https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/ec6a8ab51976bd5f18a4ec571e7c5e71.pdf b3c00accfadca6302878f2e938881778 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information SECRET CANADIAN JIC 4 2 3 / 1 ( 6 l ) 20 October,-. 1 9 6 1 7 COPY NOo 2 SINO-SOVIET ECONOMIC AND MILITARY RELATIONS OBJECT lo The object of this paper is to review the main factors affecting the Sino-Soviet economic and military relations;, to discuss their recent developments and to consider, in general terms their possible evolution-,, CONCLUSIONS 2o Although there is little evidence that Sino-Soviet economic relations have improved greatly since the fall of 1960s trade continues on a reduced scale and there is a large measure of business as usualo In the longer terms the Chinese government will probably seek to reduce its dependence on Sino-Soviet trade. 3o The limited nature of Soviet aid and the little that has been said about its together with the restriction of assistance in particular fields such as the defence industries^ suggest that there are continuing strainso Nevertheless8 China is apparently to receive some Soviet aid in the coming years0 40 There is evidence that economic means are becoming increasingly important in the struggle for power between the two countries and that this trend will continue0 This is now particularly apparent within the Sino-Soviet Bloc but may become increasingly evident throughout the underdeveloped world„ 3* Although China is still receiving some military equipment and limited technical aid from the Soviet Union^ this assistance has declined substantially during the past few years„ Soviet military missions to China have been reduced or withdrawn arid the Soviet Union is not providing the mere sophisticated weapons and equipments nor the technological assistance which would enable Cosisiunist China to meet its,. owii requirements» 001866 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 2 - SECRET 6» There is evidence that the Soviet Union has assisted Gommunist China in establishing a guided missile test range„ Although the full extent-of Soviet assistance is not.known it seems clear that there has been at least sufficient assistance to enable Communist China to launch their own guided missile research and development programme. DISCUSSION Sino-Soviet Economic Relations Introduction 7* Economic affairs,, perhaps more than any other aspect of SinoSoviet relations;, reveal the dimensions of the political dispute between the two countries0 The price which China is prepared to pay for its waywardnesss the severity of the sanctions which the Soviet Union is willing to impose and the extent to which considerations of economic gain overcome ideological qualms all provide some gauge of the limits of the quarrel0 Sino-Soviet trades Soviet economic aid to China and Sino-Soviet economic aid to both communist and noncommunist underdeveloped countries are the three categories of economic activity which are most illuminating in this connection„ Sino-Soviet Trade 8„ It may be that in a later perspective 1959 will appear as a peak year in Sino-Soviet economic cooperation and as a turning point in economic relations between the two countries0 In that year China, by overtaking East Germany,, became the leading trading partner of the Soviet Uniono It registered an increase of 50 per cent in imports of Soviet origin and increased its exports to the Soviet Union by 23 per cento Sino-Soviet trade totalled 2 billion dollars or about 30 per cent of all China's foreign trade„ The Soviet Union shipped 600 million dollars in machinery alone to China and the year as a whole seemed to presage increasingly close Sino-Soviet economic cooperation,, This being sos the subsequent deterioration and loosening of economic ties has been all the more strikingo 9, Chinese trade with the Soviet Union declined in i960 and will almost certainly decline further in 196l0 The reasons for this trend were initially economic but its continuation has some political overtoneso By the middle of i960 it was apparent that the Chinese were encountering serious difficulties in agriculture8 as well as in some sectors of industrys and that they were unable to meet their export commitments to the Soviet Union0 Since the Soviet Union was apparently unwilling,, for either political or economic reasons9to meet even part Of China's requirements for grain the Chinese Government was obliged to make large purchases from non-communist countries and to assign a large part of its future export earnings to this purpose„ Also; it is now known .that the Chinese accumulated a deficit of 320 million dollars in their balance of payments with the Soviet Uiad.on? and as a result of the disruption in the Chinese economy8 they were obliged to delay the conclusion of a new Sino-Soviet trade protocol for 1961 until April of that yearo 10o This agreement, which was finally signed on 7 April after protracted negotiations9 demonstrated the extent of the changes which had taken place since 1959* The Soviet Union recognised Chinese difficulties by allowing the Chinese Government to make interest-free 001867 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information ' - 3 - ' SECRET repayment of its deficit over a period of five years beginning ih 1962 and by agreeing to deliver to China 500,000 tons of sugar on interest-free, deferred payment terms, but the list of commodities to be exchanged was curtailed and no indication was given of the expected level of trade0 In particular, there was no mention of the export of Chinese foodstuffs or raw cotton to '-fche Soviet Union, although in previous years these had made up over 25 percent of Chinese exports. 11. The terms of the agreement, although practical and businesslike, hardly suggested a major Soviet effort to assist its largest ally. The funding of the Chinese short-term debt may well have been, from the Soviet point of view, a virtue growing out of necessity; the loan of sugar was paltry by comparison with both Chinese overall economic requirements and Soviet aid to other nations. Nevertheless, the agreement at least showed a determination to continue orderly business, albeit on a reduced scale, and at most it suggested that there had been some improvement in Sino-Soviet relations.since the fall of 1960= Although Sino-Soviet trade will probably decline in 1961, both absolutely and in relation to China*s trade with the West, the value of maintaining this tie apparently outweighed the bitter ideological issues which separate the two countries politically0 While some overtones of these deeper Issues were apparent in the communique announcing the agreement, its general objective was clearly a large measure of business as usual0 12 . It is doubtful, however, whether even a major improvement in the Chinese economic situation or a political rapprochement would result in a reversion to previous patterns of trade„ The Chinese, who have shown some reluctance in the past to commit themselves to excessive dependence- on Soviet economic support, are likely to take their recent experiences as evidence of the wisdom of a.more balanced distribution of their trade0 If they are able to expand their exports to the non-communist world and to obtain suitable credit facilities, they will probably seek to lessen their dependence on the Bloc, and particularly the Soviet Union, in the longer term*. Soviet Economic Aid to China 13. While the agreement on trade showed a determination to retain some degree of business as usual, later Sino-Soviet agreements on aid and technical cooperation have revealed with equal clarity the rather narrow limits within which Sino-Soviet economic ties must develop,, The communiques describing the agreements on economic, scientific and technical cooperation, which were signed in Moscow on 19 June 196l, were curt and contained no hint of new large-scale economic aid for China0 While it is possible that such aid was in fact promised, the absence of the usual propaganda fanfare makes this unlikely and it seems that Soviet assistance to China is to be restricted to the deferment of short-term debt and the loan of sugar as set out in the trade agreement, and to some unspecified assistance in the development of industryc This is all the more remarkable in the light of a later announcement of a Soviet credit of 50Q million dollars to last Germany and the major Soviet contribution to Indian development plans0 It is nevertheless consonant with the history of Soviet aid to China over : the past decade 0 14 Up to the end of i960 Soviet economic credits and grants to China had amounted to only about 500 million dollars, a surprisingly small amount in view of the size and importance of the ©ountryc Only Czechoslovakia, Albania and North Vietnam in the communist world have received less economic aid than this from Moscow, and even neutralist India has received more0 Although the Chinese have frequently boasted of their ability to pay their own way, there have been some indications o o o / *v 001868 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information :> - 4 - SECRET that they feel that they have been neglected and that they particularly resent the granting of large Soviet credits to influential, neutralist countries such as India0 They also are probably annoyed by the restriction of Soviet aid in particular fields; so far, for example, they have received no modern jet bombers •. Y,t;-, ;; although these have been provided to Indonesia.;. ... -. sx y-o XL , . "! „ The precise balance between this kind of resentment and the desire to avoid too great a dependence on the Soviet Union is difficult to determine and is doubtless confused in the minds of the Chinese, la any event, the greater part of Soviet support to the Chinese industrial development programme has been in the form of machinery provided in the course of normal trade or technical assistance in the establishment of new plants. 13 . It is now apparent that even this limited programme has been further curtailed and that since the middle of I960 the Soviet Union has withdrawn most of its technicians from China0 This move seems to have been.an expression of the bitterness of the Sino-Soviet dispute rather.than a serious attempt to bring the Chinese to heelo There is no evidence to suggest that the Soviet Government applied any other economic sanctions and, although it has not been generous in assisting the. Ghinese, it has not taken maximum advantage of the weak Chinese economic position to attempt to force major concessions. There is,evidence that the general attitude of the Chinese toward Soviet technicians was resented and this, together with alleged Chinese attempts to Indoctrinate Soviet personnel with unorthodox ideas, was used at least in part as a pretext for their withdrawal<> Nevertheless, it also seems clear that this action was partly intended to demonstrate to the Chinese that they oould not simultaneously enjoy Soviet assistance and the right to challenge the leadership of Moscow„ But the Soviet Government, perhaps with the example of Yugoslavia in mind, seems to have decided against full-scale, economic sanctions * The impact of the removal of the technicians on the Chinese economy has so far not been serious enough to overcome Ghinese xenophobia and to oblige the Ghinese government to seek technical assistance elsewhere„ 16, In spite of its limited nature however the Soviet economic aid programme in China remains of considerable importance to the Chinese economy and it will probably continue to be an important element ia Sino-Soviet relations„ In particular, assistance with the provision of a broad industrial base, with the Soviet Union supplying both skilled technical personnel and some complete plants has been an essential ingredient in China's progress over the last ten years. . While not massive, this aid has been apportioned to industries such as steel, electric power and petroleum, all vital to the country's economic progress and incapable of making such strides as they have on their own» To maintain that progress without a loss of momentum, continued aid would be necessary for some years. In addition to these bases of her industry, China is still dependent on external sources for certain types of electronic equipment, for machine tools and for components and technological assistance in her defence industries,, The duration of this dependence is difficult to predict and would vary with different industries, but it is probable that in some critical areas„ where loss of aid would cause a severe drag on economic progress, it will continue beyond 1965 and in some less crucial sectors for an even longer period „ The current retrenchment in Ghinese industrial planning is largely related to domestic economic difficulties but its severity and duration will depend in part upon the continuation of Soviet aid. The present signs are that this aid will continue but that it may well be seriously curtailedo 001869 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 5 - SECRET Sino-Soviet Aid to the Underdeveloped Countries 17. It is clear that the Soviet Union and China are struggling for influence in the Asian communist satellites and, more recently, even in Eastern Burope and it is in these areas that their conflict is most strikingo The scale of Soviet aid to North Korea, North Vietnam and Mongolia seems quite out of proportion to the intrinsic importance of these countries and can only be related to a Soviet determination to maintain its influence in these areas. In spite of its economic difficulties China has made a major effort to match Soviet aid in scale, presumably in order to place these states in a Chinese sphere of influenceo Even more striking, China has directly challenged Moscow's leadership In Surope by extending an economic development credit valued at 125 million dollars to Albania„ In view of its alignment with China in the Sino-Soviet dispute, Albania apparently prefers to receive the majority of its aid from China thus making itself less vulnerable to Soviet pressureo The announcement of this agreement in the middle of the recent Sino-Soviet talks on economic relations can hardly have disposed the Soviet Government more favourably toward the idea of providing more aid to China0 That this kind of competition persists in spite of the disparity in the economic power of the two countries suggests the possibility of even more bitter economic struggle as the Chinese economy grows. 18'. With regard to the non-communist world, there is a basic difference of view between the Soviet and Ghinese regimes as to the best method of acquiring power in underdeveloped countries and this has led to some Ghinese criticism of Soviet foreign aid policies0 The Ghinese believe that in these-areas indigenous communists must be encouraged to seize power at the earliest possible stage. The russians assume that evolution towards communism is virtually inevitable but, since this trend could be prejudiced by precipitate Sino-Soviet action, the political takeover by communists in particular countries can and should be delayed until it follows in the natural course of events after a long period of economic and political-penetration,, Thus for the Chinese the important thing is aid to indigenous communists and the encouragement of revolt, but for the Russians massive and prolonged aid, even to bourgeois regimes, is the essential feature of communist strategy. 15. o Such divergent concepts might be expected to produce vastly different foreign aid programmes but in fact the differences are more apparent than real0 Generally speaking the Chinese have been more active in the support of dissident groups such as the UPC in Cameroun and the FLN in Algeria, but the Soviet Union has also shown its readiness to take forceful and effective action to support Communist dissidents where there has been a prospect of important gains, as for example in Laos. Conversely, the Chinese have extended large credits to neutralist countries such as Burma and to extremely reactionary regimes such as that in Yemen. 20. In view of this general similarity between the two aid programmes it seems reasonable to conclude that Chinese objections to Soviet aid activities are closely related to specific Chinese interests and objectives, rather than to any doctrinaire concept of the nature of world revolution. Specifically, Chinese criticisms of Soviet aid to India and the UAR probably arise from the fact that these neutralist countries are the major competitors of the Chinese for influence in the Afro-Asian world, although Ghinese disapproval may well be reinforced by a consciousness of her own needs. This view receives some support from China's policy of distributing more than half her foreign aid in neighbouring Asian countries where the nature of the governments does not seem to have been an important consideration in the Ghinese mind. 001870 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 6- SECRET 21,.. Thus, although the different Soviet and Chinese concepts of communist strategy in the non-communist world produce some differences in the emphasis and balance of their aid programmes, there does not seem to be an important conflict between the two states in this field. As long as neither country pushes its disagreement to the point of obstructing the other's efforts the two aid programmes will tend to complement one another. ,.. 22. nevertheless, the fundamentally different concepts of the two regimes lead to some difference in practice, for example in Iraq and Latin America. This will remain a potential source of friction and as China becomes economically more powerful the opportunities for serious conflict and competition will increase. 23o Any assessment of the current state of Sino-Soviet economic relations must in the light of the foregoing, attempt the following: .(a'V to distinguish between the effects of current Chinese economic difficulties and the effects of Sino-Soviet political and ideological differences; (to) to balance the influence of China's need for assistance and its resentment of Soviet parsimony against its desire for economic and political independence; and (c) to weigh the wish of the Soviet Government not to disrupt the alliance completely against the temptation it must feel to use its economic power to bring the Chinese into line. 24-c Obviously j, all these factors and others interact in a very complex way so that any forecast has a larger than usual element of guesswork* The Chinese dilemna is to continue rapid economic progress without accepting Moscow's political hegemony. The Soviet Union must attempt to retain its leadership and exercise its power without splitting the alliance. In this situation there is a measure of economic interdependence which neither state is anxious to disavow but for the ifflmediate future it seems that Sino-Soviet economic cooperation warrants no more enthusiastic description than "satisfactory", even from the Communists themselves. ' SINO-SOVIET MILITARY RELATIONS 2j»CT Sino-Soviet military cooperation which, up to 1956, had been one of the principal features of Sino-Soviet collaboration began to deteriorate in 1957 when the Russians are thought to have revealed to the Chinese their intention not go give them nuclear weapons. Although Soviet support in the military field has enabled China to become the leading indigenous power in Asia the Chinese probably feel that their prestige and" their, bargaining power vis-fe-vis the United States could be greatly increased if more Soviet assistance were forthcoming. China, although able to produce some of its military equipment, continues to be heavily dependent of the Soviet Union as a source of modern arms and equipment, particularly nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. In the nuclear field tfchis dependence will probably last for another three or four years. J Ke.v»l Forces 2£ 0 Soviet Naval assistance which had declined since 1956, was further reduced during the past year. This decline may in fact be the reason for the substantial reduction noted in Chinese naval 001871 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information i - 7 - SECR1T shipbuilding. However, it is believed the Chinese Government; is now capable of continuing conventional naval building programmes unassisted. Ground Forces 27. General - Historically the Soviet Union has played a significant part in the development of the Chinese Armya The Chinese Communist Party's first big opportunity to build its strength came in 1923, when Nationalist leader Sun Yat-sen, after his appeals for aid from the West had been rejected accepted Soviet offers of military aid. 28. In return for this Soviet aid, the Nationalists agreed to cooperate with the Ghinese Communist Partyo The Communists actively participated in the programme of the new Whampoa Military Academy, whieh, upon Soviet recommendation, had been established in 1924 to furnish the Nationalist Army with a modern and politically indoctrinated officer corps. Many members of the PLA?s present high command were either faculty members or students at Whampoa during *the years 1924 to 1926. Through their connections with the Academy, the Communists were able to influence the assignments of Gommunist and pro-Communist graduates and thereby build up strong cadres of Gommunist officers in selected Nationalist units, commanded by sympathetic generals. 290 Following a break between the Nationalists and the Communists in 1927, Chinese Nationalist Army units, commanded by Communist and proCommunist officers, revolted at Nanchang on 1 August 1927. This revolt marked the birth of.the Chinese Communist Army. This army fought against the Nationalists in a desperate struggle to survive in the years 1927 to 1936, gained strength during the years of war with Japan from 1937 to 1945, and in the renewed civil war from 1946 to 1949 was able to drive the Nationalists from the mainland of China. 30. Soviet Military Missions - In February 1950 the Chinese Communists entered into a 30-year "Treaty of Freindship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance" with the Soviet.Union, and by early March major contingents of the Soviet advisory missions began arriving in China. 31 „ The first ten years of alliance between China and Russia have brought considerable advantages to both countries. Russian support in the military field has enabled China to become the leading power in Asia with the largest army in the world. However, there have been some recent indications that Soviet military missions to China are being reduced or withdrawn. These changes can be attributed in part to the friction which exists between the two countries and also to the fact that the Soviet missions may have for the time being fulfilled their functions. 32, Soviet Arms for China - As a result of experience in Korea-which revealed logistical and tactical weaknesses of the Chinese "human sea" type of warfare, with advisory missions and modern equipment from the Soviet Union, the Communists undertook a new programme, which reached its climax in 1953 and which had as its objective the formation of a well-equipped and a well-balanced army of younger, more physically fit and &ore politically reliable men. As the CCA had been essentially an infantry force, the new organization called for the creation of support elements such as artillery„ armoured, engineer^ and signal units. These new organizations were formed around cadres provided by existing units •ad the Soviet Union furnished some of the instructors and most of the equipment from Second World War stocks. 0 a e./.O 001872 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 8 - SBCRET 33. Up to now the bulk of the weapons of the CCA has been of Soviet manufacture but the Chinese are now manufacturing an increasing quantity and variety of weapons themselveso They now make their^'own small arms, mortars, artillery, tanks and trucks0 In the past,older Soviet designs have been copied and it seems probable that ghinese arkeuaent production will ultimately standardize on Soviet designed weaponSo Some~of the * newer more complex conventional weapons continue to be imported fro* the USSR, but others, notably the T54 tank and the 152mm gun are now being produced in Chinese factories which previously manufactured older weapons. 34. In spite of some ideological differences between Chinese and Russian Communists, it is likely that in the event of a war with the West/if the Chinese require additional conventional weapons these would be supplied from existing obsolescent or obsolete Soviet stocks. Such Chinese weapon requirements would therefore not constitute a significant drain on current Soviet armament production» Air Forces 35. The Ghinese Gommunist Air Force (CCAF) and the Ghinese Communist Naval Air Force (CCNAF) consist of about 2,700 aircraft, all of Russian design. With the exception of some FRESCO jet fighters produced in China, these aircraft were manufactured in the USSR. The two forces, originally organized and trained by the USSR,, reached their present strength about 1958o Since that time, except for the possible delivery of a few FARMSR jet fighters, there has been no apparent significant assistance from the Soviet Union and the strength of the CCAF and CCNAF has remained more or less static. 36. The following brief review of the various aircraft types on the CCAF and CCNAF order of battle illustrates their obsolescence and provides an indication of trends in military relations between China and the USSR. .••••-. Y 37 . Medium Bombers •= China received approximately 20 BULL piston engine medium bombers in 1952/1953. Although this aircraft is now obsolete and was completely phased out of SAF service as a!bomber over two years ago, it is still in operational use with the CCAF. To date, there has been no evidence that the Ghinese have acquired a replacement for the worn-out BULLSo There has been speculation for some time that deliveries of BADGER jet medium bombers are impending or that their manufacture under licence by China is contemplated, however, neither possibility has materialized. Considering China's internal requirements, as well as her aspirations in South last Asia and her desire for recognition as a major power, it is logical to assume that she would wish to build up a strategic striking force and that BADGBRs would be the choice for this purpose. The non-appearance of these aircraft in China, particularly in view of the recent deliveries to Indonesia, can be considered as either a result of, or as one of the causes of strained relations between the USSR and China. 3&7 Light Bombers » The strength of the Chinese light bomber force, some 450 BSAGLSs and 150 BATs, has remained static for several years. Large numbers of obsolescent BSAGLSs have become surplus to Soviet requirements as a result of the wholesale disbandment of the Tactical and •ival Aviation strike units, and it is obvious that the Russians could readily have replaced China's piston engine BATs and increased her jet light bomber force. 0 0 0 / 7 001873 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information » - 9 - SECRET }9, a With respect to modernization, the Soviets are not re-equipping with newer light bombers, and it is, assumed that their role is being taken over by short: and medium rangis surface-to-surface missiles . There is no indication that such weapons are or soon will be supplied to China. The Chinese are left, therefore, with a light 'bomber striking force which is rapidly becoming obsolete. It can be assumed that they are by no means eontent with this situation0 40 „, Fighters *Y The Chinese have produced about 500 FRSSGOs and are currently believed to be producing the more modern FARMER, Russian assistance in ^fchis field has been reasonably liberal, as the SAF itself is still equipped with large numbers of fighters inferior to the FARMSR. However, here again, the USSR has agreed to supply Indonesia with new generation fighters, whereas there is as yet no indication that such aircraft will be supplied to China. Furthermore, the Chinese have not been provided with surface-to-air defensive missiles, although such weapons are extensively deployed in the USSRo 41. Other aspects of CCAF and CCNAF operations which may tthrow; some light on Sino-Soviet military relations include radar equipment, training of ai-a? and ground crews, and aircraft product!on<> 42, Radar - Although some of the newer, but not the newest, Soviet radars are being deployed in the more important areas of China, many . of the EW/GCI radars used by the Chinese air surveillance and warning units are very old and inefficient. However, Soviet military assistance in this field is likely to continue and to improve as China is an ' essential link in the Soviet air defence system,, 4 2Training - CCAF and CCNAF air and ground training schools were originally formed and subsequently organized to a standard pattern with the assistance of Russian instructors,,' Russians were also attached to operational units for instructional duties. During the last few years, tlje aumber of Russian instructors in the schools and at operational bases has gradually declined to the point where the Chinese are now considered fully capable of conducting their own training programme. 44 0 Aircraft Production •= China's aircraft industry has developed to the point where it is believed that a number of factories are capable of producing air frames, engines and components„ Substantial technological and material assistance continues to be provided by the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Sast Germany. Although the Chinese aircraft industry is known to produce FRSSGOs and AR=2s under licence and to be fulfilling 25% of the country's peacetime requirements, Soviet assistance has not involved the most modern developments and it will be many years before China is capable of producing on her own aircraft comparable to those in the West or in the USSR* ^5, It is apparent that the Russians are not providing ,the offensive aireraft which the Chinese probably believe they require. However, they have been fairly generous in the air defence field, though considerably less so than would be expected in a contiguous ©ountry which could be of value as a buffer. Reluctance to provide the Chinese with either the most modern aircraft and missiles or the technological assistance to produ©e them herself suggests that the USSR is attempting to control any possible Ghinese aggressive tendencies in-South Sast Asia by restricting her military air potential. 001874 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information » - 10 - SECRET Unclear Energy 4$. I n the nuclear energy field, although we know that the Russians have given some assistance to the Ghinese we do not know the full extent and nature of the Sino-Soviet nuclear information exchange. The Russians have helped the Chinese since 1950 to mine their uranium resources. They are thought to have provided plans for a uranium metal plant and have given-the Ghinese a 10 MW reactor as well as 25 Mev cyclotron.. Soviet nuclear scientists have lectured in China and approximately 400 Chinese students attended nuclear courses in Soviet universities. Soviet technology helped the Ghinese establish a basic industry which will provide some of the raw materials for a nuclear programme, e.g., stainless steel, and uranium in different forms. We believe that China is how in a position to pursue her nuclear energy programme alome.. I n a few years, possibly three or four s China will probably have detonated nuclear' devices'and entered upon the production of nuclear weapons. Her'complete dependence on tho Soviet Union in this vital area will have been considerably reduced * 9:Hjid ed._Mi g_s i ies • . A7x There are many indicators that the Soviet Union has assisted Communist. China in establishing a guided missile test range... The rangehead is believed to be located in north central China near . .ChuangvCheng Tze with the range itself extending westward for at ,'•'.Y least 4.50 n.ms. and possibly as m u c h as 1000 n.ms. Firings, have taken 7;. ..place on this-range, possibly in early I960. The missiles which were. probably surface-to-surface, are reported to'have been fired to ranges of about 100 n.ms. Those fired to date have probably been Soviet supplied "Scuds", estimated to have a maximum range, of 150 n.ms. • 48tt Although the full extent of Soviet assistance is not known it seems clear that there has been at least sufficient assistance to enable Communist China to launch their own guided missile research and development programme. It is improbable that the Soviet Union will supply missiles of any greater range than "Scud" to Communist China and it w i l l probably be some 3 or 4 years before they will be able to develop their o w n . 001875 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIM01383 Title A name given to the resource CDIM01383 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "JIC [Joint Intelligence Committee] - Soviet Union," RG25-A-3-b-2, Vol. 7904, File 50028-B-40, Part 11, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Subject The topic of the resource Intelligence Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/staging/CanadaDeclassifieditems-November2020/CDIM01383.pdf Language A language of the resource en