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CIRCULAR
DOCUMENT
No. B.
Ottawa, JanQary 26, 1954.
5/54
Subject:
Foreign Policy Speech by Mr. Dulles in
New York· on January 12 •
I enclose, for your information,
the
text of a foreign policy speech by Mr. Dulles in
New York on January 12, along with a Minute
pre1><_ared
in the Department summarizing the main
poin~s.
~
}
Secretary of State
for External Affairs
To the Heads of
Canadian Posts Abroad.
000172
�.• .
•
Foreign Pol.icy Speech by Mr. Dulles
in New York on January 120
RESTRICTED
January
2,,
1954
J.G.H.Halstead/hf
All Posts
Abroad
Attached is the text of a most important
address given by the United States Secretary of State
to the Council on Foreign Relations
in New York on
January 12. The purpose of this address was evidently
to announce the long-range global policy which the
_Eisenhower Administration,
after a ·year• s study in the
National Security Council, had formulated.
2.
The main distinction
between this new policy
and the policy of the previous Administration
is
represented
as being that the new policy is based on
assumptions and will embrace objectives
and methods that
should be valid over a long period of years, whereas the
old policy was made up of ad hoc measures designed to
meet immediate emergencies.
The new policy is intended
to regain for the United States strategic
flexibility
in
the continuing
struggle with the Soviet Union.
3.
The main elements
summarized as follows:
of the new policy
may be
(a)
"The basic decision was to depend
primarily
upon a great capacity to
retaliate
instantly
by means and in
places of our choosing."
(b)
Military
planning would, therefore,
__
.
shift emphasis from conventional
forces
and weapons (designed to meet aggression
anywhere in the. world by direct and local
opposition)
to strategic
reserves,
strategic
air power and nuclea~_weapons,
designed _to launch crippling
retaliatory
attacks against the enemy's forces or
his home base if the Soviets launch
aggression.
(c)
It is calculated
that this new d·efence
policy would cost less money·--tnan the old
one and would enable the United States
to support the necessary defence effort
over a long period without grave budgetary, economic or social disturbances.
\
\
4.
Mr. Dulles gave the following
application
of the new policy:
(a)
examples of
In the Far East_:
(i)
UoSo land forces in Korea will
gradually be withdrawn in order
augment the strategic
reserve;
to
000173
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(b)
(ii)
The Communists are warned that if
there is a renewal of aggression in
Korea or if there is open Chinese
aggression in Indo-China, there will
be "grave consequences" that might not
be confined to Korea or Indo-China;
(iii)
To underline this thre,at, Mr. Dulles
expresses the intention
of the United
States to maintain its striking
power
in Okinawa.
In Europe:
(i)
The UoSe had already proposed that the
pace of the.NATO defence effort be
changed from a rapid build-up to the
"long haul 11•
(ii)
The NATOforces will be reinforced
by
the striking
power of the U.S. strategic
air force.
(iii)
(c)
With respect
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(d)
The security
and prosperity
of Europe
cannot be assured without a German defence
contribution
and Franco-German cooperation,
·for both of which objectives
establishment
of the European Defence Community is
"indispensable 0 •
to economic policy:
U.S. economic aid will be _limited,
"broadly speaking",
to situations
where
it is essential
to military
strength
and where that military
strength is
essential
to safeguard a particular
strategic
area.
Other grants in aid will be replaced
by "trade, broader markets and a flow
of investments 11 o
The technical
assistance
programme and
disaster
relief
will be continued.
With respect
to foreign
policy:
(i)
The United States will never make a "deal"
with the UoS.S.R. which would seem "to
endorse captivity''.
( In other words, the
United States will not accept any general
settlement
which, for example, would
endorse the status quo in Eastern Europe.)
(ii)
The United States will be prepared to
negotiate
on specific matters th~t
"advance the cause of human welfare" (e.g.
the peaceful use of atomic energy, the
unification
of Germany, the liberation
of
Austria and the unification
and evacuation
of Korea).
000174
�..
,'
DEPARTMENT
OF STATE
FOR THE·,J'RESS
January
No. 8
12, 19 5'4
ADDRESSBY
THE HONORABLE
JOSN FOSTERDULLES
SECRETARY
OF STATE
BEFORETHE COUNCILON FOREIGNRELATIONS
NEWYORKCITY, JANUARY12, 195'4
THE EVOLUTION
OF FOREIGNPOLICY
It is now nearly a year since the Eisenhower Administration took office.
During that year I have.often
spoken of
various parts of our foreign policies.
Tonight I should like to
present an over-all
view of those policies
which relate to our
security.
The Good in Past Policies
First of all, let us recognize that many of the preceding foreign policies were good. Aid to Greece and Turkey had .
checked the Communist drive to the Mediterranean.
The European
Recovery Program had helped the peoples of Western Europe to
pull out of the post-war morass.
The Western powers were steadfast in Berlin and overcame the blockade with their airlift.
As a loyal member of the United Nations, we had reacted with
force to repel the Communist attack in Korea. When that effort
exposed our military weakness 7 we rebuilt
rapidly our military
establishment.
We also soughb a quick buildup of armed strength
in Western Europe.
These were the acts of a nation which saw the danger of
Soviet Communism; which realized
that its own safety was tied
up with that of others; which was capable of responding boldly
and promptly to emergencies.
These are precious values to be
acclaimed.
Also, we can pay tribute
to Congressional
bipartisanship
which puts the nation above politics.
The InsUfficiency
of Past Policies
But we need to recall that what we did was in the main
emergency action, imposed on us by our enemies.
Let me illustrate.
1. We did not
in advance, that it
army to fight land
pull out of Korea.
back.
send our army into Korea because we judged,
was sound military
strategy to commit our
battles
in Asia.
Our decision had been to
It was Soviet-inspired
action that pulled us
2. We did not decide in advance that
billions
annually as foreign economic aid.
policy in response to the Communist efforts
free economies of Western Europe.
it was wise to grant
We adopted that
to sabotage the
·
000175
�..
·- 2 =
3o We did not build up our military
establishment
at a
rate which involved huge budget deficits,
a depreciating
currency and a feverish economy, because this seemed, irt advance, a good policy.
Indeed, we decided otherwise until the
Soviet military
threat was clearly revealed.
We live in a world where emergencies are always possible
and our survival may depend upon our capacity to meet emergencies.
Let us pray that we shall always have that capacity.
But,
having said that, it is necessary also to say that emergency
measures - however good for the emergency - do not necessarily
make good permanent policies.
Emergency measures are costly,
.
they are superficial
and they imply that the enemy has the
initiative.
They cannot be depended on to serve our long-time
interestso
The Need for Long-Range Policies
This "long time" factor
is of critical
importance.
The Soviet Communists are planning for what they call "an
entire historical
era", and we should do the same. They seek,
through many types of manoeuvres, gradually to divide and
weaken the free nations by over-extending
them in efforts
which,
as Lenin put it, are "beyond their strength
so that they
come to practical
bankruptcyff.
Then, said Lenin, "our victory
is assured 11• Then, said Stalin,
will be "the moment for the
decisive blow".
In the face of this strategy,
measures cannot be judged
adequate merely because they ward off an immediate danger.
It
is essential
to do this, but it is also essential
to do so
without exhausting ourselves.
,,
felt
When the Eisenhower Administration
applied
that some transformations
were needed.
this
test,
we
It is not sound military
strategy permanently t'o commit
U.S. land forces to Asia to a degree that leaves us no strategic
reserves.
It is not sound economics, or good foreign policy, to
support permanently other countries;
for in the long run, that
creates as much ill will as good will.
Also, it is not sound to become permanently committed to
military
expenditures
so vast that they lead to "practical
bankruptcy".
Change was imperative to assure the stamina needed for
permanent security.
But it was equally imperative that change
should be accompanied by understanding
of our true purposes.
Sudden and spectacular
change had to be avoidedo
Otherwise,
there might have been a panic among our friends,
and miscalculated aggression by our enemieso
We can,
I believe,
make a good report
Collective
in these
respects.
Security
We need allies
and collective
security.
to make these relations
more effective,
less
be done by placing more reliance
on deterrent
dependence on local defensive power.
Our purpose is
costly.
This can
power, and less
000176
:
�..
,i
- 3 This is accepted practice
so far as local communities are
concerned.
We keep locks on our doors; but we do not have an
armed guard in every home. We rely principally
on a community
security
system so well ~quipped to punish any who break in and
steal that, in fact, would-be-aggressors
are generally
· ·
deterred.
That is the modern way of getting maximum protection
at a bearable cost.
What the Eisenhower Administration
seeks is a similar
international
security
system.
We want, for ourselves and the
other free nations,
a maximum deterrent
at a bearable cost •
... ..
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locai ~~:;~~:f:~i~~w!~~~!
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of the Communist worldo Local defenses must be reinforced
by
)
the further deterrent
of massive retaliatory
power. a potential aggressor must know that he cannot always prescribe
battle
conditions
that suit him. Otherwise, for example, a potential
aggressor,
who is_glutted
with manpower, might be tempted to
attack in confidence that resistance
would be confined to manpower.
He might be tempted to attack in places where his superiority
was decisive.
,
!1ir
I
The way to deter aggression
is for the free community to
be willing and able to respond vigorously
at places and with
means of its own choosing.
'
.d
.,.
So long as our basic policy concepts were unclear,
our
military
leaders could not be selective
in building our
military
power. If an enemy could pick his time and place and
method of warfare - and if our policy was to remain the
traditional
one of meeting aggression by direct and local
opposition
- then we needed to be ready to fight in the arctic
and in the tropics;
in Asia, the Near East and in Europe; by
sea, by land and by air; with old weapons and with new weapons.
The total cost of our security
efforts,
at home and abroad,
was over $50,000,000,000
per annum, and involved, for 1953,
a projected
budgetary d~ficit
of $9,000,000,000;
and
$11,000,000,000
for 1954. This was on top of taxes comparable
to war-time taxes; and the dollar was depreciating
in effective
value.
Our allies were similarly
weighed down. This could not
be continued for long without grave budgetary, economic and
social consequences.
.
before military
planning could be changed, the
President
and his advisers,
as represented
by, the National
Security Council, had to take some basic policy decisions.
This has been done. The basic decision was to d¢pend primarily
upon a great capacity to retaliate,
instantly,
by means and at
places of our choosing./
Now the Department of Defense and the
·Joint Chiefs of Staff can shape our military
establishment
to
fit what is our policy, instead of having to try to be ready
to meet the enemy's many choices.
That permits of a selection
of military
means instead of a multiplication
of means. As
a result,
it is now possible to get, and share, more basic
security at less cost.
1
1
·~
The Far East
Let us now see how this
foreign policy, taking first
concept has been applied
the Far East.
to
·
In Korea this Administration
effected a major transformation.
The fighting has been stopped on honorable terms.
That
was possible because the aggressor,
already thrown back to and
000177
.
'
�- 4 -
behind his place of beginning, was faced with the possibility
that the fighting might, to his own great peril,
soon spread
beyond the limits and methods which he had selected.
The cruel toll of American youth, and the non-prod.ucti ve
expenditure
of many billions
has been stopped.
Also our armed
forces are no longer largely committed to the Asian mainland.
We can begin to create a strategic
reserve which greatly
improves our defensive posture.
This change gives added authority
to
members of the United Nations which fought
the Communists renewed the aggression,
the
response would not necessarily
be confined
the warning of the
in Korea that if
United Nations'
to Korea.
I have said, in relation
to Indochina, that if there
were open Red Chinese Army aggression there, that would have
"grave consequences which might not be confined to Indochina".
I expressed last month the intention
of the United
States to maintain its position in Okinawa. Th:j.s is needed
to ensure adequate striking
power to implement the collective
security concept which I describe.
All of this is summed up in President Eisenhower's
important statement of December 26. He announced the progressive reduction of the United States ground forces in Korea.
He pointed out that the United States military
forces in the
Far East will now feature "highly mobile naval, air and amphibious unitsll; and he said in t;his way, despite some withdrawal of land forces,
the United States will have a .
capacity to oppose aggression
"with even greater effect than
heretofore".
The bringing home of some of our land forces also
vides a most eloquent rebuttal
to the Communist charge
"imperialism".
-
proof
If we turn to Europe, we see readjustments
in the NATO
collective
security effor'to
Senator Vandenberg called the
North Atlantic Treaty pledges· 11the most practical
deterrent
and discouragement to war which the wit of man has yet devised".
But he said also that "if the concept and objective are to
build sufficient
forces in being to hold the Russian line•••
it present ruinous corollaries
both at home ancl abroad'''•
In the first years of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, after the aggression in Korea, .its members made an
emergency buildup of military
strength.
I do not question
the judgment of that timeo · The strength thus bw.lt has served
well the cause of peaceo But the pace originally
set could
not be maintained indefinitely.
At the April meeting of the NATOCouncil, the United
States put forward a new concept
now known as that of
the "long haul 11 o That meant a steady development of defensive strength at a rate which will preserve and not exhaust
the economic strength of our allies
and ourselves.
This ·
would be reinforced
by the striking
power of a strategic
air
force based on internatLonally
agreed positions.
000178
�- 5We found, at the ,Council of last December, that there
was general a~ceptance of the "long haul" concept, and
recognition
that it better served the probable needs than an
effort to create full defensive land strength at a ruinous
price.
One of the emergency aspects of NATOis that
begun before there was a solid foundation.
For example, Western
defended without a defense
cannot be defended without
participation
is excluded
still
in force.
it was
Europe cannot be successfully
of West Germany •. West Germany
help from the Germans. German
by the armistice
arrangements
The West German Republic needs to be freed from the
armistice;
and new political
arrangements should be made
to assure that rearmed Germans will serve the common cause
and never serve German militarism.
The French produced a plan to take care of this matter.
It was to create a European Defence Community, composed of
France, Italy,
Belgium, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg, and
West Germany. They would have a European Army, including
Germans, but there would be no national
armies in West
Europe.
A treaty to create th.is Defense Community was signed
in May 1952. But when the Eisenhower Administration
took
office last January, no Government had sought parliamentary
ratification,'and
the project was nigh unto death.
President Eisenhower is deeply convinced that there
can be no long-term assurance of security and vitality
for Europe, and therefore
for the Western world including
the United States,
unless there is a unity which will include
France and Germany and end the disunity which has led to
recurrent
wars, and in our generat±on to two World Wars.
As NATO's Chief Commander, and now as President,
he continues
to make clear the importance which the United States attached to the consummation of the European Defens:.e Community
and, we would hope thereafter,
a Political
Community.
Until the goals of EDC are achieved, NATO, and indeed
future peace, are in jeopardy.
Distrust
between France
and Germany is inflammable and already Communist agents
are looking to it as a means for international
arson.
There are of course immense difficulties
in the way of
the final consummation of Franco-German unity.
But we have
confidence that peace will soon have the indispensable
foundation of the EDC.
Economic Aid
New collective
security concepts reduce non-productive
military
expenses· of our allies
to a point where it is desirable and practicable
also to reduce economic aid •. There was
need of a more self-respecting
relationship,
and that, indeed,
is what our allies wanted.
Trade, broader markets and a flow
of investments are far more healthy than inter-governmental
grants-in-aid.
000179
�,_
..
- 6 -
There are still
some strategic
spots where the local
governments cannot maintain adequate armed forces without
some financial
support from us.
In these .cases, we take the
judgment of our military
advisers
as to how to proceed in the
common interest.
For example, we have contributed
largely,
ungrudgingly,
and I hope constructively·,.
to end aggression
and
advance freedom in Indochinao
The Technical Assistance
Program is being continued,
and
we stand ready to meet non-recurrent
needs due to crop failures
or like disasters.
But, broadly speaking,
foreign budgetary aid is being
limited
to situations
where it clearly
contributes
to mili'tary
strength.
The Hope
In the ways I outlined
term defense of freedom.
we gather
strength
for
the long-
We do not, of course, claim to have found some magic
formula that ensures against all forms of Communist successes.
It is normal that at some times and at some places there may
be setbacks to the cause of freedom.
What we do expect to
ensure is that any setbacks will have only temporary and local
significance
because they will leave unimpaired those free
world assets which in the lo~g run will prevail.
=-
If we can deter such aggression
as would mean general war,
and that is our confident
resolve,
then we can let time and
fundamentals
work for us. We do not need self-imposed
policies
which sap our strength.
The fundamental,
on our ~ide, is the richness--spiritual,
intellectual
and material--that
freedom can produce and the
irresistible
attraction
it-then
sets up. That is why we do not
plan ourselves
to shackle freedom to preser~e ·freedom.
We
intend that our conduct and example shall continue,
as in the
past, to show all men how good can be the fruits
of freedom.
If we rely on freedom,. then it follows that we must ab~ ..
stain from diplomatic
moves which would seem to endorse captivity.
That would, in effect,
be a conspiracy
against freedom.
I can assure you that we shall never seek illusory
secur.ity for
ourselves
by such a ""deal".
We do negotiate
about
the cause of human welfareo
specific
matters
but only to advance
President
Eisenhower electrified
the world with his
proposal to lift
a great weight of f~ar by turning atomic energy
from a means of death into a source of life.
Yesterday,
I
started
procedural
talks with the Soviet -G·bv.ernment on that
topic.
We have persisted,
with our Allies,
in seeking the unification of Germany and the liberation
of Austria.
Now the Soviet
rulers have agreed to discuss these questions.
We expect to
meet them soon in Berlino
I hope they will come with a sincerity
which will equal our own.
We have sought a conference
to unify
of foreign troops.
So far, our persistence
have not given up.
Korea and relieve
it
is unrewarded; but we
000180
I
�- 7These efforts
at negotiation
are normal initiatives
that
breathe the spirit
of freedom.
They involve no plan for a
partnership
division of world power with those who suppress
freedom.
If we persist
in the courses I outline we shall confront
dictatorship
with a task that is, in the long run, beyond its
strength.
For unless it changes, it must suppress the human
desires that freedom satisfies
-- as we sha~l be demonstrating.
If the dictators
persist
in their present GOUrse then it
is they who will be limited to superficial
successes,
while
their foundation crumbles under the treat of their iron boots.
Human beings, for the most part, want simp~e things.
They
want to worship God in accordance with the dictates
of their
conscience.
But that is not easily granted by those who promote
an atheistic
creed.
They want to think in accordance with the dictates
of their
reason.
But that is not easily granted by those who represent
an authoritarian
system.
They want to exchange views with others and to persuade and
to be persuaded by what appeals to their reason and their
conscience.
But that is not easily granted by those who believe
ih a society of conformity.
They want to live i-n their homes without fear.
But that is
not easily granted by those who believe in a police state system.
They want to be able to work productively
and creatively
and to enjoy the fruits
of their labor.
But that is not easily
granted by those who look upon human beings as a means to create
a powerhouse to dominate the world.
We can be sure that there is going on, even within Russia,
a silent test of strength between the powerful rulers and the
multitudes
of human beings.
Each indi~idual
no doubt seems
by himself to be helpless
in this struggle.
But their aspirations in the aggregate make up a mighty force.
There are signs that the rulers are bending to some of
the human desire·s of their people.
There are promises of more
food, more household goods, more economic freedom.
That does not prove that the Soviet rulers have themselves
been converted.
It is rather that they may be dimly perceiving
a basic fact, that is that there are limits to the power of
any rulers indefinitely
to suppress the human spirit.
J
In that God-given fact lies our greatest
hope.
It is a
hope that can sustain us. For even if the path ahead be long
and hard, it need not be a warlike path; and we can know that
at the end may be found the blessedness
of peace.
State--PB,
Wash., D.C.
L
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Dublin Core
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Title
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Deterrence
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New Look / 25 JANURARY 1954
Date
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1954-01-25
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PDF
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en
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Text
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CDTT00017
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External Affairs to All Posts Abroad, "Circular Document No. B. 5/54," 25 Jan. 1954, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 2.
continental defence
Dwight Eisenhower
John Foster Dulles
Okinawa
Soviet bloc
US National Security Council
western Europe