https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/fd9030485f89649d15dee7e7053d6ba0.pdf 415a88572d6c7a6ba997aeabf016f69f PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information (THIS DOCUMENT IS THE OF HER MAJEOTY'S PROPERTY CANADIAN GOVERNMENT) IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE No ... 119tpartmtnt of J!attonal lltftnce ATTACHMENT: TOP SECRET CANADA JOINT 9.~9.... 5.'.'.'.+.+. ...{~9.L ....... . STAFF JOINTPLANNING COMMITTEE ADDRESS REPLY TO CHAIRMAN CHIEFS Of STAFF, OTTAWA- 2 October 1957 Secretary 9 .Chiefs of Staff Concapt-of _Operation Following the Initial Phase of a Major War lo The JPG has studied a DRBcontribution~ inclusion 2. submitted for in the paper on the above subjeet. The JPC now recommends that the DRBsubmission be included in _the Paper ''Concept of Operations Following the Initial Phase of a Major War. paragrapbs29 3. to 34 inclusive The JPC further This ·submission is o.ontained in · in the enclosed Paper. recommends that this Paper be kept under one cover with the CSOPaper "Conditions Under Which Mobilization Might Take Place". .9- rt•krfJ(W_/.,. J.C. Newlands) Majorg Secretary 9 Joint Planning Com.'n.ittee. Copies 2 to 15 inclusive. 000298 ~ �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information ) - TOP.SECRET csc 5-11 COPYNO ___ 2 October 1957. !:-REPORT to the CHIEFS OF·sriFF·coMMITTEE .. , ... - - .b_y_.the - - .•.. - ' - .•· . - . JOINT PLANIUNG ·COMMITTEE The Chiefs of Staff Coilllittee in a paper entitled 1. Under Which Mobilization the preparation of service- Might Take Place", mobilization - tary coimitments during the initial -•--••- provided guidance for plans to meet present phase of a major war. to plan for the subsequent operations necessary for the Chiefs of Staff "Conditions ndli- In order of a major war it is now to decide- on the part the Canadian forces should play during this period and consequently the form the forces should take to meet this requirement. 2. It has been agreed in the Chief's of Staff' Committee that the eondi tions which might exist in_ Canada during the initial a general war may be sununarized as a serious life and war effort for at least disruption phase of of national the period of the threat of attack and for a much longer period in areas destroyed or contaminated. The causes of this disruption and additional conclusions drawn up by the Chiefs of Staff Committee to provide part of the basis for mobilization 3. planning are attached at Appendix "A,~. The Chairman, Chiefs of Sta.f£ has therefore directed the Joint Planning Commmitte to prepare a study on the concept of military operations following the initial is to be carried be related follow.will initial 4. phase of a major war. out within present This study National Defence policy and is to to our agreed equipment policy so that the plans which not interfere with our established priorities for the phase. The aim or this study is to reeonunend to the Chiefs Committee what th' Canadian concept of military operations •••••• 1---------------------------------------000299 or Staff should be ·2 1.....__ �I Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - TOPSF..CRET -2- cluring th~ period toll.owing tb.e initial phase of a major war up to the mid.•l<J60a,together with the role to be played by each ot the 1ervice1 duringthie period and the general pattern of &trf reorgan~ ilation ot tile forces required to carry out this.role. GERERAL CONSIDERATIONS ,. 8 s primary obJective1 in a It ie conaidered that the ene101 maJorwar in pursuit ot his war aims would be to neutralize all, or a major portion of NATO'a main retaliat017 powero This would in• f elude large scale attacks against North Amerioao The enem, can hope to acbine his aim onl.1'bt a surprise attack and as the Soviets will,have the initiati•e at the beginning of the wax-it is concluded tut ve wW.get littl• 110rethan tactical warnings,p:robal:t]1" a was,itrcot 2•3 houre received from the DEWlineo 60 It is verr difficult to judge when the initial phase would end. ad the subsequentphase begia, however, it is considered that the ild.tia1 Phase woulden4 when the enemyis incapable of delivering large eoai. nuclear attackeo The initial or wttlct, ..,_, ~ere will not be ait,y phase could last tor dqa abrupt change f'J"omthe initie.l pbase ~ tbe subeeque•t phase. 7• %niht!! i'\1'1,e~qu~~t pbase ot opera.tions we will be 11mite41a our oapaotty to tigb.t to the 94eELpone remaining at the end et the ild.tial ' phase. F\lrthermore\le cannot e.ss1JJ11.e that any productive aapaoit, will be available tor eomeconsiderable time. 8. Xt is aeswed thate a) tlie initial phe.ee has mt broupt an en4 to hostilities and the will to l:ring ~e warte - a eucoesstul conclusion still exists in MA.TO, Wewi1l still meet resistance in varying de• greea trom the forces ot the USSRo i-----------------------------------000300 1, 7 j �i Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information At the close or the intense nuclear exchange b) the NATO powers will ha\'e euperiority in the abillt1 to deliver nuclear attacks. ·concm OF)JILITARYOPERATJORJOLLOWIBG TD 9. Pl4SE of forces and tile intense uee of Despite the heavy attrition nuclear weapons during the initial phase the Soviets will still limited in the use ot th• nuclear weapons and will only be numbers and types of deliver, systems still available. 11111have a small number ot long-range aircraft and will also have a substantial but reduced operations. INITIAL have 'bt the The Soviets for sporadic raids number ot submarines tor sustained There will therefore be a continuing re- quirement tor air defence and anti-submarine forces for the defence ot Canada and the United States. 10. Because of the intense Soviet use ot nuclear weapons during the initial p~ase, directed against targets in North America, the pri- mar., probl811111'1Canada will probabl.7 be one or survival. -Consequenti, it is considered that the maximum military f"orcee that cd be made available will be required to assist in measures ~or the survival and rehabilitat1on ot the eount17', The battle ot survival will be the first task and, until survival priority commenced,it will not be possible to undertake and rehabilitation any- militar;r has bee11e.ccompliehed activities 1n addition to tho•• alread7 being carried out 1n the ti~st phase. 11. The situati~n ab]J' be similar "ill following the initial to that existing phase in Europe will prob- in North America. However, Europe not onl1'have been subjected to an intense nuclear attack but it vUl like]¥ have been overrun to some extent by Soviet groun4 forces. The greatest effort will have to be devoted to the s'Ul"Vival and rehabilitation of the NATOcotmtriee, and therefore military- oper- ot ations will have to be limited to the containment and liquidation remaining Soviet forces• · The IATOpowers b7 the threat or ttae ot /4 i-----------------------------------000301 j �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • TOPSECRET - 4 - their nuclear power will endeavour to prevent Soviet superior advances and to force the capitulation Subsequently it !la.Ybe necessary the USSR to establish not re-organized. required control of the enemy forces. to take over certain areas of and to ensure that resistance is It is not envisaged that large forces would be for these operations or that it would be necessary to occupy large areas of the USSR to carry out this objective. Canada might be called upon to assist Europe and operations against in the rehabilitation of remaining Soviet forces. MARITIMEOPERATIONS Role of the Maritime Force 12. areaso Strait To destroy sublla.I'ines in transit The transit routes, to their operational passing as they do through the Dell!lark and Norwegian Sea, will allow us to obtain a degree of defence in depth by means of an A/Sbarrier in these areas. How- ever, since some submarines will undoubtedly have penetrated barrier either before the war starts or during the initial and since submarines can enter the North Atlantic Atlantic without passing t..his barrier, must also be to control this phase, from the South the role of maritime forces -waters adjace·nt to North Allerica by destroy- ing submarines -within firing range of North .Allerican targets. U.S. maritime forces in close cooperation will be required Canada• to deny this area to the enemyo Concept 13. A large proportion support facilities attacks. Some of Soviet naval bases and mobile will be rendered inoperative allied submarines can be expected to be destroyed in transl t and in A/S operations. although substantial, to provide support. weaspons available, initial following in port, The remaining submarine force, will be limited to the capability of the WSR However, because there will be nuclear the submarine force will continue phase operations in the subsequent pha~e, but at a reduced ea•··,} ;i-,-· ·~ ~ ,·• ~ . ..... /5 1-----------------.--...--------------------------000302 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information - • TOP SECRET - 5- and gradually dillinishing the,subsequent Consequently, . in intensity., phase, allied, Jlari tiiie forces will have to continue to combat the Soviet submarj_ne threat. Operations 14. In the transit outset against intensity sailed area operations may be expected to start submarines already at sea when the initial of operations will increase from USSRports to their rapidly operational from the blow is strucko The as the remaining submarines are areaso In the waters adjacent to North America the USSRwill also be capable of deploying a number of guided missile l!IUbmarineswithout giving away surprise prior though small in numbers could provide a significant nuclear attack on this continento contribution the initial of the war at sea is expected to be felto operations is expected to last to the initial The number of submarines reaching this area will rise sharply three to six weeks after intensity to D-dayo These even approximately - attack when the full This period of intense seven to eight weeks, subsequently . decreasing a) in intensityo consist To meet these threats, of forces-in-being, maritime forcel!I should: combat ready and deployed so as to be able to deal with the submarine threat b) be able to maintain intense operations for a minimum period of three months to defeat'initi~l operations from the onset. phase submarine and to be able to meet operational commitments in the subsequent phase. c) be sunnorted by dispersed airfields outfitted and logistics d) bases and alternate maritime with a minimumstock of 90 days POL o be provided with seagoing mobile logistic support forces to increase and, more important, chances of survival to increase maintain ~ts greatest by dispersal the period that the fleet operational can intensityo oeooeooooo/6 Q 1----------------------------------------000303 _·_1 -.1 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • - 6 - 14. e) TOPSECRET Provide a seagoing mobile repair organi- zation to operate from a safe haven or minor port. t) Control operations through the establish- ment of maritime headquarters - and adequate - eommunicatio1lS, located interrupted operation so as to ensure un-during both phases of the war. Pattern 15. or Forces No change in the pattern considered tinuation likely of .forces for the subsequent phase is as the subsequent phase is expected to be a con- of the initial expected to be-available case of logistics, phase. after repairs Normal base facilities the initial exchange, so, as in the will have to be made at dispersed making use of seagoing mobile repair tional are not sites, to maintain maximumopera- units intensity. Reserves 16. A small number of naval and air reserves and earmarked for a particular duty and located specifically in areas where they would be employed in war, should be able to report the initial phase. It is unlikely until at the onset of that the bulk of the reserves could be employed in the RCNand RCAFroles of operations trained the task of survival envisaged by this concept has been achieved. Shipping in the Subsequent Phase 17. Shipping at sea will be attacked in both phases. would require The direct protection Canadian maritime forces from North American sources of support, as a secondary target of shipping, and mo~ility such operations is necessary, to operate at great distances adding emphasis to the need for mobile support to ensure our forces retain bility if' it priority the endurance, flexi- demand. •••.• /? 1---------------- ....... -- .......... ----------------~---000304 �, Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • TOPSECRET - 7 CONCLUSIONS ~8. The concept or maritime operations and the role or the RCNand RCAFin ~f i~tial the subsequent phase will be a continuati~n v due to reduced intensi phase operations at a serious loeses experienced on both sides in the intial phase. 19. The types of RCNand RCAFmaritime forces suitable the initial phase will also be suitable provision of requirements listed initial and for employment in for the subsequen~ phaseo Therefore, the in paragraph 14 above will apply to both the subsequent phases in the prosecution of a general war a.t seao Role of the Ground Force; 200 The role of the ground forces in the subsequent phase will be to: a) continue to conduct operations under SACEUR in Europe; b) assist c) continue to conduct any required direct defence of civil author~ties in_survival operations; Canada operations. 21. Because of' the many imponderables in.the initial phase, it is diffi- cult to determine when any portion of the balance of' the division sent to SACEUR.Apart from eome additional support to the force now in Europe to bring it up to WEand provide first the division has been placed in strategic 22. Initially progresses, reinforcements, reserve by SACEUR. from the Militia. As mobilization of the it will gradually take over all survival commit.mentein Canada with the exception of defence against enemy lodgments. strategic the balance of' most of the Army commitments will be met by the Regular Force with limited assistance Militia could be reserve may not be available SACEl.JR's for despatch to Europe until conditions in Canada are such that the Government will agree to its releaseo Its role will vary between employment in rounding up enemy detachments to ae.eis tance in the rehabilitation of' We~tern European economyo o. o oo ooo/8 i---------------------------------------000305 _j �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu_ de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • - 23, Arllf¥ assistance to civil authorities will include po1icing evacuated centres and maintenance ot vital services such as trana• portation tac111tiea, tacilitia1, etc• tood distribution services, commmication Since the asaiatance required will -ra:qconaider• ablJ'-in ditterent sections o:t the counts-y and since nol"Jll&l. traupor- tatioa tacilitiea will be disrupted, troops hem one aeotioi,. ot tbe it 001:mt17 JDa1'be essential to to another bf air. JllOTe ibie a1 • i1tance ..,- extend well into the euoaequent phase as the bar ¥111 be required to assi1t in controlling the return ot the econoiqr8114 · populatioit to more no%'m&l conditions. However, as inclicatecl abo-re, thie l'Ole cu be taken oTer progreseivell' 'by the Militia as it 11 mobilized • 24• It ie ditticult to pi-edict at what period in the initial subaequant phases the requir••nt mardi,appear • or tor detenoe against en.., lodgment• !he A'l'tJtj m\lat be prepared to continue to meet thi• cona1taent if' :required. !he t-eqttirement to'l' othet- direct defeno• ot Canada opetationa such as protection ot vital points, assistance to I.OBin Ooa1t8Jl4 Seaward Defence, and internment, and JIOW operatiou will continue in ihe subsequent phase. It ID!A1 be ~eoaasar, to ,01t• pone cfftaia ot the1e ta1k1 i• orde:r to 21eet the dnan4e ot ciT11 tor assistance 1~ 1\U'"ViTal operation,. authorities QOlliLVIJQIII· 25• It it concludedtlaate a) Gro'31ldtorces tor emplo,aent both wi;hia C&nada 11 1trategics reserve should be airu4 aa SACED portable , la) The toroe_1n Europein peacetillle auat be main- tained up to establishment stre~gth and should bave with it itJJ initial reinf'orcement1. o) 'lh• militia should be reorganized to pro'V'ide • strong healthJ- tore• related to it1 role in war. Mobiliaation pl&M must include the mobUizatiqn of ,.the militia althoup 1-------------~IIUIV!!!W-~be~~A\t.84 1- _________________________________ such mobUizat1oa h---lih.o.l•~A~r~. ~1~n...p~.a~rt~•------+-/t•--Q00306 ._. �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information ., •9- - 1------------....._ d) The Az,q must maintain its abilit7 to conduct militar,- operations both at home and abroa4 and at the ·s•e time prepare to aaa1e1; civil authoritiea.in eurvival operation•• AIR n,.e Role of tl)e Rpg 26. The role ot the ROAF,in the light or the stated concept ot milita17 operations in the subsequent phase, will be: a) To continue to maintain the air defence qstem · on full alert until the threat ot enem, air operations aga~nst North Amerioano longer exists. b) To continue to maintain the ROAFcomponentot our maritime force at maximumoperational capabilit7 until the eneJD1maritime threat no longer exists. c) .To continue air operations in Europe under tbe operational control d) or 4 ATAF. To maintain in immediate i-eadiness, the maximum air transport capabilit7 to meet the demands ot the militarr airlift servicee and the civil power for from Canada to Europe, and within Canada, in support ot milite.1"1 operations and national survival. e) With the resources and personnel not direct]1' engaged in, or in logistic to assist support ot the above tasks, in ~ska r~lated to national sUl'\'ival tor as long as reqw,.red. /10 __________________________ .000307 1 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information ·• - TOPSll:RET -10- General Pattern of Re-Organization or the RCR 27.• As the role ot the RCAFin the subsequent phase will not differ appreciabl.1 from that ot the initial organization ot forces is required. peacetime pattern phase, no major re- The tolloVing changes in the ot the RC.AFwould take place 1n the initial phase, and would continue into the subsequent phase: a) The role ot the RO.Al training organization would change at the.General Alert from that or training to that of providing trained personnel to augment the RC.AF operational commandsas first and to assisting priori tr• priorit)", in national survival as second Training might be resumed in the sub- sequent phase dependent on conditions in Canada and the requirement tor additional trained personnel. b) At some stage in the initial the RCAP'tactical or subsequent phase, component which supports the MSF will either have compl~ted its task or the require• ment tor MS1operations Will have disappeared. thi1 time, the role ot the ROAFtactical At component will change to reinforcement ot ROAFoperational eomandeand assistance to the national survival ettort. CONQLUSIOU 28. It is concluded that8 a) as ROAFair defence, maritime and transport operatione are expected to continue indefinitely in the subsequent phase, every effort should be made in peacetime to en• sure that logistic support (especially fOL and armament) could continue beyond the presently planned 30-dq period despite the breakdown in transportation and sources ot supply which might be expected from en9D11 action. /11 1- ______________________ _.______________ 000308 - J �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • • TOP SECRET ':" 11 b) To ensure the maximumutilizatio.n resources assigned to national of operations, survival of the ROAF.forces and survival, the concept .and the task assignments of the national organization should be clearly defined as soon as possibleo .. - ... -- Role of the Defence Research Board 290 To assist the Armed Forces in their conduct of military against the enemy and in aid of the civil operat.ioW!I power.. Concept 300 In addition to its Headquarters, acrol!IS Canada. Some 640 scientists employed.. Major fields represented 31.. the Board operates ten laboratories and an equivalen'i number of technicians in the Physical, are Chemical and Biological Sciences are to a more or less degree in pita establishments amd its Headquarters .. Under the present concept of condi ti.one which may exist in Canada in the event of a thermo-nuclear attack, research activities seriously it seems probable that a number of the of the Defence Research Board will ceaBe or at best be disrupted .. ~nder these conditions the scientific sources of manpower might easily be dispersed .and technical re- and lost to the defence effort. Probable Tasks 32. In order to prevent such an occurrence probable tasks which might be undertaken should be determined and detailed planning carried out in cooperation with the ArmedServices .. 33. The training and experience of the scientific Board make them capable of a variety and technical staff of the of tasks.which may arise as the result of an atomic attack .. Broad examples of such tasks are:a) scientific advice on military problems posed by enemy action ..; b) contribution rehabilitation, to the solution of problems of $Ul'vival, and control of population; ooooeooe/12 000309 - �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Docume'llt divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur /'acces ii /'information • • 33. - 12 - C) direct aid to the Services in certain TOPSECRET technical fields such as telecommunications; d) calibration e) detection and maintenance of radiac ill8trumen"M. and identification of first use of BoWoor c.w.; f) or plans for the rehabilitation coordination scientific of the community. CONCLt5IO~, .34. In view of the possibility noted in the concept., planning should start now·to:a) 1 Provide for '-orderly evaoua.tion of''each es tabiishnent and the Headqua.rterso b) Determine the requirements of the ArmedServices -for scientific and technical anticipated initial c) role in military Allocate responsibility Enlist to each establishment to organize and and technicians by the Military visualized to meet Commanders in areao the support ot other scientific "tor the .rehabilitation. 1-----------------"' of their operatioll8 following the groups of scientists the requirements their in light phase of a major war. train selected d) assistance of the .""' ,_ ~ ,'· ~ "scientific :agencies and provide c6mni ty • . ~ --·..-...·---------------------------' . i------------~---""'!"""-----------------------000310 j � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Nuclear Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Concept of Operations / 2 OCTOBER 1957 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1957-10-02 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource en Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDTT00112 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Concept of Operations Following the Initial Phase of a Major War," 2 Oct. 1957, LAC, RG 25, vol. 4903, file no. 50115-P-40, part 3.