https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/4a81bb1d8f88477ef58fa91c7db5fa5a.pdf 5882cfa00d55a3ef74a2ec27b125d20b PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE NO ...................................................... TOP SECRET . NSTS 1650-35 V3 (STAFF) CANADA ®ttatua, JPC AGENDA 14 November, 1958. COPY NO.I CONDITIONS UNDERWHICH MOBILIZATION MIGHTTAKEPLA.CE,CSC 1/57 DRAl!T REVISION Enclosure "A"- Draft Revision 1 CSC 1/57. Five copies of .Enclosure distribution to the members and the required. Revision of CSC 1/57 is Planning Committee Minutes 11/58-2, "A'' are forwarded for Joint Planning Staff as provided for in Joint 17 June, 1958. 2. The threat of missile attack in the form of ICBM or submarine launched missiles has been taken into account in the draft revision. The primary task of the military has been clearly established in Paragraph 21 as to provide and support the combat forces and their supporting facilities. Aid to civil power has been reeognized as a secondary task in Paragraph 22. The nature of civil defence operations has been removed from the main body of the paper to Appendix "B". 3. Appendix "A", "The Nature and Scale of Soviet has not bee~ revised pending clarification of what intelligence it is intended. to use. Attacks" 4. Therefore CSC 1/57 be placed it is requested that revision on a JPC agenda to determine: of (a) Direction to JPS who will co-ordinate and produce the revised CSC 1/57 for further . JPC consideration. ( b) The intelligence to be used for·the revision, particularly in Appendix "A"· (A.G. Boulton), Commodore, RCN, Naval Member, JOINT PLANNINGCCM4ITTEE. SH:CRETARY, JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE. TOP SECREr HQ. 1010A 150M-11•54 (NS. 449) N.S. 7570-HQ. 1010A 000131 ___l___,___,__..1 --~ ~ .:.. - .- J �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information .. • TOP.SECRET ENCLOSURE "A" to: NSTS 1650-35 Vol 3 (STAFF) Dated: 14 November, 1958. CONDITIONS.UNDERWH.ICHMOBILIZATIONMIGHT TAKE PLACEr CSC 1/57, DRA.Fl' REVISION 4. The aim of this study is to set forth which might prevail in Canada at the 9utbreak between the eastern and western blocs 1969 a~d under which, states of Oanada 9 s armed forces the conditio~s of a general war from the ea~ly 1960 9 s up to of readiness, alerts and mobilization would take place. ASSUMPTIONS 5. a. The war will be global b. .... The war will warning. targets start in scope. with little Missile or no and air attacks in NORTHAMERICA will against take place from the outset. c. Nuclear weapons of all by both sides d. sizes will from the outset. The intercontinental ballistic and the submarine launched missile by both sides. The Government may not have declared ALERTprior to the first ( ICBM) guided missile will be in use operationally e. be used an warning of actual attack. !· Plans will exist for decentralizing the administration of Canada temporarily to each province but the Government will not have made any firm arrangements until the Middle 1960 9 s for alternative sites from which to conduct the nation business should Ottawa be evacuated 9 s or bombed. g. In addition cities, to direct there will attacks on Canadian be random nuclear explosions. 000 TOP SECRET 2 000132 --~- - ~_J �' Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • TOP SECRET = 2 - ~ NATURE. Of THE W~ MC 48 Col).cept In the MC48 concept NATOnations 6. a future global war will relatively short would determine operations soviet consist are agreed that of ~wo phases - firstlyj and intense nuclear e~change which probably the ultimate victory; and sec_ondly, a period of indeterminate length of lesser be based upon preserving their at the same time enforcing would first attempt is ranged against intensity. strategy general assault presented their will all upon the West. nuclear Thus they offensive An equal threat by the naval atomic offensive forces power which These would be attacked simultaneously North America. of industry, Centres The nature to ~ussia ICBM, submarine by in the initial aµd scale phase. of attacks that are probable North America are sullllJlarized at Appendix "A". Attacks Agail).st Cl;l.llada The Soviet's SAC and AEC i~stallations Therefore most direct be routed that over Canada. Because the vast of oceanography difficult, SSG's could reach suitable 3 coasts North America. will bombers sea areas and off Canada. make submarine location to launch missiles The likelihood not necessarily is over Canada. ICBMand aircraft the nature Canada.~s air approach route to in the United States it can be expected on government and population against 9. is of the USSR. with any attack in North A,m.erica would also be attacked and aircraft in any and the SAC and RAFbomber commandbases around the periphery a. while The SAC base complex and weapons storage through the air. launched missiles would own country from destruction to destroy them. Soviet sy~tem in North America will be a major consideration cities of CO\lrse of Actipn It should be assumed that will a firing against of nuclear be on their positions off most targets attack relative in on Canadian importance Ooo TOP SECRET 3 000133 �1 --------------,--;-,-------------------D-o-cu-m-en-t-di-sc-los_e_d u-n-de-,-th-e-Ac-ce-ss-to_/_nf,-o,-ma-t,-·on Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur /'acces ii /'information • TOP SECRET which may have been assigned other factors» to them by the soviets, such as the strength of our defence missiles and size of warhead available on their aircraft and submarines, to be taken into account. Canadian cities or ourselves. the nwnber of 9 to the sovieti weather Therefore attrition conditionsi etc. it should be assumed that and areas may be attacked deliberately or at random e~en though they may not be high on the Soviet -North American target have list of priorities. 'lHE.EFFECTSOF 'IBE INITIAL HI.ASE IN CANADA ,7 At the time qf the first 10. be much as it is today, state of readiness day business t.t,J.eservices maintaining and the population and pleasure. v'\..;..,,it,,,, r,.,-..JI-..{ ~t...o- warning!\ the country will carrying The following on its present day by few paragraphs to fores.ea the reaction in Canada to the first and the effects warning and actual of this their V attempt warning of attack, thermonuclear (/;t4 attack 9 in the initial overriding '"'':J.&tt 1 ,✓, (Z•. J~j.f/;.11ft. ,.,." , /~ 1 ' phase. - .-~ Considerations Joce,..J-,.;uKt!} 11. f- dec,t/4-., "'- ~ The degree to which thef(effects '" _. in Canada must be assessed conditions at the time. against will the prevailing It must be accepted that /i.1.;kp-,/- be experi8nced climatic all effects V will be more greatly accommodation, felt in winter food distribution wµen transportation, will present appreciably more problemf3. In~ti~l Warning and Reaction (°\ 12. MaxipJUmwarning of ICBMattack minutes. During this possible to alert retaliatory short defence against and defensive forces. submarine launched missiles form of attack public period it will would be about 20 probably only be the ICBMand to alert The warning of attack would be even shorter. the by Under this there would probably be no time to warn the 'biefore the first missiles fell. 000 4 TOP SECRET 000134 j �i Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • TOP SECRET = 4 - Presuming that warning would come from BMEWS,the 13. DEWLine and its seawings, underwater surveillance minutes before heavily populated the ASWdetection system, an attack areas. The.warning would be received and Civil between the receipt positive defensive developed. that unless streamlined immed'iately the authorities evaluate the warning information governmental and even probable that will be delays are inability to and to arrange levels. of procedures concerned, Consequently, time taken to consultation at it is possible the enemy would have been engaged before the Government had declared an Alert. all War Book measures prior to attack Formal implementation would not be possible of in circumstances. 15. The Civil to react public to warning and the initiation contact these there Delays would be caused by possible the higher information Defence authorities. of the actual action first Commander, who in addition would relay It is almost inevitable 14. to through the air would reach the the Air and ASWdefences, the Chiefs of Staff or the Canada would have from by Air Defence Commandor the•Maritime to alerting barriers, quickly. Defence authorities They would relay if such is the policy, and, measures in the selected cities may also be expected the mrning would initiate within to the general evacuation minutes after the warning is received. (L ') 16. trigger populated It is anticipated violent reaction areas. of the populace Personal and this that warning of attack in Canada, particularly safety attack. in the heavily would be the primary concern would result in a rush to clear of areas which, in the minds of the people, nuclear would Workers would leave their endeavour to unite and to leave the cities and in the process it is inevitable that out would be liable jobs, families to would as soon as possible, surface transportation 000 TOP SECRET 5 000135 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • TOP SECRET - 5 - facilities and telephone The nature 17. Priority )\ ot----c1vi.l"defence operat1~ \,____.-.-~- It must be expected reaction and movement of people, would prevail ---~~ is surnma-ri"zad ~ resources that, , with the disorganization, and denial·of during e~cuation, in the event of attack, to the Civil Howevert.he and sustain Clandestine Powers and to the Civil is to be sec~ndary essential points, they will services, reorganization major cross operations certainly of manpower. country communications Defence organiz= /to provid} to th6ir ' c.~ prime tas'i obstacles services of at isolated and may cut land= points with the aim of breaking and preventing are attempted to evacuation For example, saboteurs and rail routes and sabotage add to the disruption and produce further communications for and Sabotage If clandestine at vital forces ~heir suppi MY ot'.;rope/!n rorces Operations 19. and reserve primary task of the Armed' Forces ~at which there would be many demands upon the ?eArmed Fore?/ involving facilities and which would be more serious and manpower of the regular assistance ation. would become overloaded. of Task and Demands on Armed Forces ·18., line communications on the air defence the movement of personnel and equipment. CCNCLUSIONS 20. It is concluded that break of a general in only partial conditions war from the early mobilization of the mass disruption in support to the otherwise in Canada on the out- 1960 9 s to 1969 would result of combat forces, orderly because way of life. I These conditions of disruption from the time of the threat a. would commence to be generated of attack and would include:= Delays and difficulties government direction, policy in obtaining a~proval and for war measures. • 0 • 6 TOP SECRET 000136 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • TOl?SECRET = 6 Para. ~ (cont 9 d) 20 b. Overloading facilities in and through and/or affecting air cities defence, the command of the armed forces, ation and areas evacuated attacked control c. and breakdown of communications of the populace, of the country Overloading facilities attacked 0 0 and the co=ordin- s war effort. and breakdown of transportation in and through cities evacuated and areas transportation, and/or thus reducing transcontinental rail local capacity through Edmonton, Winnipeg and Montreal, making uncertain in ports such as Vancouver, John, N .B., d. Fear, the use of terminal and facilities Montreal, Saint and Halifax. confusion, panic, apathy, and even anarchy in the population. e. Casualties, resulting civil f. coupled with in loss authorities, ~'and~ of centralized and mil~tary Competitive ~P control municipal, provincial governments and the armed forces, equipment, the supply of fuel, h. Unpredictable. i. The probable /The ,, the provision agai~ I for manpower, channels requiring abandonment of large departures areas, for long periods ---------.. primary task of the Armed-Forces continues /\ of, comba.~arrd for plans. have been contaminated, 21. and federal food and materiel. circumstances from formulated defence food and accommodation. Breakdown of normal distribution g. by authorities. demands ~etween civil , transportation, above, /" their ~ support in~rrs that of time. . to be ~ the enemy. •• TOP SECRET 0 7 000137 �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • TOP SECRET - ? = 22. conditio~ to prevail war i.n the . perior 1960 9 s will require I assist in Canada 9 s National l Defence o / Military 230 including the raising provision of additional until operations and training stores some rehabilitation the earmarked reinforcing and round=the-clock support required the initial the earlt the initial of additional forces s phase, and the and equipment may not be possible visualized in this Therefore p~per may preclude to provide the forces for immediate defence activities must be 1 raised, t;l\ to be immediately following of our M=day forces manning. phase, the has been accomplished. The conditions 240 CanaQ \1960' the Services, as a secondary task, to -I \ survival, chiefly by aiding Civil' ~/ ini J;ial phase 0neral to late in trained, for 100%, and their on M=day, and equipped and functioning .t, available\ on an alert having commenced, or when directed being declared, hostilities by the Government of Canadao L TOP SECRET 000138 �i Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • TOP SECRET APPENDIX"B'' to: NSTS 1650=35 Vol 3 (STAFF) Dated: 14 November 9 1958. Evacuation On the basis authorities of their would try to effect perimeters about the cities to prepare for attacko maintained the Civil of the population evacuated and areas and control expect Civil Defence warningo of the people was lost in a three less Defence to arbitrary shown at Appendix "B'1 and could be moved to re~ative presume that plans the Civil evacuation Where plans exist or where control authorities an orderly Defence authorities hours from the first plans rehearsed that could be about 6~ safety in about 3 Where there 9 Civil were no Defence than 60% of the population could be hour period. Under an emergencr evacuE1tion, · planned or unplanned~ there would certainly uncertainties, surface o be confus~on, CQllflicting transportation jammed. service.s would be curtailed disrupted. and lack of information. Municiipal, difficult if in fact provincial exodus from Ottawa and the six provincial of cities to be evacuated It will 3. while carrying out their also have a secondary stability, authorities be against capitals to give aid to the civil they were not authority in the hurried which are on background that to create the armed forces to defend Canada will otganization and power and Civil Defence during the period between the initial time of a first and Defence authorities. primary responsibility responsibility, and could increase and federal by Civil this facilities~ such as power, water, would be weakened and :in some cases non-existent the list and perhaps abandoned communications would make control Qither essential food distribution 9 would be over=taxed Overloaded and perhaps the confusion. completely instructions facilities both trunk and local, perhaps panic and looting, warning and the attack. 000 2 TOP SECRET 000139 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • 'l'O~v§!CRET = 2 = 4. Civil interruption Defence authorities from an attack the largest of the target Defence organization with the results population expected that Telephone exchanges, terminals, at all, cities and may be Civil at large Defence officials days and prolonged would be of doubtful until and rail reliability Defence authorities the initial power stations, arid relays, evacuated increase in the area. services would l~st to deal of the of the popula~ion areas because tp.e Civil evacuation and the Ciyil of dispersal period would be from 4 to? Essential without and prepared The extent areas would likely if t:P,ere had biee~ an attac,k that organized for some periodo this in the evacuat'!d would be evacuated a reorganization for the war effort suggest cities of an attacko to prevent that it should take about 6 = 8 hours before more or less from target consider phase is overo landline trap.sport plan communications systems, to and t~rough the may qr ~Y not be working reliably, because of the absence of key operating if WQrking and maintenance personnelo At:tack An ICBM or other before evacuation evacuation, rioting, would be hearr warehouses, Restoration at least of t4ese food and material and transportation services throughout and facilities the first and material to Loss of life phase, for a month or more, because of the residual hazard ·an:d the lack of tools or no of tl:).e people leading services, or area of essential and even anarchyo, and dame,ge to essential impo~sible more likely apathy, and denial accommodation, and communications would be great. a city was completed~ or where there was little and would magnify the. terror panic,.looting, be a,ttack agt\inst would add to the disruption services, would nuclear and radiation for reconstruction and ,, repair. Halifax ;Examples of the effects are contained of attack$ ?l~ainst Montreal and at Appendix "C"o .. TOP SECRET 0 0 3 000140 �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • TOP SECRET - 3 = An attack 7. result in a lower loss facilities would still transportation of life has been completed should but the implications apply~ except in the case of mobile of evacuation. might be expected Stocks and upon which the services probably of damage to amount of the equipment would have been moved in the process in storage, will evacuation equipment where lower losses because a large clear after of equipment and foods and public normally not have been removed from the target not in the first few days of Phase I, and will rely & areas& certainly be destroyed and. damaged. The broader 8. include effects a break in the major rail of an attack route might be overcome by using the single Ontario to the Maritimes. rail line to Q.uebec, but if Q,uebec is attacked not be possible the main line an attack to complete the rail east and west. shipping. Because an attack on Halifax to plan to use alternate This would necessitate though limited transportation, would be limited facilities connections on the south shore of the St. Lawrence. and other in these diversion it would with Similarly, communications between should be expected and anchorages it for to minor port areas communications, places. should be carried ports This through Northern or evacuated and ferry on Winnipeg would cut rail is necessary on Montreal might Therefore storage and accommodation dispersal out on a permanent basis even of vital in peacetime. R~n~om Nuclear Explosio~s It should be expected 9. damage to equipment, and areas not assessed to random nuclear destruction that cities population as likely ~xplosions. targets etc., of life, in cities but which may be subject Some of these or might be relied and defence forces. would be loss of accommodation, used for the accommodation and support target there areas might have been of people evacuated upon for the sustenance The effects from of the of random explosions ••• 4 TOP SECRJ!n' 000141 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur l'acces ii /'information TOP SECEET =,' would be of limited si~ificance would cause more widespread of life, and disrupted 4•·-- in northern public services parts apprehension of Can_ada but and disorder, in and near industrial loss anq populated areas. Fall-Out Hazard There is likely 10. out throughout Southern ~uebec. evacuation perhaps Canada, particularly Extensive fall-out and re-organization panic in areas may be expected of essential to be a considerable services will considered to the loss in affected Ontario and add to the problems of and may bring otherwise to contribute in Southern hazard from fall= about disorder to be safe. of life and Fall=out and the disruption areas. TOP SECRET 000142 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Nuclear Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Concept of Operations / 14 NOVEMBER 1958 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1958-11-14 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00117 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Conditions Under Which Mobilization Might Take Place, CSC 1/57, Draft Revision," 14 Nov. 1958, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 3.