https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/9e02a67f3f13bbd729a1a000e4f21a3f.pdf 472e7f600171d302874cbe797d9fa0a4 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a {'information 1 fi„i„ kmMH S E C R E T ° 0/CS COPY NO.. SEP 2* 1952 io REPORT TO THE COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE ON THE TRIPARTITE CONFERENCE ON ATOMIC ENERGY SECURITY STANDARDS WASHINGTON, D. C. MAY 15 AND 16, 1952 ATTENDANCE Canada Dr. C. J. Mackenzie, Canadian Atomic Energy Control Board D. Babbitt, Canadian Embassy Mr. J Mr. W H. Barton, External Affairs Mr. J L. Gray, Canadian Atomic Energy Control Board Mr. L H. Nicholson, Royal Canadian Mounted Police Mr. G. Ignatieff, Canadian Embassy United Kingdom Sir Archibald Rowlands, Ministry of Supply Mr. Roger M. Hollis, British Security Service Sir Christopher Steel, British Embassy Mr. W. D. Wilkinson, Ministry of SupplyMr. M. P. R. Hockliffe, Ministry of Supply Lord Talbot de Mahlahlde, Foreign Office Dr. W. A. MacFarlane, U.K. Scientific Office Mr. Alec. Longair, U. K. Scientific Office Mr. C. S. Goad, Ministry of Supply Mr. F. W. Marten, British Embassy Mr. R. T. Callender, British Embassy United States Commissioner T. Keith Glennan, Atomic Energy Commission Capt. John A. Waters, Atomic Energy Commission Mr. Francis R. Hammack, Atomic Energy Commission Mr. Leo L. Laughlln, Federal Bureau of Investigation Mr. Ralph R. Roach, Federal Bureau of Investigation Mr. Joseph Chase, State Department Mr. John A. Hall, Atomic Energy Commission Mr. AI Wells, Atomic Energy Commission Mr. Roy B. Snapp, Atomic Energy Commission Mr. Ernest Chase, Jr., Atomic Energy Commission Dr. Walter F. Colby, Atomic Energy Commission Lt. Col. Donald G. Williams, Department of Defense Lt. Col. Andrew L. Cox, Department of Defense Lt. Col. Walter C. Wickboldt, Department of Defense ( ; When separated from enclosures handle this document as UNCLASSIFIED Q8l C 1CEET 000157 �Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information This document consists of Copy No. 17 of 30 26 Series pages B S E C R E T SECURITY INFORMATION ESSJLSESSioa SEP 8s 9;30 a.m., Thursday, May 15, 1952 m /_ 1. Dr. Glennan, Member of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, took the chair for the first session of the conference and opened by welcoming the British and Canadian delegates. He proposed that the Secretariat of the U.S. AEC be responsible for the record of the conference, aided by whomever the other delegates might designate. He then asked ap- proval, on a stand-by basis only, of a draft press release,* previously circulated to members of the conference, which had been prepared for Issuance in case of inquiry. 2. The conference then turned to a review by Heads of Delegations of significant developments in the respective atomic energy security programs since July, 1951. Dr. Glennan proposed that this review be limited to matters of personnel security since there had been agreement at the 1951 conference that physical security standards were already comparable. 3. Dr. Glennan then reported on the effect of a new law, Public Law 298, approved by Congress April 5* 1952, which transferred responsibility for certain applicant type Investigations from the Federal Bureau of Investigation to the Civil Service Commission, and briefly summarized reasons for the change in law. *Appendix "B" This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. 1CEET 000158 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information S E C R E T He also mentioned the amendment to Sections 5 and 10 of the Atomic Energy Act, with which members of the conference were already familiar. 4. Dr. Mackenzie, President of the Atomic Energy Control Board of Canada, stated that there had been no fundamental changes in the Canadian atomic energy security program, though there had been some organizational changes. Briefly, a new Crown Company had been formed to replace the National Research Council as the operating body in the Canadian program under the over-all control of the Atomic Energy Control Board. This change was largely one in name only and the same people continued in charge. 5. Mr. Nicholson, of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, stated that there had been certain changes in the Canadian security program as a result of the great interest in the number of Investigations required but indicated that these changes had not affected the atomic energy security procedure. 6. Sir Archibald Rowlands, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Supply, stated that the U.K. personnel security program had moved much closer to that of the U.S. and Canada since the last conference. Fundamental ly., the objectives and results of the security programs of the three countries were the same, although there were still some differences in the methods used. He felt these were inevitable, resulting from such factors as different political traditions and customs, and the difference in size of the countries and of the respective atomic energy programs. 7. Dr. Glennan then proposed that the conference resolve into a working group and consider: 000159 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a {'information CRET S E C R E T (1) The Security Questionnaire. (2) The Background Investigation. (3) The Evaluation. The Heads of Delegations designated representatives to participate in the working group. 8. The conference adjourned until 4:00 p.m. 1C1RET 000160 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a {'information S E C R E T REPORT TO THE TRIPARTITE CONFERENCE BY THE WORKING PARTY The Working Party convened at 11:00 a.m. with the following present: United States Commissioner T. Keith Glennan, AEC John A. Hall, Director of Special Projects, AEC Capt. John A. Waters, Director of Security, AEC Francis R. Hammack, Division of Security, AEC Leo L. Laughlln, Federal Bureau of Investigation Ralph R. Roach, Federal Bureau of Investigation Lt. Col. Walter C. Wickboldt, Military Liaison Committee Joseph Chase, Department of State Roy B. Snapp, Secretary of the AEC Canada L. H. Nicholson, Royal Canadian Mounted Police Dr. C. J, Mackenzie, President, Canadian Atomic Energy Control Board J. L. Gray, Canadian Atomic Energy Control Board United Kingdom Sir Archibald Rowlands, Ministry of Supply Roger H. Hollis; Security Service M. F. R, Hockliffe, Ministry of Supply F. W, Marten, British Embassy The Security Questionnaire 1. Sir Archibald Rowlands opened the proceedings of the Working Group by giving a brief review of the new investigative procedure which has just been introduced into the United Kingdom. The new procedure will apply to all persons having access to classified atomic energy information and to certain other very secret information. Sir Archibald Rowlands said the new British questionnaire would supplement the information obtained from employment applications. An application form for temporary employment in the Ministry of Supply was circulated as an example of the other information which is required by British Government Departments. Both the employment application and the Special Security Questionnaire would be among the data available to the - 4- CRET 000161 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information S E C R E T investigators. It was pointed out that the nationality rule of the Ministry of Supply barred from employment in the Ministry Individuals who were not British born, of British parents in the U.K. or one of the self-governing Dominions. All exceptions to this rule required the approval of the Minister.. The Minister sometimes delegated his power of approval to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Supply (at present Sir Archibald Rowlands). 2, Dr. Glennan referred to the responsibilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for conducting investigations and invited the FBI representatives to ask questions about the U.K. security questionnaire, 3« Liability to Prosecution. Mr. Roach raised the question of liability to prosecution for making a false statement in filling out the new security questionnaire. It was pointed out by Sir Archibald Rowlands that there was a liability to prosecution for attempting to obtain remunerative employment by false pretences. There was also a possible liability under the Official Secrets Act if it could be shown that there was any attempt to obtain official secrets by making false statements. Apart from that, as is made clear in the certificate which the individual is required to sign at the end of the security questionnaire, a new applicant would be rejected and a person already in the Government Service would be dismissed if there was reason to believe that he had made false statements. He would not, however, necessarily be prosecuted. 4. The Government had considered very carefully whether the form of the questionnaire should be filled in on oath, in which case there would be an automatic liability to prosecution 5 000162 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - ^ | Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a {'information '€EEf S E C R E T for perjury if the applicant made a false statement. This course had been rejected because it was felt that in a great many cases the evidence required by the prosecution would come ' from undercover sources and if these were brought out in open court the operation of the British Security Services would be prejudiced? 5. The meeting then examined the question of whether there was any significant difference between the U.S. method (whereby the applicant is notified on the form itself that a false statement will entail liability to prosecution) and the British method. Dr. Glennan pointed out that the warning on the U.S. questionnaire had a deterrent effect. Sir Archibald Rowlands said that in certain economic circumstances, e.g., when unemployment is prevalent, the mere liability to dismissal or to rejection for making a false statement could be a real deterrent. Commissioner Nicholson pointed out that the penalties for prosecution for a false statement about a situation now many years past, (e.g., a false statement about membership of the Communist Party twenty years ago) might be so light as to nullify the deterrent purpose of prosecution. In response to a question from Sir Archibald Rowlands, Mr. Laughlln said that there had been a few prosecutions in the U.S. growing out of deliberate misstatements on the PSQ,. The question actually was one of the degree and effectiveness of deterrents. Sir Archibald Rowlands and Commissioner Nicholson said they could not recollect any prosecutions in their country for false statements in filling in a questionnaire to obtain Government employment. - 6- 1CIRET 000163 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a {'information 1CEET ^AJLJ7A2 6. Aliases. Mr. Roach remarked that there was no question on the British questionnaire relating to aliases. Mr. Hollis pointed out that the investigator would examine school and college records and would also talk to two referees who have known the applicant for some time. The investigator would also check up with the local police who, in British communities, have an intimate knowledge of people living in their area. It was, therefore, unlikely that use of an alias would go undetected. Mr. Roach and Mr. Laughlin pointed out that the mere fact that applicants have to answer a question about aliases had a deterrent effect. It probably meant that a num- ber of people who might otherwise have applied did not do so. They then asked whether, on the British side, it was likely that the authorities would know about aliases if there was no question about them in the questionnaire. Mr. Hollis indi- cated that he did not think the problem would be a big one and that he thought that use of aliases would be brought to light in the course of investigation. 7. Mr. Glennan then asked Mr. Hollis to explain in what ways the British Security Service (MI-5) kept a check on the activities and membership of Communist organizations in Britain and the use of aliases for Party purposes.. Mr. Hollis listed the following methods: a. The local police had an.intimate knowledge of individuals in their areas and passed on all data about Communist and subversive activities to MI-5. b. The Security Officers of Government Departments, and Immigration and Customs Officers also supplied any information which came their way. - 7- 1CRET 000164 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information '£MET S E C R E T c. There was close liaison with the Security Authorities of other countries. d. An important factor was the length of time during which the British Security Service had been operating. It was founded in 1909. It started checking Communist activity even before the British Communist Party was founded and knew the records of the organizations which formed the origins of the BCP. e. The BCP had never been driven underground. As a result, it had not been forced to operate in a covert way and this had made it relatively easy for the Security Service to penetrate the BCP with its own agents. Information supplied b3r them was cross-checked with information supplied by defectors from the BCP and with information from other sources. 8. Mr. Roach said that the FBI was not questioning the thoroughness of MI-5 knowledge of Communist activities in Britain. What they wanted to know with regard to aliases was whether Mr. Hollis thought the omission of a question about aliases was important or not. Mr. Hollis said he did not think it was important. 9. Commissioner Nicholson said that, to the present, the problem of aliases had no particular importance in the Canadian security program. The most important contribution that a' question about aliases would make would be in facilitating file searches by the Canadian authorities. 10. Mr. Laughlln said that listing of aliases was quite useful in the U.S. in facilitating cross-checks of individuals. He was also concerned lest a man's membership under an assumed name in.the Communist Party or his activity in organizations sympathetic to Communist causes might completely escape detection. Sir Archibald Rowlands and Mr. Hollis thought this was unlikely to occur in the U.K. - 8- 000165 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'accesa /'information S E C R E T 11. Physical Description. Mr. Hammack drew attention to the fact that it was vital to identify correctly the applicant for employment. The previous questions on aliases had been concerned with this question of correct identification. Other points which assisted in identification were fingerprinting and a physical description of the applicant. There was, however, no question on the questionnaire concerned with physical description. Commissioner Nicholson pointed out that Scotland Yard have very thorough and fully cross-referenced police records which served the purpose of identification. Mr. Laughlin said that in the United States there had been instances of one individual substituting for the real applicant in undergoing school or college examinations. To take an extreme case, was a similar substitution possible in the case of an applicant for employment in the U.K. in the atomic energy program? Mr. Hollis stated that it would be difficult for a person to get away with a case of substitution because of the wealth of other records available to the Investigating authority against which the applicant's statements could be checked. A number of these records, Including applications for passports and military records, provided physical descriptions. 12 • Residence. Mr. Roach pointed out.that the American questionnaire required applicants to say where they had resided for the past 15 years, but the British questionnaire only asked for records of the past 5 years. Mr. Hollis again pointed out that from other information available to the investigator, a picture of an individual's movements over a much longer period 9 000166 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information S E C R E T than 5 years could easily be built up. Information about the person carrying back for more than 5 years would be provided by the two referees, who would themselves be scrutinized as to the fullness of their knowledge of the applicant and as to their own reliability. Moreover, on the employment application form the applicant had to list all his previous employment from the time he was first employed and this provided a check on his movements. Mr. Glennan pointed out that any figure -- 5/ 10 or 15 years -- was arbitrary but a longer period than 5 years seemed desirable. Mr. Hammack said that the AEC had chosen to use 15 years because it went back to the late 1930s when Communist and Fascist subversive organizations began to grow and assume importance in the U.S. 13. Relatives, Brothers, Sisters and Former Spouses. Mr. Laughlln pointed out the necessity of obtaining information about relatives and former spouses and gave as an example the case of Pontecorvo, whose sister was married to a communist. Sir Archibald Rowlands and Mr.. Hollis agreed that it was desirable from the security point of view for the investigator to have the fullest possible information about family background and relatives. A good investigator, however, would obtain this in the course of his investigation. There had originally been a proposal to include a specific question about brothers and sisters in the security questionnaire. not to adopt this proposal. Ministers had decided Sir Archibald Rowlands also pointed out that applicants who were not born British subjects are now required to supply information about relatives. - 10 - 000167 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information i y/ S E C R E T 14. Mr. Roach summed up this part of the discussion by saying that under the U.S. procedure, where more information was automatically available tc the investigator from the questionnaire than is provided through the British questionnaire, a lesser load of work is thrown onto the investigator. He is therefore less likely to miss some item of importance. Against this, the British side pointed out that a potential security risk would perhaps deliberately make false statements """A . in reply to any questionnaire, either the fuller American kind or the more restricted British kind and that, therefore, the real responsibility for establishing the reliability of the applicant remained with the investigator. Mr. Glennan suggested that the Working Group should decide whether investigation was adequate to ferret out information about family background and relatives. Mr. Hammack pointed out that information about' the activities of close relatives of the applicant was often the chief source of doubt about applicants. On the American side, great importance was, therefore, attached to this part of the investigation. The British side felt that adequate information S~~>\ i on this subject could be obtained by the investigator and stated that he would be instructed to do this. 15. Organizations. Mr. Roach pointed out that under the American procedures an applicant is required to list all organizations (except religious and labor -- i.e., trades unionsorganization). Furthermore, the PSQ contains the Attorney General's list of subversive bodies. In the British procedure the applicant had merely to state whether he belonged to any body which was generally held to be Communist or Fascist connected. The Americans felt that various important deductions, positive and .*+*- negative, could be made from a full list of organizations to which a person belonged. In addition, individual applicants were 000168 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a {'information 1CEET S E C R E T often unaware that some body to which they belonged was penetrated by Communism or some other subversive group; In answering the American questionnaire they would have to list it anyway-. Under the British method the applicant might deliberately or inadvertently omit the name of some organization which might have provided an Important clue to his reliability. In discussion, it was agreed that the British did not have anything comparable to the Attorney General's published list of subversive organizations but that the real point at issue was whether the two questions about Communism and Fascism on the questionnaire which the British applicant had to answer and the interviews gave all the information which was necessary and could reasonably be expected to be provided about his associations. Sir Archibald Rowlands said that in his opinion there would be political opposition in the U.K.. to requiring an applicant to list all the organizations and clubs, etc., to which he belonged. This would be considered an undue infringement of the liberty of the subject. 16* Dr. Glennan asked whether investigators Were supplied with a list of organizations, membership of which would raise question as to an individual's loyalty. The U.K. representative stated that such a list was available to the investigator to aid him in obtaining in the interview a list of organizations to which the individual belonged. 17. Foreign Travel. Mr. Roach pointed out that on the British questionnaire, applicants were only required to list foreign travel since 1945. Visits to the Soviet Union and other foreign travel prior to 1945 were important factors in the investigation; The U.K. representatives pointed out that since. - 12 - SEQRET 000169 �KCRET S E C R E T there was essentially no voluntary foreign travel for residents in the U,K. during the war years 1939-45, the British questionnaire, in effect, covered foreign travel since the beginning of the war. This was going back 13 years at this time and might be termed adequate. 18. Convictions and Arrests. Mr. Roach pointed out that under the British procedure, applicants were only required to list convictions, while under the American procedure they were required to list arrests and indictments as well as convictions. These are important factors and assist in conducting a full and complete background investigation. Sir Archibald Rowlands said that under the British system of law it would be impossible to ask for information about arrests or indictments which had been quashed and on which the applicant had been acquitted. There could be no question of including a question of this sort on the British security questionnaire. However, it was a matter which the investigator could take up confidentially and informally with the local police and information about arrests and charges could, therefore, be obtained. Mr. Roach and Mr. Laughlln expressed doubt whether it would be possible in all cases to obtain any indication of a former police record, especially if the applicant had used aliases or had moved about the country and taken steps to conceal the fact that he had been arrested or charged. On the British side it was pointed out that the investigator would almost certainly obtain this information from the local police. The Investigation 19. Mr. Roach opened this part of the discussion by describing the American methods of investigation. There were a number of steps: - 13 - 000170 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information €RET S E C R E T a. The PSQ (Personnel Security Questionnaire) Form was processed against FBI central records in Washington.. b. Copies of the completed PSQ's were then sent out to the appropriate field office or offices for local Investigation. The FBI had 52 field divisions throughout the country. c. The results were sent back to the central office in Washington and correlated by the FBI. d. A report was then compiled on the basis of the material collected in this investigation and sent to the evaluating authority (the AEC). The actual field investigations carried out included Inquiries made at school, from credit bureaus, friends, references, and various other sources designed to develop all possible information. Mr. Laughlln commented that certain specific sources set forth in Executive Order 9835, such as the files of ONI, G2, CSC, etc., were also checked on these cases. Simultaneously with the investigation described above, the applicant's fingerprints were checked at the central fingerprint depository. Mr. Roach said that there was a slight variation in that the FBI no longer had sole responsibility for these security investigations. Under a recent amendment to the relevant legislation the Civil Service Commission had taken over some of the investigations (see para. 22 below). 20. Any evidence of association with subversive persons or organizations is fully checked and developed. The applicant's connection with a subversive organization is checked both from the organization outwards to the applicant and inwards from the applicant to the organization. 21. In reply to a question, Mr. Laughlln said that an average investigation took 44,4 days. Mr. Hammack said that the average time required for a clearance (i.e., for investigation - 14 - �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information S E C R E T and evaluation) was somewhere about 65 days. 90. It had been nearly So far about 0.4$ of applicants had been formally denied clearance for security reasons. 22. Dr. Glennan said that under the new system the CSC would handle routine investigations for less sensitive positions. The CSC had formed a corps of investigators for this purpose and the FBI assisted in their training. The total number of in- vestigations carried out in fiscal year 1951-52 would be about 90,000. In the future, the CSC would handle a large percentage of the investigations, but the transfer of responsibility from the FBI to the CSC would involve no change in investigating procedure or methods. As soon as investigation by the CSC turned up anything which cast doubt upon the applicant's loyalty, the case would be handed over to the FBI. Mr. Chase of the AEC joined the group at this point, 23. in reply to a series of questions by members of the American delegation, Sir Archibald Rowlands outlined the steps an investigator would follow in conducting a background investigation under the new British system. Briefly this procedure provided in the first place for an M.I, 5 checkup of the applicant or employee against their records. Following on the M.I. 5 checkup an investigator, who would be provided with all the available data about the individual, would be assigned to carry out a field investigation. The investigator would interview the individual personally to obtain pertinent information not furnished by the forms (e.g., relating to close relatives and organizations) and then proceed to make any necessary check of residences, schools, the referees named by the applicant and other - 15 - 000172 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information S E C R E T appropriate sources of information. Cases in which any doubt existed as to the loyalty of the individual were referred back to MI-5 for further examination and then returned to the Ministry of Supply for final evaluation. 24. Sir Archibald Rowlands emphasized that these procedures were still in process of formulation, with only about 40 cases so far processed by his organization. Under the conditions, he welcomed any suggestions the U.S. or Canadian security people might be able to make as a result of their longer experience in this'field. In the course of discussion Sir Archibald Rowlands asked whether the FBI investigators had personal interviews with the subject of investigation, as was the case under the British procedure. Mr. Laughlin said they did not. They worked round the individual but did not go directly to him. 25. Military Clearances. Mr. Gray asked whether military personnel, who would have access to atomic energy data, would be cleared by the AEC or by their own services. Mr. Glennan said that dissemination of atomic energy information within the military establishment is made on the basis of military clearance procedures, which the Department of Defense have provided to require investigation commensurate with the classification involved. Mr. Glennan observed that military requirements involved large numbers of military personnel having access to operational information. Colonel Wickboldt stated that the Defense Establishment conducted investigations based on information supplied by a personal history statement similar to that used by the AEC. The extent of this investigation, he said, was determined by whether the subject would have access to confidential, secret, or top secret information. - 16 - 000173 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information S E C R E T 26. Fingerprinting. Mr. Roach indicated that the FBI considered fingerprints of vital importance in conducting its own background investigations. He stated that fingerprinting was no longer regarded in the U. S. as something entirely associated with criminal action but rather was widely accepted as a means of identification. He gave examples of how useful the FBI had found its central fingerprint files In security investigations. These files, at present, contain over 124,000,000 sets of fingerprints. 27. Sir Archibald Rowlands agreed that fingerprinting appeared to be a very useful device in the U.S. but pointed out that its usefulness depended upon the existence of the massive central file Mr. Roach had mentioned. the U.K. However, there was no such file in Fingerprinting of people in the British atomic energy program thus would have only limited value at this time. 28. Mr. Nicholson remarked that the Canadian position was somewhere in between the other two. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police maintained a central file for criminal cases. Applicants for positions in the Canadian atomic energy program were fingerprinted and the fingerprints checked against the central file. These fingerprints, however, were not kept as part of the central file but rather returned to the Atomic Energy Control Board to form part of Its personnel files. 29. Sir Archibald Rowlands stated that the British people considered fingerprinting in non-criminal cases to be objectionable and that, therefore, it would require a period of political education before the public could be expected to accept fingerprints as a part of the investigative process. To make it - 17 - 000174 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a {'information S E C R E T compulsory at the moment v/ould require legislation. This would . be exceedingly controversial and it v/ould in any case not be possible to introduce a bill for some time, as the parliamentary program was full. 30. Mr. Roach then asked what the British reaction would be to furnishing the U.S. with fingerprints for U.K. atomic energy personnel planning to visit the U.S. on classified business. The U.S. of course would be willing to furnish similar information for American atomic energy employees visiting the U.K, or Canada on classified business. Sir Archibald Rowlands indicated that the individual concerned would have to comply if the U.S. made it a requirement for classified visits to the U.S.. If he refused, he would not be admitted to the U.S, Mr. Gray agreed with this position but pointed out that he saw no reason why the Canadians would want anything more than notification of "Q" clearance on American personnel visiting Canada. 31. Backlog of Cases. Dr. Glennan pointed out that the British were embarking upon their new program of background investigations for atomic energy personnel with a backlog of 11,000 employees and asked whether they had any Idea as to the time it would take to complete action on these cases. Sir Archibald Rowlands indicated that he could do no more, at this time, than to say that the backlog would be cleared up as Soon as possible. EVALUATION 32. In answer to a question by Dr. Glennan, Sir Archibald Rowlands stated that evaluators were to be provided with a written checklist of the criteria to be applied to all cases of investigation. This document was not, however, to be published - 18 - 000175 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information S E C R E T as it had been in the U.S. The U.S. would be provided with a copy of the U.K. criteria. 33. Sir Archibald Rowlands said that in the case of a new applicants who filled in the security questionnaire there was no appeal if the Ministry of Supply decided to reject their application on security grounds. In the case of existing employees, an appeal procedure existed. It consisted in the following stages:- a. The security authorities develop a prima facie case showing that there is evidence of unreliability about a given employee. He is promptly removed from the work he is doing and sent on paid leave. b. He is informed that there is a prime facie case against him. He is given an opportunity to make representations in his own interest. c. The case then goes forward for Ministerial consideration and determination as to whether the individual should be retained in the secret • employment or not. d. The individual has a right of appeal from the Ministerial decision if it is adverse to a board of three independent advisers. These advisers consider the case and submit their findings to the Minister. e. The Minister than makes a final determination. f. If this is adverse, the individual is either sent to some other non-secret job or, if no suitable employment can be found for him, he is dismissed. 19 000176 J �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a {'information S E C R E T SECOND SESSION 4:00 p.m., Thursday, May 15, 1952 1. The. Conference reconvened at 4:00 p.m., with Dr. Glennan in the chair. 2. Dr, Glennan reported that there had been a thorough discussion of the points on the agenda by the members- of the Working Group and that a reasonable understanding had been reached on most of these points. There were still one or two typos of Information which v/ere not provided by the U.K. forms but it appeared that it would be possible to develop the necessary information as part of the investigation. He, accordingly, proposed that the understanding reached by the Working Group should be reduced to writing and considered at the next session of the Conference, on Friday at 11:00 a.m. i< 3. As a closing remark, Dr. Glennan pointed out that the members of the Conference should keep in mind that the Conference was attempting to evaluate a system v/hich was very new. Accordingly, Sir Archibald Rowlands had suggested that American or Canadian representatives would be welcome to visit the U.K. later on to see how the program.was working out. As far as the U.S.. was concerned, Mr. Glennan said they would be glad to provide facilities for reciprocal visits of this sort. 4. Members of the Conference agreed to the Minutes of the ' First Session. 5. The meeting then adjourned until 11:00 a.m. on Friday. 20 000177 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a {'information S E C R E T THIRD SESSION 11:00 a.m., Friday, May 16, 1952 1. Dr. Glennan stated that a summary report (distributed at the meeting) had been prepared by the working group for discussion by the full conference and that detailed minutes would be available for review after the meeting. The working group recommended acceptance of this report as an official record of the conference. Dr. Glennan hoped that the report, as and if approved by the conference, would lead to further discussion when the delegations had reported to their respective Governments. 2. Dr. Glennan pointed out that the fourth paragraph was intended by the British delegation to place responsibility for providing fingerprints as a prerequisite to classified visits upon the individuals concerned rather than upon the governments. He also emphasized that this paragraph was not intended to be an indication that the U.S. v/ould necessarily decide to make fingerprints a prerequisite but was merely an expression of a possible future course of action. quire agreement within He felt that such an action would re- the executive branch before implementation. 3. The conference then accepted the report of the working group. 4. The Heads of Delegations in closing expressed their pleasure at the cooperation and mutual good will shown at the conference. - 21 - SECEET 000178 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a {'information ;ORET S E C R E T 5- Dr. Glennan said that there was insufficient experience with the working of the new British clearance procedure on which to base a considered judgment of its adequacy. The AEC would not, therefore, be able at the present time to certify in a general way that British security standards were adequate to safeguard restricted data of U.S. origin. However, from what the U.K. representatives had said at these meetings he thought that there were good grounds for hoping that when there had been further opportunity to see the system at work on a larger scale, the AEC v/ould feel able to certify U.K. standards as adequate. - 22 -__ ;CEET 000179 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a {'information S E C R E T APPENDIX "A" SUMMARY OF REPORT OF TRIPARTITE SECURITY CONFERENCE WORKING PARTY May 15-16, 1952 - Washington, D.C, 1. The Working Party discussed the U.S., Canadian and U.K. Security Questionnaires. It was noted that the U.S. and Canadian Questionnaires developed essentially the same information. The U.K. Questionnaire, however, omitted some items which the U.K. delegation stated would be covered adequately by their new procedure in other ways. But there remained three items which called for special consideration in the U.K* Questionnaire. These were: a. Listing of former spouses and close relations, other than parents and present spouse. b. Listing of all organizations, other than religious or labor, to v/hich the applicant might belong.. c. Fingerprinting. 2. With regard to the first tv/o of these items, these questions would be covered by suitable instructions issued to the investigator early in the process of investigation. 3. With regard to fingerprinting the U.K. Delegation pointed out that fingerprints at this time would be of little immediate value to the atomic energy project owing to the lack of fingerprint records on such a comprehensive pattern as existed in the U.S. Moreoever, to introduce fingerprinting to the United Kingdom on lines comparable with the U.S. system would require legislation. - 23 - Appendix "A" 000180 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - -^m Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a {'information CEEf S E C R E T 4. The U.K. Delegation indicated that if the U.S. so requested, it should be a prerequisite for visits by individuals to discuss classified atomic energy matters that their fingerprints should be provided. This arrangement would of course be reciprocal. 24 Appendix "A1 ICRET 000181 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a /'information UNCLASSIFIED "r>» •' • APPENDIX "B • DRAFT FOR USE IN •..t CASE OF INQUIRY •-Representatives of the United States, United Kingdom and Canada are meeting in Washington on May 15 and l6 for the purpose of discussing security standards and procedures applicable to the protection of information jointly held by the atomic energy programs of the three countries. This meeting is a continuation of talks, which were held In London last year and Is being held under the auspices of the Combined Policy Committee, the organization responsible for directing Anglo-American-Canadian cooperation in the atomic energy field. The British delegation will be headed by Sir Archibald Rowlands, Permanent Secretary of State, Ministry of Supply; the Canadian by Dr. C. J. Mackenzie, Atomic Energy Control Board, and the United States group by Dr. T. Keith Glennan, y "• ' ' United States Atomic Energy Commission member. - 25 - "•n'l Appendix "B 000182 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur faeces a {'information OFFICIAL USE ©NLY OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPENDIX n C" TRIPARTITE SECURITY CONFERENCE May 15-15", 1952 ' AGENDA !• Welcoming Remarks - T. Keith Glennan 2. Review of Significant Developments In the Atomic Energy Security Programs Since July 1951. (Respective Heads of Delegations.) Following this discussion the. representatives will resolve into a working group and will explore the following items: 3. (a) The Security Questionnaire (b) The Background Investigation; Procedure and Report (c) The Evaluation 4. Report to the Conference by the Working Group 5. Closing Remarks - 26 - A p p e n d i x "C" OFFICIAL USE OMLY 000183 J � Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDNW02184 Title A name given to the resource Report to the Combined Policy Committee Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 9/25/1952 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "United Kingdom-United States-Canada - Security arrangements re." RG25-A-3-b, vol. 5956, 50219-AB-40, part 1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Atomic energy, tripartite cooperation Description An account of the resource Report on the Tripartite Conference on Atomic Energy Security Standards Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en