https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/ddc8043d6f87ddb1ebe456374c49c70a.pdf 4e726b2866d713d1deb0b1f4dc63bcd2 PDF Text Text Docume THISDOCUMENT IS THEPROPERTY OF THEGOVERNMENT CANADA CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE .TOP s:mm csci;.11.9 csc: 5.11 ... 28 November 1957. COPYN0_. __ 2_"""_ '- CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS Including. (A) (B) CONDITIONS UNDERWHICH MOBILIZATION MIGHT TAKEPLACE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOLLOWING THEINITIALPHASEOF A MAJOR WAR APPROVED BY THECHIEFSOF STAFFCOMMITTEE ,- .....-:-w' -::,, I • LJc_~ (FoWoTeLucas) Captain, RCN Secretary ..__ �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - TOP SECRET csc 5-11-9 25 November 1957 COPYNO. 2 REPOR't Tb THE CHIEFSOF .STA.FF,· COMMITTEE BY THE ., .. JOINrPLANNING·coMMfi'TEE / CONDITIONS UNDER .WHICH MOBILIZATION MIGHT. TAKFf PLACE lo The Chiefs of Staff Committee will shortly review Service mobilization plans. Before such a·review can be carried out the Chiefs of Staff require an agreed set of · conditions ..for the first stages of a war taking place in the early 1960's under the.MC 48 concepto 2o At its 596th meeting the Chiefs of Staff Committee agreed that the Coordinator, Joint Staff prepare a directive to the Joint Planning Committee to prepare the necessary studyo 3. The terms of the study as presentetl to the Joint Planning Committee by the Coordinator, Joint Starr are q~oted verbatim under the headings AIMand ASSUMPI'IONSo AIM --,- 4. The aim of this study is to set forth the conditions which might obtain in Canada at the outbreak of a general war between the eastern and western blocs, in the early 1960Pa, and under which mobilization of Canada Vs armed forces would have to take J)laceo ASSUMPI'IONS 5. The war will be global in scopeo Nuclear weapons of all sizes, including submarine-launched guided missiles, will be used by both side:s'from the outseto .£. 0 . . The intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)will not be in use operationally by either sideo J -1 Plans will exist for decentralizing the administration of the •country temporarily to each province but the Government will TOPSECREr ,V 1r 000144 b �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information ·: - TOP SECREr --csc5-11-9 - 2 - dated 25 November 1957. not have made any firm arrangements for alternative sites from which ~o conduct the nation 11s business should Ot_tawabe evacuated or bombedo ~o The war will-start with little or no warning and air attacks againf$t targets in N01'1.'H .. AMERICA will take plaqe. from the outseto i:O The Government will not have declared an ALERT_ prior to.the first warning of, actual attacko go In addition to ariy direct attacks on Canadian cities» there will be random explosions of nuclear bombs from damaged or crashed eneiey aircrafto i MC48 Concept 60 In the ~ 48 concept global war will consist of two intense nuclear exchange which victory; and secondly 9 a period lesser intensityo NATOnations are agreed that a f'uture phases'_ firstly» a relatively short and probably would determine the uitimate of operations of indeterminate length of Soviet Course of Action 7o It Bhould be assumed that· Soviet strategy would be based upan preserving -the·ir owncountry from destruction while at the s~e time enforcing their will upon the Westo Thus they would first attempt to destroy all nuclear offensive power which is ranged against themo The SACbase complex and weapons storage system in North ~rica will be the major consideration in any ~eneral air assaulto An equally vital and closer threat for Russia, however 9 is presented by the naval atomic strike forces and the SACand RAF bomber commandbases around the periphery cf the USSRo These would_be attacked simultaneously with any attack on _North Americao Centres of industryj government and population in North America are targets which would be attacked as second priority targets in the initial phaseo So The nature and scale of attacks America are summarized at Appen~ix "A"o that are probably against ,.. ( _ North c-, Attacks Againe;t Canada 9. The most direct approach route to ·sAC and AECinstallations in 1 the United States is over Canada and thus it is possible that the USSR would route a considerable number of bombers--_ over Ca~ada o The likelihood of air attack on Canadian cities is not entirely dependent on their importance or on the priorities which my have been assigned to them by the Soviets 9 or ourselveso.other factorsj such as the strength of the defence, the attrition of enaiey aircraft 9 the rortitude and experience of eneiey aircrews~ weather conditiens 9 etc.» have to be taken into account, and therefore it should be assumed that Canadian cities and areas may be bombed deliberately or at random even though they may not be high on the list of North American target priorities. Similar considerations should be taken into account when assessing the probablity of submarine launched guided missile and other for:m:sof attack against Canadao ./ TOP SECRET 000145 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information •• - - 3 - TOP SECREr csc 5-11-9 dated 25 November 19570 lOo At the time of -the fir~,:t.wa~ning the country will be much as it is today, the population carrying on its day__by day business and pleasure, and the services maintaining their present sta:te ef readiness~ The following few paragraphs attempt to foresee the reaction in Canada to the first warning of attack and the effects of this warning and actual thermonuclear attack in the initial phase. Overriding Considerat~ons 11 o The degree to ·which the effecte will be. experienced in Canada must be assessed against the prevailing climatic conditions at the time. As a matter of principle it should_be assume4 that.all effects will be more greatly felt in winter when trarisportation,,accommoda,tion, food distribution naturally present more pro~lemso Initial Reaction l2o Presuming that warning would. come from the DEWLine, Canada would have about 2-3 hours before an attack would rea.ch the heavily populated areas. The Yarning would be rece.ived first by tl;le Air Defence Command which, in addition to alertin.g the air defences, ~ould relay the information to the Chiefs of Staff a.nd to Civil.Defence authorities. 13. It is almost inevitable that there will.be delays between the receipt of the actual warning and the initiation of positive defensive action unless streamlined procedures are developed. Delays would be caU8ed by possible inability to contact immediately the authorities concerned, time taken to evaluate the warning information and to arrange consultation' at the higher governmental levelso Consequently, it is possible and even probable that the enemy would have been engaged before the Government had declared an Alerte Formal implementation of War Book measures prior to attack would not be possible in,these circumstances, 140 HoYeverj the Civil Defence authorities may be expected to react quickly. They would relay the warning to the general public and, if such is the policy, would initiate evacuation measures in the selected cities Yithin minutes after the warning is received. 15. It is anticipated that warning of attack would trigger violent reaction in Canada, particularly in the heavily populated areas. Safety of self. and family would be the primary concern of the populace and this Yould result in a rush to clear out or areas which, in the minds of the people, would be liable to nuclear attack. Workers would leave their jobs, families would endeavour to unite and to leave the cities as soon as possible, and in the process it is inevitable that surface transportation facilities and telephone communicatiorui would ~ecome ?verloade~. Evacuation 16. On the basis of their rehearsed plans the Civil Defence authorities would try to effect an orderly evacuation to arbitrary perimeters about the cities and areas shown at Appendix "B"and to prepare for attack. According to Civil Defence sources it is doubtful that plans would exist for Montreal and Quebec where political considerations have delayed their development. Where plans existed-and control could be maintained the Civil Defence authorities expect that about 60%of the population could be moved to relative safety in about 3 hours from the first Civil Defence Yarning. Where there were no plans or where control of the people was lost, Civil Defence-authorities presume that less than 60%of the population could be evacuated in a three hour period. TOP SECRET 000146 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - - 4 - TOP SECRET 'csc 5-11-9 dated 25 November 1957. 17., Under an emergency evacuation 9 planned or unplanned 11 _there would certainly- be conf'usiori 9 perhaps panic and looting, uncertainties, conflicting instructions» and lack of information .. Surface transportation facilities would be over-taxed a,nd pe_rhaps jammtl3doOverloaded· and perhaps abandoned communications facilities 11 1:»th. trunk and'local1> would make control difficult and could increas.e the. confusion •.. other essential ser..: vices such as powers, wa.teri, and food.distribution would be curtailed if in fact they were not completely disrupted. M.micipal 9 . provimcial and federal authority would be weakened and i:il..·some c.ases .non-existent in the hurried exodus from Ottawa and the six provincial capitals. J',!'hichare the list of cities to be evacuated by Civil Defence authorities .. ! .. on 18.. rt will be against this background the armed forcee will have to maintain organization and discipline 1 to give aid to the civil power and Civil Defence authoritiee 1 to continue their.efforts to repulse the enemy, andcto prepare themselvee for the war effort during the period between the initial warning and the time of a first attack .. 19. Civil Defence authorities consider that without interruption from an attack it should take about 6 - 8 hours before the_largest of the target cities would be evacuated and the Civil Defence organiz~tion more or lees organized and prepared to deal wi_th the resulte o! !3,n.attacko The extent of dispersal of the population from target areas.would likely increase and may be expected to prevent a reorganization of the population at large for the war effort for some periodo Civil Defence officials euggest that this period would be from 4 t9 7 days and prolonged if there had been an attack in the areao · 200 Essential services would be of doubtful reliability in the evacuated areas because the Civil Defence authorities plan that evacuation would last until the initial phase is over .. Telephone exchanges, power stations, landline communications systeme, terminals 9 and relays 9 and rail transport to and through the evacuated.cities may or may not be working · reliably 9 if working at all 9 because of the absence of key operating amd maintenance personnelo As it becomes apparent, if indeed it does, that some of the target cities might not be attacked during the first few days of the initial phase it would seem reaeonable to expect that after their families have been safely and confortably established, some key personnel swept away in thEf evacuation might return to offer their services o Therefore 9 before the firet phase is Qver tnere might be a partial restoration of essential services in evacuated and unattacked a.reaso · Attack 2lo A nuclear attack against a city or area before evacuation was completed, or where there was little no evacuation 9 would add to the disruption and denial of essential servicee » and would magnify the terror of the people leading to panic 9 looting 9 rioting» apathy 9 ·and even anarchyo Loss of life would be heavy and damage to essential services, f0od and material warehouses, accommodation 9 ana communications and transportation would be great .. Restoration of these services and facilitiee would be impossible at least throughout the first phase 1 and more likely for a month or more 9 because of the residual radiation hazard and the lack of tools and material for reconstruction and repair o Examples of the effects of attacks against M,:ntreal and Halifax are conta 1ned at Appendix "C"o or TOP SECRET 000147 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information •,, ;' - = 5- TOP SECREI' csc 5-11-9 dated 25 November 1957. 220 An attack after evacuation has been.completed should result in a lower loss of life but the implications of.damage to facilities would :still apply, except in the case···of mobile transportation equipment where lower lo:sses might be expected becaus~ a: large amount of the equipment would have been moved clear in the process:iof evacuation .•_ Stocks of Equipment and foods in storage, and upon which .the services and public normally rely, will probably not have been removed from the target areas, certainly not in the.first few da.ys of Phase I 9 and will be destroyed and damagedo 230 The broader effects of an attack on Montreal might include a break in the major rail route to the M:i.ritimeso · fhi~ might be overcome by udng the :single rail ltne through Northern Ontario to Quebec, but if Quebec b attacked or evacuated it would not be possible to complete the rail and ferry connections 'With 't,he mai_n.line on. :the. south :,bore of the St. La:wrenceo Simila.rly 9 an attack on Winnipeg would.cut rail and other com'munications between east andwesto. An attack on Halifax would deny the UBe of the port to shipping and would nece::isitate diversion to minor port area:, where only limited transportation)) comniU.ni.cati.ons and acco:mmc,dation 51•. storage are availableo Random Nuclear Explosiorus 24. It should be expected that there would be loss of life, damage to equipment 9 destruction of aceommodation·9 .etco 9 in· cities and areas not assessed a:s likely targets but which may be subject~o random nuclear explosions following,the destruction or damage to enemy bombers as they overfly Canadao Some of th~se areas might have been :used for the accommodation and supP()rt of peopl~ evacuat~d :from target cities or might be relied upon for the sustenance of the population and.defence forceso The effects of random explosions would be of.limited significance in norther parts of Canada but would cause more widespread public apprehension and disorder, loss of life~ and disrupted services in and near industrial and populated areaso Fa:1.1 ...0o.t Hazard 25o Whether from bombs aimed at Canadian cities, or from bombs jettisoned :from or exploding 'Within crippled bombersll there is likely to be a comsiderable hazard from fall-out through0ut Canada 1:ut particularly in 'southern Ontario a12d:southern Quebeco Exten:sive fall-out will add to the pr,riblems of evacuation and r~organizatipn and.may 1Jring about disorder ;and p~ha-ps panic in areas otherwise· considered ·to be safeo Fall-out may ' be·, expected to -contribute to the, loss of life and the disruption of essential services in affected areas.. ' -Clandestine Operations and Sabotage 260 If clandestine operations and sabotage were attempted at vital points fl a's is possible~ they may be expected to add to the disruption of essential services and to produce further obstacles to evacuation and reorganization of manpowero For example~ saboteurs may cut landline commmtlcations and rail services at isolated points on the major cross country routes with the aim of breaking air defence communications and preventing the movement of personnel and equipmento TOP SECREr 000148 L �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - = TOP SECREI' csc 5-11-9 dated 25 November 19570 6 = 27. It must be .expected tha.tll with the disorganization 9 reaction and movement of people 9 and denial or facilities w:hi_chwould prevail during evacuation and which would be more seriou~ in.the event of attaqkll there would be many demands upon the resources and manpower of the regular and reserve forces for assistance to the Civil Powers arrl to the Civil Defence organizationo cbNbttrsroNs 280 It is concluded that the conditions in Canada on the outbreak c,f a general war in the early 1960~is-maybe summarized as a serious disruption of national life and war effort for at least the period of the threat of attack and for a much longer period in areas destroyed or contaminatedo This would be caused by evacuation 9 damagej _loss of lifell and fall-out in the areas in which the majority of Canada vs population and armed forces are located» and will includei · Delays and difficulties in obtaining government direction 9 approval and policy for war measures. Overloading and breakdown of COlDIIIUnicationefacilitiee in and through evacuated and/or attacked cities and areas affecting air defence, the comm.andof the armed forcesll control of the populace, and the coordination of the country 0s war effort. Overloading and breakdown of transportation facilitiee in and through evacuated and/or .attacked cities and areas thus reducing local transportation, transcontinental rail capacity through Edmonton9 ·winnipeg and Montreal, and making uncertain the use of terminal facilities in ports such as Vancouver~ Montreal 9 St. John 9 NoBolland Halifaxo Fearll confusion populationo ~o 9 'panic apathy .. 9 · 9 and even anarchy in the Casualities 9 coupled with h 9 £~and~ abovel) resulting in loss Qf centralized control by civil and military authoritieso Competetive demands between civil defence authoritiee, municipal 9 provincial and federal governments and the armed forces~ for manpower9 transportation 9 equipment, food and accommodatione Breakdown of normal distribution channels for the supply of fuel 9 ~ood and materielo Unpredictable circumstances _formulated planso requiring departures The probable abandomnent of large areas contaminated, for long periods of time. 1 :from that have been TOP SECRET 000149 ---_________ �i Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information ·,/ - TOP SECREl' ADDITIONAL CONCLUSIONS DRAWNUP BY THE CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE TO PROVIDEPART OF THE BASIS FOR - -. ·11oi3tt.tz11'toN· PLANNING .. !,o Conditione likely to pertain.in the first few days of a war in the early 196O°s~ and perhaps f0r the first phase, will require the Services to devote the maximumresources that can be made available to assist in survivalo .Qo The battle of -survival will .be the first priority task andi, until slll7Viva1 pas been accomplished and rehabilitation commencedj it-will not_ be possible to carry out additional military_ activitiesi, .such as the raising and training of additional forces and the provision ~f additiona; stores and equipmento .£0 The conditions visualized in this paper may preclude the earmarked reinforcing of ourM--dayforces to allow for 100% and round=the~clock manningo Therefore the forces required for urgerit defence activities on M=dayi,and for the first phasel) must be raiseds, trainedll equipped and be immediately·available on an alert being declared or hostilities connnencedo TOP SECRET 000150 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - TOP SECREI' APPENDil "A" to CSC 5-11-9 dated 25 Nov 57. NATURE. ANDSCALE .OF.SOVIET-ATTACKS (Based on ACAI39) Ur Attack To enable nticlea.r·attacks to'be carried out against North America it is estimated that the Sov-iets could .employ a minimumof 600 heavy bombers, of which approximately 480.could arrive in target areas anywhere in North America on ...two way missions. .A maximum of 1,100 medium and heavy bom9ers, of which 850 might reach target ~reas might be used, with the medium.bombers oper.ating on a o•e'way basis. This latter course is considered unlikely. ' 1. 9 Submarine Attack 2. The Soviets are given the capability of operating a maximum of 319 and 17 submarines· on a continuing basis, in Atlantic and Pacific coastal waters respectivelyf and may_be.expected.to use a limited number of these submarines for launching guided missile attacks against targets up te 250 miles inland. Airborne Attack 3o The USSRwould be capable of carrying out airborne assaults against the continent of North America. However, .it is considered that such assaults on Canada would be limited to small scale attacks on isolated points in the North. Amphibious Operations 4. Amphibious operations against North America will be limited to commandotype raids probably launched fr.om submarines but will not be a. significant threat. 5. Submarines might also be used to transport Clandestine a.gents and saboteurs. Operations 6. Clandestine operations by the Soviets using nuclear weapons is considered risky and unlikely to be carried out but they remain as alternatives to other major attack methodso In addition clandestine employment of psychochemical agents is a possibility in support of the primary aim of the Soviet. Sabotage 7. It is probable that Soviet organized sabotage groups will attempt to attack pre-determined targets either in conjunction with~ or as soon as possiblef after the outbreak of war to add to the disruption of Canadian and United States transition to war. TOP SECRET 000151 �------;-----r ., Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - TOP SECRET APPENDIX11B" to CSC 5-11-9 dated 25 November 1957 ctvrL'bmNt:E'LIST CITIEs-·FoR· WHICH EVACUATION IS PLANNED Halifax Quebec City 'Montreal Ottawa & Hull Toronto ' Hamilton 'Windsor Niagara Falls Winnipeg Edmonton Vancouver Victoria 000152 �Document disclosed under the Access tp Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information { - SECRET APP1!:NDIX "C" to CSC 5-11-9 dated 25 Nov 57 lo The informa:tion-contained·in the enclosures· to this appendix has been extracted from the appendices to JIC 158/1(56) dated 13 January 1956. 2o The enclosures are included to indi.cate the estimated extent of damage to Halifax and Montreal after attack. by nuclear weapons of 50 kiloton and 1 .megaton yields ... (Enclosure l - Effects of a 50 Kiloton Airburst on Halifax 2 - Effects of a 1 megaton Surface Burst in Halifax 3 - Effects of a 50 Kiloton Underwater Burst on Halifax 4 - - Effects of a 50 Kiloton Airburst on Montreal 5 - Effects.cf al Megaton Surface Burst on Montreal 6 - Effects of a 50 Kiloton Underwater Burst on Montreal 000153 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information l .' - SECRET APPENDIX"C" Enclosure 1 EFFECTS OF-·A· 50 krt.bToN·AIRl3URsr ON.THE POR'fot HALIF.AX 1. It is essential that this medium-yield weapon be employed in such a way as to make full use of its blast and thermal effects. 2. Ground zero was selected s~ as to. give the greatest possible effect on pert reception and clearance capacity. For a 50 KT weapon this was determined to be the area: of_ Union Station_~- ..The :maximumeffective height of burst for such a WElaponwould be a.bot1.t3000 feet. 3. The comments presented-tmder effects of a 20 Icr air burst are also applicable, in- general., to the effects of a 50 Icr air burst. The largest single problem of recovery would. be the raising of vessels sunk alongside the piers. · 4. The damage that might be expected, from this be su.nnnarized as follows: type of burst can (a ) Complete destruction by-bla~t and primary and secondary fires of all structures and piers in the commercial wharf area between the Deep Water Termiu.ls and the Oceu Ter~nals. (b) Virtually complete destruction of all transit sheds and contents in the Ocean TermiMl:5 and moderate to severe damage to transit sheds and conte-nts in the_ Deep Water Terminals. ( c) Severe damage to· ships at Pier B and complete blockage of Sea Wall •nd Pier .Aby vessels sunk alongside. (d) Severe damage to 90%.of loco:rnotives in marshalling yards and complete destruction of remainder of rolling stock. (e) All frame structures, about 85% of the total, in the general area east of Dalhousie University and south of Cogswell street destroyed by blast and fire. (f) All buildings east of SummerStreet Citadel area severely damaged. (g) 100% casualities yard made up of 85% killed (h) Probable slight storage depot. and south of the in the Ocean Terminals and marshalling and 15% seriously injured. damage to Imperial Oil refinery and ./ (i) All streets within 1.5 miles of ground zero blocked with rubble to varying depths. 5. Residual~adiation in the target area would be negligible and re-entry into the area would not be impeded by the radiat~on hazard. Fire would be the greatest immediate restriction on re-entry and debris would prohibit the movement vehtcles. of 000154 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information ; - SECRET APPENDIXttCtt Enclosure 2 EFFEtTS OF A ONEMEGATON SURFACE BURST ON THEPORTOF HALIFAX 1. The dimensions or the fireball of this size of weapon is such that in most cases it will touch the ground and must be con·sidered therefore as a ground burst • . 2. Although the surface burst does not give maximumblast effects, the radius of blast effects is still extremely large. In addition the secondary radiation is or such intensity and so widespread that the use of large areas is prohibited for a considerable period. This is a particular advantage of the large size weapon since it would increase considerably the time required to reestablish the p~rt capacity. 3. The effects of blast and thermal radiation of this size weapon, which would probably be a thermonuclear weapon, wo'Uld be similar to the smaller atomic weapons but proportionately larger. Insofar as these effects are concerned, the best location of ground zero would be in the vicinity of Barrington and Sackville Streets. The physical damage that would probably be incurred is summarized as follows: a) A crater in excess of 3000 feet in diameter and some 500 feet in depth could be formed at ground zero. b) All structureswithin would be demolished. c) All structures in Halifax, Dartmouth and Woodside would be seriously damaged. d) All vessels e) All rail facilities and rolling stock in the Ocean Terminals, Deep Water Terminals and H.M.C. Dockyard, would be seriously damaged• .f) 90 percent of the population of Halifax and Dartmouth would be casualties of which 90 percent would be killed. This does not include secondary radiation casualties. g) Complete destruction 1½ mile radius of ground zero in the inner harbour would be sunk. of the refineries at Imperoyal. 4. The area affected by secondary radiation is dependent upon meteorological conditions, particularly on wind velocities at various levels, the nature of the soil or rock at ground zero and the height of the centre of the fireball. The number of variables does not permit an accurate, detailed description of the fall-out pattern; however, an indication of the order of magnitude can be given. A downwind belt about 40 miles in length and up to 15 miles in width would be so contaminated as to seriously threaten the lives of nearly all persons in the area who did not take protective measures. 5. plosion It is probable that the radiation level one hour ~fter in the Ocean Terminal area would be about 1000 roentgens exper /2 000155 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information ; • SECRET -2- hour. Assuming a normal decay rate it would be 1.3 days before the dose rate would be down to 1 roentgen per hour. Assuming a maximum allowable whole body radiation dose of 25 roentgens for a 24 hour period, 24 hours after burst a working party would only be able to stay in the area for 1 hour and 10 minutes. This allowable dose is particularly high and could only be applied to the immediate relief phase. If the allowable dose or 0.l roentgens per day, which was established by the U.S. Committee on X-rays and Radium Protection, and which is still high compared with the present peacetime dose of 0 •.3 roentgens per week, were applied it would be eighteen months· before a working party could enter the area and remain for an eight hour period. 6. Although the extremes have been presented to illustrate the problem, it must be assumed that it would be a matter of months before the real work of rehabilitation could be commenced. Just how long it would take depends largely upon the availability of manpower. If manpower were scarce the allowable dosage would have to be reduced in order to get the maximumoverall return from that manpower available. It is probable that some decontamination measures taken in critical areas would improve the situation. 000156 �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information ·I .. SECRET APPENDIX "C" Enclosure 3 EFFF.CTS OF A 50 KILOTON UNDERWATER BURST ONTHEPORTOF HALIFAX 1. The comments presented under effects of a 20 KT underwater burst on the port of Halifax are also applicable, in general, to the effects of a 50 KT underwater burst. 2. On the basis of estimated very tentatively of a harbour 50 feet deep 250 feet deep, with a lip bottom would reduce these very inadequate information, it can be that a 50 KT bomb detonated on the bottom would form a crater 2000 feet in diameter, height of 140 feet. Deeper water and rock dimensions somewhat. 3. The damage.that might be expected from a 50 kiloton at a depth of 50 feet and at a distance of 500 feet off-shore Pier A can be summarized as follows: burst from on Pier A and severe a) total destruction of structures damage to those on Pier B. b) Destruction c) Severe damage to at least in t~e marshalling yard. d) Severe to moderate damage to all structures south of Morris Street and east of South Park Street. e) Severe to moderate damage to the Uniop Station, the Cold Storage plant and the Nova Scotia Light and Power Co. f) Moderate damage to about 60% of the commercial docks between Ocean Terminals and Deep Water Terminals. g) Streets in terminal areas and as far west as South Park Street blocked with rubble to varying depths. of Pier A and 80% of Sea Wall. 50% of the rolling 4. Re-entry into the target area would be dary radiation hazard. One hour after explosion, Ocean Terminals area would probably still exceed It would take almost two weeks for the dose rate gen per hour. stock impeded by the seconthe dose rate in the 800 roentgens per hour. to decrease to 1 roent- 5. Within 3/4 mile of ground zero at least 25% of the population would be casualties, of which 35%would be killed. · 000157 �i Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information ; SECRET APPENDIX"Ctt Enclosure 4 EFFECTSOF A 50 KILOTON AIRBURST ON THEPORTOF MONTREAL 1. Details or the effects of a 50 kiloton weapon are given here; however, as in the case of the 20 KT weapon, it is relieved that certain factors would preclude the possibility of a low or medium yield weapon being used in an attack on Montreal. 2. The best location for ground zero for an airburst 50 XT weapon would probably be at the end of Alexandra Pier, with a probable burst height of 2800 feet. The probable results of such an attack can be summarized as follows: a) All vessels sunk at Alexandra, King Edward and Jacques Cartier Piers, severe damage to ships at Victoria Pier, and moderate to severe damage to ships in Market Basin. b) Moderate to severe damage to ships at Bickerdike Pier and in Windmill Point Basin. c) Light to moderate damage to rolling St. Charles yards. d) Moderate to severe damage to rolling stock in Windsor and Central Stations and in the Bonaventure freight yards. e) Severe damage to Locks 1 and 2 of Lachine Canal. f) Moderate damage to Cold Storage Warehouse. g) Severe damage to all structures inland within a distance of about 3/4 mile from ground zero. h) Moderate damage to all at least 1.5 miles. i) Considerable damage to other port facilities such as cranage and harbour craft depending upon their location at the time of the explosion. structures stock in Point at a distance of 3. Within 3/ 4 mile of ground zero 100% of the population be casualties, with at least 80% killedo would 4. Residual radiation in the target area would be negligible and re-entry into the area would not be impeded by the radiation hazard. Fire and debris would be the greatest immediate restrictions on re-entry and vehicle movement. Severe damage would extend over an area of almost one sque.re mile outside the harbour area and moderate damage over an additional area of about 4 square miles. This would greatly reduce the number of recovery facilities available and would seriously restrict access to the harbour area from landwards. 000158 �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information I J SECRET APPENDIX - "C". Enclosure 5 EFFECTifOF A ON.ifMEGATON' SURFACE BURSI' rom·OF--MON!REAL ON THE L Although one megaton and larger weapons are of the order of size which might be used e>nMontreal because of,its·importance as an industrial target, these weapons weuld not completely-· destr<>Ythe port facilities. Im the case of a one mega.tori weapon about 3 miles of.harbour frontage would be damaged, which is less than half.of the 10 mileso..r so of actual frontage. The burst would be sG positioned to destroy-the most vital portions of the harbour but it is -probable that it would be placed to cause the greatest destruction to the industrial ·capacity· of. Montre.al, and to place the majority of the effects over the more built.up areas of the city.rather than over water. 2. A surface burst of this size weapoJahas, in addition to the blast, thermal and instantaneous effects,.cratering and secondary radiation effects which greatly increase the problems of recoveryo ·The diameter of the crater formed would prooably be in excess of .3000 feet in diameter a:nd 500 feet deepo The dependence of the distrib~tion of fall out and secondary radiation upon meteorological conditions.makes the prediction of the possible contaminated area impossibleo The figures indicating the order of magnitude of the problem for Halifax in Appendix "C" would apply equally to Montrealo · .3o Assuming ground z~ro to be t};te CNRCentral Station the following damage would result to the harbour facilities: (a) Severe dama~e to: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (b) The following vessels (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) ( c) Sheds Noo 2 to 20 Elevators No; 1 and 2 Elevat~r B Cold S~orage Warehouse All Rolling stock in Point St. Charles Yards, CPR Freight Yards, CNRCentral Station, CNRBonaventure Freight Terminal Locks 1 and 2 of Lachine Canal Transit sheds along La.chine Canal as far south as Atwater Avenue All at Alexandr~ Pier, King Edward Pier, Ja~ques Cartier Pier and Victoria Pier All at Bickerdike .Pier and in Windmill Point Basin All in Wellington Basin and Basins, 1, 2, .3 and 4 of La.chine Canal All in vicinity ,t3f Montreal Dry Docks Limited. The following vessels (1) (ii) would be :sunk: would be immobilized:; All in'Ma.rket Basin Vessels tied up at Harbour Sections 23 and 24. In addition to _this damage to the port and transport facilities, abwt 10 square miles of the city would be severely damaged or completely destroyed, and another .30 square miles would be moderately to lightly damagedo Also other harbour fa~ilities such as cranes and tugs would be damaged depending upon their locationo\ 5o Within 2 miles of ground zero there would be 100 per cent casualties of which ~0 per cent would be killedo 000159 �i •. Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information ' I SECRET APPENDIX"C" Enclosure 6 EFFECTSOFA 50id::toi'oi{UNDERWATER BURsr ON THE.PbR•tOF-MONTREAL 1. The comments presented under effects of a 20 KTunderwater burst are a.pplicable,-in·geiieral, to the effects of a 50 KT underwater burst. On the basis of very: inadequate inf.ormatio.n, it ...can be estimated very tentatively that a 50 KT bomb.detonated oh.the bottom of a.harbour 50 feet deep would form a crater 2000 feet _in. diame.ters, .250 feet in depth, with a lip height ef 140 feet. 2. In the harbour area itself the river is wide enough to prevent its being completely blocked; however the shipping channel would be blocked and entrance to the harbcmr.. upstream. fr,o:rn.the burst would be prohibited. 3. Assuming a 50 KT burst with grounq. zero 200 feet off the end of the ~ing Edward Pier, the.following effectswollld be expected: (a) Probaple total destruction ~/ 4 of .Aiexandra and Jacques Cartier Pier. Pier, of King Edward Pier, Piers i and 1/3 of Victoria (b) Moderate da~ge to Market Basin Sections, and Windmill Paint Ba.sin area. (c) Total destruction Bitkerdike of Sheds Nos. 2 to 19 and ElevatortJ Nos. 1 and 2o (d) Moderate damage to Elevator_Bs, CPR freight and associated rolling stocko terminals, (e) Complete blocking of entrance to La.chine Canal, Windmill Point Basinl' and Bickerdike ,,Pier. (f) Severe damage to all structures'inland of about Oo4 mile from gro_tmd-zeroo (g) Moderate damage to all structures up to one mile o 4. Within 3/4 mile of grotmd zero at least would be casualties, with 30% killedo to a distance at a dietance of 60%of the population 5o In addition to the above effects an area of secondary contamination would be presento This would create an additional hazard and reduce the recovery capability as wello One hour after explosion~ the dose rate in the vicinity of the crater would still exceed 600 roentgens per hour. It would take about 10 days for the dose rate to decrease to 1 roentgen per houro 000160 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information I' ,. / ;✓ TOPsEbRET csc:5.11 2 October 1957 COPY·NO ? ,.... , A REPORT to the CHIEFS.OF STAFFCOMMITTEE by the JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOLLOWING THEINITIAL PHASEOF A MAJORWAR INTRODUCTION 1. The Chiefs of Staff Committee in a paper entitled "Conditions Under Which Mobilization Might Take Place", provided guidance for the preparation of service mobilization plans to meet present military commitments during the initial phase of a major war. In order to plan for the subsequent operations of a major war it is now necessary for the Chiefs of Staff to decide on the part the Canadian forces should play during this period and consequently the form the forces should take to meet this requirement! 2. It has been agreed in the Chiefs of Staff Committee that the conditions which might exist in Canada during the initial phase of a general war may be summarized as a serious-disruption of national life and war effort for at least the period of the threat of attack and for a much longer period in areas destroyed or contaminated. The causes of this disruption and additional conclusions drawn up by the Chiefs of Staff Committee to provide part of the basis for mobilization planning are attached at Appendix "A". 3. The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff has therefore directed the Joint Planning Committee to· prepare a study on the concept of military operations following the initial phase of a major war. This study is to be carried out within present National Defence policy and is to be related to our agreed equipment policy so that the plans which follow will not interfere with our established priorities for the initial phase. 4. The aim of this study is to recommend to the Chiefs of Staff Committee what the Canadian concept of military operations should be during the period following the initial phase of a major war up to the mid-1960s, together with the role to be played by each of the services during this period and the general pattern of any reorganization of the forces required to carry out this role. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 5. It is considered that the enemy's primary objectives in a major war in pursuit of his war aims would be to neutralize all, or a major portion of NATO's main retaliatory power. This would include large scale attacks against North America. The enemy can hope to achieve his aim only by a surprise attack and as the Soviets will have the initiative at the beginning of the war it is concluded that we will get little more than tactical warning, probably a warning of 2-3 hours received from the DEWline. /2 000161 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information TOP SECRET -2- 6. It is very difficult to judge when the initial phase would end and the subsequent phase begin~ however, it is considered that the initial phase would end when the enemy is incapable of delivering large scale nuclear attackso The initial phase could last for days or weeks, and there will not be any abrupt change from the initial phase to the subsequent phaseo 7. In the subsequent phase of operations we will be limited in our capacity to fight to the weapons remaining at the end of the initial phase. Furthermore we cannot assume that any productive capacity will be available for some considerable timeo ASSUMPTIONS It is assumed that; 8. a) the initial phase has not brought an end to hostilities and the will to bring the war to a successful conclusion still exists in NATOo We will still meet resistance in varying degrees from the forces of the USSR. b) At the close of the intense powers will have superiority nuclear attackso nuclear exchange the NATO in the ability to deliver CONCEPT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS FOLLOWING THEINITIALPHASE 9. Despite the heavy attrition of forces and the intense use of nuclear weapons during the initial phase theSoviets will still have nuclear weapons and will only be limited in the use of them by.._ the numbers and types of delivery systems still available. The Soviets will have a small number of long-range aircraft for sporadic raids and will also have a substantial number of submarines for sustained but reduced operations. There will therefore be a continuing requirement for air def.ence and anti-submarine forces for the defence of Canada and the United States. 10. Because of the intense Soviet use of nuclear. weapons during the initial phase, directed against targets in North Anlerica, the primary problem in Canada will probably be one of survival. Consequently it is considered that the maximummilitary forces that can be made available will be required to assist in measures for the survival and rehabilitation of the countryo The battle of survival will be the first priority task and, until survival has been accomplished and rehabilitation commenced, it will not be possible to undertake any military activities in addition to those already being carried out in the first phase. llo The situation following the initial phase in Europe will probably be similar to that existing in North America. However, Europe will not only have been subjected to an intense nuclear attack but it will likely have been overrun to some extent by Soviet ground forces. The greatest effort will have to be devoted to the survival and rehabilitation of the NATOcountries, and therefore military operations will have to be limited to the containment and liquidation of remaining Soviet forceso The NATOpowers by the threat or use of their superior nuclear power will endeavour to prevent Soviet advances and to force the capitulation of the enemy forces. /3 000162 �Document disclo~ed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information TOP SECRET Subsequently it may be necessary to take over certain areas of the USSRto establish control and to ensure that resistance is not reorganizedo It is not envisaged that large forces would be required for these operations or that it would be necessary to occupy large areas of the USSRto carry out this objective. ,Canada might be called upon to assist in the rehabilitation of Europe and operations against remaining Soviet forces. MARITIME OPERATIONS Role of the Maritime Force 12. To destroy submarines in transit to their operational areas. The transit routes , passing as they do through the Denmark Strait and Norwegian Sea, will allow us to obtain a degree of defence in depth by means of an A/S barrier in these areas. However, since some submarines will undoubtedly have penetrated this barrier either before the war starts or during the initial phase , and since submarines can enter the North Atlantic from the South Atlantic without passing this barrier, the role of maritime forces must also be to control waters adjacent to North America by destroying submarines within firing range of North American targets. Canada~UoSo maritime forces in close cooperation will be required to deny this area to the enemy. Concept 130 A large proportion of Soviet naval bases and mobile support facilities will be rendered inoperative following allied attacks. Some s~bmarines can be expected to be destroyed in port, in transit and in A/S operations. The remaining submarine force, although substantial, will be limited to the capabibility of the USSRto provide support. However, because there will be nuclear weapons available, the submarine force will continue initial phase operations in the subsequent phase, but at a reduced and gradually diminishing interisityo Consequently, in the subsequent phase 9 allied maritime forces will have to continue to combat the Soviet submarine threat. Operations 14. In the transit area operations may be expected to start from the outset against submarines already at sea when the initial blow is struck. The intensity of operations will increase rapidly as the remaining submarines are sailed from USSRports to their operational areas. In the waters adjacent to North .America the USSRwill also be capable of deploying a n;umber of guided missile submarines without giving away surprise prior to D-day. These even though small in numbers could provide a significant contribution to the initial nuclear attack on this continent. The number of submarines reaching this area will rise sharply three to six weeks after the initial attack when the full intensity of the war at sea is expected to be felt. This period of intense operations is expected to last approximately seven to eight weeks 9 subsequently decreasing in intensityo To meet these threats, maritime forces should:! a) consist of forces~in=being 9 combat ready and deployed so as to be able to deal with the submarine threat from the onset o b) Be able to maintain intense operations for a minimum period of three months to defeat initial phase submarine operations and to be able to meet operational commitments in the subsequent phase. /4 000163 �r Docum~nt disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information 0 TOP SECRET -4c) Be supported by dispersed bases and alternate maritime airfields outfitted with a minimum stock of 90 days POLand logistics. d) Be provided with seagoing mobile logistic support forces to increase chances of survival by dispersal and, more important, to increase the period that the fleet can maintain its greatest operational intensityo e) Provide a seagoing mobile repair organisation to operate from a safe haven or minor porto f) Control operations through the establishment of maritime headquarters and adequate conununications, located so as to ensure uninterrupted operation during both phases of the waro Pattern of Forces 15. No change in the pattern of forces for the subsequent phase is considered likely as the subsequent phase is expected to be a continuation of the initial phaseo Normal base facilities are not expected to be available after the initial exchange, so, as in the case of logistics, repairs will have to be made at dispersted sites, making use of seagoing mobile repair units to maintain maximum operational intensityo Reserves 16. A small number of naval and air reserves specifically trained and earmarked for a particular duty and located in areas where they would be employed in war, should be able to report at the onset of the initial phaseo It is unlikely that the bulk of the reserves could be employed in the RONand RCAFroles envisaged by this concept of operations until the task of survival has been achievedo Shipping in the Subsequent Phase 170 Shipping at sea will be attacked as a secondary target priority in both_phaseso 'I'he direct protection of shipping, if it is necessary, would require Canadian maritime forces to operate at great distances from North American sources of support, adding emphasis to the need for mobile support to ensure our forces retain the endurance, flexibility and mobility such operations demand. CONCLUSIONS 18. The concept of maritime operations and the role of the RON and ROAFin the subsequent phase will be a continuation of initial phas 7 operations at a reduced intensity due to serious losses experienced on both sides in the initial phaseo 19. The types of RONand RCAFmaritime forces suitable for employment in the initial phase will also be suitable for the subsequent phase. Therefore, the provision of requirements listed in paragraph 14 above will apply to both the initial and subsequent phases in the prosecution of a general war at sea. /5 000164 I �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information . ;, -.,..... TOPSIDRET GROUNDFORCES Role of the Ground Forces 20. The role of the ground forces will be to: in the subsequent phase a) continue to conduct operations in Europe; b) assist c) continue to conduct any required of Canada operations. civil authorities under SACEUR in survival operations; direct defence 2lo Because or the many imponderables in the initial phase, it is difficult to determine when any portion of the balance or the division could be sent to SACEURoApart from some additional support to the force now in Europe to bring it up to WEand provide first reinforcements, the balance of the division has been placed in strategic reserve by SACEUR. 22. Initially most of the Army commitments will be met by the Regular Force with limited assistance from the Militia. As mobilization of the Militia progresses, it will gradually take over all survival commitments in Canada with the exception of defence against enemy lodgments. SACEUR's strategic reserve may not be available for despatch to Europe until conditions in Canada are such that the G9vermnent will agree to its releaseo Its role will vary between employment in rounding up enemy detachments to assistance in the rehabilitation of Western European economy. 23. Army assistance to civil authorities will include policingevacuated centres and maintenance of vital services such as trans· portation facilities, food distribution services, communication facilities, etc. Since the assistance required will vary considerably in different sections of the country and since normal transportation facilities will be disrupted, it may be essential to move troops from one section of the country to another by air. This assistance may extend well into the subsequent phase as the Army.will be required to assist in controlling the return or the economy and population to more normal conditions. However, as indicated above, this role can be taken over progressively by the Militia as it is mobilized. 24. It is difficult to predict at what period in the initial or subsequent phases the requirement for defence against enemy lodgments may disappear. The Army must be prepared to continue to meet this commitment if requiredo The requirement for other direct defence or Canada operations such as protection of vital points, assistance to RCNin Coast and Seaward Defence, and internment and POWoperations will continue in the subsequent phase. It may be necessacy to postpone certain of these tasks in order to meet the demands of civil authorities for assistance in survival operations. /6 000165 �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information TOPS:mRET -6CONCLUSIONS It is concluded thatz a) Ground forces for employment both within Canada and as SICEUR's strategic reserve should be airportableo b) The force in Europe in peacetime must be maintained up to establishment strength and should have with it its initial reinforcements. c) The militia should be reorganized to provide a strong healthy force related to its role in war. Mobilization plans must include the mobilization of the militia although such mobilization may be delayed in whole or in part. d) The Army must maintain its ability to conduct military operations both at home and abroad and at the same time prepare to assist civil authorities in survival operationso The Role of the RCAF 26. The role of the RCAF, in the light of the stated of military operations in the subsequent phase, will bes a) b) concept to continue to maintain the air defence system on full alert until the threat of enemy air operations against North America no longer exists. . To continue to maintain the RCAFcomponent of our maritime force at maximumoperational capability until the enemy maritime threat no longer exists. c) To continue air operations in Europe under the operational control of 4 ATAF. d) To maintain in immediate readiness, the maximum air transport capability to meet the demands of the military services and the civil power for airlift from Canada to Europe, and within Canada, in support of military operations and national survivalo e) With the resources and personnel not directly engaged in, or in logistic support of the above tasks, to assist in tasks related to national survival for as long as required. General Pattern of Reorganization of the ROAF 27. As the role of the RCAFin the subsequent phase will not differ appreciably from that of the initial phase, no major reorganization of forces is required. The following changes in the peacetime /7 000166 �,.. Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information .• TOP SECRET --7pattern of the RCAFwould take place in the initial continue into the subsequent phase: a) phase, and would the role of the RCAFtraining organization would change at the General Alert from that of training to that of providing trained personnel to augment the RCAFoperational commandsas first priority, and to assisting in national survival as second priority. Training might be resumed in the subsequent phase dependent on conditions in Canada. and the requirement for additional trained personnel. b) At some stage in the initial or subsequent phase, the RCAFtactical component which supports the MSFwill either have completed its task or the requirement for MSFoperations will have disappeared. 'At this time, the role of the RCAFtactical component will change to reinforcement of RCAFoperational commands and assistance to the national survival effort. CONCLUSIONS It is concluded that: 28. a) As RCAFair defence, maritime and transport operations are expected to continue indefinitely in the subsequent phase, every effort should be made in peacetime to ensure that logistic support (especially POLand armament) could continue beyond the presently planned .30-day period despite the breakdown in transportation and sources of supply which might be expected from enemy action. b) To ensure the maxinrumutilization of the RCAFforces and resources assigned to national survival, the concept of operations, and the task assignments of the national survival organization should be clearly defined as soon as possible. RESEARCH ANDDEVELOPMENT. Role of the Defence Research Board 29. ations To assist the Armed Forces in their conduct of military against the enemy and in aid of the civil power. oper- _Concept 30. In addition to its Headquarters, the Board operates ten laboratories across Canada. Some 640 scientists and an equivalent number of technicians are employed. Major fields in the Physical, Chemical and Biological Sciences are represented to a more or less degree in DRB establishments and its Headquarters. 31. Under the present concept of conditions which may exist in Canada in the event of a thermonuclear attack, it seems probable that a number of the research activities of the Defence Research Board will cease or at best be seriously disrupted. Under these conditions the /8 000167 j �r Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information , • I I ) 0 TOP SEJRET scientific dispersed and technical resources of manpower might easily and lost to the defence effort. be Probable Tasks 32. In order to prevent such an occurrence probable tasks which might be undertaken should be determined and detailed plan• ning carried out in cooperation with the Armed Services. 33. The training and experience of the scientific and tech• nical staff of the Board make them capable of a variety of tasks which may arise as the result of an atomic attack. Broad examples of such tasks are: a) scientific advice on military enemy action; problems posed by b) contribution to the solution of problems of sur• vival, rehabilitation and control of population; c) direct fields d) calibration e) detection and identification or C.w.; f) coordination of plans for the rehabilitation scientific community. aid to the Services in certain such as telecommunications; technical and maintenance of radiac instruments; of first use of B.W. or the CONCLUSIONS 34. In view of the possibility should start now to: noted in the concept, planning a) Provide for orderly evacuation of each establishment and the Headquarters. b) Determine the requirements of the Armed Services for scientific and technical assistance in light of their anticipated role in military operations following the initial phase of a major war. c) Allocate responsibility to each establishment to organize and train selected groups of scientists and technicians to meet the requirements visualized by the Military Commanders in their area. d) Enlist the support of other scientific agencies and provide for the rehabilitation of the scientific community. 000168 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information I TOP SEX::EET APPENDIX --nA" to CSC:5.ll dated 2 Oct 57. THECONDITIONS IN CANADA DURINGTHEFIRST PHASE 1. 'I'be following is an extract of the Conclusion contained in JPC paper CSC:5.11.9 dated 14 November 1956 which deals with the conditions under which mobilization of Canada's armed forces would have to take place at the outbreak of a general war between the eastern and western blocs in the early 19601 s. This paper was approved by the Chiefs of Staff Committee at their 600th meeting held on 7/8 November 1956. CONCLUSIONS 2. It is concluded that the conditions in Canada on the outbreak of a general war in the early 19601 s may be summarized as a serious disruption of national life and war effort for at least the period of the threat of attack and for a much longer period in areas destroyed or contaminated. This would be caused by evacuation, damage, loss of life, and fall-out in the areas in which the majority o,f Canada's population and armed forces are located, and will include: a) delays and difficulties in obtaining government direction, approval and policy for war measures. b) · Overloading and breakdown of communication facilities in and through evacuated ana/or attacked cities and areas affecting air defence, the command of the armed forces, control of the populace and the coordination of the country's war effort. c) Overloading and breakdown of transportation facilities in and through evacuated ana/or attacked cities and areas thus reducing local transportation, transcontinental rail capacity through Edmonton, Winnipeg and Montreal, and making uncertain the use of terminal facilities in ports such as Vancouver, Montreal, St. John, N.B., and Halifax. d) Fear, confusion, the population. e) Casualties, coupled with (b), (c) and (d) above, resulting in loss of centralized control by civil military authorities • panic, apathy, and even anarchy in and f) Competitive demands between civil defence authorities, municipal, provincial and federal governments and the armed forces, for manpower, transportation, equipment, food and accommodationo g) Breakdown of normal distribution channels for the ~upply of fuel, food and materiel. /2 J I 000169 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information APPENDIX"A" to CSC:5.11 dated 2 Oct 57 -2- TOPsroRET h) Unpredictable circumstances from formulated plans. requiring departures j) The probable abandonment of large areas, have been contaminated, for long periods that or time. ADDITIONAL CONCLUSIONS DRAWN UP BYTHE CHIEFSOF STAFF.COMMITTEE TO PROVIDEPARTOF .THEBASIS FORMOBILIZATION PLANNING a) Conditions likely to pertain in the first few days of a war in the early 1960's and perhaps for the first phase, will require the Services to devote the maximumresources that can be made a~~ilable to assist in survival. _, ? ,irt, .fl/ ~/1- b) ,The ~ba·ttil:e::t.G>:f: survival will be the first pri~ ·ority task and, until survival has been accomplished and rehabilitation commenced, it will not be possible to carry out additional military activities, such as the raising and training of additional forces and the provision of additional stores and equipment. c) · The conditions visualized in this paper may preclude the earmarked reinforcing of our M-Day forces to allow for 100% and round-the-clock manning. Therefore the forces required for urgent defence activities on M-Day, and for the first phase, must be raised, trained, equipped and be immediately available on an alert being declared or hostilities commenced. TOP SECRET f � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Nuclear Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Concept of Operations / 28 NOVEMBER 1957 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1957-11-28 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00114 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived CSC paper no. 1 (57), "Concept of Operations following the Initial Phase of a Major War," 28 Nov. 1957, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 3.