https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/0bd092aa480700886c502353d6056611.pdf 4c4b31e93b3ba2a0e93becb5582f4a7d PDF Text Text Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Defenc^SMlW^rDW S E C R E T January. 10, 1955 There is a further and related question Concerning "alerts" which has not yet been dealt with satisfactorily either in NATO or between ourselves and the United States and United Kingdom authorities. It seems clear that however satisfactory a procedure may be worked out for dealing with "alerts" that procedure depends fundamentally on an assessment of the information which leads to an'klert". we suspect that it is the problems surrounding this question which has led Sir Anthony Eden to be so emphatic about urging a tripartite agreement between London, Washington and Ottawa before going further. The Chairman of the Ottawa Joint Intelligence Committee has k been in communication with the Chairman of the London J.I.C. in an effort to obtain United Kingdom views* We have not yet tackled Washington on the problem. At least in part as a result of this preliminary correspondence, the London J.I.C* discussed the question of "alerts" and its relation to intelligence at a meeting on December 23,, 1954* Although we have not seen the papers on which the discussion was based, the following quotation from the Minutes may be of assistance to you in any discussions you have with Sir Norman Brook and other United Kingdom officials. 000348 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi sur I'acces a I'information - 2 * " ALERTS (Previous references J*I*C* (5^)lH|.th Meeting, Minute 10) THE COMMITTEE continued their discussion on this subject which had been covered in three separate papers* MR.. DEAN said that it was clear from the discussions which had taken place in Paris that it would be necessary at the earliest possible stage to examine the machinery whereby an agreed U*S*/U*K*/Canadian evaluation of urgent indicator Intelligence could be reached and passed to the highest political levels in all three countries. The first step, however,, was earefully to study the present system of handling alerts in the U.K. which was not by any means clear* This study was a necessary preliminary to any discussions with the Americans and Canadians,* The urgent need for closer coordination was accentuated by the changes the Americans proposed to make in their Watch Committee system, which had been covered in a recent Secretary's minute. In discussion it was agreed that an examination of the U*K* system was required which would high-light any weaknesses or deficiencies and recommend measures to correct them." 2 * From a preliminary examination here of the problems Involved, it seems elear that the United States Air Defence Command has been calling "alerts" (which of course Included the Air Defence Command at St,* Hubert) without telling us precisely the Information which has led them to take such action* It Is, therefore,'more than ever Important that the J*i*C* In Ottawa should have available to it both from London and Washington by the most rapid means possible all information of a kind i which might lead to an "alert" so that an intelligence assessment of the information may be made here. Ift arrangements of this kind cannot be made we shall, of course, be at the mercy of both the operational commands in the United Kingdom and the United States* * *. *3 - 000349 �Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgue en vertu de la Loi surfaeces a I'information -3-, •'•', • r' ,Tl,>, • 3» By the same token one wonders on what basis NATO commands will call "alerts" under the current agreed procedures* The only intelligence which they receive now are in fact contributions made by national intelligence organizations* So far as we know, such intelligence is evaluated before it goes to NATO commands but .even so it seems clear that NATO commands will be lnrv;?ririn£3ry at the mercy i^^^^ of the principal intelligence organizations of NATO, namely* the United States and the United Kingdom* The latter question is not one which can readily be discussed in NATO, but if an agreement could be reached*tripartltely between the intelligence organisations In Washington, London and Ottawa, this should go a long way to ensure that NATO commands receive properly evaluated Intelligence from national staffs. It is, of course, possible that the NATO commands themselves may receive some indication from their own sources of a situation which should lead to an "alert" but by and large this seems unlikely* There is, of course, some 9 danger that they may receive intelligence from the United Kingdom or the United States authorities in the field in Europe which will be passed to them laterally before the information has been properly evaluated in London and Washington* k'* x» The foregoing remarks, of course, only state the problem on the intelligence side and we are not yet in a position to suggests suitable solution. 000350 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDIW00012 Title A name given to the resource CDIW00012 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived "Tripartite Intelligence Alerts Agreement," RG25, Box 34, File 29-3-1-2, Part 1, Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Department of External Affairs Subject The topic of the resource Intelligence Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/staging/CanadaDeclassifieditems-November2020/CDIW00012.pdf Language A language of the resource en