https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/3e34e7e50ab5aab9398dff6259461810.pdf 0e74b9192bf3626454a8f3c0045709d9 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY Speech by Ambassador Mrs. Alva Hyrdal, Swedish Delegation . 11. August 1966i Mr. Chairman, Notwithstanding the fact that today's deliberations should preferably focus on General and Complete Disarma- : ment, I. beg the permission, Mr. Chairman, - according to a general rule and-an oft-repeated practice - to Speak on the subject of collateral measures. Eecause today, I wish to follow up the line of reasoning in ny intervention of last week which dealt with the issue of a comprehensive testban v/ith some comments, mainly centering on another collateral measure, the cut-off of production of nuclear mate9 rial for weapon purposes. In the view of the Swedish delegation these two measures continue to be closely linked with each other and with a non-proliferation treaty. Without them, the latter kind of treaty seems to us to be both Operationally and politically weak. As in the case of the test-ban I wish to enter a plea for practicality, and suggest that we set a target date for achieving agreement on tbe freezing: of production of nuclear v/eapons material. The rearrangements called for in the case of termination of the long-range military programmes for nuclear material supply, involving large and diversified industrial �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'infbrmation - 2 - • * processes, will undoubtedly be more time-consuming than breaking off the comparatively short-run and intermittent series of tests. YJculd it not be appropriate, may I ask my fellow delegates, to aim at July 1st, 1967, as the historical date when further additions to the stockpiles of nuclear weapons material would cease? If this were.an agreed target date, both for the cessation of ongoing production and for. the elaboration of a treaty, it would give the nuclear weapon countries time to prepare for the closing of the crucial processes; for the non-nuclear countries it could be said to equal a kind pf Panfani-moratorium of close to one year's duration. One might go even further in accomodating the nuclear weapon countries and state that if they are really sitting down to a serious study of the practical requirements for a phasing-out of the production in question, we ought to be prepared to envisage a flexible pattern, i.e. a series of dates for closure of various parts* of the manufacture, some perhaps later but some, hopefully, coming earlier than the date I have indicated, tentatively and for the purpose of discussion. The most intricate problems to tackle, here as always, refer to verification. Fortunately in regard to this measure of a "cut-off" we have an agreed foundation to start from, the IAEA safeguards. They belong to a living system, one being oontinously extended, where the verification needs in connection with a cut-off agreement! which evidently would 1 have to be applied in a more obligatory fashion* could be * linked in. Difficulties relating to the pace of extension ought not to be insurmountable. -•-• 000065 | \ �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information • 3 - In this connection it is interesting to review the suggestions made by the distinguished representative of the United States, Ur. Fisher, at our 2Afdk> meeting, although they were tied into the negotiations for a non-proliferation rather than a cut-off treaty, thus aimed at stopping the ominous production of fissionable materials for weapons in countries who have not started it but not in those who have. V/e realize how important is the offer that also the nuclear weapon powers should submit to control of their trade in nuclear material for peaceful purposes, an offer already put into practice in some recently concluded agreements for' co-operation on civil uses of atomic energy. It certainly must mean a burden, involving considerable inconvenience to them. On the other hand it does, of course, not contribute to any-curtailment and still less any reversal of the present arms race. Hay I therefore be allowed to point out, how greatly an international agreement to cut off production for v/eapon purposes would simplify the situation, as there v/ould then exist no activities to shield off from controll In order to be quite realistic, I believe we should discuss a time-table, when various types of obligations would enter into force, taking into account the necessity for a gradual phasing-out plan, as just mentioned, but taking into account also "the balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations", which the non-nuclear weapon states are interested to see observed. I could well imagine that a reasonable and equitable plan for introducing controls, entailing a series of steps, which.might follow each other at prede- 000066 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 4 - termined but rather protracted intervals, would amount to something like the following: first, controls on all transfers of source or special fissionable (nuclear) materials and principal nuclear facilities between all countries and for all' purposes, second, control extended also to all new facilities including not least those capable to produce weapon grade materials, again in all countries, third and fi- nally, control also of already existing production facilities. This, Mr. Chairman, is a suggestion which I hope will be seriously examined. It is offered in a desire to be helpful.Hy Government as well as others, I am sure, will keep am open.mind also for other possible modalities, which might grow out of our continued negotiations. Hay I just point out that the first step is very similar to one part of Mr. Fisher's recent proposal, envisaging "an undertaking by all states not to provide source or fissionable material, or specialized equipment or non-nuclear material for processing of use of source or fissionable material or for the production of fissionable material, to any other state ...... unless such material and equipment are subject to IAEA or international/ equivalent/safeguards." (Provisional PV.277, p.11). The main difference lies in the dots representing three words which I skipped in the quotation, namely "for peaceful purposes". But the alteration is self-explanatory: Mr. Fisher's formv.la refers to a situation as of today, when production for weapons purposes is not forbidden, mine to a situation when a cut-off treaty would make such production non-existent. On this subject I might raise a few additional points, 000067 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 5 - although they refer more to details than to the general merit of an agreement. One is a question, directed to the United States' proposals just mentioned, of a control system which might rely either on the IAEA or on equivalent international safeguards. What safeguards can really be considered equivalent? TI this is meant as a reference to various kinds of bilateral arrangements or regional systems, my delegation must beg to differ. We have to be more stringent when looking to a future, when the cut-off of fissionable material production for weapon purposes should be fully implemented. From a less technical and more political point of view we, as I believe also other nations who are outsiders, could hardly accept verification v/hich takes place inside a closed system as being "equivalent" to IAEA safeguards, at least if there cannot be established some adequate co-operative arrangements for verification purposes between the IATA and the "equivalent" systems. By "international safeguards" we must mean a system open to our observance. Only a system under such public, international control can really satisfy all signatories to a treaty. As a second observation I should like to touch briefly on the point made by I.Ir. Fisher at our last meeting, namely that not only explosions for weapons testing but all nuclear test explosions should be prohibited. If a test-ban, made truly comprehensive in this way, were combined with a cutoff agreement, there would be no new explosives to use even for such peaceful projects as may become permitted under in- 000068 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 6 - ternational control. Thus any such undertakings would have to utilize already manufactured fissionable material, thus detracting from the stockpiles already produced for v/eapons purposes. The third of my marginal comments refers to the fact that if one such agreement is reached, it has beneficial effects also in other directions. Thus, a cut-off treaty with control of all transfers from as well as to signatories, v/ould to a certain extent hamper independent production even in countries v/ho had not signed the treaty. An exemplification of such indirect effects relates to the application of the Moscow Treaty, if its Article 1:2, not in any way to participate, even indirectly, in testing by anybody is rigidly interpreted. "Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying ou^t of any nuclear weapons test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which v/ould take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect referred to, in paragraph 1 of this Article." As is well known, the conducting of tests is a big undertaking, involving various kinds of research and development preparations, logistic support and what is most important in the present connection, also supply of fissionable materials. If the obligations in the Moscow Treaty are most scrupulously applied, it can make the conducting of tests by other nawork/ tions more difficult, the development/ever more time-consuming and the whole activity more expensive. If this is a 000069 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 7 - potential effect of the Moscow agreement, it is unqucstioningly true that a cut-off treaty with verification procedures of the kind I have indicated would have far stronger and more universal effects. My fourth and final observation is parallel to one, made in my recent statement referring to the test-ban, namely that generally speaking the verification requirements seem to undergo an evolution towards attenuation. The IAEA system itself is being reformed, so as to be less complicated and cumbersome. The working-papers presented by the United .Kingdom and the United States (ENDC/60, ENDC/154, and EKDC/174) have also moved the requirements in the direction of making verification more automatic and less intrusive. This nourishes our hope that agreement to stop further production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes will soon be feasible. 000070 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 8 - Mr. Chairman, V*hy is not such a treaty concluded when its conditions seem so reasonable and the need for it is so pressing? Cannot the political will power be mustered? Me, who are seated in the EUDC, have a definite responsibility to look after the interests of the world and of the future, not just such short-term national interests of today, which stand in the way for an agreement on a higher, that is international, level of security. To bring about a definite change of direction in relation to the arms race is exactly what we envisage when we so persistently stress the need for really effective measures like the test-ban and the cut-off: a containment of the spectre of endlessly continuing additions to the quality and quantity of nuclear weapons. Because v/e can imagine what a frightening world would result if the nuclear weapon states remain free to test and develop and accumulate and spread out these weapons. Although it should be superfluous I might restate again that when my country insists on agreements as to a comprehensive test-ban and a cut-off - in conjunction v/ith or even as priorities in relation to a "simple" non-proliferation treaty - we are motivated by a firm conviction that such measures to reduce or at least freeze present nuclear capabilities would best serve the needs of the world as a whole. V/hen it is sometimes said, in popular publications, that nonaligned states are claiming these, measures as a "price" for their adherence to a non-proliferation treaty, this is an unwarranted simplification. The true explanation is, of 000071 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 9 - course, the one that can be surmised from the Government declaration which I quoted in my statement on August. 4 and which may serve as a kind of Swedish catechism on the issue under discussion: v/hile we are definitely in favour of international agreements to hinder proliferation of nuclear weapons, v/e are also scared by the prospect of the present armamei'.t race being left to continue at its perilous pace. Therefore, measures v/hich are broad enough to bring a halt to that ste-ply spiralling race at the same time as preventing additional countries to "go nuclear1' are definitely to be preferred to measures that would just achieve one and perhaps not the most farreaching of these goals. In our opinion, immense dangers are inherent in the continuing arms race, in regard both to the qualitative and to the quantita-^ tive growth of nuclear armouries, even when the number of military nuclear powers remains the same as nov/. Looking at it first from the quantitative'point of view there seems to be no spontaneous letting-up of the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes. We appreciate, of course, that the cutbacks of fissionable production on behalf of the USSR,'the United Kingdom and the United States, announced in April 1964, were rather substantial. However, the production capabilities left were even more substantial, and there are no signs that this course has been sv/itched into its reverse. Such a quantitative increase is also linked with the process which we have now almost routine-wise come to call "dissemination". The saturation point for the nuclear killing capacity may already have been reached by bhe .super-powers when related to their own needs; 000072 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 10 - some conversion into hew types of weapons may be what they are most interested in. But, as long as a freeze on the present stockpiles of fissionable material cannot be legislated, there will exist increasingly more of nuclear weapons to "spread", meaning in the narrower sense transferred from nuclear weapon states to alien territories or otherwise held in readiness for support of allies - or new clients. A cut-off treaty would tend to limit such supporting arsenals. If not, the danger multiplies, as the production might be kept open-ended in order to arm alliances. And, of course, deployment could also continue in an ever widening "geographical spread". It is not unthinkable that v/e v/ould have to look forward to a time when the whole globe is tightly studded v/ith arsenals of nuclear weapons - the whole globe, that is, except the countries who even then opt to remain nonaligned. And this is the recurrent question in my theme for . today: is that the kind of world we are steeririg towards? V/e may begin to feel like the Norwegian poet: "I. am afraid that v/e have come to the wrong planet." The future is no less ominous if we dwell on the qualitative aspect of a continued arms race, entailing a kind of macabre perfectioning of the nuclear deathraachines. It is on this evolution - which I refuse to call "progress" - we want to put the brakes of a comprehensive test-ban. Of course, only those with access to classified material in the archives of the groat powers can fully estimate the dangers inherent in the continued testing of nuclear explosives - in the atmosphere by two pov/ers who have not signed the Moscow treaty, and underground by three pov/ers .who have. The range . 000073 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 11 - of options for weapons development remains enormous, even if only underground tests are considered. Developing and proof-testing may be feasible of warheads, both for strategical and tactical uses, for air defense, anti-submarine, anti-missile etc. llor need the tests be restricted to v/eapons of very limited yield - several hundred kilotons are mentioned in the literature. At the present time the greatest anxiety seems to hover around the possibility - which may just be turning into a probability - that the super-powers would move into a nev/ tremendously stepped up round in arms development, centering on anti-ballistic missile defense or, rather, the combination of a system of interceptor missiles and so-called penetration aids to strategic missiles. Both fears, and advice to restraint, are now often being expressed, e.g. in a recent speech by the Prime Minister of Canada, The Right Honourable L.B. Pearson, a speech which I had the great privilege to listen to - as did General Burns, who has alreadyquoted some very important passages in his statement of July 12 (PV.272, p.8). Mr. Pearson referred to the ABM system as being"an enormously costly undertaking which, in the end, would probably lead, as the ballistic missile race did, to ever-mounting defense budgets without any permanent increase in national security or international stability." For this reason Mr. Pearson advocated an agreement between the superpowers not to deploy AB!* systems. That there are doubts in the highest places about the rationality in opening this nev/ dimension of armaments has been indicated repeatedly also in speeches by. the United 000074 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la to/sur I'acces a I'information - 12 - States Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara and reflected in the statement by the distinguished representative of the United States at a recent meeting (provisional PV.278, p. 17). An outspoken statement to the same effect was made by the disarmament minister in our midst, Lord Chalfont, on 16 June: "Already there is talk of deploying defensive systems against ballistic missiles. It seems incredible to me that anyone really believes that there can be a fully effective defence against the sort of nuclear armoury now deployed by the two great military alliances of the. world. But if that belief exists, and if it leads to the extensive deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems, we should be in no doubt that the arms race, will have entered a new and perhaps irreversible phase, and, furthermore, that a serious threat will be posed to whatever stability is provided by the present balance of nuclear power." (PV.265, p.5) In reality, security is becoming more and more expensive and less and less reliable. The step thereafter can hardly be any other than the one so dourly foreseen first by science fiction writers but now mentioned as a real possibility by prominent scientists: that the whole of mankind move into live-in and work-in underground shelters. Thus, a major issue now facing decision-makers is the procurement and emplacement of ABM systems, as well as continued testing for this purpose. The cost factor is so tremendous - running into tens of billions of dollars for even partial attempts at protection of one country - that already -•: — -• 7-000075 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 15 - on this ground it would seem reasonable for the great powers to identify their mutual interest in a firm "no" to this new phase of the arms ra*e. Mr. Chairman, The current discussion about the ABM issue can serve as a reminder what continued permissibility as to underground testing might entail. V/e should likewise ask ourselves how much has the nuclear megatonnage already increased in quantity while we have been sitting? Should not perhaps the ENDC carry a burden of responsibility because v/e did not achieve the kind of agreement which might have meant a stop to the threatening madness? Anyway, I hope that it serves as a lesson to us that it is imperative that we now get both a comprehensive test-ban and a cut-off agreement, i.e. agreement to stop the arms race from overtaking human reason. » 000076 � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDBM00019 Title A name given to the resource Transcript of Speech by Sweedish Diplomat Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 8/11/1966 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-c, file 27-11-7, "DEFENCE - CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS - ANTI - BALLISTIC MISSILES (ABM) = DEFENSE - ARMEMENTS DE TYPE CLASSIQUE ET NUCLEAIRE - ENGINS ANTIMISSILES (ABM)," vol. 10357, part 1, Library and Archives Canada, (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Anti-ballistic missiles Description An account of the resource Speech by Ambassador Mrs. Alva Hyrdal, Swedish Delegation Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en