https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/f54f6c9ecdacbbe6993fb542495dee71.pdf 8dfcd9dc8476fc0f4947bdcc30f2e0de PDF Text Text D T * (?} / r r f r p a n )^}Fi u m e n t d ' s c , o s e c 1 ' u n d e r . t h e Access to Information Act * ' ' Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information if-1TOP SECRET Februaryj 23, 2 3 , 1956. 1956. /,- MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNSIjB^gECRETARY y S 7 (through Mr. Ig5&£lafff * fy /?* t*f*£*•&. Subject: ^^flsmorandum concerning the formula presented by -'the Canadian Delegation at the last Meeting of Consultation In Washington concerning the exchange of information and consultation between the two, governments on the subject of Alerts Altogether I saw Mr. Amory of C.I.A* three times and Mr. Armstrong of the State Department twice on the above subject, although at no time did it appear that either of them had talked to each other, a factor which did not make my discussions any easier. I have recorded separately and in detail the first two discussi ons which I had with Armstrong and Amory on arrival in Washington. These discussions went on much the same lines as Mr. Glazebrook*s previous talks and which he recorded in his personal letter to me of January 2£. I am attaching the record of these discussions in case you wish to glance at them although I do hot think it is necessary* 2„ On seeing Amory a second time he said that it would make the problem very much easier from the Administration's point of view if we could separate out the problem of consultation between governments from the problem of exchanging information during a period of crisis which might lead to a declaration of an Alert by either government. In addition, he said that the question of establishing an intelligence communications link between the National Indications Centre in Washington and our new Indications Room in Ottawa was one which he felt sure could be dealt with by a letter from me as Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee to Mr. Allen Dulles, as Chairman of the United States Intelligence Advisory Committee. He regarded this particular problem as one of "nuts and bolts" which should not run Into difficulties of principle. I am, accordingly, attaching a draft which I prepared and presented to Mr. Amory before I left Washington with the request that he let me know if this was the kind of letter which, in his opinion, would be acceptable to the United States intelligence authorities* 000256 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a {'information \ - Z * TOP SECRET 3. After further discussions with Mr. Glazebrook, we decided that perhaps it would assist our negotiations further If we prepared drafts of separate letters dealing with the first two subjects mentioned above* These might be sent from the Canadian Ambassador on behalf of the Canadian Government to the United States Secretary of State. These, of course, only have the status of personal drafts but nonetheless I passed copies to Amory before I left Washington, stressing that they were purely personal. I asked him to pass both drafts on to Armstrong of the State Department. Mr. Amory Is to let Mr. Glazebrook know- his reactions to these drafts but he did volunteer the quick opinion that he could see no difficulty about the one dealing with the exchange of intelligence. lim In the course of my last discussion with Mr. Armstrong, he supported the notion of separating these two problems because he said he thought the question of government consultation was the more difficult since he did not consider that the United States Government would be likely to bind itself under any formula which'required it to consult another government before taking action itself. As you will see, it took ,no less than three conversations to bring Armstrong to what now seems to be the main problem* i/r . 5* I am attaching the drafts of the separate letters and would be glad to have your initial reactions to them. If they appear acceptable to you, I should suggest that they be not put to the Minister at this stage and that we should' wait until we have further U.S* reactions to the drafts. If you agree, however, I shall prepare a letter to General Foulkes \enclosing the drafts and copies of the record of my first two ^/^conversations. We should, I think, also send him the draft ^l < -A ^ t h e letter to Mr. Allen Dulles if you approve, concerning the communications link. For convenience, I 'am attaching a copy of the 6. ' \f\ "Formula" delivered by the Embassy to the State Department Mv°on December lit, 1955 following the Meeting of Consultation* *i 1 tutut h+~t~J******* / Defence Liaiso. v i si on .000257 �^ j ' Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act I Document divulgue en vertu(dg(la/#jj£gr I'acces a {'information Feb. 15, 1956. TOP SECRET MEMORANDUM ON INTELLIGENCE PROCEDURES RELATED TO ALERTS: Discussions in Washington. I discussed with Mr. Robert Amory of the CIA on February 15 the formula on.alerts presented by the Canadian side at the last meeting of consultation. I explained the exercise in much the same terms as those set out in Mr. Glazebrook's letter to me of Jan. 25, I said that we were not dissatisfied with the volume of intelligence which we now received from Washington and that it was not the purpose of the exercise to attempt to obtain more than we now received. We did, however, wish to ensure that, at a time of crisis when the Canadian Government might be requested by the United States Government to take certain action, both governments would be working from the same sets of facts. In order to ensure this, it seemed to us that a direct line was required between Washington, e.g., the NIC on the Washington side and our own Indications Room in Ottawa. I foresaw that the line might be kept alive In quiet periods by exchanging weekly Watch Committee type reports. We expected in the near future to produce this type of weekly report. Any queries or differences in assessment from week to week might be exchanged over this line and, clearly, in a time of crisis such an arrangement might be vital* We were anxious to eliminate from the system any built-in delays such as getting cypher operators or officers out of bed before a piece of information could be passed in either direction, 2. Amory said that he foresaw real difficulties in putting the formula as it stood to the IAC. He was particularly afraid that paragraph 1 might be interpreted as meaning that the Canadian Government should receive now, for example, information on the Chinese offshore islands. He added parenthetically that Admiral Radford and some of his colleagues were always looking for "curved balls" and #•*& 000258 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu d e T ^ ) | P ' g g ( 5 f ^ f a I'information - 2 - that this might be the Interpretation they would choose to put on the paragraph. I said that we were not concerned with getting more information now under this formula, but, clearly, if a crisis were involved which was likely to lead to the alerting of the North American air defence system and if we were to be asked to take certain action, it would be necessary to receive the facts and make our own assessment. After a good deal of backing and filling, Amory expressed the view that it might be possible to use the present land line which runs from the NIC to NSA, and thence to CBNRC and Ottawa JIC. I said I did not think -it mattered much how the line was routed so long as it terminated in the right places. 3. Discussing the formula in further detail, he felt that the first part of paragraph 2 did not add anything to paragraph 1 and that paragraph 4 was of no concern to the United States intelligence authorities. He also added that he was worried abcut paragraph 3 which referred to "relevant Information including the background necessary.....". Did we expect to receive under this sentence operational information such as SAC's plans? I said that I believed that what we meant was intelligence information and not United States planning information. There might be a requirement for that quite separately, but it was not part of the formula we were discussing. I said that I could imagine that it might be desirable to inform United States Naval authorities, for example, if the Canadian Navy decided to put to sea on an operation which might involve the United States, but this was not, however, what we were concerned about here. Amory seemed to be satisfied with this explanation of paragraph 3. 4. Insofar as paragraph 2 is concerned, I conceded that this was meant to be largely descriptive and did not add to the first paragraph. I did not suppose that we would be too worried if the Americans wished to cut it out, but I would have to seek instructions on that. Equally, with regard to paragraph 4, while this was an essential part of the operation as between governments, it was not part of the intelligence operation itself. He said, for example, 000259 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu <%e$f Lqifigflgflses a I'information - 3 would it be satisfactory if paragraph 4 were included in an exchange of notes or letters between governments rather than as part of the formula, since-it was mainly descriptive of the ultimate object of the intelligence exercise. I said I did not suppose It mattered how it was put in an exchange between the two governments, although it seemed to me that it had to be put in somewhere. 5. Amory then said he thought it might be possible to refer paragraphs 1 and 3 to the IAC. I said that I did not think it was a matter for us to say what should be put to the IAC or to any other branch of the Administration, We were, however, concerned to reach some satisfactory agreement in terms similar to those we had set out in our draft. 6. Amory then said that he thought that if the formula were put as it stood to the President, he would almost inevitably initial it. The difficulty was, however, that the Services might well see all sorts of objections and advise him differently. He thought perhaps the best way might be to by-pass the IAC entirely and take it up to Gordon* Gray, the Assistant Secretary of Defense-, thus perhaps avoiding too long contemplation of the problem by the Pentagon.: I said I could not advise on internal tactics within the Administration. I then suggested that he might like to contemplate the problem further and perhaps talk to Park Armstrong, and that we might discuss the matter again in the light of his further consultations. Amory agreed to do this. 7. In the course of the conversation I mentioned the item which appeared in the Journal of the last meeting of the Joint Board on Defence, in wbfch the American side had raised the question of consultation between the Canadian and United States authorities on the imminence of war with the view to obtaining agreement with the Canadian authorities at this time for consultation between local commanders on both sides of the border. I pointed out that,this was an example of the United States Services considering it necessary and worth while to raise a matter which was clearly related to the formula which we had presented at the meeting of consultation. Surely these desires could be suitably ...4 000260 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de lffQffst8E&BBffi I'information - 4 - married. Amory was unaware of the American proposal presented to the Joint Board and asked whether we proposed to accept the formula. .1 said I thought it was highly unlikely we would accept it until we had some general agreement between the two governments. Clearly, the two matters were related, I added that I foresaw the prospect of producing all kinds of separate arrangements for consultation between local commands, e.g., Colorado Springs and St. Hubert, and there seemed to be a danger that we would end up with the "tail wagging the dog". I mentioned as an example the conversation I had had with General Taylor, the Chief Intelligence Officer at Colorado Springs, who was already passing a lot of information by direct line to St. Hubert. I said it might cause some confusion, as indeed I pointed out to General Taylor, if information was passed between lower echelons which was not passed between the intelligence authorities concerned in Washington and Ottawa. Amory said that while he saw this point, he doubted whether information passed between Air Defence Commands would be likely to affect the main problem which we were discussing in relation to the Canadian formula. I said I merely pointed it out to show that without some direct line for exchanging assessments, one might be led Into considerable confusion and difficulty* G. G c.c. to Canadian Embassy, Wa ngton 000261 �f- Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Docum^Qi&§feW&flfertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information Feb. 20, 1956* TOP SECRET MEMORANDUM FOR FILE Alerts I discussed on February 17 with Park Armstrong the formula which we had presented at the last meeting of consultation for dealing with the exchange of intelligence leading up to a possible declaration of an alert for North American air defence system. I went over the ground in much the same terms as I had done with Amory. I tried to convince Armstrong that liaison officers could not be the answer to the problem in time of crisis. Some direct communications link between a point in Washington, e.g., the NIC, and our Indications Room in Ottawa appeared to be the only sensible way of dealing with it. This would not, of course, eliminate the value of liaison officers. . 2. Armstrong argued tentatively that If we increased our liaison staff that this would give just as good an answer. I argued strongly against this saying that I did not see the point in leaving three or four liaison officers in Washington or in Ottawa whose principal task would be to wait for a crisis. This seemed to me both wasteful and unreal and would not in any event produce the rapidity of action which seem&Vto me might be required. He seemed to be worried, however, about the notion that the link between NIC and our Indications Room would be manned by Americans at one end and Canadians at the other. He seemed to be worried about the privacy of what he called national communications. I said I did not see any reason why such a link could not work in much the same way as the present one between NSA and CB. Obviously one only would put on the link what one freely wished to trade. If there were other national views which either side thought should be conveyed with an oral explanation, presumably liaison officers would still be used* *. • & 000262 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de lajjoisurhicc^dI'information - 2 - 3* Armstrong then express some worry about the implication that all intelligence information relating to a given crisis should be exchanged and pointed out that I well knew there might be some delicate item which might be difficult to pass. I told him that surely this would be implicit in any agreement we might have and **"" "'J^f eankle^y^the written agreement we now had for the exchange of special intelligence. Both sides realized perfectly well that we could not pass seme items because of national interests, but nobody had ever suggested that because of that no agreement could be reached. I said I fully realized that there were items of information, e.g., from double agents and that type of thing^which there might be good and sufficient reasons to prevent irlf^Bexng passed. I thought, however, it was Important that we agree on principles and if the principle* were agreed, that we should have a direct link. It would be a simple matter for the communicators to work out how the link should be run between Washington and Ottawa. He then tentatively suggested that perhaps the present link between NSA and CB could be used and I conceded that this might be possible, although the communicators would have to look into the current loading of the lines. 4. I told him tha't Amory hoped to have further talks with people in Washington before T returned to Ottawa and that I hoped I would hear further about this problem before I returned. 5* I also saw Mr. Horsey in the State Department and gave him the 78 r.p.m. recording of the above line. I was encouragedto find that he had already married up on the same file this question with the one which had been raised in the last meeting of the Joint Board on Defence on consultation on the imminence of war with a view to penaltting local commanders to take certain actions. G(L--fl<crean. c.c. to Mr. Glazebrook. 000263 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information DRAFT (COFfJ mtmm!$ si* isse 8. K .0 R.I T &#&r Br* #uilea> l a the light of afjf vmmt dlaousstoae in WaaMagtcm I ma' writing to au&geafc that ** should improve th© eessaua* ieatione £aetti.tl**ifeet-weenour two orga&ittotlons* I be H a w that rapid eemunieatlone to deal with ludloatloua intelligence • bsariag tm m possible attaefe ©a Sorfch Marie© aigfct well be vital in tioe ef a&er<goftey and X, therefore, ulfib. to ^iropoae oa behalf 6f th© train* *nt**Xlig©ne© Cosaaittee that a direet eosBosinloatiotM link suitable for a l l ts?p©a of intelligence fee ©steMiiihea between our ^oiat Xnteliigenee Staff (thdieation© Rosm) aad whatever paint in Washington youtoea suitable for thia purpose* I auseeet that the existing link hatneea. R*8.A* ©ad C«&.K»ELG. he need f o r this purpose, fto© CB, texaiiuO. i s now linjeed to our .Tolnt Staff, and parhepe ait equivalent XinlE aoulft bo established between IT.S.A* and tha point yoa select la Washington* If t h i s proposal i s aaeeptahl© to yon, ;X augment we tin* the problem Uf any) oirey to the appropriate eoauaunicatoni on. heth ©idee to work out any additional teehnieel arrangement® wfcieh j&ay. be naeaeearr to ©ata&lish the link* Chairman, J.I.C. Allan PuXXes, Bsg,»» Oheiraaa, xr.a.x.A*c* (feraoaal draft .p?egar©-4 ay Olaaebroots/Creen of paeeible l e t t e r to K3*S* X*A.C. froa the Chaiasao t .ff.l.C*. on the aufejeet of AlertaJ* �- Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a I'informatio S TOP SECRET Arrangements for consultation, in relation to any requirement for alerting the defences of North America, between the United States and Canadian Governments are being made separately. To provide a sound basis for such consultation, it is proposed that the Canadian and United States Governments agree as follows! (1) The two Governments will keep each other informed on a timely basis when they receive information of a kind which, if examined, might cause either to conclude that there was a likelihood of hostilities occurring in which Worth America would likely be attacked. (2) The receipt of such information may require rapid executive action on the part of both Governments, Accordingly, the United States and Canadian intelligence authorities as represented by the United States Intelligence Advisory Committee and the Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee will pass to one another automatically and by the most expeditious means all intelligence information of the kind referred to in paragraph (1) above. They will also pass to one another all additional intelligence information, including background information, which will make it possible for each intelligence authority to make an assessment of the situation to which the information referred to in paragraph (1) relates. Any such assessments will also be exchanged expeditiously between the two intelligence authorities. (3) The United States Intelligence Advisory Committee and the Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee will make arrangements to ensure that such exchanges can be made by the most expeditious means possible. February 21, 1956. (Personal draft prepared by Glazebrook/Crean of possible letter to U.S. Secretary of State from the Canadian Ambassador on the subject of Alerts) 000265 �Docunrent disclosed under the Access to Information Act - " Document divulgue en-vertu de la Loitur faeces a {'information S E C R E'.I In a separate exchange of letters (identify) 'the United .States arid Canadian Governments have agreed to exchange intelligence which might lead, to a cony. ~elusion that operational alert measures would.be required to deal with a possible attack oh North America. The Canadian Government proposes that the two Governments should agree as follows; (1) In a situation in which either Government . , concludes that alert measures are necessary or desirable both in the United States and Canada, the two Governments agree to.consult. '(2) Such consultation will take place through diplomatic channels. If- either Government considers that more detailed arrangements for . consultation become necessary, either Government is free.to make further proposals. February '21, 1956 (Personal draft prepared by Glazebrook/Crean,.of possible letter to U.S..Secretary of State from the Canadian Ambassador on the subject of Alerts) �• • . - . . Document dbclosedB |fthe 'Access to Information Act (Copy Of paper handed tOD&tftitft (BftBgUetHJEfc dWlal&for fty$s a {'information following I n s t r u c t i o n s in-DL*2081 of^Dee* 10) s *.- TOP SECRET 1* Th© United States and Canadian Government agree that they will invariably and immediately inform each other when they receive information of a kind which, if examined, might cause either to conclude that there was a likelihood of hostilities occurring in which North America would likely bo attacked* 2. The criterion for passing information of this kind between the two Governments might be defined as the receipt of Information which could call for rapid action on the part of the Intelligence authorities in Canada or the United States; this could, although not necessarily* coincide with the calling of a R crashn meeting of the United States Watch Committee or Intelligence Advisory Committee, or tha Cam d ten Joint Intelligence Committee* •* . 3, Under such a criterion, the Governments agree that* for the duration of the Incident calling'for such action, the United States and Canadian authorities, particularly the Intelligence authorities! will automatically pass to one another all the relevant information, including the background necessary to understand the problem and their respective assessments of the problem* Ii.. Where consultation at a higher level, including Ministers, also became necessary, such an arrangement should ensure that Ministers would be fully in possession of the necessary facts upon which to base their consultations* - CANADIAN EMBASSY, Washington, D.C. December 13, 1955* � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIW00048 Title A name given to the resource CDIW00048 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Tripartite Intelligence Alerts Agreement," RG25, Box 34, File 29-3-1-2, Part 1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Subject The topic of the resource Intelligence Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/staging/CanadaDeclassifieditems-November2020/CDIW00048.pdf Language A language of the resource en