https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/b6ff961857a04e2b62446ffa7e95a5cf.pdf 5281a9c502a07a2e4a2e5e175211e103 PDF Text Text u ~~i,4)• . un~_~, vJ .~) ut; ~/U S L=tlf/ .M, w~li . Letter No....... ,.•.• '1 'J (} f, fIi----------~ ti j j .,;r\,, ~.)~-'\, .,f;t.¢~ ,9.•••••••.. •· · · •· }). f.~b.J.'Uqf.Y..25'., ..:J-.9.5?-f: .. Date ........ A pv'. l JII, L,{i,) omw, ,1L, No.:;;.~'!J !. .s:.-: ?.-..Y.b sf SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SECRET FROM:THE CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THENORTHATLANTICCOUNCIL .AND THB 0EEC, PARIS TO: THE UNDER-SE~RETARY OF STATEFOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA ,..----H;eference ...... -----ubject: .... . J:.ItlP.li~a.tiAOS .. of. Jfaite.d. S.ta.te.s. 9.tr.at.egy.......................... . In addition to political consequences of the first importance for NATO, the new United States strategy will undoubtedly have effects on Canadian and also NATOmilitary planning. 6 -1---1 7 _8_\___ _ ' I : I 3 MAR1954 Copies Referred To .............. Y..QV.;r. J ... ~:t:t;~;r..NQ-.,l;>.~71. P.f. :EehruarY...5., ..19.5>+ ..................... . 2. To the extent that the new United States strategy is to concentrate power and to develop ability to retaliate massively at points of United States chosing, the protection of this retaliatory power will assume progressively greater importance and, in the end, it will become inseparable from the power itself. In a figurative but very real sense, the United States and the North American Continent will become a fortress as well as the power house of Western ability to deter and defeat aggression. The strength and invulnerability of the fortress will be essential elements of NATO security. No. of Enclosures 3. Canada must inevitably be part of the fortress "America"; and it is not difficult to foresee that a greater part of our military effort than hitherto will have to be devoted to the integrated defence system of the American Continent. This will be a contribution not only to our own and to United States security but to the defence of the Free World. If such is the case, there seem to be implications as regards the strength, nature and deployment of our forces. ... JJ.~l).~........• 4. Post No.. file 7/~(i~ ..... As regards strength, the danger to America and therefore to Canada rises in proportion to the increas ofSoviet power to wage unlimited atomic war. A few years hence, the main front may shift from Europe and centre in the armament competition between the offensivedefensive capacity of the Soviet Bloc and the American Continent. The race will not only involve better weapons but also a redeployment of those weapons (i.e. thicker walls for the fortress). Unless we can reduce our commitments outside the American Continent, our defence bill in future years may therefore be higher. 5. Moreover, it seems possible that a re-appraisal of the balance and the character of our forces might be necessary as the new United States strategy will almost inevitably bring the forces of our two countries into closer relationship. By a fact of geography, our strategy must be ins~arably linked with, and follow closely, that ••• 2 �• ' ·-, - 2 - of the United States •• So far, our strategy, in common with that of NATOas a whole~ has been based on the assumption that the main danger was in Europe and that our principal contribution was to help to provide the shield for that area. This resulted in the development of our present force structure which may not meet the needs of a different role than the one previously envisaged. It seems, therefore, that we should also have a "new look" at our force structure. 6. The deployment of our forces will probably create problems. In this regard there is likely to be a conflict between political and military requirements. It will now be necessary to re-examine carefully the allocation of our forces, within the NATOarea. This is not a new problem, but it may become more acute. Hithertot it was largely agreed that Europe was the threatened area and North American requirements were low in comparison. The North American area, because of the change in the United States strategic concept, .and the development in Soviet atomic capabilities, seems now to have a relatively higher priority. Unless there is an overall increase in the forces available, it will be necessary to make some reallocation of existing forces or perhaps a change in the direction of the defence effort. Our European partners will oppose any such suggestions, and we must be careful not to weaken the European front to the point where European morale will deteriorate in the knowledge that Soviet forces could occupy Western Europe easily; a new and delicate balance must be found between conflicting European and North American defence requirements. The final decision will not be made on military grounds alone; for political reasons, it may not be possible for the United States and ourselves to reduce our forces in Europe as much as purely military expediency might suggest. 7. If these tentative conclusions are examined in relation to some of the problems now facing NATO, the results are of interest. - _,,-__ 8. Let us take first the field of defence expenditures. The general agreement that the curve should flatten at approximately the present level, we feel, should be a tentative one. Bearing in mind that there can be no absolute security, defence expenditures should, in general, depend upon three factors: an assessment of Soviet political intentions, an assessment of Sovi~t military capabilities (atomic and otherwise)~ and the defence strategy that is employed. These interdependent, factors will not remain constant and must, therefore, be the subject of continuous review. In practice, we suspect, that as commitments cannot easily be reduced in Europe, and North America becomes more exposed, defence expenditures will go on increasing. 9. In connection with the "new look 0 concept, the point has been made that it offers only the alternative of an-.. atomic attack (global war) or the loss of~ local war, and is, therefore, much more likely to encourage p•ecemeal concessions. In reality, we doubt whether the "new look 0 implies such a fundamental change. As we see it, the arsenal of the West should continue to be diversified; it should continue to have both atomic weapons and conventional forces; it should be prepared both for atomic warfare and local aggression. The proper balance of forces is likely to be achieved by a series of approximations rather than by a single formula, but in any case, it seems unlikely that the aggregate cost will be less. • •• 3 000113 �.,, - 3 - 1~- 10. Further, in modern conditions, as the danger of a lightning attack increases,the need for larger and larger standing forces, with higher and higher standards of readiness grows. Our "peacetime" forces are larger than they have ever been. Other factors being equal, it is difficult to see how we will be able to avoid having even larger forces if the present trend continues. 11. The conclusions of this rather cursory the implications of the new United States strategy to be that: (a) NATOdefence burdens availability of new and more efficient in the long run; review of would appear in spite of the weapons may increase (b) there is likely to be a shift in the allocation of resources in favour of the North American as compared to the European area (hence the fresh need of a German contribution); the Canadian the nature, structure, and distribution forces are likely to be affected. (c) of THE DELEGATION I ·•" 000114 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Deterrence Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource New Look / 25 FEBRUARY 1954 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954-02-25 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00020 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Letter from Canadian Delegation to the North Atlantic Council to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 25 Feb. 1954, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 2. atomic war continental defence NATO