https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/4e238ea09a0a962c497bac07a77ff48f.pdf ba9c857cf0469f95720fb9311464435e PDF Text Text s.15(1) - Defence Copy /tf> 3. v4Mrr e. ™t~Y&<a°<. ^ y~ G.G.Crean/ja TOP 3SCKBT— September 2, 1949 // - y -/ Mmommmi FOR MR. amEr: Review of the Canadian Intelligence Organization Attached are a series of memoranda dealing with the following main topics in th© Intelligence fields Signals Intelligence Th.e Work of th© Joint Intelligence Committee Th© Work of th® Defence _ Liaison Division - memorandura dated Jun© 8 prepared for Mr. Raid Appendix "A" Appendix ffB" Appendix "C M - (Paragraph* 1 and 2 list th© security and intelllgenoe work currently undertaken In the Division) I thought it desirable to go into som© detail, partly for th© record* and partly to give you the necessary background upon which to judge my recommendations. I also thought it would be useful to review In this covering memorandum th© saliant problems at present Involved In th© conduct of intelligence in Canada, with particular reference to th© role of this Department* 2. This Department has two main interests In taking a leading rol© in intelligenceJ (a) The formation of sound foreign policy depends In large measure upon the amount and accuracy of intelligence available to th© Department. lot only do we require Intelligence from our missions abroad, but also all intelligence which can be made available from secret sources. In addition w© require strategic intelligence, which can be provided by the J.I.G, While strategic considerations may often be discarded on grounds, it is important to take them into aooount in forming foreign policy. Prior to the creation of J.I.C. in Its present form, a mechanism for producing collated strategic Intelligence did net exist in Ottawa. Increasing use should be mad® of the J.I.C, for this purpose. (b) The conduct of our relations with Intelllgenoe agencies in other countries, must be k@pt in line with government policy toward the governments of those countries. It Is thus desirable for External Affairs officers to take a leading part In negotiations and talks with such authorities. In th© past four years, this has been important in working out relations with 3. The greatest effort of the past 4 years has been placed on th© organization of Intelllgenoe In Canada. is have, first, been concerned with the creation of an efficient and workable structure and, secondly, w ith the training of staffs In the various Intelligence Directorates so that w© would be in a position to produce finished Intelligence appreciations for the Chiefs of Staff. In addit!on> a a n « /£• rpr\ L/000925 �s.15(1) - Defence efforts have been mad© to improve our relations with the In the intelligence field, with a view to procuring the maximum intelligence information both from th© Services and from the organizations. 4. As early as 1945 it became clear that this Department would have to take a leading role In the organization of Intelligence In Canada not only to fulfill our own interests, but to ensure the effective working of the intelligence organisation as a whole.. In the spring of 1946 th© Department provided the Chairman for the newly created Communications Research Committee and in May, 1946, on the Invitation of the Chiefs of Staff we took over the Chairmanship of the ^oint Intelligence Committee. At about th© same time, at our suggestion, the Security Panel was formed, under th© Chairmanship of th© Secretary to the Cabinet, to deal with interdepartmental security problems. The Panel has proved valuable in dealing with a variety of lnter-departmental security problems, which could scarcely have been dealt with at all without the creation of some such organization. It haa fully justified the time apent by the Department in assisting in Its development. As, however, there are no outstanding problems regarding the organisation and functions of the Panel, I have not thought it necessary to review its work here* 5. Since that tim© th© Chairman has been able, with the particular assistance of the Director of %litary Intelligence and, since January, of the Director of the Joint Intelligence bureau, to reach a point where the J.I.C. Is capable of producing useful intelligence appreciations for th© Chiefs of Staff and for this Department. 6. Insofar as progress has been mad© in both th© J.I.C. and In signals intelligence, a good deal has • depended on the extent to which the Chairman of both the G.R.G. and the J.I.C. has been able to function as a working Chairman of both Committees. In both Appendices "A" and "B" I have examined the question in som© detail. The amount of time which the Chairman has had to devote to intelligence since the formation of the Defence Liaison Division in lovember, 1948, has been much too,limited to permit him to discharge his functions effectively. While I agree with Mr. R@id's memorandum of June 27(with which you concurred) concerning th© desirability of maintaining the Defence Liaison Division, it is nonetheless true to say that th© added res-* ponsibllitles placed on th© Chairman of the two Important Intelligence Committees has seriously affected the development of intelligence work. While he has spent a good deal of time persuading and assisting other intelligence organisations to get on their feet, these developments have not been parallelled by a corresponding development in the Department. While these might b© arguments for reverting to the old system of maintaining an intelllgenoe section In the Undersecretary's Office, I am of the opinion that a satisfactory solution ©an be found to the Intelligence problem without sacrificing the advantages of having intelllgenoe dealt with in the same Division as defence matters generally, 7. In this connection it might be worth tracing the history of the arrangements for intelligence and security in the Department sine© I entered the Department in 1945. V000926 �s.15(1) - Defence 8. Until July, 194© Mr, Glaaebrook and 1 were concerned with intelligence and security, the latter Including all security questions relating to the Department in Ottawa and Its Missions abroad, as well as matters of interest to us in the field of counter-espionage. From July, 1946 until August, 1947 I functioned without assistance on those matters in the Department, with the exception that the Chairmanship of J.I.C, was held first by Mr. RIddell, then by Mr. Johnson and, finally, by myself since October, 1948, As both Mr. Riddell and Mr. Johnson were mainly engaged in the work of their respective Divisions, they were unable to devote much time to the formulation and direction of general Intelligence policy. 9. In August, 1947 Mr. Teakles was appointed as th© Joint Intelligence Staff member for the Department. This did littl© to relieve th© pressure of work as he was engaged almost full time on th© work of th© J.I.S. In June, 1948, Mr. George was added to the Intelligence Section of the Department. The appointment did little, however, to relieve the pressure of work as I spent the summer of 1948 in tha United Kingdom and Europe and shortly after my return the Defence Liaison Division was formed. While I have been able since then to devote a certain amount of time to policy questions dealing with Intelligence, the pressure of work on the Intelligence Section as such has been altered littl© by the addition of Mr. George. 10. As a result, we have had little time to deal with anything but policy questions in the Department and, Branch of the R.C.M.P., the staff is totally Inadequate to ensure that it is used to full advantage in the Department. 11. W© should also bear In mind that N«#.C. and D.R.B., largely at our instigation and in our interests, have spent several million dollars on signals intelligence. In addition, th© Services and the R.C.M.P. have spent considerable sums In expanding their intelligence branches. I think, therefore. It Is time that the Department started to reap the benefit from the government Investment, quite apart from discharging our responsibilities for policy and coordination with respect to the J.I.C. and signals intelligence • 12. In organizing Intelligence In the Department. we have to deal with three central problemsj(a) What might be called (b) Counter-espionage and generally. (o) problems. Intelligence Arrangements for and d i r e c t i o n of s e c u r i t y measures, which are necessary f o r the p r o t e c t i o n of th© Department In Ottawa, and of our Missions abroad. All these problems ar© r e l a t e d to each o t h e r , although work connected with physical security I s only I n d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to the o t h e r s . (i y\ 000927 �s.15(1) - Defence s.15(1) -Security — 4 — Problems 13. As you know, the ^apartment has never favoured the formation of a secret service in the sense of forming a section of th© Department, or a separate service* to undertake espionage operations abroad. On the other hand, w e have always been anxious to do what w© could within the limits of the Departmental organisation to assist intelligence operations, so long as w® did not become involved in espionage as such. Thus, for example, we have been prepared to instruct certain of our JSuropean Missions to handle Soviet defectors, who may present themselves at our Legations or Embassies. The scheme has been worked out in consultation with and apart from the initial contact with our Missions, defectors are handed over to Tor subsequent interrogation and possible use as W© have also agreed to accept as immigrants a few defectors each year. More recently, we have agreed for planning purposes that certain sections of might be evacuated to Canada In the event of an emergency. 14. On the other hand, w© have always stopped short of more extensive assistance in the form of permitting our Missions abroad to act as officers. 15. In return for what might be called our administrative assistance, has been prepared to send us a good deal of political intelllgenoe from eecret sources, some of which is extremely valuable, e.g», a Soviet defector who was evacuated through our Mission in Berlin. 16. In order to continue our liaison with ©van on th© present limited basis, w© require officers who understand something of th© techniques of espionage, as well as those who are capable of evaluating th© political intelligence w® receive from sources* In addition, we must provide staff to evaluate signals intelligence» 1© should, therefore, build up in Ottawa an intelllgenoe section capable of dealing with these aspects of th© same problem. As In the signals Intelligence field, the extent t© which will cooperate with us depends on th© degree of confidence they have In the departmental officers, with whom they deal. The cooperation we have at the present time with both and has flowed frora personal contact with their officers and does not arise from any prior agreement or discussion with the C.R.O. or Foreign Office, although no doubt the cooperation between agencies and ourselves tes&fJtfr thelr general blessing. We do not, however, normally discuss our intelligence arrangements with through d iplomatic channels, Our arrangements with agencies have been treated similarly. Counter-espionage and generally intelligence 17. Our requirements in this field overlap with those I have considered under th© heading of problems. As long ago as September, 1947, Mr* Pearson agreed that w© required an officer in the Department who would concern himself with keeping abreast of general development® In th© counter-espionage field. While the Special Branch, R.C.M.P, y~~^ { /000928 �s.15(1) - Defence s.15(1) -Security - 5 - is responsible for case work and following developments generally, we found a serious gap in our organisation when the case broke. As you know, we had to draw on the services of Mr, Dwyer, and In the early stages 1 gather we leaned pretty heavily on advice. Had we employed such an officer at that time, he could have given political advice on the conduct of the case, advice which an officer of the Department cannot normally give without a thorough understanding of the techniques of espionage and counter-espionage* 18. The undertaking of such work 'in the Department would not overlap with the police, but would materially assist them, by ensuring that they receive from the Department sueh political Information as they require in the course of their work. If, for example, we finally establish the product "will need to be read in th© Department, and the appropriate f©ed»baok of polltloal information given to thei Special Branch. There are, of course, other problems in which close liaison with the R.G.l.P. Is required, a liaison which ean only be developed satisfactorily if w© have officers in the Department conversant with espionage and c"ounter«*espionage problems. 19. In addition, knowledge In these matters Is valuable In screening our own employees in the Department, in dealing with s ©curity apseote of visa cases, policy respecting the screening of immigrants abroad, censorship, the study of Communist parties, and general security ques-tions of an inter^departmental nature arising from our membership on the Security Panel. It Is also Important for the Department to have available an experienced officer to t ak@ part in security policy discussions with other governments. In this connection you will recall the part taken by the Department In th© Commonwealth Security Conference, which was held in London last October during the Prime Ministers' Conference, 20. Since %*. Pearson's original agreement to the above requirements, we have not h@en able to find the right man for th© job. As an alternative It was suggested that an F.S.O. should be trained in over a period of a year, so that he wOuld gain the necessary experience in case work. Mothlng, however, has been done about it. 21. There »iay coiae a time, when we have met the requirements I have outlined above, when consideration should b© given to undertaking, probably in cooperation with some limited form of intelligence operations abroad. ®e are, however, still at the training stage, which should be completed for th© reasons I have already outlined, before w© consider any more ambitious scheme. At the same time w© should bear In mind that w© should be In a very bad way indeed, should an emergency arise, and find that w© have no officers trained in intelligence, at a time when demands would Inevitably b@ made on us. 22. The collation and dissemination of material from secret sources could b© dealt with in one of two ways in tho DepartmentJ ... * 6 (AY �s.15(1) - Defence "* 6 " (a) We might follow the Foreign Of fie© system of disseminating all material received by th© Intelligence Section to th© geographical desks. Under this system no collation would be done centrally. On th© other hand, w 1th th© rapid movement of personnel from on© Division to another, I could not recommend such a system, as the security risks would b© too great. (b) We might follow th© State Department system of collating intelllgenoe from secret sources centrally a s in the Office of Research and Inteliigenee. For security reasons,. I would favour this system. While It means that the ' Intelligence Section will have to keep Informed of general developments in order to collate information from secret sources adequately, staff trained in interpreting th© material Is essential at this stage of th© development of our departmental organization. In addition, th© system permits us to assure and other sources that the material receives a v&rj limited circulation, an important point in our relations with intelllgenoe organizations in 23. There is an additional problem, which is now of some Importance, and which is concerned with political intelligence from mm- secret sources for us© in J.I.C. appreciations and for day-to-day business with the other intelligence directorates. Any factual or historical data is normally supplied by th© Foreign Office Research Department in th© U.K., and by th© Offie0 of Research and Intelligence in the U.S. Both these organizations are staffed fey noncareer officials. We have no equivalent of these organizations, and my recommendations for the staffing of our Intelligence Section only provide for dealing with secret source material, as well as making available officers with expert knowledge in the secret inteliigenee fields. This means that there is a serious gap In the departmental organisation sine© the Divisions are not ©quipped to do research work, either for political Intelligence or for eneral d epartmental purposes. There is, I believe, a good eal to be said against setting up a special research division of the Department, although this problem Is only Indirectly connected with Inteliigenee problems. On the other hand, if no such organisation is ever to 'be set up, w© shall require th© geographical divisions to organise themselves on different lines If they ar© to keep pac® with the growth and increasing us© of the J.I.C. The Divisions are now primarily concerned, and only ©quipped to deal, with day-today problems. If one requires a review, say, of Soviet policy for the past two years, they neither have th© staff, nor are their records so organized, as to be able to produce such studies quickly. Squally, it is difficult to obtain rapidly information on Important political personalities, due mainly, I think, to the limited way In which their records ar© organised, f 24. This problem arises, not only In th© Intelligence field, but also in respect to supplying material for purposes of political propaganda. In the latter case, I think it would be folly to permit special records to be built up for this limited purpose only, without regard to the intelllgenoe and research needs of th© Department. I do not wish to make any specific recommendations here, which • © • • i S7 ^000930 �s.15(1) - Defence - 7 - would lead m© to th© examination of a problem relating to the organization of th© Department as a whole.. I do recommend, however, that an officer be appointed to examine th© problem before w© reach th© stage of being faced with it In an acute form. In this regard, I understand Mr. Rogers has already submitted a memorandum dealing with the problem from th© point of view of psychological warfare. His study should be related to the overall requirements of the Department. 25. arrangements for security measures In the Department and at our Mission© abroad You may recall that I was originally brought Into the Department as a security officer mainly with a view to tightening up security both In the' Department In Ottawa and at our Missions abroad. A great deal of work remains to be done in-this field, although w e have made som© progress in supplying adequate safes*, arranging for tests for listening devices in our vulnerable missions abroad, and in the appointment of a limited number of R.C.M.P. for security duties to our missions In Europe. Despite this limited progress, security arrangements, both in Ottawa and at a large nxmiber of our Missions abroad, ar© seriously inadequate. Owing to pressure of work In other fields, I have not yet submitted my report on the state of security at our Missions behind the Iron Curtain following my tour last summer. Whan you receive it, I think you will agree that w© have not :tac.kl«d th© heart of th® problem, but have only taken a series of half-measures, which will be satisfactory only if w© ar© lucky. Th© difficulty in this field is that you never know whether you hav© been lucky or not* We shall soon have to. fae® up to th© costs of security or accept th© risks, a course I could nob recommend If w© wish to retain the full confidence of our colleagues, from whom so much of our political intelligence comas. 26. Much of the work involved is of a semi-technical character. We need the best advice on the types of safes, locks, burglar alarms, etc* which w© should use. We need advice on the risks Involved in telephone systems, microphones, etc. Th© R.C.M.P. hav© been of great assistance to us, but w© must supply our own officers to supervise and carry out th© measures w© decide to adopt. To supervise security measures 1-n the Department and at Missions abroad i» now a full time job for at least on© officer, which cannot b© done adequately by an F.S.O. working part time. The introductionand enforcement of the proposed new security measures in Ottawa alone should b© th© responsibility of one officer, who can go about the.building checking on how the system works. 27. I do not think that the security officer need b© an F.S.O. II© could b© equally well an Administrative Officer, 1 am not sur© whether he should be attached to th© Defence Liaison Division, but be would in any eese have to take broad policy direction from it, as the Division contains th© officers dealing; with security intelllganee. 28. Implementation of recommendations concerning departmental organization I attach a copy of the original chart for the establishment of the Defence Liaison Division, which sets out th© requirements inter alia for the Intelligence Section. Mr. MacKay will be submitting separately to Mr. (j[JJ,y000931 �s.15(1) - Defence aMoran a revised chart dealing with th© establishment of th© Division as a whole. You will note that this provided for an Assistant Head of Division who would be Chairman of th© Communications Research Committee and the representative of th© Department on the Security Panel. In view of the requirements I have already outlined to conduct the work of the J.I.C. and the Communications Research Gommittee, I think it Is essential to appoint without delay an Assistant *i©ad of Division to be responsible for all intelllgenoe matters. Should the Head of Division b© absent, I can see no objection to the Assistant acting as Head of Division so long as such periods ar© not prolonged. I suggest that h© should b© not lowar than F.S.Q. Or ad© 3 and preferably F.S.O. Grade 4. 29. While I reoognia© that a degree of permanency is necessary for th© Chairmanship of the Communi oat Ions Research Committee, I-think a four-year term for the Chairman is sufficient to supply tha necessary continuity as the advice and experience of the Director of the Communications Branch will always b© available. 30. I would recommend that the Hoad of Division should retain the Chairmanship of the J.I.C, mainly because it is Important to keep the work of that Committee In step with related defeno© problems with which th© Hoad of Division will normally deal. So far as continuity In tho Chairmanship of J.I.G. is concerned, there is some merit In having a change in Chairmanship ©very three or four years In order to ensure th© Introduction of new ideas into th© work and direction of the Committee, I'h© changeover in the Chairmanship of J.I.C. is easier than that of th© C.R.C. sine© Its work is more .closely related to the everyday work of th© Department. 31. I have gone over the names of possible Assistant Heads of Division who might in my view conduct our Intelligence responsibilities adequately. I have tried to bear in mind that it is not every officer in the Department who would have the appropriate mental approach to w ork of this kind and that however Intelligent an officer may be In other respects, h© may be totally Inadequate for this type of work, I am putting forward th© following names In my own order of preference: Mr. Ralph. Collins Mr. J. it, Starnes Mr, George Kidd 32. As you know, Mr, .Collins has done a certain amount of 31glnt work already ash© was associated with Mr. In addition, I think he is th© type of person who would gain th© confidence of the Senior Committee. 33. While Mr. Starnes is perhaps young, he has the right typs of mental approach to intelllgenoe'work and saw a good deal of the policy questions at the time he was working directly for Mr. Pearson. 34. While Mr, &ldd has, I think, little experience in this field, I believe he is th© type of person who would learn quickly and gain th© confidence of those with whom he Is acquired to work, 35. 1 have for the moment selected these names without regard to their availability* • •»»y Y\ <000932 �s.15(1) - Defence - 9 » 36. So far as the Intelligence Section itself Is concerned, I would recommend that only three officers, in addition to ths Assistant head of Division (.Intelligence), are for th© moment required. These are as shown on th© original chart, I would recommend that the officer in charge of countor-espionage work should b© not less than an F.3,0.3. For th© other two posts, J'VS.O.'s a or 3 would be adequate. Ho officer who has not been In the Department some time should be posted to this typs of work* 37. For the present I would recommend that Mr. Teakles, tha present J.I.S. member, should be switched with Mr. Goorge and that Mr. Louis Rogers, on joining- the Division, should work with Mr. Teakles on th© collation of Intelligence for the us© of- the Department. 1 doubt, however, whether Mr, Rogers has either th© Interest or th© right type of approach for this type of work and unless the decision to post him to the Division Is irrevocable, I think consideration might be given to the posting of another officer in his place, Hon© of the other officers in the Division, with the possible exception of Mr. Tow©, who Is employed on other Important duties, would be suitable. Mo special training In Intelligence is required for the Departmental member of J.I.S. 3.8, As a long-term project, I would recommend, however,, that we undertake as soon as possible th© training of two officers' to deal with what I have called : problems and counter-espionage. I have com© to the conclusion that it Is © I ther difficult or Impossible to train In the Department officers for this work unless they have had some previous experience. The only alternative, therefore, is to undertake a programme of training. has offered us vacancies on their short courses and I would recommend that two officers be sent to the next course. whenever it begin®. I under stand that they last for two or three months. On their return they would then be in a position to r ©Hev© the officers in the Inteliigenee Section when they ar© due for their next postings. 33. A» a longer term project, two officers should b© selected now for training lasting approximately a year in both and with tha Special Branch of the R.C.M.P. If they were sent to at the beginning of the year we would then have mors carefully and more fully trained officers who oould take th© places of those who had only taken th© short course. One of the latter might also .receive som© extra training with a view to taking over In • du© course as Assistant Head of th© Division. 40. The following ar© a number of officers who, it seems to m©, might be usefully trained for Intelligence xvork In the Department, either on th© short courses I hav® suggested or on the longer term project. 0, T. J. Q, J, P. H, V. Beaudry L. Carter D, Foot© K, Grande G, II, Halstead a. Hooton R. Horn© J. **ld <1, P. Kldd a. R. Kllgour K. D. Mollwraith V, C, Moore H. B, 0. Robinson a, H, Southam J. II. Warren ....10 VS000933 �s.15(1) - Defence - 10 While both Mr. T@akles and Mr, George would be excellent candidates for further work In intelligence, I have assumed that they would not be available for such an extended period. 41. I have also recommended the appointment of an Administrative Officer In tha Department as Security Officer. Unless this Is don© outside of the proposed establishment for th© Defono© Liaison Division, an additional officer should ba added to th© chart. I have two possibilities in mind for such an officer. You might consider the appointment of Corporal Vaucher, who Is in charge of security in the Paris Embassy, for the appointment, providing the R.C.M.P. concur. Corporal Vaucher has done an excellent job In Paris and would certainly deal admirably with physical security problems both In our Missions abroad and in Ottawa. Alternatively, if w© are seeking an officer already In the Department, * would be Inclined to recommend Mr. Lavlgne, who is at present responsible for security matters in Washington, as well as conducting his normal consular duties. On the whola I would favour my first suggestion. 42. I have one other somewhat novel recommendation to make In order to strengthen indirectly the Intelligence Section. You may recall that shortly after the case Mr, Dwyer, th© representative in discussed with Mr. Robertson the possibility of his employment in the Department. While I understand that. Mr. Robertson was favourable to such a scheme, there was at that time no way administratively of employing as a Foreign Service Officer a British Officer who had not completed the required period of residence In Canada. On his last visit to Canada Mr, Dwyer again raised the possibility of his working for the Canadian Government. In discussing th® matter with Mr. Glazebrook we reached th© tentative conclusion that Mr. Dwyer might be Initially employed in the Communications Branch as th© Head of th© Reporting Section. This Section, as you know, deals with the collation of the intelligence product from Signals intelligence sources and, while it lias don© good work on a limited basis, w© have never yet found the right man to head the Section, Mr. Drake would be quite agreeable to the appointment of Mr. Dwyer to this position. 43. in making such an appointment, Mr. Glaaebrook and I have in mind that Mr. Dwyer could at th© same time be • an adviser to this Department on espionage and counterespionage generally from a political point of vlow. in due course w© had In mind that it might be possible to appoint Mr. Dwyer In some capacity to th© Department or perhaps hold him on th© strength of the Communications Branch while actually working here. Both of us feel that we should not miss an opportunity of employing on© of the ablest officers in this field, particularly as It would take a long time to train an officer up to Mr. Dwyer's level of intelligence knowledge and experience. If we are to adopt this scheme w© would, of course, have to clear the matter with Dr. Mackenzie and with the R.O.M.P, I think you will agree that Mr, Dwyer would fill th© position of an expert In counterespionage which w© have wanted to fill for a long time. * • * « XX. (a. \J """000934 �11 - Summary of Recommendations Arising out B H of Appendices A and "B" > Appendix "A" (i) Appointment of &r. Drake as a full.member of Communications Research Committee. (•Ii) Review of th© Naval commitment for manning 40 positions at intercept stations. (iii) Creation of a Research and Development Section in the Communications Branch, (iv) Appointment of Head of the Research and Development Section as permanent chairman of the Technical Steering Group, th© latter to be mad© directly responsible to th© C.R. Committee* (v) In connection with (Hi), to take over Leltrlm Wireless Station to be manned by civil operators under the Director of C.B. (vl) Th© Chairman, C.R.C, should be freed by departmental reorganisation to devote more time to th© G,R* C, (vii) The Chairman to bs mad© personally responsible to th© Senior Committee for tha overall co-ordination and direction of both signals intelligence and "Y M . Appendix "&" (I) Th© Chairman of J,I.e. to attend Chiefs of Staff Committee at regular intervals, together with the entire J.I.C. where necessary. (ii) Completion of th© arrangements for a member of the Department to sit on the Joint Planning Committee and to receive all relevant planning papers, (ill) Th© Commissioner, R.C.M.P,, should be Invited to Chiefs of Staff Committee meetings for Items of interest to him, (iv) fhe Chairman, J.I.C, should b© freed by departmental reorganisation to devote th® tlm© required to give vigorous direction to bhe J.I.G. (v) Th© appointment of a full-time secretary to J.I.C. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDDF00001 Title A name given to the resource Review of the Canadian Intelligence Organization, Memorandum for Mr. Heeney from G. G. Crean. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 02-Sep-49 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Global Affairs Canada (GAC) Special Registry File 11-4-1, Part 1. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Government of Canada Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Cold War Defectors Description An account of the resource Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en