https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/a335551fa53106628b7a65b2fedf016b.pdf 5dc9fcf61e93e22ed5e127d08ef94f78 PDF Text Text f • ___ _Docy rr|£ntdisclosa<i ujgderjhe Access to Information Act T ^ c W e i f f w u ^ i g f l ^ l ^ f n r a e H l W ^ S r' i ' a c c e s a I'information <Mti, Ottawa, March 22, 1966 BEST ORIGINAL1'AVAILABLE MEILLEUR ORIGINAL Peputy-Hinister, Dept. of Mines & Technical Surveys, ^ // 5SS Booth Street, M / Ottawa ^ Attention: Dr. J.M. Harrison, Assistant Deputy-Minister CQMFIDMTIAL , — _ 4?#-#-•*/- J Comprehensive Test Ban Tr»a;by The conclusion of a comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is a major immediate goal of the Canadian Government because of the political and psychological impetus it might give to further disarmament negotiations, its impact on non-proliferation discussions and its inhibiting effect on the nuclear arm3 race* Agreement on a comprehensive Test Ban has run into difficulty, hoivever, because of differences between the USA and the USSR over verification, the former insisting that on-site inspections are essential, the latter taking the position that national means of detection are sufficient to verify a comprehensive treaty. It ie the view of this Department that Canada can contribute to the removal of some of the obstacles to agreement only if we have the answers to or considered judgnenta on a number of scientific, -technical and military questions that are beyond omvcompetence. 1 am writing to you along with the Department of National Defence and the Defence Research Board to seek your views on these problems based upon your speci&liaod knowledge. I recognise that the problems cover a vd.de range of topics and that you probably will not wish to comment on aspects with which you are not familiar. I ahould emphasise, howevert the dependence which this Department, in advising the government on disarmament policy, has xipon the specialized knowledge of other government departments and agencies and our inability to foraulate various alternatives without your views on the test ban problem* At the moment we see two areas in which non-political information is required in order to permit a development of the �Document disclosed underthe Access to Information Act „ Document dj^feifi^ft^ejju de la Loi sur I'acces a I'informatiol Canadian position. These are first, the verification of a comprehensive test ban which resolves itself to the problem of detecting and identifying underground tests, and second, the value from the point of view of Canadian and Western defence interests of continued underground tests. With regard to detection, tha problem haa arisen because of Soviet objections to on-site inspection and American insistence that dependence on seismic detection alone would not eliminate the possibility of clandestine testing. Doubts have been expressed about the American contention, and it is for this reason that'we are seeking scientific advice. In particular we should appreciate answers to the following questions, although we should not wish to limit any cossaents on the topic that would 3eem to you appropriate and helpful. (1) it ie recognized that it is unlike3y .that we shall reach in the foreseeable future a stage where all seismic events will be identifiable. What is the threshhold above which we can now identify all seismic events in the Soviet Union? Is this threshhold likely to be lowered significantly in the near future? (2) could the Soviet Union undertake a series of tests underground without at least one test registering unmistakably on a seismometer outside Soviet territory? (3) could the Soviet Union make significant advances in nuclear weapon technology on the basis of isolated teste, not in series. What increased cosx-s and difficulties would there be to achieve the same results in single tests? (4) supposing there were a nuclear detection club (including many countries, types of seismometers and areas of the world), what likelihood would there be of a seismic reading by only one station indicating a nuclear test? (5) what do the American Defence Department officials ra&exi when they say that iASA's can offer a potential increase of effectiveness of 15$ in the capacity to detect nuclear tests? (6) even if the proposed nuclear detection club fully achieves its goals, what percentage of seismic events in the Soviet Union or China will regain doubtful or suspicious in origin? (7) if cost were no object, would a successful LASA or chain �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - 3 ** Document ffijflffiBSJfSffij) de la Loi sur I'acces a I'informatio of LASAe provide a significant advance in the ability to identify nuclear tests? (S) does our concept of the nueloar detection club envisage the installation of a system of sensors especially on the Pacific Ocean floor off the Kamchatka-Kurile coasts which would provide the results described in conclusions (a) and (b) of the Special Report of the UKAEA, December 1965 (p.*0). (9) what is the relationship between the w 20 to 30 high-quality seismic stations" spoken of in (a) above and LASA? (10) , when the British conclude ((c) of the UKAEA paper) that an increase in sensitivity would result in an increase in ambient noise, are they discounting detection below ad.5 and identification below &4? If 95/* of all seismic events above m4 can be identified, what is the rate at which it is estimated that the identification percentage vdll drop as m ia reduced? Could you estimate roughly how low a percentage of identification would permit or induce the USSR to undertake a clandestine testing programme of any significance? (11) how categorical ceuld one be with tlie evidence of seismology in stating that a particular seismic event was or was not- a nuclear explosion? V/ould one's judgment be as categorical at, say, m4 with one report as atra7or ®8 with several reports? The second set of problems on which we are seeking information conodrns the military benefits to be Jerived from testing. Ae you are aware, both the USSR and the USA have continued to conduct underground tests in the absence of a comprehensive treaty. A considerably body of American official opinion is of the view that, regardless of the ability to identify Soviet tests, the.United States should continue to test* Vie are informed that the Americans themselves do not agree on this question and that the inconclusive stage of the identificationverification discussions h&& postponed the necessity of choosing between contin'""3d testing and a comprehensive test ban. Recently, however, we have be*a told that although the tests are advantageous, on balance the Americans take the position that a comprehensive test ban with adequate Verification procedures would be of net benefit to the United States and the Western world. (1) how valid is the USA military argument that tho USA should continue testing to improve its nuclear warheads both for the strategic deterrent and tor a possible ABM system? �H ** Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act DocumenWfmH^r.lnffmnLu de la Loi sur I'acces a {'informatio To what extent will improved saiseile systems result from developments in propulsion, targetting, guidance, decoys, etc. and to what extent from further improvements in nuclear warheads? (2) do you think it possible or likely that the USA deterrent ttfould lose its credibility if the USSR conducted small clandestine nuclear tests underground leading to some technological improvements? (3) the necessity of developing an ABM system Is cited as on© of the principal reasons for a continuation of the testing prggramme. To what extent is an effective ABH system attainable and how much testing would have to go into the '. realization of such a system? (4) to What extent will the growth of Communist China as a nuclear power affect the USA need for an ABM system? A more recent problem, ancillary to the pre-oocupations discussed above, is the emestionin& by the USA delegation in Geneva of Edward Teller*s opinion In I960 that on-site inspections were of dubious value; Hrs. Myrdal, the Swedish representative In Geneva, had earlier referred to Teller's judgment in an SHDC speech. We should be grateful foraany comments that you might have on this subject. It may be that the replies to these questions will involve m much detail and so much speculation that representatives of your Department and this Department should meet to discuss the more complex issues. Before considering the possibility of & meeting, however, we think that it might be be3t to seek at least preliminary replies to this letter. I hope, therefore, that you will find an opportunity to give theee problems early examination. Jh^^JUfaJfc © -^ D - < k o ^ f.tfcb" D. M. COBNETT X Under-Secretary of State for External Affaire f •} I 7 jj 1 j * E 'f v � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDBM00009 Title A name given to the resource Letter to Assistant DM Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 3/22/1966 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-c, file 27-11-7, "DEFENCE - CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS - ANTI - BALLISTIC MISSILES (ABM) = DEFENSE - ARMEMENTS DE TYPE CLASSIQUE ET NUCLEAIRE - ENGINS ANTIMISSILES (ABM)," vol. 10357, part 1, Library and Archives Canada, (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Anti-ballistic missiles Description An account of the resource Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en