https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/19e0a6a48b5af7f795605bc2413fd3f0.pdf 232f2de6b68c57815df7d1cf2c00cd58 PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • TOP SECRET csc 2156..1. (JIC) 20 May59 DRAFT Sec JPC CSCJ/57 - croncept of Operations 1. I.refer to your memorandumCSC5-11-9{.JPC) of 5 Dec 58 requesting JIC comments upon the above paper. You will recall that on 30 Dec 58 I replied on behalf of the JlC' suggesting tbat comments should be postponed until the new Canadian-United States Agreed Estimate of the Threat to North America had been completed. 2. This estimate {CANUS-59) has now been finally reconsidered CSCJ/57. upon certain approved, and the JIC has; The JIC considers that it is only competent to comment of the assumptions, paras 6-9 of the paper itself and Appendix "A" • .Commentson these points are attached. Secretary JIC· 000192 __j �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information .• - TOP SECRET R A F T JIC COMMENTS ONCERTAIN SECTl'ONS OF CSCJ/57 A. Para 5c If the period under consideration remains the "early 1960's" (say 1960 to 1964)11 the assumption that ICBMswill not be in use operationally by either side requires revisiono We estimate that a few ICBMsmay be available for operational use by the Soviet planners as early as 196011 or possibly 1959, and that this number will grow fairly years. We suggest that this assumption be deleted of the intelligence 11 rapidly in the following now that ICBMsform part background. B. Paras 7-8 We suggest that these paragraphs be deleted and that the following paragraphs (from CANUS-59)., which provide a more balanced statement» be inserted.a 117. An attack against North America involving Soviet military forces can be expected only in a general war, or~ an attempted surprise attack that would initiate general war. The Soviet leaders might decide to initiate general war during the progress of a limited war, during a period of intense intenmational crisis or in a period of comparative international calm, although the last possibility is considered the least likely., The Soviet leaders do not, in our view9 intend deliberately to initiate general war; they wish 9 on the contrary 9 to avoid serious risk of such ware Despite the acquisition of long-range missiles capable of striking the United States 11 the Soviets probably believe that the scale of damage they would suffer in a general nuclear war would be too risky to accepto (This judgment presumes, among other things, the continued maintenance and improvement of Allied armed strength and the absence of an unforeseen Soviet technological breakthrough of major military significance)o The Soviet leaders would almost certainly not decide to precipitate general war unless they concluded that conceding a position to the West would sooner ar later threaten the survival of their re·gimee They would undoubtedly initiate a general war, however, if they were convinced that the United states was irrevocably committed to the early launching of an all-out nuclear attack against the USSR.. · ooo/2 000193 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - 2 ·- TOPSECRET "8. In planning for general war, the Soviet leaders must relate t;Jtrategically desirable objectives to what is tactically feasible with forces at their disposal. They probably wu1d adopt as far as possible the following general course of action for the Blocs .&• .is the highest priority, initially to employ its strengths to attempt the destruction or neutralization of Allied forces capable of causing immediate and significant damage to Bloc warmaking strengths • .b• To employ its strengths, as appropriate, to destroy, neutralize, or reduce the effectiveness of other Allied forces-in-being by ground, air and naval action. S• To employ its strengths, as appropriate, to destroy, neutralize or capture Allied war-supportillg strengths. ,g. To employ the st,rengths considered necessary to ensure the continued security of the USSR. of the Bloc and especially "SA~ In planning for an attack against the North American continent, the Soviets undoubtedly wou1d seek to maximize their chance of securing surprise, consistent with the necessary weight of attack. The Soviet planners would probably select as objectives for attack the following (not necessarily listed in order of selection for attack)& .. Nuclear retaliatory forces and facilities • . .b• _tlontrol centers from which direction is provided for governmental actions, continental defense and retaliatory offensive operations. S• .Population, transportation centers. "1 and communication C:. .Ai.ppendix"A". We suggest that these paragraphs be deleted and that the following be inserted. This text is extracted from the conclusions of CANUS-59and certfd.n paragraphs (7 and/ or 8, for example) can be omitted if the period covered by the revised CSCl/57 is restricted. "Aircraft, .Missile and Submarine Threats 1959-196Q 1. The USSRwould place chief reliance for attacks against North America upon aircraft carrying nuclear weapons supplemented by such ballistic missiles and guided missile submatines as are available. Guided missile submarines would probably be employed to launch missiles with nuclear warheads against targets along the coast, with the Atlantic seaboard receiving the bulk of the attack. Ballistic missiles would probably be directed against area targets in North America• •••/3 000194 �i Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information I - - .'.3- TOPSJOORET 2.·· .It is believed that the whole of the available he~vy bomber force plus a substantial portion of the medium bomber force of Long-RangeAviation would be employed against North American targetse As an example for pl.anni.Ilgpurposes, it is estimated that· (disregarding combat attrition), the USSRin mid-1959 could put a combination of about 500 heavy and mediumbombers over continental North America in an attack designed to 6mh1eve surprisee A majority of the strike airorad't launched would necessarily be on one-vtay missions • .'.3. Soviet employment of a small surprise bomber force {sneak attack) to be followed by the ma.in body of the assau1t 1s regarded as a possible but relatively unlikely course of etion., .Should a sneak attack be detected enroute or fail to any significant degree• Horth American defenses would be at a :max1mmnalert for combatting additional Sovi~t forces and attacks on the USSRby retaliatory forces would be set in motion. 4. ·While some heavy bomber operations could be mounted from home bases, the USSRwould have to use forward bases in 1£ola, the Central Arctic, Chukotski and Kamchatkafor mounting most initial mediumand heavy bomber attacks against North America., Additional bases elsewhere in the Bloc oould be used after the initial considerations of surprise no longer existed. ;. The USSRwould probably plan to the maximum extent possible to penetrate all Allied radar screens simultaneously, and to take the greatest advantage of the hours of darkness for their missions against North America. Someportion of the aircraft would probably be employed as specialified ECMaircraft for diversion and decoy pm-poses. 60 The USSRhas developed an operational pattern with their submarine force which would allow them to have stationed off the East and West coast ot North America• a small number of submarines for use in the initial stages of general war. It is estimated that this force would be composed primarily of such guided missile submarines as are available, used in conjunction with aircraft in the initial attack. There would also be at sea. in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans a significant number of torpedo attack submarines capable of attacking naval forces and shipping soon after the initial attack is accomplished. 1963-19667. By mid~l963, Soviet guided missile capabilities will probably allow extensive reliance on ICBM' s for the delivery of nuclear weapons against North American targets. Mannedbombers wou1d be available in sizeable numbers, however, and would probably be employed to supplement missile attacks. Submarine-launched missiles will probably contribute significantly to the Soviet assault. In spite eu/4 000195 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • - 4 - TOP SECm of reliability and accuracy factors, the inherent speed of delivery and relative invulnerability of the ICBMrender this weapon a most like4' choice for initiating the assault on North Americao· The timing of the diversified operations like4' to make up the Soviet attack would pose extreme4' complex problems to Soviet planners. To the extent practicable, however, they probab~ would plan to place ICBM1s on target at the time Soviet bombers were penetrating AJ.J.ied radar screens. By such tactics, the USSRwould hope to pin down Allied defenses and retaliatory forces until the bomber attack arrived over its targets. Soviet bombers would probably utilize air-to-surface missiles against the more heavi4' defended targets. S'oviet guided missile submarines would probab4' be employed in both the Atlantic and Pacific against North American land targets within missile range. Limited numbers or submarine-launched missiles could also be directed against the Gulf' coast. The effectiveness of USSR submarine attacks, including those on shipping and naval forces in North American waters, will be increased by- the advances made in nuclear propulsion and advanced weapons. 1964-1971 _Duringthis period, the Soviet long-range weapons system inventory will probab~ come to include ample numbers of improved lDBM1s and other advanced missiles including submarine,.,la,mched types, manned bombers, and large numbers of nuclear weapons tor all purposes and with a wide variety of yieldso It could also include advanced-performance manned winged vehicles capable of hypersonic speeds with ranges of from 61 000 n.m. to global and possib4' capable of weapons delivery 9 and/or other radical4' new weapon systems., The Soviets will have markedly improved capabilities in communications, and in electronic warfare including many types of decoys and jamming techniques. The likely form and scale of a Soviet attack on North kmerica during the latter part of this period may be generally described as involving the launching of large numbers or imrpoved l'CBM'sas the pr.i.marymeans of attack, supplemented by advanced guided missile submarines and advanced bomber and a;ir-launched missile attacks. Nuclear submarines with advanced weapons will probably be on stations in North A'merican waters from the outset. 8. other-Threats 9. It is estimated that the initial attack on North America would entail little threat of amphibious operations beyond commando-typeraids against selected targets in the Aleutians, the coast of Alaska north or Bristol Bay, and even possibly against parts of Canada and continental United States. These raids would most probably be launched' from submarines • ... /5 000196 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information .. - 5·- TOPSF.cm 10. It is considered unlikely that the Soviet :Union airborne operations against . North America at least in the early stages or a nuclear w_m-,although airborne operations on a small scale against isolated points in Alaska and the .meutians would be a probable course of a ctiono Airborne operations against Northern Canada, Greenland and Iceland are considered improbable. would attempt sizeable 11. Sabotage and subversion both by lmown and anonymous local m:immunists and sympathizers and by trained saboteurs outbreak or war. The ile ans or sabotage could include Bl and CWagents, and limit·ed numbers of nuclear weapons •. Espionage would be carried out by trained and integrated "illegal residents". The scale of all these operations would, hOlilever, be limited by countermeasures, fear of prejudicing surprise, and by the effects or the nuclear exchange itself. 000197 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Att Document divulgue,en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE NoC.SC ..·.2156~1..(JIC.) ...... . 11\tpartmtnt of J}ational1lltftntt · TOP SECRET CANADA JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE \ 11 Jun 59. ·Secretary, ·Joint Plarmii:ng Committee,, Conditions Under Which Mobilization · .Mt$t_.Take Pl.ac6 1. I.refer to your memorandumCSC 5-11--9 (JPC) of 5 Dec 58·requesting JIC comments upon the above paper. You will recall that o~ 30 Dec 58 I replied on behalf of t~e JIC suggesting that comments should be postponed until the new_Canadian~United States agreed estimate of the threat to North America had been completedo This estimate. (CANUS=59)has now bean approved by the Chief's of and the JIC has·reconsidered CSC1/570 The comments of the JIC on Appendix "A" and on certain other parts of the paper are attached. After studying CSC1/57, the JIC has been led to suggest that it might be . useful if certain aspects of such studi_es were considered by the JPC and the JIC togethero For axamplep the JIC ·believes that it might be useful to consider jointly some of the assumptions of CSC1/57 (para. 5), the adequacy of the MC.48 concept as a basis for this paper {parao 6), and some of the details in parao 9 9 which deals with-Soviet air attacks against Canada. 2. Starr, Att. GfH/2-5459/cp 000125 lo � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Nuclear Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Concept of Operations / MAY-JUNE 1959 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1959-05 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00119 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Draft report, "CSC 1/57 - Concept of Operations," 20 May 1959, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 3; Draft, "JIC Comments on Certain Sections of CSC 1/57," LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 3; "Conditions Under Which Mobilization Might Take Place," 11 Jun. 1959, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 3.