States, it has a firmer guarantee than India. United States deployment of ABMs might be viewed as reinforcing this guarantee. --At the same time, we would have to ensure that the Japanese I did not view a United States ABM deployment, capable of denying the ChiCom threat, as meaning that we might more readily "opt out" of future Asian conflicts. S E C R E T (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) - J4 000151 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act -» Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information S E C R E T (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) --The Japanese might well come to be interested in whether ABMs could be made available for defense of Japan against Communist China. This would raise a number of problems we haven't yet resolved. How they would react to a situation where we were defended and they were not has to be considered problematical at this time. (c) Sweden|s attitude might be affected by the prospect of prolongation of the "arms race". However, we suspect that they would continue to be reluctant to take a step which might increase pressures within West Germany. (d) So many factors bear on the West German question that we do not think ABM deployment by the United States and Soviets would spur German interest in a national nuclear weapons program. They might be more interested in nuclear sharing. (e) Effects on attitudes in the Middle East would probably be even less direct than in any of the foregoing cases. Indeed, it is difficult to see how ABM deployment by the United States and Soviets would directly influence the possibility of proliferation in this area one way or another. 3. EFFECTS ON "NON-ALIGNMENT" In the case of a non-aligned country such as India, "going nuclear" may in any event come to be regarded as essential to maintaining non-aligned status. Except for the effects that United States and Soviet ABM deployment might have on the decisions of such countries, that is, these which are themselves capable of "going nuclear", we see no other major impact on the attitudes of non-aligned countries. Generally speaking, we do not think the reaction of non-aligned countries would be either intense or particularly relevant. S E C R E T (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) - IS - 000152 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information S E C R E T (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) COMMUNICATING INTENTIONS TO ALLIES AND ADVERSARIES We cannot, of course, "manage" public discussion of the ABM question. However, Secretary McNamara's published testimony before the Congress does offer an authoritative guide available to adversaries as well as allies. If a decision were made, we think it fair to assume that a principal vehicle for conveying the character of the decision and the nature of our intentions would be Secretary McNamara's testimony. How such public statements would be interpreted would, of course, differ as between allies and adversaries. 1. Allies We would hope the present discussions and others that may. take place would better acquaint our allies, with the factors bearing on a decision. The NATO Special Committee and the proposed permanent machinery b : should provide a useful forum for discussion of aspects of the ABM problem. J Since the question of ABM deployment is of interest to our allies in Asia and the Pacific as well as Europe, discussions on that front will also j presumably be undertaken. Any decision on deployment would be taken in the light of the security interests of the United States and its allies. We have no reason to suppose our allies would fail to recognize that fact. 2. ,-;', Adversaries :-, Although the Soviets maintain that ABMs are purely defensive, we have to assume they would apply a double, standard if it were the United States carrying out the deployment. However, if they have tended to assume a certain inevitability about ABM deployment, they might not view a United States decision on deployment as more than a contingency they had in part already foreseen as a normal outgrowth of advanced technology. ', In this connection, they can hardly overlook in their private assessments the fact that they were first to deploy. The Soviets would have to weigh the effects of whatever level of I deployment was contemplated in a United States decision. In gauging our inten''.- --.-• ••"•••.'•• tions, they would probably take into account whatever we happened to be doing S E C R E T (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) - 16 - 000153 ! i �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - . Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information S E C R E T (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) . j with respect to strategic offensive as well as defensive capabilities. Whatever we might say at the time would not be dismissed by them but would certainly be measured against the conclusions they might draw on the basis of "objective" evidence such as the foregoing. The general atmosphere prevailing at the time would be a factor in this, that is, whether United States-Soviet relations were otherwise on a fairly even keel, or whether relations were already tense. Within the limits set by this range of factors, we would, of course, seek to ensure a proper reading of our intentions as defensive and nonaggressive. We have, of course, more difficulty in communicating with Communist . China. Perhaps the general objective here would be to ensure a sober realiza- tion on their part of the capabilities at our disposal, without causing them i . j to fear that these capabilities might be used for purposes other than respond\ ing to aggressive actions on their part. It would be difficult at best to i . i ; strike this balance. However, this might be a reasonable approach for us to take. EFFECTS OF ABM DEPLOYMENT ON ARMS CONTROL MEASURES k The relationship of four arms control measures to the ABM question needs to be considered: (1) A non-proliferation treaty; (2) A comprehensive test ban; (3) A cut-off and transfer (to peaceful uses) of fissionable materials; and (4) A freeze and reduction of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Before considering each of these measures, three points should be noted. ., First, we have not given ABMs priority over arms control; neither have E we delayed an ABM decision in the expectation of early major progress in the arms control field. Second, all of the arms control proposals we have made remain open'. Third, in each case, the ABM question is only one aspect of the matter. S E C R E T (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) - 17 000154 .. �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act t Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET(UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) Soviet willingness to accept inspection remains an especially crucial question in the case of several proposals. These considerations describe the situation that exists today. They are not intended to minimize the additional difficulties for arms control that would arise if both the United States and Soviets were to commit themselves to large-scale ABM deployment programs. Under those circumstances, there would certainly be greater problems in arriving at agreements. Any ABM deployment, as would be the case with any major new weapons program, could adversely affect the negotiating climate for anas control measures. On the other hand, it is possible that if ABM deployment begins this might, in fact, facilitate certain arms control agreements. The great cost involved and growing awareness that the net result of ABM deployment and reactions thereto might leave the stategic balance essentially unchanged could generate support for an ABM freeze or moratorium. In considering effects on specific measures, we have not tried to sort out all possibilities. Much would depend on the situation that existed at the particular time an agreement became feasible --- where the "balance of detterence" stood at that time, and so on. Ke have tried to consider some of the general relationships that would need to be examined. 1. NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY • « «•••-••• • — > From the standpoint of the United States and Soviets, we don't believe i the ABM questions make a non-proliferation treaty any less desirable. Nor '. does it seem likely that the ABM question would cause the United States or Soviets to change their views on what a non-pToliteration treaty should and should not seek to do. However, if the ABM question were to become a major focus of international I. debate, the attitudes of other countries toward a non-proliferation treaty night be affected. S E C R E T (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) - 18 - 000155 ' �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - :. Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) : --Those countries (such as India and Sweden) which have been arguing the "have not" case in Geneva might carry the argument even further. This '" would presumably be based on the view that if the United States and Soviets were about to embark on an expansion of their nuclear forces, they have no right to ask others to give up the nuclear weapons option. --It is possible that some countries might want to hold open the nuclear sharing option in the hope of eventually being able to shzare in ABM defenses. We don't know of any country that now takes this position. Notwithstanding the foregoing, we believe roost other countries -probably all which would otherwise do so -- would still sign a non-proliferation treaty if the United States and Soviets should reach agreement. 2. COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN - ' ,. A comprehensive test ban would, of course, rule out all further testing of ABM warheads. This would mean that if a decision were made to proceed with ABM deployment, we would have to employ whatever warhead designs were •• available at the time the test ban went into effect. To make this point clear: (a) we do have some designs now; (b) we would certainly improve on these with further testing; (c) the actual effects of a comprehensive ban would depend on how far we had gotten down the road-before the ban came into effect. ! ,' \ '• As a practical matter, of course, the barrier to a comprehensive test ban has been Soviet opposition to onsite inspection, not ABM testing requirements. E 3. *:.•' CUT-OFF OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL PRODUCTION n i r< The cut-off would preclude the so-called heavy deployment of ABMs by the 7. United States without a major reorientation of priorities which would be impracticable. We could, however, proceed with some level of deployment if ABMs were given . • -'*- sufficient priority in relation to other claims on the fissionable material that would remain available. •' "• I--. We are uncertain what the precise impact of a cut-off agreement would be ; on the Soviets. We believe that their stockpile of fissionable materials is SECRET (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) - 19 000156 •' I �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information S E C R E T (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) considerably less than ours. If they do not have, large uncommitted stocks of nuclear materials they would be unable to carry out large-scale ABM deployments if a cut-off agreement occurred in the near future. Of course, they could conceivably make major reallocations of nuclear materials fromother weapons systems but this probably would be at least as difficult for them to do as for us. In connection with a cut-off, we have offered; (a), to transfer fissionable materials to peaceful uses; and (b) to derive at least part'of this material through the destruction of warheads. To some extent, these additional measures would, of course, add to the priorities problem. They would not necessarily preclude some level of ABM deployment if that were considered a high priority requirement. 4. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLE (SNPY) FREEZE AND REDUCTIONS The question of a freeze and reduction of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDV's) directly involves the question of the "balance of deterrence". The offensive and defensive capabilities that comprise this balance change with time. ABM deployment would add an additional complicating element that would have to be taken into account in working out the details of the freeze and reduction proposal if the Soviets were to accept the proposal. How much effect ABM deployment would have would depend on such factors as: (a) the level of deployment reached by one or both sides prior to the freeze; (b) assymetries not only in deployment, but also in the assumed effectiveness of the other side's ABM system; (c) the effectiveness of penetration aids; and (d) the relative strength of strategic offensive capabilities at that time. A special question would arise from the standpoint of deploying ABMs to defend against a future ChiCom nuclear threat to the United States. This (would, of course, be ruled out if an SNDV freeze were achieved prior to ABM deployment for that purpose. Soviet stated opposition to the freeze has been concerned more with the inspection issue than with the weapons that would be included under the tena;n00157 s\f -• freeze. �Document disclosed under the Access to information Act£y ~ Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a {'information S E C R E T (UNLESS•OTHERWISE INDICATED) Our own belief that ABMs should be included in the SNDV freeze reflects that view that there would be an inherent instability in an agreement which attempted to freeze strategic offensive forces only. Under such circumstances, ABM deployment by one side could reach a level which the other viewed as potentially upsetting to the "balance of deterrence". Undesirable tensions and uncertainties would be created, and the net result would probably be that the side concerned about the effectiveness of its deterrent would probably abrogate the freeze on strategic offensive delivery vehicles in order to remedy the situation. This seems a more likely outcome than an effort to restore the balance by deploying ABMs although that alternative would be open. For such reasons, we have favored the inclusion of ABMs in an overall SNDV freeze, and, as previously noted, ABM deployment complicates efforts to achieve an overall freeze. Although several suggestions have been made for limiting ABM deployment, and these are under study, we have not proposed any of these approaches but rather have concentrated on the desirability of getting on with the overall SNDV freeze. SOVIET THINKING ON IMPLICATIONS OF ABM DEPLOYMENT The Soviets have always placed heavy emphasis on strategic air defense. For some years, they have had an active and substantial program for developing ABMs. They are certainly aware of our development efforts, and it is fair to assume that they have expected us to initiate deployment if -- or as soon as — we had anything we considered worth deploying. If any single generaliza- tion best describes their attitude toward deployment, it is probably that ABMs are -- or will be -- a fact of life, more or less inevitable in the advance of military technology. We have no evidence of internal Soviet debate on these issues. However, we can speculate on three key questions: (1) What is their attitude toward costs? (2) How much consideration have they given to arguments against ABM deployment? S E C R E T (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) 21 000158 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a {'information SECRET .(UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) (3) 1. COST What p o s s i b i l i t y i s t h e r e tbat they might change t h e i r views? . The Soviets know from their own experience that ABM's are expensive. The irregular pace of the Soviet ABM program in the past suggests they may at one point have made a false start, run into technical difficulties, backed-off and done more research, and started again. These are the very sorts of problems that run up the costs of major research and development programs -- and of operational programs started at too early a.stage of research and development.. The Soviets don't, however, seem to have been discouraged by past experience. We have long followed resource allocation debates in the Soviet Union, and we have no doubt that any large new military program could only be financed at the cost of something else. It seems clear that cost considera- tions have not precluded a decision to proceed with some level of deployment. If the Soviets feel the pinch, and depending on what priority they have , assigned ABM deployment, they might hold annual costs down by stretching • deployment out over a period of years, or by limiting the extent of the deployment program. The balance of considerations may differ as between large-scale deployment and a limited deployment to defend Moscow and perhaps a few other principal cities. j: \ -• 2. POLITICAL-STRATEGIC ARGUMENTS AGAINST ABMs '"" Through such forums as the Pugwash meetings, Soviet officials and scholars have for some years been exposed to arguments from the West about the possible destabilizing effects of ABMs. They have understood these arguments well enough to publish rebuttals. As far as the public record is concerned, they have thus rejected the j proposition that ABMs would be destabilizing, and have instead insisted on the legitimacy of ABMs as defensive weapon systems. This view is consistent with past emphasis on defense in Soviet military thinking. S E C R E T (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) - 22 - i000159 �Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I acces a I | S E C i.R E T (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) S - I . - . It might be supposed that the Soviets might be particularly sensitive to the argument that ABM deployment might provoke a "new round in the arms race". They have had the experience of generating a so-called "missile gap", which served primarily to cause a United States build-up which left them in a worse relative strategic position than before. Nonetheless, they have ! ' continued to make exaggerated claims about the status of advanced technical developments. Over the years, they have made a number of claims about ABMs. And, "" ~*T r although the Soviet press relished criticisms of United States policies voiced at the White House Conference on International Co-operation last winter, there was no mention of the suggestion of a moratorium on ABM deployment - a suggestion which drew wide attention elsewhere. j The "next round of the arms race" argument does not seem to have struck home. 3. POSSIBILITY OF CHANGE . We have seen little evidence that suggests the possibility of change in the Soviet attitude toward ABMs, We can't rule out the possibility of j • i change, but neither does this possibility seem to be emerging. If you have formed a different impression on the basis of your own j discussions with Soviet leaders, we would be interested to learn about it. i f i S E C R E T (UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED) - 23 000160 � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDBM00036 Title A name given to the resource PJBD Meeting Notes (Annex) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 12/13/1966 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-c, file 27-11-7, "DEFENCE - CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS - ANTI - BALLISTIC MISSILES (ABM) = DEFENSE - ARMEMENTS DE TYPE CLASSIQUE ET NUCLEAIRE - ENGINS ANTIMISSILES (ABM)," vol. 10357, part 1, Library and Archives Canada, (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Anti-ballistic missiles Description An account of the resource ABM Briefing Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en