https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/7c3fed27227c9f0b42b5ca5b124e02d6.pdf 5446828b1b4fa6e9fbd993078f8b0fcd PDF Text Text ation * t - ^ B Document disclosed under the Access tolnformatt a a / l f l l n t divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'injorJnatiortS I'infon 'EI* &,!**. '—». WtKORA. D Y -CH FIL8 W> ^ 7 - //-" / ? Subjecti fialt af Bapressntatlve of Foreign Offlea Dlsarwennat Research Unit. On tha woraing of September 21 Mr. Geoffrey Jukes of tha Foreign Office Anna Control aad Oiaaraanent Research Unit spoke ta a small group froa Dlsarnanaat and European Divisions. _^ 2. Jukes began by wnpla3.nlng tha functions of hia Unit, which ia ona of tha Foreign Office diaaneneent organs falling nndar tha Jurisdiction of Lord Chalfont, Minister of Jtate with 3poeial Responsibilities in tha Foralgn Office, whose portfolio waa created in fulfilnant of an election pladga of tha preaent Labour Qiiwiiri—nt. Sinoe ita laseptlon tha Raaaaroh Unit haa produced two substantive studies - ana an tha laf1<^*i™»r of tha atratagle nuclear umbrella prapoaad by Androi Qromyke eon* yaara ago and tha othar on anti-bellistie niaailaa (AQMi). It waa aa longar eaay to dafina and iaolata the subject of m a oontrol, since it was inextricably bound np with othar aspeota of defense polioy. A-Vri-BALLI3TIC MISSILE 3. Jukes epoka at length on the Unit's second atudy and related hav tha Soviet military laaderahlp, doadnated an it nan by World War II generals abaseeed by ca over-rldlng saisjarn far national security, had precipitated an anas race la the l«$6*a ia the spheres of atrategio bombers and ICBMs. With ita vastly superior esansala reaouroea, the USA had fairly rapidly overtaken tha USSR and put it at a considerable stratagie dissdvantags. The Sonet leaderahip ana making tha aaaa mistake ia reepeet ef ABMo, had foraed the USA te —bark upon aa axtenaite A W production programme and, apparently starting deployment ef its few missiles, nan now causing tha VIA seriously to consider what response should ba made ta this deployment. Broadly speaking there vara two al tarnativea| (a) to. increase rapidly the aambsr of deployed XQHtj ia tha USA and elsewhere,' so aa to ensure saturation of tha Soviet ABM defeneea and annihilation of •ajar oentree in the USSR. (This could be dons relatively quickly and at leas coat than tha asasnd alternative)! (b) te start a large pistjra—M far tha production of AJ»l weapons and to deploy than to protect 2$ major papulation and industrial centres in USA. (This would take fron 7 to 10 years to complete and Mould be extrenely costly, though not beyond American aapabilitiaa). It waa probable that the USSR had already started deploynent ef its ABHa, Wiilo the USA was atill weighing Its sdvisability in tanas of cost and strategic necessity, Msanaei*, however, had not yet taken the decision. By deploying nissUas around its neat important 2$ urban centres, Washington would ba covering a third of ita papulation and two-thirds of its Industry, a pattern reflected in west western industrial countries. �Document disclosed under the Access to information Ac Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a i'informd -2 - u. Tha present balance of IC©1B was ttm aO ta 60 fer the QSan and 1,1400 fer tha DBA with P* ultiaats target of 2,000. Thare was a* way ef determining the reliability ef either Soviet sr American ABMs, aa ths only way they could be tested i s against JCBKa with actual atonta warheada. Ia any event, i t waa likely that tha Aaerlsas version, tha Hlke-Zeua, waa superier ta tha Soviet veraion. Although tha USSR was mere advaaeed in terma of alee of booster rockets* i t s technology in other respects was probably inferior. BBItAIB 5. Tbe British ara considering an initiative to halt the deployment of ASMs as an antl ssoilalowj and anU-proliferatlen msssurs, but Jukee was sf the opiuion that it is already too lata, tha basis decision for production and deploy.*-... nt by USSR having been taken several years age* The production cost factor was not Important to Britain, since ita sine and geographical position ada production eVafsaslble. In sa far aa Britain could be taken out only wltto IiUKa, it enjoyed a ali;;htly larger measure cf aacurlty than the FOB, whioh waa exposed ta Soviet tactical Jukes did not think it likely timt the United States would become involved in a nuclear conflagration with China, annept In tha event cf unexpected and blatant provocation. Bs was a little disturbed however by a tendency in certain American anertwals circles to advocate the elimination of C'.ina'a nuclear capability by aerial attack, while it was still faaai' le. Thia did net appear, however, tc represent thinking ia American official circles. He thought that if nuclear wsapona ware ever swployed by ths USA against China in euah a way as to threaten the existence of tha Conaunlat regime, tha USSR vould be forced to respond, fer ln Moooow's view a rumbustious neighbour waa better than the KMT alternative, whish weuld bs regarded ss an American satellite. The Soviet generals could net afford to see sueh a great ahift In the world strategic equilibrium. It would therefore be highly dangerous for the Americana to aasuas that whatever haiisssed between the USA and China, tha USSR weuld not intervene. FRA 7. Jukes gave an enplsnstian ef French strategic planning. It net possibls and i t was not de Oealle'e intention, he argued, to create ea independent nuclear deterrent* out: A-E' 8. Jukes said that, although the Oernsns complained af feeling •isolated", there was xwdly nothiiv- that could be dene to meet - with any kind of parity • the Soviet alsaile force ef 700 rockets, a large proportion oi ths USSR's intermediate tactical and nuclear capacity deployed against ths FOR's border. (It was difficult to design sn ABM Interceptor 000011 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a I'information for these weapons beoause of tha abort tine of n i g h t . ) Germany oould bs wiped out by these weapons end i t s vulnerability rasa 1nsd a f a c t . Strauss' position in a d influence on tha new Bean Cabinet would ba crucial ln determining haw •ggraasivs ths FOR wag l i k e l y ta be froa new an about defending • (a) mora nuclear deterrents on i t s s o i l - (ths Bonn Government have already ma e i t clear that a aaa-rtlsccaliiiitlon treaty i s nef high oa their l i s t ef priorities) • aad (b) acre say in Atlantic nuclear policy generally. Strauss' extreme position, of course, has bean t a suggest that Germany night denounce the Perls Protssola of l?5n which banned tha production ef ABC weapons on German s o i l . Although Jukes thought acne af tide was simply a p o l i t i c a l football, i t asesa clear that Srhard nay bs obliged, ln t h i s respect, to take acre nota of tho new n a t l o n s l i s t i a •waraness that characterised the recent election usnnaljii 9. Like Mr. Arnold Smith, Mr. Jukes saw an Inter scting sequence cf events proceeding Khrueshsr'a f a l l l a s t autumns D m e s h e v ' s projected trla> to West Oeraanyj tha preparatory v i s i t by Admhnbel at whioh tins hs lavished unaccustomed praise ea the Put and even an ths calibre of the German soldier in World dar II) the rumoured p o s s i b i l i t y that tha FOB aight oxtend badly needed credit to the Soviet Union in return for a deal on £ a s t Qarmanyj aad ths disappearance of Rhrnechsv followed by statements from both Moaeaw snd Pankew that the DOB ahould not ba "sold fer gold*. All of t h i s seamed to suggest thet Khruschev had had i n mind cone significant departure in uermai policy and tended to support speculation that t h i s could have bean a factor contributing ta his downf a l l . Indirectly, Jakes seamed to s u r e s t that Ulbricht's successful freewheeling sines ln Cairo and Berlin was perhaps connected with the deposition of ths Soviet leader, who had seemed t c consider sacrificing hin* SLSTBUt gUBOPl 10. While Saetern European forces were equipped with d r franca deaigned t o carry nuolear weapons snd vara trained ln nuclear t a c t i c a , they were not equipped with nuclear warheada. In f a c t , even Soviet forcee did not possess their own warheads, whioh were entrusted only to the KGB. COLLATE SAL DISAR^AMneT MBASURfcS 11. Jukee thought the proliferation of nuslosr weapons waa inevitable. In this view, proposels for nuclear-free sonea (aasept perhaps fer the one in Antarctica) were not too meaningful ln terms o£ r e a l i s t i c arms control but wsrs merely stnosp^ere-iaprovlng devices (Mr. Oecrgs pointed out that 000012 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la loi sur I'acces a I'information WEILL geenwcj any improvement in the "atmosphere" was worthwhile aad that ths detente owed more to what hsd been accomplished towards disarnaneat than to any othar area of negot itions with ths USSR*) : ASTttCTS CF ABM3 RACE 12. <&s asserted that Soviet interest in arms control lay not so mucr in vha diversion of resultant savings intc esonomic production (the eavlngs would not be appreciable), bat rather in the avoidaneo of cost escalation in ths next generation of weapons. The USSR was already operating aiuch closer to lte acceptable coat ceiling far arms expenditure than the USA, and Jukes suggested that to the extent the preaent Soviet leadarahip was collective, pressures iron the military far a larger share of scarce resources would bo diffused. Since na single neaber of the lsaders. ip seemed to have assured a poaition Wbcro he controlled, and thus represented, ths araad fcrcea alternative demands far resources were likely, for tho tine being, to be affectively competitive with theirs. ABMS COsTROL IH OUTBe SPAQg 13. Jukes explained tha principle by which ABMs neutralised ICBMs. It was not by aa explosion generating heat or blast (ths vacuum ln apace nullified thoss affects), bat hy a nuclear evplccica generating concentrated x-rays, which "cooked" the wsrbcad. Iii. Re spoke cf present diffieultiea in using outer specs for military progressive purposes, since specs techniques were new on tho verge af perifittln^ the inspection of orbiting bodies by opposing interests. Inspection by aeans of Soviet and American satellites had already had a mutually reassuring affect on tho groat power who, though thoy hsd ths capacity to ahoot down each other'a reconnaissance satellites , had never done so. 000013 � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDBM00002 Title A name given to the resource Memorandum for File Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 9/29/1965 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived RG25-A-3-c, file 27-11-7, "DEFENCE - CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS - ANTI - BALLISTIC MISSILES (ABM) = DEFENSE - ARMEMENTS DE TYPE CLASSIQUE ET NUCLEAIRE - ENGINS ANTIMISSILES (ABM)," vol. 10357, part 1, Library and Archives Canada, (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Anti-ballistic missiles Description An account of the resource Visit of Rep of Foreign Office Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en