https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/a75f63b4090405d5360b7f008ed7130c.pdf 508017d8cf166a38d89b36e2cb097ea0 PDF Text Text ntdis UNITED STATES 'ormation Act es a I'information INFOR'MAT VICE United States Embassy, Ottawa - Telephone: 613 2 3 6 - 2 3 4 1 / 2 3 2 - 8 0 2 0 PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S PRESS-CONFERENCE AUSTIN, TEXAS, DEC. ~\, 1966—FOLLOWJHMG IS THE TRANSCR PRESIDENTIAL PRESS CONFERENCE IN AUSTIN DEC, 6: of THE PRESIDENT: THERE ARE TWO OR THREE BRIEF ANNOUNCEMENTS BEFORE WE GET INTO THE SUBJECT OF TODAY'S MEETING. FIRST, i PLAN TO SEE EUGENE BLACK SOME TIME EITHER THIS WEEK OR IN THE EARLY PART OF NEXT WEEK. I EXPECT I WILL DO IT IN WASHINGTON. AS SOON AS THE DATE !S CLEAR, I WILL INFORM YOU. LAST WEEKEND, I ASSURED SECRETARY GORDON AND AMBASSADOR LINOWITZ THAT I WANTED TO SEE THEM AS SOON AS THEY RETURNED FROM THE TRIP THAT THEY ARE MAKING IN THIS HEMISPHERE. WE TALKED ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA. AS YOU KNOW, AMBASSADOR LINOWITZ RECENTLY VISITED COSTA RICA WHERE HE MET INFORMALLY WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES. ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON AND AMBASSADOR LINOWITZ WILL BE TRAVELLING TO SOUTH AMERICA BETWEEN NOW AND DECEMBER 18TH TO CONSULT WITH LEADERS ON THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS, AND THE PROPOSED MEETING OF PRESIDENTS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS. THEY WILL HAVE A STAY OF SOME LENGTH IN MEXICO AND VISIT WITH THE PRESIDENT OF MEXICO. I DISCUSSED THAT WITH THE PRESIDENT OF MEXICO AND ASKED THAT HE SEE THEM UPON THEIR RETURN FROM SOUTH AMERICA. THEY WILL EITHER COME TO THE RANCH OR REPORT TO ME IN WASHINGTON. THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD HAS TOLD ME THAT IT HAS REVIEWED ITS FINANCIAL POSITION AND HAS DETERMINED THAT THE HOME LOAN BANKS CAN INCREASE THEIR LENDING TO MEMBER SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS AND SAVINGS BANKS BY 500 MILLION DOLLARS OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS FOR INVESTMENT IN RESIDENTIAL MORTAGES. AS YOU KNOW, WE RELEASED 250 MILLION DOLLARS FOR SPECIAL ASSISTANCE IN THE PURCHASE OF MORTAGES THE OTHER DAY. THESE ADDITIONAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD FUNDS WILL HELP TO EASE THE SHORTAGE OF MONEY FOR INVESTMENT IN HOME MORTAGES (MORE) 000124 FOR PUBLICATION, BROADCAST OR BACKGROUND, AS DESIRED, WITH OR WITHOUT CREDIT TO USIS �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'informatio A -k-. .. W | HAVEN'T MADE -THE. DEC! Sf ON. I DON'T WANT TO CONVEY THE IMPRESSION THAT I .HAVE. " • • - . . QUESTION: MR. PRESIDENT, IS MR. MCNAMARA OPEN TO QUESTIONS? THE PRESIDENT:. YES; AND MR. VANCE AND MR. ROSTOW. QUESTION: THERE ARE WIRE REPORTS FROM VIETNAM THAT WE BOMBED THREE TARGETS IN NORTH VIETNAM SINCE LAST FRIDAY THAT WE HAD NOT BOMBED .BEFORE. IS THIS PART OF A NEW PROGRAM THAT WE DECIDED UPON? SECRETARY MCNAMARA:. NO. TARGET SYSTEM THAT. OUR ; Ml L FOR OVER A YEAR, THE LINES FAC I.LI TIES. SUPPORT ING THE VIETNAM TO SOUTH VIETNAM. THESE TARGETS ARE PART OF THE SAME I TARY EFFORTS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED.AGAINST OF COMMUNICATION AND THE SUPPORTING FLOW OF MEN AND MATERIAL FROM NORTH THE TARGETS YOU REFERRED TO WERE PETROLEUM DEPOTS, WHICH ARE THE FOUNDATION OF THE MOVEMENT OF MEN AND MATERIAL TO THE SOUTH; A VEHICLE PARK, A VEHICLE MAINTENANCE DEPOT, WHICH WAS A STOREHOUSE FOR THE .TRUCKS USED IN THOSE MOVEMENTS, THE ARMY TRUCKS USED IN THOSE MOVEMENTS;' AND RAILROAD YARDS THROUGH WHICH THE ' MATER I ELS WERE FLOWING. QUESTION:-.MR. SECRETARY, IS THE APPARENT INTENSIFICATION OF'THE AIR WAR POSING ANY POLICY PROBLEMS FOR US, THAT IS, STRIKING AT THE AIR FIELDS IN NORTH VIETNAM? SECRETARY MCNAMARA:.NO, I DON'T THINK IT IS FAIR TO CHARACTERIZE IT AS AN •INTENSIFICATION. THERE .WAS SOME VERY BAD WEATHER FOR AN. EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME, AND THE RESULT WAS THAT THERE.'.WAS A-VERY ' SUBSTANTIAL DECREASE IN THE .NUMBER OF SORTIES. THEN ALL OF A SUDDEN THE WEATHER' BROKE'AND AN INCREASE COMPARED TO THE RECENT PAST. I THINK THAT. IS WHAT HAS GIVEN THE APPEARANCE OF AN INTENSIFlCATiON, WHEREAS THERE WAS NO INTENSIFICATION.. • QUESTION: NO, SIR. I MEANT BY THEM -SECRETARY MCNAMARA: I UNDERSTAND WHAT YOU MEANT. THE POINT IS THAT :tHE NUMBER OF SORT IES THAT HAD BEEN OPERATED .FOR A PERIOD OF WEEKS HAD BEEN LOW, AND, HENCE,'THE MIG RESPONSE HAD-BEEN, E N A SENSE, LOW. THEN AS THE WEATHER CLEARED AND THE SORTIES REVERTED BACK TO A NORMAL.-LEVEL, THE MIG RESPONSE REVERTED BACK TO THE LEVELS THAT WE HAD. EXPERIENCED' I N PR I OR PER I ODS. QUESTION: THEN-YOU DON'T'REGARD OUR PLANE LOSSES AS UNUSUAL OR ABNORMAL? •• SECRETARY MCNAMARA: NO. THEY FLUCTUATE DAY BY DAY. THE PLANE.. LOSSES FOR A PERIOD. OF FOUR-WEEKS, FOR EXAMPLE, IN RELATION TO THE NUMBER OF SORTIES I THINK WOULD BE SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME AS WE. HAVE EXPERIENCED I NT "PR I OR "PERIODS. / m D r ^M0RLJ v 000125 �M& Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information 5- QUESTION: SECRETARY MCNAMARA, CAN YOU GIVE ANY INFORMATI ON ON WHAT HAS BEEN DECIDED ON THE POSEIDON? WILL WE GO INTO THAT PROGRAM, THE ANTI-MISSILE? WILL IT BE ADVANCED TO THE NEXT LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT, AND ON THE MANNED B0M3ER? SECRETARY MCNAMARA: AS'THE PRESI DENT'MENTIONED, HE IS CONSIDERING A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC WEAPONS SYSTEM PROPOSALS FOR FISCAL 1968. NO FINAL DECISION HAS BEEN MADE ON SEVERAL OF THESE. THEREFORE, IT IS INAPPROPRIATE, I THINK, TO SPEAK OF ANY PARTICULAR SYSTEM AT THIS TIME. QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, V/OULD YOU GIVE US AN ESTIMATE OF THE MONTHLY COST OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM NOW WITH THIS SUPPLEMENTAL FIGURE? SECRETARY.MCNAMARA: NO. IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO GIVE MONTHLY FIGURES. THE PRESIDENT HAS REFERRED TO THEM IN THE PAST AND I HAVE NOTHING TO ADD TO WHAT HE HAS S A I D . QUESTION: DO YOU SEE A LEVELING OFF OF THE COST OF THE WAR IN THE YEAR AHEAD? SECRETARY MCNARA: I THINK THERE WILL BE A LEVELING OFF IN THE RATE OF BUILD-UP, IF YOU WANT TO CALL IT THAT. I HAVE SPOKEN BEFORE, AFTER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT ON THE FISCAL 1967 SUPPLEMENT AND THE FISCAL 1968 BUDGET, ABOUT THE LEVELING OFF THAT WE SEE IN THE BUILD-UP RATE, BOTH IN VIETNAM AND IN OUR TOTAL FORCE. IN THAT SENSE, THEREFORE, I BELIEVE THERE WILL BE A LEVELING OFF TOWARDS THE END OF THE FISCAL YEAR IN THE RATE OF EXPENDITURE ASSOCIATED WITH THE VIETNAMESE OPERATIONS. QUESTION: AND FISCAL 1968, MR. SECRETARY? SECRETARY MCNAMARA: AND FISCAL 1967, THE RATE OF EXPENDITURES. ASSOCIATED WITH THE VIETNAMESE OPERATIONS. THE PRESIDENT: BEFORE WE ENDED, I COMMENDED THE JOINT -CHIEFS OF STAFF AND THE SECRETARY FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR MEN IN VIETNAM. I COMMENDED THEM FOR THE ECONOMY AND EFFICIENCY WITH WHICH THE DEPARTMENT WAS OPERATING IN THAT THEATRE. I DID :THAT BASED UPON REPORTS THAT I RECEIVED FROM OUR PEOPLE IN THE F I E L D ; IN PARTICULAR, GENERAL WESTMORELAND, WHO HAS ASSURED ME THAT IN ALL OF HIS EXPERIENCE IN THE MILITARY FIELD HE HAS NEVER OBSERVED AN ARMY THAT WAS PROVIDED FOR BETTER, THAT WAS BETTER TRAINED, THAT HAD BETTER EQUIPMENT, AND HAD IT WHEN IT NEEDED I T , WHERE IT NEEDED I T . I ATTRIBUTE A GOOD DEAL OF THAT TO THE C I V I L I A N MANAGEMENT OF SECRETARY MCNAMARA AND UNDER SECRETARY VANCE, AND THE SERVICE SECRETARIES, AND ALSO TO THE VERY OUTSTANDING ADMINISTRATION OF THE CHIEFS THEMSELVES. (MORE) 000126 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'informatio 9% Q^/E WENT .INTO. SOME DETAIL DURING. THE LUNCH HOUR ON PROBLEMS .OF ADMINISTRATION. YOU AND THE COUNTRY OUGHT TO KNOW THAT I THINK WE HAVE A VERY HIGH CALIBER OF MEN IN THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, WHO HAVE DONE AN EXCEPTIONALLY GOOD JOB, PARTICULARLY FROM THE STANDPOINT OF'EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION AND ECONOMY. QUESTION: MR. PRESIDENT, SOME TIME AGO I BELIEVE YOU WERE QUOTED-AS SAYING YOU COULD SEE THE LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL. I MAY BE PARAPHRASING IT. DOES THAT LIGHT LOOK STRONGER TO YOU NOW AND DO YOU SEE THE COMING OUT OF THE TUNNEL IN 1967? THE PRESIDENT: I WOULD NOT SPECULATE ON THAT. QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, DOES IT APPEAR NOW THAT THE DEFENSE BUDGET FOR THE NEXT FISCAL YEAR WILL BE HIGHER THAN THIS YEAR'S, ' COUNTING IN WHAT YOU WILL REQUEST IN THE SUPPLEMENTAL? SECRETARY MCNAMARA: AS THE PRESIDENT INDICATED, THE TOTAL FOR FISCAL 1968 HAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED. I DO NOT WANT TO TALK IN NUMERICAL TERMS. -.,1 WILL SIMPLY TELL YOU THAT .AS BEST WE CAN SEE IT NOW, THE TOTAL DEFENSE BUDGET FOR FISCAL 1968 WILL NOT TAKE A SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT PART OF THE TOTAL NATIONAL INCOME THAN IT DID IN FISCAL YEARS 1961, I962 AND 1963. QUESTION: WHAT WERE THOSE FIGURES? SECRETARY MCNAMARA: ABOUT 8.9 PERCENT. QUESTION: OF THE GROSS NAT IONAL PRODUCT? SECRETARY.MCNAMARA: YES. QUESTION: DO YOU SEE ANY SLOWING DOWN OF SUPPLIES TO THE VIET CONG? THERE ..HAVE BEEN REPORTS THAT THE RED CHINESE ARE STOPPING SOVIET SUPPLIES FROM MOVING OVER THE MAINLAND. SECRETARY MCNAMARA; 1 HAVE SEEN THE REPORTS. BUT WE HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING WHAT SOVIET SUPPLIES ARE MOVING THROUGH RED CHINA. • QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, THESE AIR LOSSES IN THE LAST FEW DAYS, ARE THEY'DUE ALMOST ENTIRELY TO MIG'S, AND IF SO, DO WE KNOW WHO IS^FILYYNG THE'MIG'S? SECRETARY MCNAMARA: NO,. THE, NUMBER OF LOSSES TO MIG'S IS VERY ' SMALL. MY RECOLLECTION IS -- CHECK ME ON THIS -- THAT ONE AIRCRAFT' HAS BEEN LOST TO MIG'S IN THE PAST TWO WEEKS. UNDER SECRETARY.VANCE: THAT IS CORRECT. QUESTIONS: ARE THESE MOSTLY. SAM'S? (SURFACE TO Aj'R MISSILES)' SECRETARY MCNAMARA;.NO, 'MOSTLY ANTI-AIRCRAFT CAUSED. QUESTION: ARE THEY CONVENTIONAL? • .SECRETARY MCNAMARA': YES, (MORE)' . 000127 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'inforraation .-T- QUEST I ON:-MR. SECRETARY, WOULD LIKE ATA READ' TO US? ' • • ' . ' IS THAT A PAPER IN YOUR HAND THAT,YOU . SECRETARY MCNAMARA: NO.. I ANTICIPATED A -QUESTION, AS A MATTER OF FACT, AND SINCE'..IT HAS NOT COME,' J AM NOT GOING TO VOLUNTEER THE ANSWER, ' NOW.THAT YOU RAISE THE P O S S I B I L I T Y , .LET ME MENTION.ONE MATTER THAT DID COME UP THAT WE HAVE BEEN QUERIED ON IN THE PENTAGON. I THOUGHT YOU MIGHT POSSIBLY ASK IT HERE. SINCE IT WAS A MAJOR POINT OE DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT, I WAS PREPARED TO RESPOND TO ANY QUESTION THAT CAME ON I T . IT IS AN IMPORTANT MATTER, I DICTATED A STATEMENT FOLLOWING OUR D I SCUSS I ON TH I S MORNING; .'.WHICH I THINK PERHAPS MR. CHRISTIAN CAN HAVE REPRODUCED BY THE TIME VE LEAVE HERE, ON TH I S MATTER. IS THE QUESTION OF THE CHANGES IN THE SOVIET INTERCONTINENTAL C M I S S I L E . THERE HAS BEEN SOME SPECULATION ON THOSE SYSTEMS. THESE, OF COURSE, ARE ONE OF THE FACTORS THAT WE CONSIDER IN DEVELOPING OUR OWN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCE. EACH YEAR WEBREVIEW THE LATEST INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES ON THIS SUBJECTv WE HAVE DONE SO AGAIN THIS YEAR. I WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT ON THESE ESTIMATES TO YOU. N ORDER TO PUT THEM IN PERSPECTIVE, I WOULD' LIKE TO TELL YOU SOMETHING ABOUT THE OBJECTIVES OF OUR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCE, LAST YEAR'S ESTIMATES OF THE SOVIET FORCE, THE WAY THOSE ESTIMATES HAVE CHANGED, AND THE EFFECT, IF ANY, THAT THAT WILL HAVE ON OUR FORCE PLANNING. THE OBJECTIVES FOR OUR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES ARE TWO. THESE ARE THE SAME OBJECTIVES WE HAVE HAD IN RECENT PAST YEARS. THEY ARE THE OBJECTIVES WE-WILL HAVE AS A FOUNDATION FOR THE FORCE PLANNING IN FISCAL 1968.' FIRST, TO DETER A DELIBERATE NUCLEAR ATTACK UPON THIS COUNTRY AND i TS A L L I E S , AND TO ACCOMPLISH THIS DETERRENCE BY MA.I NTAINING.A CLEAR AND CONVINCING CAPABILITY TO ABSORB A FIRST STRIKE AGAINST US AND WITH SUFFICIENT POWER TO LITERALLY DESTROY THE ATTACKER, EITHER A SINGLE ATTACKER OR ANY COMBINATION OF AGGRESSORS. THAT IS THE FIRST OBJECTIVE. IT IS BY FAR THE MOST IMPORTANT ONE AND THE ONE WE MUST ABSOLUTELY MEET WITHOUT ANY QUESTION, REGARDLESS OF COST. • THE SECOND OBJECTIVE, OF COURSE, DETERRENCE FAILS IN THE EVENT OF AN NATION, TO L I M I T ' THE DAMAGE TO OUR AND THE PEOPLE AND THE RESOURCES OF IS THAT IN THE EVENT • ATTACK ON THIS PEOPLE AND OUR RESOURCES,:. OUR A L L I E S . (MORE) 000128 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information J -8- jHE DETERRENT PORTION OF OUR FORCE IS CALLED OUR "ASSURED 'RUCTION FORGE," OR OUR ASSURED DESTRUCTION CAPABILITY, AND THE REMAINING FORCE; THAT REQUIRED TO REDUCE THE WEIGHT OF AN ENEMY ATTACK OR TO . REDUCE THE LOSSES ASSOCIATED WITH ONE IS CALLED THE "DAMAGE LIMITING .FORCE." THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE EST I MATES WHICH ARE PREPARED ANNUALLY> AND REVISED MORE FREQUENTLY, IF NECESSARY, OF THE SOVIET FORCES ARE ONE OF SEVERAL FACTORS WE EXAMINE IN DETERMINING OUR OWN FORCE STRUCTURE. IN MY STATEMENT TO THE CONGRESS- LAST FEBRUARY — AND, AS A.MATTER OF FACT,.IN THE UNCLASSIFIED EDITION OF THAT STATEMENT WHICH RAN TO SOMETHING ON THE ORDER OF 200 PAGES -- .1 EMPHASIZED THAT OUR ESTIMATES OF SOVIET STRENGTH, SOVIET NUCLEAR STRENGTH, iN THE YEARS IMMEDIATELY AHEAD WERE, OF COURSE, MUCH MORE CERTAIN THAT-'OUR LONG-RANGE ESTIMATES. SPECIFICALLY, I SAID THIS -- AND I AM GOING TO READ YOU A PARAGRAPH OF THE MATERIAL THAT WAS PRESENTED TO CONGRESS LAST FEBRUARY AND THAT WAS MADE PUBLIC AT THAT TIME: "IN ORDER TO ASSESS THE CAPABILITIES OF OUR GENERAL NUCLEAR. WAR FORCES OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS WE MUST TAKE iNTO ACCOUNT THE SIZE AND CHARACTER OF THE FORCES OF THE SOVIETS ARE LIKELY TO HAVE FOR THE SAME' PERIOD. ; "WHILE WE ARE REASONABLY.CERTAIN OF OUR ESTIMATES FOR THE NEW FUTURE, OUR ESTIMATES FOR THE LATTER PART OF THE DECADE, THE DECADE OF THE 1960'S, AND THE EARLY PART OF THE DECADE OF THE 1970'S, ARE 'SUBJECT TO GREAT UNCERTAINTIES. . "AS ,1 POINTED OUT IN THE PAST, SUCH PROJECTIONS ARE AT BEST ONLY INFORMED ESTIMATES, PARTICULARLY SINCE THEY DEAL WITH THE PERIOD BEYOND THE PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT LEAD-TIMES OF THE.WEAPON SYSTEMS INVOLVED." ' THEN I WENT ON TO POINT OUT THAT WE PLANNED OUR OFFENSIVE'FORCE OF MISSILES AND BOMBERS TO HEDGE AGAINST THE SEVERAL DIFFERENT CONTINGENCIES, INNLUDING TWO POSSIBILITIES IN PARTICULAR: FiRST, THAT A SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE MIGHT BE GREATER THAN EXPECTED BY THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES; AND, SECONDLY, THAT THE;SOVIETS MIGHT EMBARK UPON ANY ONE OF SEVERAL•POSSIBLE OFFENSIVE BUILD-UPS,' INCLUDING VARIATIONS IN THE IR TARGET!NG DOCTRINE, VARIATIONS IN THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOPH I ST I CAT I ON OF THEIR WEAPONS SYSTEMS, AND VARIATIONS IN-THE'SPEED OF DEPLOYMENT OF THOSE SYSTEMS. •I TOLD CONGRESS-, AND AGAIN I AM QUOTING FROM THE MATERIAL WE PRESENTED,LAST-FEBRUARY- TO THE CONGRESS WHICH WAS MADE PUBLIC AT THAT TIME, THAT:1.'WE. HAD GIVEN-SPECIAL ATTENTION TO AN ANALYSIS OF' SOVIET THREATS OVER AND ABOVE THOSE- PROJECTED IN THE LATEST NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES.' (MORE). 000129 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information -9"WE HAVE DONE SO BECAUSE AN ASSURED DESTRUCTION CAPABILITY, A CAPABILITY TO SURVIVE THE'F IRST - STR I KE AND SURVIVE WI TH SUFF IG-IEN i - . POWER TO DESTROY THE ATTACKER, IS THE VITAL FIRST OBJECT IVE WHICH ' MUST BE MET IN FULL REGARDLESS OF THE COST UNDER ALL FORESEEABLE CIRCUMSTANCES AND' REGARDLESS OF;ANY .DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED." . I ADDED THAT AFTER GIVING THIS SPECIAL ATTENTION TO AN ANALYSI S.-OF" SOVIET THREATS.BEYOND THOSE - PROJECTED JN THE INTELLIGENCE EST I MATES, • WE HAD, DECIDED TO_ ACCELERATE • THE • DEVELOPMENTS ' OF THE . ', POSEIDON M I S S I L E . . •'. y .' ."•;/" . "'•."'.''=•• THAT IS THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAST YEAR AND DOES NOT RELATE TO;ANY ACTION WE MIGHT TAKE. I N .. F I SCAL 1 9 6 8 . : FURTHER, WE DECIDED TO MOVE AHEAD ON NEW PENETRATION AIDS TOEINSURE GREATER CAPABILITY FOR PENETRATING ANY DEFENSES THAT MIGHT BE PUT • ' IN PLACE.' . ' " THIRDLY, WE DECIDED TO COMPLETE THE DEVELOPMENT OF AND TO PRODUCE AND DEPLOY MINUTEMAN I I I , WHICH, ALTHOUGH IT BEARS THE SAME NAME AS MINUTEMAN I I , HAS A MUCH GREATER OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY. ' WE TOOK THOSE THREE STEPS NOT BASED UPON THE NAT IONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES OF WHAT THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE IN THE FUTURE. BUT BASED UPON. THE' RECOGNITION THAT POSSIBLY THE SOVIETS WOULD DEVELOP A FORCE IN EXCESS OF THOSE'NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES. WE HAVE SAID REPEATEDLY IN THE PAST THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS AN INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCE THREE TO'FOUR TIMES THAT OF THE. SOVIET UNION.. THAT IS S T I L L TRUE TODAY. OUR SHORT RANGE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES OF THE SOVIET INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCE HAVE BEEN REMARKABLY ACCURATE. EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT THE SOVIET INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE STRENGTH TODAY IS ALMOST EXAC1LY--AND I MEAN WITHIN A FEW MISSILES , FIVE TO TEN MISSILES--OF WHAT OUR INTELLIGENCE PEOPLE PREDICTED IT WOULD BE A'YEAR AGO. ' ' ' . • . . • : :r . WE ALSO BEL J EVE THAT LAST YEAR : S INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES — 1965 — OF THE :.l NTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES FORCE WHICH THE SOVIET UNION WILL'HAVE A YEAR HENCE WILL BE ACCURATE. OUR LATEST INFORMATI ON CONFI RMS THESE ESTIMATES OF LAST YEAR FOR MID-1967. ADDITIONALLY, WE NOW HAVE EVIDENCE. INDICATING THAT WE WERE "VERY WISE TO PLAN OUR INTERCONTINENTAL BALL I ST IC MISSILE PROGRAM ON THE \ ASSUMPTION THAT THE NAT I ONAL . I NTELL I GENCE EST I.MATES' FOR THE FUTURE BEYOND. MID-1967 MIGHT BE LOW, AND DESPITE THE LACK OF. ANY SOLID PROOF A YEAR AGO THAT.THE SOVIETS MIGHT DECIDE TO STEP UP THE PACE OF THEIR INTERCONTINENTAL BALL I ST I C Ml SS I'LE DEPLOYMENT. WE THINK THEY ARE DOING THAT NOW. WE THlKlK THEY HAVE BEEN DOING IT FOR THE PAST YEAR. EVIDENCE, THEREFORE,NOW SUGGESTS THAT IN MID-1968 THERE WILL BE MORE SOVIET ICBMS THAT WERE PREDICTED A YEAR AGO IN THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES. (MORE)' �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information ft W. WANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT WE HAD ANTICIPATED THAT'DEVELOPMENT I'M OUR PLANNING, AND THIS NEW INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE, THEREFORE, HAS NO IMPACT, NO BASIC IMPACT, ON OUR OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC FORCE REQUIREMENTS. IN'SUMMARY, THEREFORE, I THINK THESE THREE MAJOR POINTS SHOULD BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD BY THE AMERICAN PUBLIC: FIRST, EVEN IF THE NEW INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES FOR MID-I968 PROVES ACCURATE, THE UNITED STATES, WITHOUT TAK.I NG ANY ACT I ONS BEYOND THOSE ALREADY PLANNED AND ALREADY FINANCED IN THE FISCAL 1967 PROGRAM, WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL:QUANTATIVE AND.QUALITIVE LEAD OVER THE SOVIET UNION IN INTERCONTINENTAL BALL I ST IC MlSSILES AT THAT TIME. SECONDLY, THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS AS MANY INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC ..MISSILES TODAY AS THE LATEST INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE PREPARED WITHIN THE' LAST THREE OR FOUR WEEKS GIVES THE. SOVIET UNION SEVERAL YEARS HENCEE THIRDLY, THAT OUR STRATEGIC FORCES HAVE TODAY, AND THEY WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE IN THE FUTURE, THE 'CAPABILITY OF ABSORBING A' DELIBERATE FIRST STRIKE AGAINST THIS NATION AND SURVIVING WITH THE :; SUFFICIENT STRENGTH "TO-RETALIATE IN SUCH A WAY. AS TO INFLICT UNACCEPTABLE DAMAGE UPON THE AGGRESSOR OR ANY COMB I NAT I ON OF AGGRESSORS. THIS IS THE FOUNDATION OF THE.DETERRENT POWER ON WHICH OUR NATIONAL SECURITY DEPENDS. I HAVE GONE TO SOME LENGTH TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER BECAUSE THE POWER OF OUR. STRATEGIC MISSILE FORCE AND THE ASSOCIATED BOMBER FORCE, THE POWER OF. THAT FORCE. TO SURVIVE. A STRIKE AND TO SURVIVE WITH" SUFFICIENT CAPAB.IL I TY'TO DESTROY THE ATTACKER, IS THE DETERRENT OF,AN ATTACK ON THIS; NAT I ON, IS THE FOUNDATION OF OUR SECURITY, AND HAS. THE F.'lRST CLAIM ON'OUR RESOURCES, REGARDLESS OF THE AMOUNT REQUIRED. THAT IS THE POLICY WE HAVE FOLLOWED IN 1967; THAT IS THE POL ICY.WE ARE FOLLOWING, IN DEVELOPING THE 1968 PROGRAM. QUESTION: THERE IS APPARENTLY GO ING TO BE CONSIDERABLE PRESSUREIN THE NEW CONGRESS TO GO AHEAD WITH NIKE X BECAUSE OF THE ADVANCE IN THE'.SOVIET MISSILE SYSTEM. : HAS YOUR POSITION CHANGED ANY ABOUT THE NIKE X? SECRETARY MCNAMARA: AS I' SAID'EARLiER, I DON'T WANT TO COMMENT ' ON ANY SPECIFIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS FOR 1968. QUESTION: MR. PRESIDENT, HOW ARE YOU'FEEL I NG, SIR? THE PRESIDENT: I FEEL FINE. QUESTION: WILL THE'SUPPLEMENTAL BE JUST TO ADD TO THE DAY-TO-DAY COST OF THE WAR? IS THERE SOMETHING NEW? (MORE) 000131 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRETARY MCNAMARA: THE, SUPPLEMENT TO THE FISCAL .1967 BUDGET WILL BE RELATED SOLELY TO THE FUNDING.AND FINANCING OF OPERATION IN VIETNAM. QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, WHAT WES THE ORIGINAL BUDGET FIGURE? SECRETARY MCNAMARA: 5 8 . 5 B I L L I O N DOLLARS, CORRECTLY, FOR FISCAL 1967. IF I RECALL THE FIGURE QUESTION: MR. PRESIDENT, THE 500 MILLION DOLLARS THAT THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD SAID IT COULD MAKE AVAILABLE', IS THIS COMING FROM THE SAME SOURCES AS THE 250 MILLION DOLLAR'S? ' THE PRESIDENT: 'NO. THE 2 5 0 MILLION DOLLARS WILL BE USED IN THE SAME F I E L D . THEY ARE FROM DIFFERENT SOURCES. ONE IS FROM AN APPROPRIATION OF CONGRESS. THE OTHER IS FROM THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD. IT MAKES A TOTAL OF 7 50 MILLION DOLLARS AVAILABLE IN THIS FIELD THUS FAR--THESE TWO ANNOUNCEMENTS. QUESTION: ARE THERE ANY PLANS TO RELEASE THE OTHER 750 MILLION DOLLARS THAT CONGRESS APPROPRIATED? : . THE PRESIDENT: WHY DON'T YOU WRITE A STORY ON THIS 50O MILLION DOLLARS, AND NOT OVERDO IT TODAY, AND WE WILL SEE. THE ANSWER IS NO, WE HAVE NO PLANS AT THIS TIME. QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, THE STATEMENT THAT YOU READ REALLY. TOUCHED ON MOST OF THE POINTS THAT ARE MADE AGAINST ADVANCING THE ANTI-MISSILE MISSILE PROGRAM. IS THAT NOT SO? SECRETARY MCNAMARA: NO. THE STATEMENT I-READ HAD TO DOWITH THE SOVIET OFFENSIVE FORCE AND THE DEGREE TO WHICH THAT OFFENSIVE FORCE MIGHT KNOCK OUT OUR BOMBERS OR OUR MISSILE'S BEFORE THEY HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO RETALIATE IN RESPONSE TO'AN ATTACK ON US, AND, THEREFORE, THE NEED FOR POSSIBLE ADDITIONS TO THAT FORCE. WHAT I SAID WAS THAT LAST YEAR, AS ALWAYS, WE MAKE A PREDICTION OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE ' FUTURE. THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE IS THE BASIS FOR THAT. WE USE THAT AS THE FOUNDATION OF OUR FORCE PLANNING. HOWEVER, LAST YEAR, RECOGNIZING THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT PRODUCE AND DEPLOY MISSILES IN EXCESS'OF THE NUMBER INCLUDED IN THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE, WE TOOK'ACCOUNT OF THAT AND ACTUALLY EXPANDED THE FISCAL 1967 BUDGET TO FINANCE THESE THREE ADDITIONAL ACTIONS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POSEIDON, THE ADDITIONAL PENETRATION A I D S , AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF MINUTEMAN I I I , IN ORDER TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THIS BARE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY WOULD GO ABOVE T H E . NAT IONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE. THEY APPEAR TO HAVE DONE SO. FRANKLY, THE AMOUNT BY WHICH THEY HAVE ACCELERATED HAS NOT BEEN AS GREAT AS WE TOOK ACCOUNT OF IN THIS GREATER THAN EXPECTED CASE. ' (MORE) 000132 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information IT DOES NOT RELATE TO ANT I-BALL I ST IC MISSILES, HOWEVER. QUESTION: THERE HAVE BEEN A LOT OF STORIES ON WE WON'T IF YOU DON'T. DO YOU HAVE ANY REASON WHY THE SOVIET UNION IS NOW BEGINNING SECRETARY MCNAMARA: I CAN'T EXPLAIN THEIR ACTIONS. QUESTION: SIR, THERE HAVE BEEN COMMENTS IN CONGRESS, NOTABLY BY THE MORSE SUBCOMMITTEE, THAT THERE HAS BEEN INSUFFICIENT FINANCIAL SURVEILLANCE OVER SOME OF THE DEFENSE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS IN VIETNAM. COULD YOU COMMENT? SECRETARY MCNAMARA: WE HAVE AN AUDITING SYSTEM AT WORK. IT HAS BEEN AT WORK SINCE THE CONSTRUCTION STARTED. THE AUDITS ON THE WHOLE HAVE BEEN COMDREHENS i VE.. I THINK THEY HAVE SHOWN, AS YOU MIGHT EXPECT, THAT IN THE RUSH OF PUTTING IN PLACE THE TREMENDOUS INFRASTRUCTURE THAT WE HAVE—WHARVES, PORTS, DEPOTS, AIR BASES — THERE HAS BEEN SOME WASTE, BUT, ON THE WHOLE, I AM PLEASED WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF OUR CIVILIAN CONTRACTORS AND OUR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION BATTALIONS. I THINK THAT THE PROGRAM IS PROPERLY CONTROLLED. QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, HOW MUCH OF THE 58.5 BILLION DO YOU ATTRIBUTE DIRECTLY TO VIETNAM? SECRETARY MCNAMARA: I HAVE NOTHING MORE TO ADD ON THE COST OF THE MILITARY OPERATION IN VIETNAM THAN WHAT THE PRESIDENT HAS SAID PREVIOUSLY. (2B - PP) 000133 � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDBM00034 Title A name given to the resource Transcript from US Embassy, Ottawa Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 12/7/1966 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-c, file 27-11-7, "DEFENCE - CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS - ANTI - BALLISTIC MISSILES (ABM) = DEFENSE - ARMEMENTS DE TYPE CLASSIQUE ET NUCLEAIRE - ENGINS ANTIMISSILES (ABM)," vol. 10357, part 1, Library and Archives Canada, (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Anti-ballistic missiles Description An account of the resource President Johnson's Press Conference Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en