https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/338324e41010f14e64042d87d2417c29.pdf dcc8027aa042ceb9bc632b2a11c59449 PDF Text Text .i / .'• Document disclosed under the Ateess to lafarmaiion- Act-' . " .•*, -V ft. \ y » -•',.- ' . ' ' , . - '• ..:."'• '"'••'-'•':•'" ••. Defence Lioleoh (!) Division •. ' y • .-•"_•: •'•"• - •'•* - .: y." .. •"-'. Defence Liaison (2) Division "•'"••>"'' f -'1 •.><- TOPSEGRBT ^ ; .November £tj*_-l<g> •'."'.'•• •" •"""'" ";•.'.:.- United States Alde-Hemoir© datedJJovember 18* I95'5l©n '•: Alerts Procedures •. * J>. The following are my preliminary comments so far as the Intelligence aspects of the Alde-Merablre are concernedj (1) Paragraph 2 of their^ general -comments ' ' X am not clear what is meant when It is stated that the "procedures outlined in the British' paper should" be regarded as exceptional*1. Does this merely refer to the strictly NATO aspects or the entire paper* Perhaps this is a point on which we should seek clarification. , : y ;'•.-•• .*•',"' .•'.; (2) Paragraph II of the* general oomments . X doubt that existing procedures for exchange of intelligence are adequate. It could bo argued not only that therprocedures ^are inadequate but that we do not receive all the information we should, although this applies primarily to Far Eastern information which is hot, of course, covered by thilr paper. : /- I also question the expeditioUsness of the present . channels. While it is. true that a summary of the;Watch Committee Report is cabled to us it does not come directly to the J.I.C. and we have found.in practice that when we have to comment on it, we have waited as long as several, months to obtain any satisfactory reply.: It seems clear that we need to establish a direct bommunlcatlons link between the 2.A.C. or some other body designated by tho •,••• United States authorities and -the J.I.C In Ottawa, y It Is 000314 �v\ jf-'}. "VT"^ .-.. Document disclosed under the Acces&to Information Act-. ' ^Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur I'acces a I'informatio - hot, as .you know, merely a question of exchanging .reports but a question of commenting on the assessments which these contain in both directions. At the moment, this is where speed is lacking. In addition, there are no direct liaison channels between-tho I.A.C. and J.I.C* There is no United states l.A.C. representative in Ottawa nor a*J.I.C. representative In Washington, although I am sure this could be easily remedied* (3) Concluding Paragraph on Pa^e k Since the Aide-Memo ire! suggests that the procedures for political consultation^should bo explored further, X •/. believe this would give us ;on opportunity to re-open the intelligence problem.' I believe we could argue with some effect that an exchange of information and assessments on the intelligence level are basic to subsequent political discussions. It will hardly be satisfactory if the political consultations take place on the basis.of different interpretations, e.g. of military information, some of which might not have reached us through one of several possible intelligence channels. For example, under,the present system, we might receive information from any of the United States intelligence agencies represented on the l.A.C, namely the three services, the State Department, 'C.I.A.-and the. F.B.I* ••' . , '• 2. Those comments are preliminary and the Aide-Memo ire is to be discussed at our next meeting of the J.I.C 3* As you know, our own house has not been put in . order to centralize the exchange of "hot" information and assessments. Our views were submitted to tho Chiefs of Staff in a paper, dated March 21, in which we recommended an additional officer and two clerks to deal with indications intelligence. ... The intention was that this extra officer would be attached to J.I%S. and that an Indications Room would be established adjacent to the J.I.C. conference room. The creation of the room was accepted In principle but the Chiefs decided that we needed no more staff» I believe we •»• must go back to the Chiefs on this and I hope the Department would support strongly the request for additional staff. If We regard the expeditious handling of intelligence information •• 3000315 �-7 " Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act ,-—Document divulgue en vertu de la Loisur i'acces in {'information s~~. D • ••" " ^ 7 • . : -...' •' .• - • • ;.•:-. •' . f-'-T^ '• •'• • - '••" ,.•• - 3 <• '' "v as basic to=satisfactory political consultation, then clearly we must support any proposaie which will help to make the system work* Even though We are short of officers, I believe we should perhaps be prepared to say at the Chiefs of Staff meeting that we would supply an officer for.this purpose. This, at least, would have the effect of making them take the matter more seriously than they have up until now* ®\&m) G, G. CREAIi. Defence Liaison (2) Division V '""••• -, t. .:• v " •• .- • »T. •• ... . ;. • .v. •: • •'•..-..' 000316 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIW00032 Title A name given to the resource CDIW00032 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Tripartite Intelligence Alerts Agreement," RG25, Box 34, File 29-3-1-2, Part 1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Subject The topic of the resource Intelligence Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/staging/CanadaDeclassifieditems-November2020/CDIW00032.pdf Language A language of the resource en