https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/e569ec658a626e194fb9fc19c1c76308.pdf 415b90bced1aade6505d6f5f117fcc12 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document d i v u J g » g « ¥ W W * / © $ & S B P ^ i i & I'information L ^ EXTERNAL AFFAIRS % AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES MEMGRaNOUH DVL.(l) Division TO FROM Oe Disarmament Division REFERENCE Your Memorandum of October 28 and ifeeting on Reference NOVeffiber SUBJECT U.S. Paper on Anti-©allistic Missiles Sujet ENCLOSURES Annexes DISTRIBUTION ASME Div. D.L.(2) Div. European Div. P.E. Div. H.B.Robinson R.E.Collins 9. SECURITY Securil DATE N o v e m b e r UU, 1 9 6 6 . NUMBER HuinSro FILE OTTAWA 3TTAWA _•, 21- / / - 7 MISSION sr At the meeting on November 9 it was agreed that our aim at this- X stage is to have Divisions comment on those aspects of the U.S. paper of / particular interest to them in order to draw attention to unstated assumptions, questionable arguments, biased conclusions or relevant factors not taken into account. Divisional comments would then be consolidated by D.L.(1) along with those received from the Department of National Defence; it was proposed that the consolidated comments should be circulated with a view to preparing a^eed Canadian comments for transmission to U.S. officials. Because of its farreaching implications for arras control and disarmament, the whole paper is of very considerable interest to Disarmament Division. However, in the following paragraphs we will confine ourselves in the main to those areas which fall within our particular field of interest and are not the responsibility of other Divisions or Departments. 2. In general, we think the paper a relatively good onej it is reasonably balanced and sets out the arguments for and against most points without apparent bias and without attempting to formulate explicit conclusions. Nevertheless, in certain areas the way the argument is presented seems to us to shape one's thinking towards certain conclusions with which we would not always agree. 3. Mr* Halstead has already questioned the concept of a balance of deterrence as between the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union. Vfe agree that to think of an equal balance of strategic capabilities as between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. is misleading since the U.S.A. has a safe margin of superiority in this area. Nevertheless, the argument has some validity since the Soviet Union has sufficient strategic capability to dissuade American leaders from seriously considering a pre-emptive first strike. In this sense, therefore, one can speak with validity of a "rough balance of deterrence". Jj,. It seems to me that in the Section on "ABM and U.S.-Soviet Balance of Deterrence" (pp. 2-7) the paper assumes that Soviet thinking about the pros and cons of major strategic moves, such as ABM deployment, is as rational and carefully calculated as American thinking in this area and that decisions are based on a careful weighing of a number of very complicated military and foreign 000095 Ext. 407D/Bil. (Admin. Services Div.) �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET political factors. But this assumption ignores another school of thought which holds that the overriding element in Soviet strategic thinking, derived from experience over more than two centuries, is to safeguard at all costs the Soviet heartland, i.e., that it places great engphasis on defence. Adherents of this latter view argue that the influential military lobby in the Soviet Union wants primarily to have more and more of the most sophisticated weapons available, regardless of cost or of the offset on the Soviet economy* If these weapons happen to be defensive in nature, so much the better as far as the Soviet military hierarchy is concerned, whose thinking tends to be more subject to influence by emotional factors (defence of th© homeland) and to be defensively oriented. This view of Soviet thinking is reflected in the last two sections of the paper on pp. 21-23* In my view, the paper would be strengthened by some discussion of these alternatives and a pronouncement in favour of one or the other. $. A similar issue arises in the discussion about China. Reflection about psychological standards and motivation suggests that the Chinese act in a rather different way and for rather different reasons than the Russians* For instance, as indicated by their propaganda, the Bussians want peace while Chinese propaganda suggests that they would welcome war because of the cipportuhlty afforded to annihilate the enemy "paper tiger"• It is not clear from the paper whether its authors accept that Chinese intentions and actions will be in accord with their propaganda line, i.e., motivated largely by emotional and ideological considerations, or be based on more rational considerations such as the deterrent value of ABM defence and other factors such as cost-effectiveness, which play a major part in Western calculations. At some points the paper suggests that the authors regard the Chinese as rationally motivated! elsewhere, it suggests that other factors are more influential or at least may become dominant factors in the future. It seems to me that the paper would be strengthened if this issue could be faced up to squarely, decided one way or the other and the accepted assumption stated explicitly. J5y own feeling is that in the final analysis Chinese actions will be based on rational calculations in much the same way as decisions on these matters are reached in Western countries. 6. I also think that the brief section on page 10 purporting to discuss the effect an American decision to deploy ABM's might have on Communist China* s attitudes falls short of the general high quality of the paper* In this relatively short passage, there is little attempt to analyze various possible courses of action or to weigh the effects of these alternatives on China's attitudes* No doubt the reason for this is that the authors have not made up their minds about the prior question of Chinese motivation, i.e., whether it is based on rational considerations or on other factors such as ideology and emotion. 7. The distinction made between gradual deployment and full-scale deployment would not make a difference in the psychological effects. With the amount of public exposure that military programmes receive in the U.S.A., gradual deployment would require a ma^or decision in which the issue would be debated nationally and internationally. Furthermore, if the arguments for deploya©nt were accepted, it would be logical to deploy quickly and massively. Is it realistic in terms of U.S. public opinion to envisage a "partial" deployment against a limited Chinese threat? We would suspect 3 000096 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'informatio SSCHET - 3that even a limited deployment would lead to irresistible pressure for a nation-wide programme which would really send the balloon up. 8. Turning from these more general points and looking now at that part of the paper which discusses the implications of A M deployment for arms control and disarmament, the first point we should like to make is that a U.S.A. decision to deploy an A M defence either in response to a partial Soviet AK! deployment, or against a future Chinese nuclear threat to Horth America, would almost certainly be viewed by other countries as an escalation of the arms race to a new and higher level* In our view, the effect on prospects for agreements about arms control would be most serious and the whole international climate could be affected adversely. We think it unlikely, as suggested on p. 18 that the' cost and strategic consequences of deployment would act as an impetus to agreement$ the more likely course is that once set in motion, the process would be self-feeding and lead to an unwillingness to look for "agreements such as, for example, a freese on 5NQ?fs. This in turn would probably have quite pronounced effects on the attitudes of certain non-nuclear countries towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons. In our view, even a limited U.S. deployment of an ABM defence against a&resumed Chinese nuclear threat would Seriously and adversely affect the prospects for general adherence to a non-proliferation treaty* Indeed, one direct result might be to encourage non-aligned non-nuclear countries like India to increase their price for signature of a non-proliferation treaty. 9* We also question the argument (at the top of page Ik) that American deployment of an ABM defence against China would make the U.S. more reliable in Indian eyes* provided such deployment did not lead to a deterioration of relations between the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union* Despite the absence of formal defence conaaitments to India, we suspect that the Indians, like the Japanese and the other Asian allies of the U.S., would feel that a U.S.A. deployment against China would make it easier for the U.S.A. to opt out of future Asian conflicts.' Thus, to the Indians, the U.S.A. would appear less rather than more reliables this in turn would tend to increase Indian concern about its security and might accelerate an Indian decision to develop nuclear weapons. 10. Another issue is whether the deployment of an ABM defence by the U.S.A. might lead to demands by allies (e.g., Japan and Germany) for an ABM defence system covering their territory. We think there is a strong likelihood that both the Germans and the Japanese, and perhaps some others, might press strongly to come under an ABM umbrella* Some evidence of preliminary German reaction along this line was revealed at the meeting of disarmament experts in Paris in September of this year. While I suppose it would be technically feasible for the missiles and warheads of an ABM system to remain under U.S. control, nevertheless in broad political terms, particularly since the ABM defence system is almost entirely automatic in operation with a minimum of human direction and control, deployment of such systems in areas outside North America would probably put an end to present efforts to reach agreement on a non-proliferation treaty. �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRST -mm •oi hib»» 11* Ws also think that the American paper is less than ingenuous in stating (p* 19/2) that "the barrier to a comprehensive test ban has been Soviet opposition to on-site inspection, not ABM testing requirements"• While we have not taken issue with this stated U.S.A* position, we have become less and less happy with it and suspect that ASM testing requirements play a significant part In U.S.A. reluctance to accept seismic means of detection to monitor a treaty. It is interesting to note that of all the arms control questions, only the eoa$>rehensive test ban is directly affected not £ust by deployment but also by R & D on ABM defence system. We concluded some months ago that perhaps testing as part of an R & B prograJiane is a compromise U.S.A. position between the pro- and anti-. ABM deployment factions in the U.S.A. If one is opposed to deployment, R & D might be a small price to pay for Secretary McNamara*s continued resistance to the Joint Chiefs and to Congress. 12* We would be sceptical about the extent to which the U.S.A. decision to deploy will be **taken in the light of security risks to ... its allies" (p. 16). In the spring when we were appraising the possibility of a comprehensive test ban without inspection, it was abundantly clear that Canada was not in a position to assess the technical features of the ABi. As was said at the time, we had opted for innocence and therefore had ignorance. Comments which we make on the ABM are based on what the Americans sre. willing to tell us* 13* If it is true - and it seems to be the only firm conclusion in the paper * that deployment would not affect significantly the ^balance of deterrence11 between East and West and that the offence will always outweigh tlie defence, should the U.S.A. not logically ignore Soviet deployment and also the developing Chinese threat? The argument on p.5 of the paper under the "First Strike Question" seems conclusive* the deployment of ABM's would still expose the USA and USSR to substantial casualties in a nuclear exchange. As European Division concludes, at the present time, it would not appear that deployment against a Soviet attack would serve a useful strategic purpose. If one accepts that the Chinese think about these matters in a rational way, then on grounds of logic there would seem to be no need for an ABM deployment against China. 1U. An important aspect of the ATM problem which is not mentioned in the paper is th© domestic American controversy over deployment. If our reading of the debate is correct, it is quite possible that the issue will be decided on less than rational grounds* Congressional demands for the ABM system have been based to a great extent on the specious argument that it is the duty of the administration to take ths steps necessary to reduce losses from lUO,gGO,QOO to 70,000,000 American lives in a nuclear attack. We would do w e H , therefore, to spend as much effort assessing U.S.A. intentions and reactions as those of ths U.S.S.R., China and the non-aligned. 1$. Among questions which we would like to see answered are the following. (a) when the paper speaks about ABM deployment, doss this include the shelter programme? Is there such a thing as a shelter �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act . Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET «• J> «• programme related only to the Chinese threat,- i.e., only in the'Western U.S.A.? (b) to what extent could there be an BM> programs for ABM systems without testing? Could this programme either, maintain the technical gap with China or satisfy the African "hawks" as to U.S.A. preparedness? (c) would deployment of AJ&Ps be directed toward China in an obvious manner or could the Soviet Union misinterpret the anti*Ghinese ABM system to be directed at the U.S.S.R.? (d) we are Intrigued by the reference on p*9 to "a formidable range of capabilities and options"* As the value of these options could materially affect a judgment about the efficacy of the ABM system, shouldn*t there be some description of them? (e) would the 12 million casualties suggested on p*8 result from a Chinese attack without U.S.A. defence or with present defences? 16. We agree that the implications for Canadian defence are serious and involve our projections about Canadian^McT Chinese foreign policy and alignments in the l^TO's. While this probably goes beyond our present purpose, we indicate below some of the kinds of questions which we may eventually have to answer J (a) would we consider elements of an American ABM system on Canadian soil? *(b) have the Americans suggested that there might be deployment in Canada as part of shield against attack on U.S.A.? (c) would the U.S.A. consider an ABK system which would protect Canadian west coast? (d) would Canada be affected by nuclear exchange between China and U.S.A. whether we were under ABM umbrella or not? (e) would ourtulnerability to attack depend on our relations with the U.S.A.? Is there a possibility of pursuing a foreign policy which would distinguish Ganada sufficiently from the U.S.A. to exempt us from the threat? (f) is it realistic to consider developing or operating our own AIM system against China? (g) should Canada depend entirely on the U.S.A. deterrent against the threat of Chines© attack? (h) is there a fundamental difference between our post*war adhesion to NATO and NORAD and any link with the U.S.A. in ABM defence against China? Crr'NAL SIGNED it D. M. CORNETT Disarmament Division 000099 � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDBM00027 Title A name given to the resource Memorandum from Disarmament Division Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 11/14/1966 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-c, file 27-11-7, "DEFENCE - CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS - ANTI - BALLISTIC MISSILES (ABM) = DEFENSE - ARMEMENTS DE TYPE CLASSIQUE ET NUCLEAIRE - ENGINS ANTIMISSILES (ABM)," vol. 10357, part 1, Library and Archives Canada, (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Anti-ballistic missiles Description An account of the resource US Paper on ABMs Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en