https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/6884342b8f9e47fbee3bbbc4917f4c5e.pdf 831c8adc069f20aba6fcc3c6d05ce22b PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en verULde la Loi sur I'acces a I'information MttSS f7- ^V"^ A FILE/PPSSIER -MIL MY30/66 FM/DE 1 <r INFO IDN WASHDC sTiem PRECEDENCE N-160 NATOPARIS KF.W mjm CONFD ^ NO C? O «~C *- H "" «Ky DISARMDEL GVA SECURITE >7- / / - EITEHNAL OTT TO/A SECURITY -J EMBPARIS Tnxvn PERMISflY BCKH PRIORITY ROME MOSCOW nawREm™ BEE SUB/SUJ COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY I THIS TEL IS THE FIRST CF THREE DEALING WITH VARIOUS ASPECTS CF THE C.T.B. IN WHICH WE SHALL EE PROVIDING YOU WITH GUIDANCE FCR THE RESUMED SESSION OF THE ENDC. IN THIS MESSAGE WE SET OUT SOME OBSERVATIONS DERIVED FROM A REVIEW OF OUR POLICY ON VERIFICATION OF A CTB. WE FULLY SHAEE THE VIEW THAT ACHIEVEMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE TEST 2. BAN IS AN IMPORTANT AND PRESSING DISARMAMENT OBJECTIVE. APART FROM INHIBITING THE ARMS RACE AND ACTING AS A NON-PROLIFERATION MEASURE, A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN IN THE NEAR FUTURE WOULD CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TO A REVIVAL OF CONFIDENCE IN ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT DISCUSSIONS. WE ARE COGNIZANT CF THE DANGER THAT LACK QF AGREEMENT IN GENEVA BEFORE THE FALL SESSION OF UNGA COULD LEAD TO A DISILLUSIONMENT WITH ENDC AND A PREMATURE CALL FOR CONVOCATION OF A WDC. AS WE CONTINUE TO THINK THAT THE ENDC PROVIDES THE MOST PRACTICAL AND HOPEFUL FORUM FOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, WE ARE CONCERNED THAT IT DEMONSTRATE ITS EFFECTIVENESS. 3. IN VIEW OF THE LACK OF PROGRESS ON A NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND OTHER ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAIS, ATTENTION MAI NOW CENTRE UPON A COMPREHENSIVE ... <- DISTRIBUTION LOCAL/LOCALE STANDARD 10 r.npjfts Dliarmament Ste, ORK5INATOR/REDACTEUR SIG c c : U.N. D i v . j European D i v . ; D . L . ( l ) D i v . ; D.L.(2) D i v . ; Legal Div. (done in D i v . ) a _ j * . ACJHIQLER ....J.*..P.... Schiolflr/bms.... EXT 18/BIL (REV 6 / 6 4 ) (COMMUNICATIONS DIV) DIVISION Disarmament APPROVEO/AUTORISE TELEPHONE 2-1892 310. .H...B«.£ohineon.. 000051 �\ \ -2 CONFD - ^ f c E S T BAN AS THE MAIN AREA IN WHICH AGREEMENT MIGHT BE FOUND. W AGREE THAT YOU SHOUU) BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE MATTER IN GREATER DETAIL THAN WAS POSSIBLE DURING THE PAST SESSION AND HAVE BEEN GRATEFUL FOR THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN YOURTEL 103 MARCH 9 AND SUBSEQUENT MESSAGES CONCERNING THE NEED TO REVIEW THE CDN POSITION ON THIS PROBLEM. AS WE INFORMED YOU, WE APPROACHED THS SCIENCE AND DEFENCE COMMUNITIES HERE IN ORDER TO OBTAIN A FULL TECHNICAL BACKGROUND FOR ANY POSITION WHICH WE MIGHT ADOPT DURING THE COMING SESSION, i WE HAVE NOW HAD BEPLIES FfiOM DND, DRB AND M & T S AND HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING THE CONCLUSIONS TO BE DRAWN FROM THEIR ANALYSES OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED. U. A MAJOR DIFFICULTY IN MAKING ASSESSMENTS HAS BEEN A LACK OF INDEPENDENT KNOWLEDGE* OUR SCIENTISTS POINT OUT THAT AS A RESULT OF CDA*S NON-NUCLEAft HOLE, WE AHE NO LONGER PRIVY TO MANY OF THE HEGENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USA NUCLEAR PROGRAMME AND CONSEQUENTLY ARE OFTEN UNABLE TO CHALLENGE AMERICAN VIEWS EFFECTIVELY. FOR EXAMPLE, CUR SCIENTISTS ACKNOWLEDGE THAT MANY CF THEIR VIEWS ON THE TECHNOLOGY OF THE ABM R AND D ARE LITTLE MORE THAN CONJECTURE. FURTHERMORE, TO THS EXTENT THAT THEY DO HAVE INFORMATION, OUR SCIENTISTS HAVE DERIVED IT FROM THE AMERICANS SO THAT IT TENDS TO CONFIRM THE USA POSITION. £# THERE AHE ALSO SEVERAL AREAS IN WHICH THE AMERICANS THEMSELVES DO NOT HAVE PRECISE INFORMATION AND THUS ARE UNABLE TO PHEDICT WITH ANY DEGREE • ' QF ASSURANCE WHAT TO EXPECT. THEY DO NOT KNOW E.G. WHETHER A SINGLE UNDERGROUND TEST MIGHT NOT PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT ADVANCES IN THE NUCIEAR ART OR WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN DEVELOPING SOPHISTICATED AND EFFECTIVE ' DEFENSIVE WEAPONS AGAINST EXISTING USA ICBMS. 6. MOST IMPORTANT IS THE REALIZATION THAT DETECTION BY SEISMIC MEANS T O T5f2 AT LONG. EANGE IS NOT NOW, AND 23 UNLIKELY IN THE FUTUREi AB&E TO' PROVIDE; SUFFICIENT ASSURANCES THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT CONDUCTING C&NDE5TINE TESTS. IT IS TRUE THAT ANY PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF SEISMIC DATS WILL ENHANCE INDIVIDUAL NATION'S CAPACITY TO DETECT AND' IDENTIFY 4IUCI&AR TESTS. 000052 I T I S ALSO TRUE THAT LASA AND OTHER ARRAYS WILL CONTRIBUTE TO A ..* 3 / �Document-disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu deQ&SB&ur I'acces a I'inform/ation -3 * LOWERING OF THE TECHNICAL DETECTION THRESHOU). IT I S RECOGNIZED, HOWEVER, THAT THE RESIDUUM <F UNIDENTIFIED SEISMIC EVENTS WILL STILL BE SIGNIFICANT PARTICULARLY WHEN ADVANCES IN DE-COUPLING ARE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. 7. MOREOVER, IT I S EXTREMELY UNLIKELY THAT THE USA WILL MOVE FROM ITS PRESENT POSITION IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE REGARDLESS OF INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES. IN EFFECT, RELUCTANCE TO DEPLOY AN ABM SYSTEM I S ALREADY IN PART A USA CONCESSION TO THE VIEW THAT THE ARMS RACE SHOULD HE HALTED AND TREATY . A TEST BAN!SIGNED. TESTING AS PART OF AN R AND D PROGRAMME I S THE CGMPROT MISE POSITION WHICH PERMITS THE USA ADMINISTRATION TO WITHSTAND THE PREFERENCE OF CONGRESS AND THE JOINT CHIEFS FOR A FULL ABM INSTALLATION. jQS A RESULT OF THE FACTORS OUTLINED IN PARAS k TO 7 WE HAVE WITH SOME RELUCTANCE CONCLUDED THAT WE ARE NOT WELL PLACED TO RECOMMEND TO THE MINISTERS A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN CANADIAN POLICY. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, CDA IS NOT ABLE TO TAKE ISSUE ON TECHNICAL GROUNDS WITH THE USA POSITION ON ON-SITE INSPECTIONS AND WE DO NOT THINK THAT WE SHOULD ATTEMPT TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE USA TO ALTER ITS VIEWS. IN ADDITION TO THE FACT THAT THEBS IS A GOOD DEAL IN USA ARGUMENTS ON THE NEED FOR THE NESTING OPTION, WE CAN SEE THAT CRITICISM, WHETHER DIPLOMATIC OS PUBLIC, WOULD BE UNPRODUCTIVE AT THIS TIME FOR, AS YOU HAVE REPCRTED, USA COULD ONLY HE MOVED FROM ITS POSITION (AND THEN RELUCTANTLY) IF USSR DROPPED ITS OBJECTIONS TO ON-SITE INSPECTIONS. 9. '.•'"' YOU HAVE ALREADY REPORTED THAT AT THE RESUMED SESSION, THERE IS A POSSIBILITY WESTERN DEIS WILL FEEL GREATER ISOLATION ESPECIALLY IF USSR GIVES EVEN A SLIGHT INDICATION OF WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER NON-ALIGNED 'PROPOSALS. TENDENCY WILL BE ApPAREKT MOST NOTICEABLY ON A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN SO THAT SOME EFFCBT SHOULD M MADE TO MAKE WESTERN POSITION CLEAR AND TO MITIGATE CHARGES OF .INTRANSIGENCE. IN COMMENTING CK A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN BASED ON SEISMIC VERIFICATION ONLY, YOU SHOULD . A) ALLUDE TO SWEDISH PROPOSALS ON THE EXCHANGE <&? SEISMIC DATA, ... c. 000053 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act • Document divulgue en vertu de fajffit&ir I'acces a information i POINTING OUT THAT IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE AT THIS STAGE TO f | •' . • TAKE A DECISION IGNORING ON-SITE INSPECTIONS WHEN INDIVIDUAL i COUNTRIES DO NOT HAVE, AND WILL NOT HAVE FOR SOME TIME, THE . NECESSARY SCIENTIFIC INFO AND TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT ON WHICH TO 'BiSl A CONSIDERED JUDGMENT ABOUT NUCI£AR DEMOTION. IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO WITHHOLD JUDGMENT UNTIL COUNTRIES HAD HAD TIME TO REVIEW THE EVIDENCE OF ANY EXCHANGE WHICH MIGHT RESULT FROM SCIENTIFIC TALKS* B) EMPHASIZE THE WAY IN WHICH THE WEST HAS MODIFIED ITS POSITION IN RESPONSE TO TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS. CONSIDERABLE RESEARCH AND STUDY HAVE BEEN DEVOTED TO ALL FACETS OF MONITORING A TEST BAN SINCE 1958 AND THE SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF i. REQUIRED ON-SITE INSPECTIONS REFLECTS THE PROGRESS MADE. TECHNOLOGY HAS NOT REACHED THE POINT {AND MAY NEVER'DO SO) OF MAKING UNNECESSARY THE RIGHT. TO INSPECT. C) DISCUSS BRIEFLY THE TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES NOW EXPERIENCED IN DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION AND THE OPPOSING ADVANCES IN DECOUPLING AND TESTING SCIENCE IN GENERAL. D) CONTRAST THE.MOVEMENT OF THE WEST TOWARD ACCOMMODATION ON THE INSPECTION PBQBffiH WITH THE APPARENT USSR MQ/EMENT AWAY FROM ACCOMMODATION, E . G . BY ITS WITHDRAWAL OF THE OFFERS OF THREE ON-SITE INSPECTIONS MADE AT THE END OF 1 9 6 2 . 10. IN VIEW OF THE PESSIMISTIC NATURE CF OUR STAND ON SEISMIC VERIFICATION, WE WOULD HOPE THAT THERE COULD BE GREATER OPPORTUNITIES FOR PROGRESS ON PROPOSALS FOR INSPECTION BY CHALLENGE AND A THRESHOLD TREATY, AND WE SHALL BE COMMENTING ON THESE IDEAS SHORTLY. � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDBM00015 Title A name given to the resource External to DisarmDelGeneva 160 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 5/30/1966 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-c, file 27-11-7, "DEFENCE - CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS - ANTI - BALLISTIC MISSILES (ABM) = DEFENSE - ARMEMENTS DE TYPE CLASSIQUE ET NUCLEAIRE - ENGINS ANTIMISSILES (ABM)," vol. 10357, part 1, Library and Archives Canada, (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Anti-ballistic missiles Description An account of the resource CTB Treaty I Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en