https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/a4b811cc106f44d570f5e809c2287699.pdf b33b96df05283f97d0434cda932f00c3 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information IN REP.LY -· QUOTE CSC:,5.11 TD:l .............................. No ................ 11\epartment of jl}ational11\tfenct CHIEFS CANADA ADDIIIEH PLEASE . TOP.SF£RET OF STAFF COMMITTEE RIIPLY TO. SECRETARY CHIIEl'S 01' STAFF COMMITTEE, OTTAWA. 28 May 1957 Chairman, Chiefs of Staff CAS CGS CNS CDRB Concept of Military Operations Following the Initial Phase of Hostilities Attached for your consideration is a paper on '.the above mentioned subject, prepared by the Joint Planning Committee in accordance with the direction of the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff. 1. 2. any This paper is in draft recommendations. form and does not include 3. This paper will be considered as Item I.I of the meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee to be held at 0930 on Thursday - 30 May 1957. (F.,W.T. Lucas) Captain, RON Secretary FWTL/6"'6756/mck c.c. Deputy Minister Secretary to the Cabinet Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Coordinator Joint Staff. .. 000354 �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - DRAFT TOPSECRET CSC5=ll Z7 May 57 A .REPORT TOTHE CHIEFSOF STAFFCOMMITTEE BI THE JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE INTRODUGTION lo ·The Chiefs of Staff Committee· in a paper entitled Under Which Mobilization preparation "Conditions Might Take Pla:ce" provided guidance for the of service mobilization plans to meet present military commi.tmentsduring the initial phase of a major waro In order to plan for the subsequent operations of' a major war it is now necessary for the Chiefs of Staff to decide on the part the Canadian forces should plq during this period and consequently' the form the forces should take to meet this requiremento 2o It has been agreed in the Chiefs of Staff Committee that the conditions which might exist j,n Canada during the initial general war may and war. effort be summarized as a serious disruption for at least the period of the threat phase of a ot national life of attack and for a much longer period in areas destroyed or contaminatedo · The ca.uses of this disruption and additional conclusions drawn up by the Chiefs of Staff Committee to provide part of the basis for mobilization planning are attached at Appendix "AIVo .3o The Chairman,, Chiefs of Staff' bas therefore directed the Joint Planning Committee to prepare a study on the concept of military / ··"""'.···. .operations following the initial to be carried related phase of a major waro This study is out within present National Defence policy and is to be to our agreed equipnent policy so that the plans which follow will not interfere with our established priorities for the,·initial pha.seo ~, 4·0 The aim of this study is to recommend to the Chiefs of ~taff Committee what the Canadian concept of military during the period following 1j,heinitial operations should be .• phase of a major war up to the 000355 �i Document disclosed under the Access to tnfofination Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information I TOPSECRET = 2 = mid-1960sj) together with the role to be played by each of the services during this period and the general pattern of any reorganization of the forces required to carry out this roleo .GEIOAL CONSIDERATIONS 5o It is considered that the enemy0 s primar,- objectives war in pursuit of his war aims would be to neutralize portion of NATOsmain retaliatory scale attacks all, in a major or a major powero This would include large against North Americao The enemy can hope to achieve his aim only by a surprise attack and as the Soviets will have the initiative at the beginning of the war it is concluded that we will get little more than tactical warningj probably a warning of 2$3 hours received from the DEWlineo 60 It is very difficult to judge whe.nthe initial phase would end1 and.:'the subsequent phase begin$) howeveri, it is considered that the I I ini/tial I , phase would end when the enemy is incapable of delivering scale nuclear attackso The initial large .phase could last for days or weeks, and there will not be arr, abrupt change from the initial phase to the subsequent phase. 7. In tbe subsequent phase of operatioDE! we will be limited in our capacity to fight to the weapons remaining at the end of the initial phase. .Furthermore we cannot assume t.hat any productive capacity will be available for some considerable time~ ASSUMPTIONS So It is assumed thats §• The initial phase has not brought an end to hostilities and the will to bring the war to a successful still exists in NATO. We will still conclusion meet resistance in varying degrees from the forces of the USSRG .B• At the close of the intense nuclear exchange the NATO powers will have superiority in the ability to deliver nuclear attacks. 000356 �r----------------------------------------- Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act:_-] Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur racces ii /'information I .. CONCEPT OFMILITARY OPERATIONS FOLLOWING THEINITIALPHASE 9o Despite the heavy attrition of forces and the intense nuclear weapons during the initial phase the Soviets will still systems still availableo will have a small number of long-range aircraft will also have a substantial reduced operationso have The Soviets for sporadic raids and number·of submarines for sustained There will therefore for air defence and anti=submarine or in the use of them b.r the nuclear weapons and will only be limited numbers and types of delivery use but be a continuing requirement forces for the defence or Canada and the United Stateso Because of the intense Soviet use of nuclear weapons during 10. the initial phase 1 directed against targets in North Americap the i prima.ry' problem in Canada wil~ be Consequently it is considered that the maximummilitary can be made available survival and rehabilitation will be the first and rehabili~tion task and.p until ?~,,{,;--7) ~fJvC(·~ The situation probably be similar that survival ,, of survival has been accomplished ~.-J..:Ar:/4,,, ~-0~7' to 1.,v{;,I,!i:;::..,,l7 -r.,,J..-{ a.~ d. /, following the initial to that existing will not only have been subjected will likely -The battle ,,t;.;du-u --1µ1/ _ .,., ~,... ~___,,u d.-i forces in measures for the commenc~d,'-it w~ll not be possibl~ ~~M~-a.-e~v-i,ties,,,; 11. to assist of the country-. priority -,,,J~A &-~ will be required . I one or stttviv~o phase in Europe will in North America. However $\trope \ nuclear attack but it to an intense have been overrun to some extent by Soviet ground forces. The greatest effort rehabilitation will have to be devoted to the survival of the NATOcountries will have to be limited Soviet forcaso 9 and therefore military to the containment and liquidation The NATOpowers by the threat and operations of remaining or use of their superior nuclear power will endeavour to prevent Soviet advances and to force the capit~ation of the enem;r forceso take over certain that resistance Subsequently it may be necessary to areas of the ~SSR to establish is not reorganizedo forces would be required oontrol and to ensure l~ is not envisaged that large for these op.e;r_~tionsor that it would be necessary to occupy large areas of the USSRto ca:rry out this obj~ctiveo Canada might be called upon to assist and operations against in the rehabilitation remaining Soviet forceso of Europe 000357 �I Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information -4- TOP SF.CR.ET MARITIMEOPERATIONSIN THE SUBSEQ,UENT PHASE OF A GENERALVJARCOMMENCING IN--4"1flEMID~196o~s ~Mi3:l ROLE OF THE MARITIMEFORCE 12. (a) To destroy submarines in transit to their operational areas. Transit routes to North American waters are channelled through the Denmark Strait and Norwegian Sea making, an A/S barrier type deience in depth an effective forward defence against the ingress of soviet .submarines into the North At'lantic. (b) To control waters adjacent to North America by destroying submarines within firing range of North American targets. Canada-us maritime forces in blose co-operation will be required to deny this area to the enemy. CONCEPT lJ. A large proportion of soviet naval bases and mobile support facilities will be rendered inoperative following allied attacks. some submarines can be expected to be destroyed in port, in transit and in A/S op,erations. The remaining submarine force, although substantial, will be limited to the capability of the USSR to provide support. However, because there will be nuclear weapons available, the submarine force will continue initial phase operations in the subsequent phase, but at a reduced and gradually diminishing intensity. con.sequently, in the subsequent phase, allied maritime forces will have to continue to combat the Soviet submarine threat. OPERATIONS 14. The period of intense operations to be conducted by the Soviet submarine force in the initial phase is expected to commence about three weeks after the onset and to be approximately seven to eight weeks duration, continuing at a reduced operational intensity in the subsequent phase. To mee.t these threats, maritime fore es should be capable of:(a} Providing forces-in-being, combat ready, deployed so as to be able to deal with the submarine threat from the onset. (b) Maintaining intense operations for a minimum period of three months to defeat initial phase submarine operations and to be able to meet operational commitments in the subsequent phase. (c} Dispersed logistics and maritime minimum POL stock of 90 days. airfields with a (d) Provision of seagoing mobile logistics to increase chances of survival by dispersali and, more important, to increase the period that the fleet can maintain its greatest operational intensity. TOP SECRET os1>oeo 2 000358 �r Document disclilsed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information TO::PSECRET 14~ (e) Providing a seagoing mobile repair organization to operate from a safe haven or miner 1,ort. (f) Controlling operations thrcugh the establishment of maritime headquarters and adequate co.mmunications, located so as to ensure uninterrupted operation during both phases of the war. PATI'EHNOf FORCES 15. No change in the pattern of forces for the subsequent, phase is considered li,kely as the subsequent phase is expected to be a continuatioµ of the initial phase. Normal base facilities are not expected to be available after the initial exchange, so, as in 'the case of logi~tics, rerairs will have to be made at dispersed sites 9 making use of seagoing mobile repair units to maintain maximum operational intensity. RESERVES 16. A small number of naval and air reserves specifically trained and earmarked for a particular duty and located in areas where they would be employed in war, sould be able to report at the onset of the initial phase. It is unlikely that other Reserves could be employed in th_e RCN and RC.AF roles envisaged by this concept of operations in either phase, except in support of a civil defence and survival role. SHIPPING IN TEE SUBSEQ,UENT PHASE 17~ Shipping at sea will.be attacked as a secondary target priority in both phases. The direct protection of shipping, if it is necessary, would require Canadian maritime forces to operate at great distances from North American sources of support, adding emphasis to the need for mobile support to ensure our forces retain the enduranceD flexibility and mobility such operations demand. CONCLUSIONS 18. The concept of maritime operations and the role of' the RCN and RCA!!'in the subsequent phase will be a continuation of initial phas~ operations at a reduced intensity due to serious losses experienced on both sides in the initial phase. 19.- The types of RCN and RCAFmaritime forces ruitable for employment in the initial phase will also be suitable for the subsequent phase. Therefore 9 the provision of requiremerrts listed in paragraphd)above will apply to both the initial and subsequent phases in the pro\ution of a general war at sea, \ '4 TOP SECRET 000359 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • -6- TOP SECRET I Role of the Ground Forces 20•... , ....The roi.e of ~11~gro.und forces will ·'· . ' in the ~ubsequent phase be to: \ (a). Co,ntinue to conduct operations under SACEUR in Europe. (b) Assist civil authorities in ~µrvival operati9ns. (c) Continue to conduct any required direct defen-ee of Canada operations. 21. it Because of th~ many imponderables is difficult to determine of the division apart of reserve a.s su.ggested the division Initially the Regular progresses it will 1ri qanada with enemy lodgements. evacuated is acc9mplished i for employment in Europe where its warfare role to assista.qce 9f the Western European economy. to civil centres vary considerably ~ of is under way in Canad~, SACEUR's strategic authorities and maintenance facilities, facilities, etc. will include of vital food distribution Since the assistance in different normal transportation it w-ill"'i>e essential gradually the 8xcepti0n When this . such as transportation and since be met by ot: the Mill tia Army assistance communication a strategic from the Militia. can be released policing the by SACEUR. in the rehabilitation will reinforcements, vary between employment in conventional 23. now in Europe assistance and rehabilitation will first force Force with limited against reserve to the should be ~onsidered ovei- alf~entS defence of the balance most of the Army commitments will As mpbilization take support up to WE and provide balance 22. when any portio.q phase, could be sent to SACEUR. It may well be that, from some additional to bring it in_ the initial sections facilities to move troops Services services, required of the country will be disrupted, from one section of the ..../~ 000360 �,--------------------------------------~ Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en v~rtu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information -· 7 oou~try into to another by airo the subseque~t i~ controlling This assistance t~e return is difficult lodgements direct points, internment role at what period in the initial for defence against en~my to continue The requirement for other such ·as pr~tection of vital to RCN in Coast and Seaward Defen9e, will can is mobilizedo of Canada operations and POWoperations coptinue to postppne to meet the de·mands of civil in survival this T~e Army must be prepared It may be necessary in order to more as it commitment if required. assistance p~aseo to predict may disappearo defence above, by the Militia ppases the-r~quiremen~ to meet this to assist of' the econ<;>myapd populati9n be take~ over pro~ressiv~ly ~r subsequent be reqµired However, as indicated ! It may extend well phase as the Army will normal conditionso 24. TOP SECRET = and in the sµbsequent certain of these .tasks authorities for assistance operations. Conclusions It .. is concluded _.,. . (~) that: Ground forces for employment both within Canada and as SACEUR 's strategic ' . reserve must be airportableo (b) The force in Europe in peacetime maintained up to establishmept should have with (c} The militia stro~g should healthy Mobilization (d} • its initial related although in ~hole i to its to provide role a in War. the mobilization such mobilization may be or in parto oper~tions its in survival ability to conduct both. at home and abroad and at the same time prepare authorities and reinforcementso Plans must include The Army must maintain -~~al strength be reorganized force of the militia delayed it mµst be to assist civil. operations. 000361 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act -. Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur /'acces ii l'informat10n i I V -8- TOP SECRE'.t .A IR ,:pe Role of the RCAF of the stated The role of the RCA]', in t~e light 26. of military operations (a) in the subsequent phase, will To continue to maintain tull alert against {b) until be: the air defence system on the threat North .~.erica of enemy air operations no longer exists. To continue to :maintain the ROAFcomponent of our maritime force at !118Ximum operational until (c) concept the enemy maritime threat To continue air operations operational control no longer exists. in Europe under the ' of 4A~Af• (d) To maintain in immediate readiness, transport military capability the maximumair to meet the demands of the capability service.a and the civil power for airlift from Canada to Europe, and within Canada, in support of military {e) operations and national survival. With the resources and i:ersonnel not directly 'in,' or in logistic support of, the above tasks -to assist in tasks related to national engaged survival for as long as required •. General :Pattern of Re-Organization 27. differ A_sthe role appreciably organi~ation of the ROAF in the subsequent phase will from that of the initial of forces is required. peacetime pattern of the RCAF phase, no ~jor The following not re- changes in the of the RC.µ'would take place in the initial phase, and would continue into the subsequent phase: (a) The role of the RCA,ftraining change at the General ~ert to that of prqviding trained organization from that personnel the ROAFopera tiona.l commands as first would .. of training to augment priority, and 000362 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information -9- to assisting priority. in national tm-vival as second Tl:\aining might be i'esum.e~in the subse- quent phase:dependent on con~tions the requirement for additional (b) At some stage in the initial • the RC~ tactical in Canada and trained persopnel. or subsequent phase, • • I component which supports the MSF will either have completed its task or the requirement for MSFoperations will have disappeared. At this time, the l"Ole of the RCAF tactical ' component will : change to reinforcement of RCAFoperational and assistance to the national commands s1ll'Viva1 effort. Conclusions 28. It is concluded that: (a) As RCAFair defence, maritime and transport operations are expe~ted to continue indei'in:f:.tely in the subsequent phase, every effort should be made in peacetime to ensure that logistic support (especially ment) could continue beyond the presen~ POLand armaplanned 30 day period despite the breakdown in transportation and sources of supply which might be expected from en~ (b) action. To ensure the maximumutilization and resources assigned to national concept of' operations, the national of the ROAF forces survival., the and the task assignments 0£ survival organization should be clearly defined as soon as possibleo 000363 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act .Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information e 11 APPENDIX•A. to csc 5.;.u dated_.'ZJ May"·57 THECONDITio:NS IN CANADA DURING THEFIRST PHASE The following is an extract 1. of the conclusion contained in JPC paper CSC 5-11-9 dated 14 Nov 56 which deals with the conditions under which m'obi1batiOn of''.Canada!s armed fOl"ceswouldhave to take place at the outbreak of a general war between the eastern and western blocs·in· the early 1960's. -· This paper was approved by Chiefs of Staff Committee at their 600th Meeting held on 7/8 Nov 56. CONCLUSIONS It is concluded that the conditions in Canada on the outbreak 2. of a general war in the early 19601 s may be summarized as a serious aisruption of national threat life and war effort for at least the period of the or:a~taek arur for a much..longer.-period:·1n: areas destroyed or contaminated. and fall•out This would be caused by evacuation, damage, loss of life, in the areas in which the majority of Canada's population armed forces are located, and and will include: J!:o Delays and difficulties in obtaining government d.irection, approval, and policy for war measures. !?• Overloading and breakdown of communication facilities in and through evacuated and/or attacked cities areas affecting forces, and air defence, the commandof the armed control of the populace, and the coordination of the country's var efforto So Overloading and b~akdovn of transportation \ \ and through evacuatea and/or attacked cities thus reducing local transportation, TOPSECRET facilities in and areas transcontinental rail ··••0002 · 000364 �r Document disclosed under the Access to Info Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur /'acces ii l'infor ' ... - TOPSECRET - 2 - capacity th~ough Edmonton, Winnipeg and Montreal, and ma.king uncertain the use of teminal facilities in ports such as Vancouver, Montl'8al, StoJ ohn, NoBo, and Halifaxo ,g. Fear, confusion, panic, apathy, and ev~n anarchy in the populationo ~• Casualties, coupled with ,!2, .!h and ,2 above, resulting loss of centralized control by civil l,o Competitive rlemands between civil municipal, provincial armed forces, and federal and military in authorities. defence authorities, governments and the for manpower, transportation, equipment, food and acconnnodationo g. Breakdown of nonnal distribution of fuel, channels for the supply food and materielo !!• Unpredictable circumstances requiring departures from formulated plans • .1• The probable abandonment of large areas, that have been contaminated, for long periods of time. ADDITIONAL CONCLUSIONS DRAWN UP BYTHECHIEFSOF STAFFCOMMITTEE TOPROVIDE PARTOF THEBASISFOR MOBILIZATIONPLANNING .§• Conditions likely to pertain in the first few days of a _, war in the early 1960ffs, and perhaps for the first ·--t phase, will require the Services to devote the maximumresources that· can be made available to assist !!• The battle of survival will and, until be the first additional and priority task survival has been accomplished and rehabilitation commenced, it will not be possible military in survival. activities, to carry out additional such as the raisii;1g and training forces and the provision of adnitional equipmento TOPSECRET of stores i r/ �i ---------------~---- ..... ..------,---~ ... 3 ... ~o The conditions visualized earmarked reinforcing :J . in this paper may precluae the of our M=dayforces to allow for 100%and round=the-clock manningo Therefore the forces re= quired for urgent defence activities first phase, must be raised, immediately available trained on an alert ties connnencedo TOPSEqRET on M-day~ and for the 9 equipped. and be being declared or hostili= � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Nuclear Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Concept of Operations / 28 MAY 1957 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1957-05-28 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00109 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Draft report to the Chiefs of Staff Committee by the Joint Planning Committee, 28 May 1957, Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 3.