https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/3ed4b46deb686e844eaed1f8b6bef5e2.pdf 667627aa551d3a16427b82ee17c47900 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ocument divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information TOP SECRET #v MEETING TO DISCUSS THE DRAFT AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES ON ATOMIC ENERGY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM PROPOSAL CONCERNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS A meeting was held in the office of the UnderSecretary of State for External Affairs on Tuesday, April 19, 1955, at 3:00 p.m., to discuss the draft Agreement for Co-operation with the United States on atomic energy matters, and to consider the United Kingdom Government's proposal that the Canadian and U.K. Governments should present to the Uni^d States a paper containing their views on the distinction ^p% between large and tactical nuclear weapons. ^Is THOSE PRESENT WERE: \fA ^SJ VSp **£$ The Under-Secretary of State for CSS £ P External Affairs - Mr. Jules Leger (ChairmaiSM 5££. The Secretary to the Cabinet - Mr. R.B. Bryce ^ ^ tjry The High Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom - Mr. N.A. Robertson. rr-4 t*X <E.i$ %fy , *j> Secretary - Mr. J. H. Taylor. Draft Agreement for Co-operation with the United States on Atomic Energy 1. The Secretary to the Cabinet reported that the President, Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd., had returned from his talks with officials of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission with the draft of a bilateral Agreement. (Agreement for Co-operation Between the Government of Canada and the United States Atomic Energy Commission - draft dated March 31. 1955) 2. Mr. Bryce believed that the substance of the Agreement was acceptable. It required no new security precautions, and the Canadian atomic energy programme would benefit from the information which would become available under its terms. It was disappointing that the U.S. authorities were not prepared to release information on package reactors under the Agreement. This was because, as Section B(2) of the draft specified, "the development of certain package reactors is presently concerned primarily with their military uses". No information would therefore be exchanged "until such time as these types of reactors warrant civil application". Apparently the A.E.C.'s work on package reactors was being done under contract to the U.S. Army, which planned to install them experimentally at radar stations. 3. There were two objections to the draft as it stood. First, its wording made it appear too one-sided. This was undesirable, particularly if the Agreement were to be published. Officials were therefore working on a re-wording which would state the provisions of the Agreement in reciprocal terms. • • • • fc 000104 Jl.q Mo(\>%^> �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 2 - TOP SECRET 4. Second, U.S. law required that any information or materials made available under the Agreement would not be used for military purposes. The Canadian authorities were ready to accept this stipulation, since the purely Canadian atomic energy programme was for peaceful purposes. However, plutonium for U.S. weapons was made in Canada, and fuel systems for U.S. military reactors were tested at Chalk River. The A.E.C. intended that these arrangements should continue, even though on a strict interpretation, they were forbidden under the U.S. law. The Prime Minister had directed that the Agreement be so drafted that Canada could observe it in spirit as well as in letter. It was therefore proposed to alter the draft to state that information or materials released to Canada under the Agreement would not be used for military purposes by Canada. This would not preclude its use for military purposes by the U.S. References to existing uranium and heavy water contracts had also been written into the draft for this reason. 5. The High Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom asked whether the Agreement would be made public. Mr. Bryce thought that it would have to be, even though the A.E.C. did not wish to publish it, and were hoping that it might be approved in a private session of the Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. Since a similar procedure even if it were followed in the United States was not possible in Canada, the Canadian view was that the Agreement should be published. . There was in any case nothing in the draft which could not safely be revealed. 6. Mr. Bryce pointed out that the possibility of a breakdown in the parallel negotiations now in progress between the U.S. and the U.K. deserved consideration. The U.K. authorities were balking at the insistence of the U.S. on full field checks for employees at atomic energy establishments. While the Canadian officials concerned were inclined to agree that the U.S. were asking for more precautions than were really necessary, they had found in their own experience that a system of field checks, while burdensome, was not intolerable. 7. Mr. Robertson considered that the U.K. authorities could quite reasonably maintain on practical grounds that their security arrangements did not need to be as strict as those of the U.S. Beyond that, they had to take account of the widespread unpopularity of U.S. security methods in Britain. The strength of this feeling had been reflected in the breakdown of the tripartite security talks last autumn. However, the U.K. authorities would no doubt be interested to learn what ' ' Canada's experience had been in operating a system of field checks. Mr. Robertson said that he would pass on this information to Sir Edwin Plowden. £. The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs pointed out that Admiral Strauss must be determined to overcome this difficulty, since he was planning to spend a month in the U.K. It would place the U.S. in an unfavourable light if the A.E.C, while failing to conclude an Agreement with the U.K., were able to conclude Agreements with other countries which had no intention of adopting in practice the security measures they accepted on paper. Mr. Bryce added that it was difficult to imagine that the U.S. authorities would put themselves in the ridiculous position of admitting that under the new Atomic 3 000105 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information TOP SECRET Energy Act, they had found it possible only to negotiate successfully with Canada. A t was also difficult to imagine dividing the Chalk River establishment to permit one half to work with the U.S., and the other with the U.K., in the event that co-operation between the U.S. and the U.K. ceased. U.K. Proposal concerning the Distinction between Large and Tactical Nuclear Weapons 9. Mr. Leger and Mr. Bryce explained the Canadian background against which the U.K. proposal should be seen. There had not yet been full discussions between the Department of National Defence and the Department of External Affairs on the implications of the nuclear strategy, although the Department of External Affairs had suggested at several levels, and with the active support of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, that such discussions needed to take place. The subject had received some attention in the Chiefs of Staff Committee, where Mr. Bryce had pointed out that there were serious implications to a complete reliance on a nuclear strategy. Such reliance could mean that we would lose our freedom of choice. It might leave us defenceless should political factors and public pressure combine to prevent the immediate use of nuclear weapons in an emergency. It would invalidate our present approach to disarmament. As Richard Rovere had argued in a recent article in the "New Yorker", the industrial potential which had enabled the Allies to recover from the initial shocks of the Second World War and finally to win, would no longer weigh in favour of the West in a short war. Furthermore, once long-range missiles had been perfected to the point where they could be fired from sites in the United States, foreign bases, and therefore allies, would cease to be significant in the calculations of the U.S. 10. Canada was already facing the problems posed by the need to improve substantially the defences of North America. If present trends continued, the Canadian Army, while nominally committed to the defence of Europe, might in fact have to be trained as a Civil Defence force for use in Canada. Because none of these problems had been thought through in Canada, and because the civilians attending the Chiefs of Staff Committee disagreed with some of the military members on how to go about studying them, it was especially difficult to reply to the U.K. Government. (Telegrams Nos. 534 and 537, from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada. London, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs^- dated April 18, 1955) 11. Mr. Robertson thought that two separate but related questions were raised by the U. K. draft paper. 4 000106 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information TOP SECRET - 4 - The first was the broad question of dependence on nuclear weapons. The second was the more immediate danger to peace in the Formosa situation, and the unwisdom of public statements of the sort Mr. Dulles had made, threatening the use of "tactical" nuclear weapons in that area. The U.K. Government were more concerned with the immediate problem, and regardless of what might be thought about the broader question, the U.K. authorities were on good grounds in pointing out that it might not be possible to contain the Formosa situation if nuclear weapons were used. On the other hand, Mr. Dulles' statements were also undesirable if they were no more than a bluff. 12. Mr. Leger saw several objections to the U.K. draft paper. First, it referred in paragraph 4 to "the American proposition" that a distinction between the two types of nuclear weapons could be drawn, and in paragraph 2 to "the suggestion (which) had been made" that the U.K. Government should accept this proposition, if this implied that the U.K. Government believed that a similar direct approach had been made to the Canadian Government, the paper should be rewritten to make it clear that no such approach had in fact been made. On the other hand, as Mr. Bryce observed, perhaps the words "proposition" and "suggestion" could be read in a more general sense without this, implication. Second, the conclusions in paragraphs 7 and 8 were not those which the Canadian Government would necessarily draw. The Canadian Government would wish to make clear that it was meaningless to talk of "tactical" employment of a weapon if the soviet Union had only large nuclear weapons with which to retaliate. Mr. Robertson agreed. Whether or not a weapon had been employed tactically or not depended on the riposte of the opponent. Mr. Bryce suggested that what might have happened in the United States was that there had been a compromise, which authorized the use of small nuclear weapons but not large ones by the U.S. forces near Formosa. 13. Mr. Leger recalled that Mr. Spaak had been alarmed by Mr. Dulles' statements. Spaak objected most strongly on moral grounds to using atomic weapons a second time against Asians, since this would not only alienate Asia from the United States, but even Europe, it was certain that such weapons were available to the U.S. forces in Germany and near Formosa, and it might even be that U.S. forces in Korea had been or would be similarly equipped. Mr. Spaak had proposed that the NATO governments together should express their disapproval to the United States. The Canadian reply had been that we agreed with Mr. spaak's arguments, but did not think the NATO approach was the best one. Mr. spaak had since approached the Netherlands Government, which had also declined to join in an approach of this sort to the U.S. Government. Mr. Robertson suggested that jealousy of Spaak might in part account for the refusal of the Netherlands authorities. 14. At the same time, Mr. Leger pointed out that we had committed ourselves to M.C. 4b, and it could be argued that it was illogical to base the defence of the NATO area on the nuclear deterrent, while denying to ourselves the use of the same deterrent against possible aggression in Asia. He agreed with Mr. Bryce, however, that our position on the present crisis in~TiEe Far East was more a matter of believing it unwise to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons in this particular situation* 5 000107 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information TOP SECRET - 5 15. So far as Europe was concerned, perhaps the root of the difficulty was that at present, the nuclear strategy suited the United States because of its superior arsenal of nuclear weapons, whereas it did not suit European countries who feared they might be made a nuclear battleground. Mr. Bryce predicted that in a few years, the roles might be reversed. •HT the Soviet Union improved the means of delivering nuclear weapons, they might well decide to concentrate their initial attack on North America and perhaps the British Isles, and take over Western Europe undamaged. If such a stage were reached, North America might have second thoughts about the wisdom of a policy which prevented it from fighting anything but a nuclear war in which this continent would bear the brunt of the attack. 16. Mr. Leger wondered whether there was not some way out of the dilemma posed by the rapid development of weapons. Devices were developed which were sold to the United States military authorities, and which became the basis of new strategic plans. Often these plans ignored political factors, and yet they deprived the policy makers who were forced to use them of any freedom of choice. Perhaps an opportunity to assert that political, not military considerations should be the fundamental determinant of policy might come with the development of longrange missiles. The Canadian Government, while accepting defensive installations like radar systems, could deny the use of Canadian territory for missile sites. Mr. Robertson pointed out that it would be difficult to do so since we had already accepted the presence of the Strategic Air Command on the Leased Bases. 17. It was agreed that because several of the Chiefs of Staff were about to leave Ottawa, it would be advisable to hold a meeting with them within a day or two to decide what answer should be made to the U.K. proposal outlined in telegrams Nos. 536 and 537. To the extent that such a meeting might help precipitate a careful consideration by all the authorities concerned of the implications of the nuclear strategy, it would be especially welcome. � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW01164 Title A name given to the resource Meeting to Discuss the Draft Agreement for Co-Operation With the United States on Atomic Energy and the United Kingsom Proposal Concerning Nuclear Weapons Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource undated Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Canada/US Agreement for Cooperation concerning military aspects of atomic energy." RG25-A-3-b, vol. 5957, 50219-AK-40, part 1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Atomic energy, tripartite cooperation Description An account of the resource Minutes from meetining concerning draft agremeent for co-operation with the United States and the United Kingdom on atomic energy Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en