https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/5418e180dbcbae084c1fcf5d03e64c15.pdf 363a6edf07ad4bd094a3e8d90e6155f7 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information / IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE NO. CSC 1 9 7 7 - 1 (JSC) ; department of Rational defence CANADA JOINT ADDRESS REPLY TO STAFF C O N F I D E NT I AL 30 May 1955. CHAIRMAN CHIEFS OF STAFF, OTTAWA. Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee Security of atomic Information 1. Attached hereto as Appendix 'A' is the draft appendix "Security Standards for Safeguarding Atomic Information" which it is proposed to use as the security appendix to the Agreement for the Exchange of Atomic Inf ormation. 2. This draft agreement was prepared by Representatives of the Joint Security Committee and the U.S. Defense Department, It has not yet received official approval in either country. The U.S. propose that the security appendix be the same for the US-Canada Agreement and the US-UK Agreement on the Exchange of Atomic Information. This draft has been accepted by the UK Representative in Washington and has been forwarded to the UK for approval. 3. There is some question as to whether the US will accept the criteria stated in paragraph I G. It is understood that the securityannex to the civilian agreement is very long and involved and contains a long list of criteria. If the referenced paragraph is not accepted by the US, it is for consideration whether the detailed criteria in the draft Department of National Defence Security Policy, also distributed this date, could be used. These criteria are attached as Appendix "B". U* Paragraph III A 2 states that Secret and Confidential atomic information may be transmitted "by registered mail. It is expected to be a condition of this transmission that postal clerks handling registered mail receive a security clearance to the Confidential level at least. The U.S. has asked informally whether these postal clerks are in fact cleared. At the present time, postal clerks receive a fingerprint check only. The new Cabinet Directive Screening of Personnel will require a fingerprint check and a check of subversive indices for security clearance to Confidential. Until the Post Office Depart" ment adopt both these indices checks for their registered mail clerks, Canada should not use registered mail for the transmission of Secret or Confidential atomic information. 5. Available Members of Joint Security Committee have examined this document and the Committee recommends: a) its adoption in this form, or b) if we are faced with the necessity of adding detailed criteria, that the criteria attached at Appendix "B" be . used and the document remain classified Confidential. c) That Chiefs of Staff Committee request the Security Panel to use its good offices to ensure that postal clerks dealing with registered mail receive security clearance to Confidential. Ends. WAT/5934/AB. TodExecutive Joint Secur: •s stary, Committee. 000143 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information APPENDIX "A" C O N F I D E N T I A L 27 May - Draft SECURITY STANDARDS FOR SAFEGUARDING ATOMIC INFORMATION EXCHANGED UNDER THIS AGREEMENT PERSONNEL SECURITY A. No person will be entitled to access to atomic information solely by virtue of rank, appointment, or security clearance. Access to atomic information will be granted only to those individuals whose official duties require such access and who have been investigated and cleared for access in accordance with the standards prescribed in this Appendix. No person will be granted a security clearance unless it is affirmatively determined that such clearance is clearly consistent with the national security interests of the 'respective countries. B. Before granting access to atomic information, a responsible government authority will make a determination of eligibility for each individual to be granted such access. C. The decision as to whether the granting of a clearance Is clearly consistent with the interests of security will be a determination based on all available information. This clear- ance will be based on a determination that such individual is of? 1. Unquestioned loyalty, integrity and trustworthiness. 2. Excellent character and of such habits and associates as to cast no doubt upon his discretion or good judgment in the handling of atomic information. D* A background investigation, which is an investigation covering the individual's background for a sufficient period of time and in sufficient detail to provide assurance that the criteria in items C 1 and 2 above have been met, will be conducted by a governmental investigative agency on the following? 1. Any person to be granted access to Top Secret atomic information, 2. Any person who is of Russian or Satellite origin or connection, and 3. Any other person who may be vulnerable to pressure from foreign or other sources. 000144 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information i Hfif When immediate access to atomic information is essential for the individual concerned to carry out his assigned task, and the delay caused by awarding a full clearance would be detrimental to the national interest, the responsible authority empowered to grant such clearance may authorize provisional clearance based on records immediately available. In each such case, the responsible authority will institute immediately the procedure necessary to satisfy the full clearance requirements set forth in the paragraphs above. 000145 �'** Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information . C O N F I D E N T I A L ' r E. For persons who are to have access to Secret and Confidential atomic information, a thorough investigation will be made of all records held by the national security services or by other government departments and agencies. In the event that derogatory or questionable information concerning an individual is disclosed as a result of this check, the inquiry will be extended as necessary to obtain such additional information as may be {p*1 . ''^v £•*» required to determine whether or not a clearance should be granted. ^y^* All establishments handling atomic information will maintain a registry of the clearance of personnel authorized to have access to such information. Each clearance will be reviewed, as the occasion demands, to insure that it conforms with the current standards applicable to the person's employment, and will be reexamined as a matter of priority when new information is received which indicates that continued employment on classified work is no longer consistent with the interests of security. II. PHYSICAL SECURITY A. Atomic information will be protected against sabotage, espionage, unauthorized access or any other hostile activity. The nature of the protection will d epend upons 1.' The character and location of the building. 2. The classification, volume and location of the information in the building. B. Atomic information will be stored as follows; 1. T O P Seeret — in safes or strong steel cabinets fitted with three-wheel combination or special security locks. 2. Secret and Confidential — in safes or steel cabinets whose locking devices are regularly inspected and known to be secure. III. TRANSMISSION A. The minimum requirements for transmission of atomic information made available by the other government will be as follows? 000146 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information CONFIDENTIAL 1. Top Secret atomic information by m i l i t a r y or diplomatic courier.-^"^ *"y ^*~**~> f '{,•£•*<£ < -fij 2. Secret and Confidential atomic information by registered mail within the postal systems of the respective nations. B. All atomic information transmitted by electrical means will be encrypted. IV ,. ACCOUNTABILITY Accountability procedures will be established to control the dissemination of atomic information. Particularly severe control will be maintained for atomic information classified Top Secret, and Top Secret control officers will be designated to maintain accountability registers for the receipt and dispatch of Top Secret documents. V. MARKING CF REPRODUCED DOCUMENTS When a document containing atomic information is reproduced, all (j\<Hjjh*d? security markings thereon will also be reproduced. VI. LOSS OR COMPROMISE In the event of loss or possible compromise of atomic information exchanged under this agreement, the originating nation will be informed and an immediate investigation will be carried out into the circumstances surrounding the loss. The originating nation will also be informed of the findings of the investigation. VII. DESTRUCTION Classified documents, when no longer required, will be destroyed by burning or reducing to pulp. Accountability records will be maintained to reflect the destruction of Top Secret and Seeret documents. VIII. CONTINUING REVIEW OF SECURITY SYSTEMS In order to insure similar implementation of the security policies and procedures detailed in this Agreement, reciprocal periodic visits will be made with a view to achieving mutual understanding of the adequacy and reasonable comparability of the respective security systems. 000147 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information C O N F I D E N T I A L DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL INSTRUCTION SECURITY OF PERSON Appendix "B" to CSC 1977.1 (JSC) of 30 May, 1955. 7, In assesing information developed as a result of the investigations outlined above, the following criteria should be used as a guide. Information of the type listed hereunder may preclude the issuance of a clearance or permit only a low level clearance. Each case, however, must be considered on its own merits: a) Committed or attempted to commit, conspired to, or aided or abetted another to commit or attempt to commit any act of espionage, sabotage, treason or sedition. b) Established an association with espionage agents of a foreign nationj with individuals who are reliably reported as suspected of espionage; or with representatives of foreign nations whose interests are inimical to the security of Canada? jL^<=yfu^L^_ -*£ »-~-*--r- &^^&**SJ&nL, <X_^*_ c) Advocated or supported the overthrow of the Government of Canada by force or violence. d) Sympathetic interest in totalitarian, fascist, or communist, or other subversive political, ideologies. „. -. ,_e) Identification with a "front" or infiltrated organization when there is also other information which e&tabia?s«es the probability that he may be part of, or sympathetic to, the infiltrating element. f) Close continued association with individuals (including those to whom he may be bound by ties of kinship, affection^, or obligation) who have subversive interests or associations as defined above when the circumstances are such that he may be presumed to know of such associations or interests. g) Present or recent alien status. h) Convictions for felony which indicate habitual criminal tendencies. i) Conviction for, or manifested tendencies of homosexuality or perversion. j) Addiction to the use of alcohol or narcotics habitually and to excess, without evidence of rehabilitation. k) Manifested tendencies demonstrating unreliability, abuse of trust or dishonesty. l) Record of a dishonorable discharge from Her Majesty's Service. m) To have been adjudged insane, have been committed to an insane asylum, or treated for serious mental illness or serious neuropsychiatric disorders without evidence of cure. n) To have wilfully violated or disregarded security regulations to a degree which eould have endangered national security. o) Demonstrated a lack of discretion or honesty essential to the handling of classified information. p) The loyalty, character or discretion of any person may be vulnerable through those to whom he is bound by ties of kinship, affection, or obligation. - Therefore, in justice to the individual as well as in the interest of security, serious thought should be given'to' the clearance of anyone whose near relative are resident in a communist nation or a satellite thereof, under circumstances permitting coercion or pressure to be brought on the individual through them. „„„„,«, 000148 � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW01150 Title A name given to the resource Memorandum for Chiefs of Staff Committee Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 5/30/1955 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Canada/US Agreement for Cooperation concerning military aspects of atomic energy." RG25-A-3-b, vol. 5957, 50219-AK-40, part 1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Atomic energy, tripartite cooperation Description An account of the resource Security of Atomic Information Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en