https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/3c677b4e03fba36a1054677b25151d93.pdf 6f99721d43eeaa3f14ebeca2a95eae61 PDF Text Text Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project GAC ATIP A-2023-03407 GAC Special Registry File 9500-00 File Pocket Public Safety memo to Hurtubise "Enhancing Canada's Foreign Intelligence Capacity Update and Next Steps" Note: This undated memo was prepared sometime after October 2006. �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - D,vulguE' en vertu de la lo, sur l'accE's a l'informat,on s.15(1) - Security TOP SECRET CEO TD No. - 342201 MEMORANDUM TO THE DEPUTY MINISTER ENHANCING CANADA'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE CAPACITY Update and Next Steps ISSUE: Enhancing Canada's foreign intelligence capacity. BACKGROUND: • The Conservative Party's Federal Election Platform for 2006 includect·a commitment to: "Create a Canadian Foreign lntelfigence Agency to effectively gather intelligence overseas, independently counter threats before they reach Canada and increase allied intelligence operations. " • Further to direction received from the Minister's offi~e in this regard, the Department led interdepartmental discussions·on options to enhance Canada's foreign intelligence capacity starting in spring 2006 and continuing through the fall. • • Following briefings provided to the Minister late in the summer and early fall, • and consideration of options, the Minister • In October 2006, you met with the Director of CSIS, the Commissioner of the RCMP, the Associate Clerk of the Privy Council Office, the Deputy Minister of National Defence and the head of the Communications Security Estabiishment, to review options. The creation of a senarate a12encv dedicated to the collection of foreign intelligence was discussed, While various other options were discussed at the October meeting, Deputies did not agree on a specific recommended approach. 000044 PS-SP A-2008-0096 1476 L/_L{ �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - D,vulguE' en vertu de la lo, sur l'accE's a l'informat,on s.15(1) - Defence s.15(1) - Security TOP SECRET CEO CONTEXT: • There is a wide range of intelligence work currently being carried out by the federal government,._ So~e_ intelligence ~~t_iyijLe_? !~l_a!~ !~ ~44r~§~ipg_tlu:ea!s_ !O. _ ..... -~eleted_,_.-~------< the security of Canada, such as terrorism or foreign influenced activity, while • •• -[oeleted:, other intejlig«:ru;_e_activities are carried out to·protect or advance Canada's economic,._political or defen,;:e interests. All kinds of intelligence cat! be, and - ·,..o_e_le_te_d_,_,n_<l_ _ _ _ _ _--< are. collected ~ithin Canada ab~~?~~ ~on~isieni with th; ~arious ~andates . . .. Deleted: The collection of both sccudty of departments and agencies as conferreli;-sl~hlt; by- -P·a-rl1;a-m·· -en-t- o-r- t-hr-o-u··g-h- •• - •• intelligence and foccign intelligence wkcs place within Canada and abroad the exercise of Crown Prerogative and • The co!lection of intelligence regarding threats to the security of Canada is the primary responsibility of CSIS pursuant to section 12 (s.12) of the CS!S Act. . The Service collects security intelligence within Canada and abroad, often with support from or in collaboration with other departments and agencies, and in concert with Canada; s allies. • The Service also collects foreign inte\\fa.ence_pursuant to section 16 (s.16) nf the CSJS Actin relation to the defence of Canada or the conduct or the internationai affairs of Canada - but the Act allows the Service o n l y ~ within Canada. It does so atJ.he..request of the Minister of roreign Affairs or the Minister of'N'ational Defence and with the Minister of Public Sa:fety's approvai, .• Intelligence is aiso collected by other departments and agencies, for example; the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade coliects intelligence relating to the conduct of the external affairs of Canada, the Department of National D'efence (DND) and the Canadian Forces collect intelligence, regarding.(a_I),:,J.4a:~ _\i~ft,p._c~__lnterests,_a_n_d_(J-i_e_(:'.9rrJ~llrJi9a_tforJs_ Security__ . ___ _ Establishment (CSE) is the lead agency for aii technicai coiiection (signals intelligence) against intelligence targets • oeieted: ! • Oe:fei:eci: in respeci Deiete& of A key gap in current iegislative arrangements is !! lack of capadty for Canada At this time, there is no department of agency with the specinc statutory authority in this regard. ANALYSIS:· Based 6i'i interdepartmental discussions, the following approaches Wefe considered to address this gap: -2 .. PS-SP A~2008-0096 1477 '-{S 000045 �GAC- Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC- D1vulguE' en vertu de la loi sur l'accE's a !'information s.15(1) - Security TOP SECRET CEO o The creation of a separ~te agency reporting to a responsible minister to provide a clear focus for foreign inte!Jigcnce collection (as is the approach in the United Kingdom and Australia, for example, where an agencv responsible for intelligence collection abroad reports to the Foreign Secretary); or o The expansion of the existing mandate of one or more departments or agencies, build.ing on existing legislation and operational arrangenients (e.g.: amending the CSIS Act to allow the Service to collect foreign intelligence abroad). Creation of a separate foreign intelligence agency • •• Establishing a new agency dedicated to ■ collection abroad would address. the key gap in Canada's current arrangements and capacity. It would provide a capacity for Canada to pursue its own political and economic interests in a more direct and focussed way than has been possible to date. It would also align Canadian arrangements more closely with those of our key allies, who have agencies dedicated to collection of intelligence abroad. • The creation of a dedicated agency would require new legislation and a substantial fiscal investment (both in terms of one-time and ongoing costs). The precise costs, time considerations to establish such an agency, and legislative implications are difficult to assess in the absence of preliminary guidance as to .how much intelligence is to be collected (based on GoC priorities), using which collection methods, and how the activities of the new agency would he reviewed. • • That said, the "one time" costs for the creation of a new agency would include acc~mmodations for headquarters and associated infrastructure, including IT costs. 1 These would be higher than most start up Government departments or agencies due to the requirement for greatly enhanced securityand infrastructure to support foreign operations. Parallel investments in other departments or agencies would almost certainly be required, for operations support and coordination purposes. • Considerable thought would have to be given to the exact mandate of a new agency, particularly in terms of how it would interact with Canada's existing intelligence collection efforts. At a minimum, every effort would have to be 1 It is estimated that the CSIS building (which has the required security and IT features). '!'ould cos ■ ,r more today. That building currently supports roughly! ~ -3 - 000046 PS-SP A-2008-0096 1478 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - D,vulguE' en vertu de la lo, sur l'accE's a l'informat,on s.15(1) - Security TOP SECRET CEO taken to ensure optimum coordination and cooperation between departments and agencies, to make the most effective use ofresources and avoid parallel or conflicting tasking. • The question of to what Minister a· FI agency would report would also be important, and there would likely be a variety of strongly held views on what would be most appropriate. • Although the option of creating a dedicated foreign intelligence agency was discussed■■l■■■■l■■■■■■I■ • Expansion of the e~igi11_g mandate of one Or more departments or a~nciefu. Q!!ihl.i.ng on existing legislation and operationalai-rangements Another approach to enhance Canada;s foreign intelligence capacity would be to amend existing legislation to give the mandate of collecting - • • •• • • abroad lo an existing body. ; lt WOUlct provide a capacity ior Canada to pursue its own political and economic interests in a more focussed way;, • The potential costs of establishing of increasing a dedicated non-threat-related foreign inteiligence capacity within afi existing department of agency are difficult to assess. Costs would naturally depend ofi how great a capacity wouid be estabiished, and that would relate back to the priorities that are to be addressed. Further study in this regard is stlii required. Preferred approach • Based- em interdepartmental work and our assessment to date there are three recommended proposals: i. Amend s. f 6 of the Esls Act lo fern5V6 the "wlthin Canada;; prov1sion to aliow Cs Is to collect foreign intelligence outside of Canada, with appropriate supporting res5Urces. -4- 000047 PS-SP A-2008-0096 1479 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - D,vulguE' en vertu de la lo, sur l'accE's a l'informat,on s.15(1) - Security TOP SECRET CEO 2. Seek resources to expanding the capacity of other departments and agencies involved in intelligence collection abroad and in analysis/assessment (e.g.: CSE, DF AIT and PCO). These resources could increase both foreign intelligence and security intelligence capacity. 3. Identify mechanisms to ensure effectiveness and optimum collaboration among Canadian intelligence agencies regarding the collection of intelligence abroad (e.g.: to ensure that work is complementary, and avoid duplication or unnece,;sary overlaps). It should be noted that these approaches could be pursued independently, incrementally or simultaneously. That said, the Department is of the view that every effort should be made to pursue all approaches simultaneously. CONSIDERATIONS CSIS Mandate • CSIS could use its existing infrastructure at home and abroad in building a new foreign intelligence capacity abroad. There would be greater opportunity for integrating and coordinating foreign intelligence and security intelligence operations within CSIS, and in connection with CSIS cooperation with other Canadian agencies and foreign partners. • Because of the structure of ministerial decision making set out in s.16 of the CSIS Act, the Minister of Foreign Affairs or Minister of National Defence would likely still be required to request CSIS to undertake operations, with the approval of the Minister of Public Safety (and possibly also the approval of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, since operations are occurring abroad). The current Tri-ministerial MoU on s. 16 operations could be updated to address specific new considerations that would arise, such as coordination of work. One consideration in any expansion of the s.16 program would be possible impacts on security intelligence collection efforts. Any enhancements to the s.16 program should be implemented while ensuring security intelligence collection efforts are not compromised. • CSIS believes that woulO ne1p ruma currem govemmem msKmg rcqmrerm:ms; anu mnner, ll!at the removal of the "within Canada" restriction alone (even without new resources) would see an immediate in.crease in foreign intelligence provided. -5- PS-SP A-2008-0096 1480 000048 �V,C - R.•l-■ ud und•r th ■ Acc ■11 to Information, Act/ AMC - D1vul1u• ■ n v•rtu d• I ■ lo, 1ur l' ■ ccll1 i, l'inform ■t,on s.15(1) - Secur.ity General .. . .. . •As discussed, the,½_eJ:i,rSCll,isence ~,;e f~i::.9~i.;!!4a.~o_d_ay_i§ J~f:c~JZ1!.C}!Y_~o- _. __ ... go!lecVpEC,igp};;iteJiJg~~c.e_r_e!~t~ }<.'.9P!1~tl! p_oJiJtc11!~nd economic interest,:. ' • •• .•• • • •. • • . • Although som. .. ....... _ .... . ,there is inadequate focus in thill 11~ Jo inoet'Canaaa's" • . strategic needs today aild in the future. . . • •Prior to moving ahead.,the G()vem111ent wlli needto decide ·now imp9rfamt the collection of foreign .inte!liger;<;e is· and how . far it.wants to, ii • go. tp minimize gaps and/or enhance exi!ting co!!ectlon effods.J:art of the process to determine priorities must include an assessment <Jf risks and benefits, and of potgntlal !imitat!ons on what Canada may be Vliliing to take: !(e.g;, - •• • •• • .The Government ..pust. decide. wheth~r the benefitiof creating a foreign. intelligenc~ capa9ityabroad outweigh3 ili~ risks and to what! . ex.tent the .Government wants to enhance its existiµg 'capacity. There are a number of;jskiassociat~d.wiUi theMllectiotlof foreign inte1ligellcr, whether it it1 in Canada or,abroad.. The activities associated with forei •intelli ence collection . .· , • .. ·' ',. :_- '·.,·. ',, ',, •• ;' • A relat~ ,md potentially cntiqal, fact6~,f'or $1/G~vemmcrit to coosid~ is whether. the ~artadfan public will. v~ew Jh~ eollectio.;i,of foreign intemgence abroad a& _beiµg coqnter tc:i 9ilnadil¥! valUCiS l!Ild ettucs. 1J,ie c;anaqian' public may view the colfoction of . . • . . . .• fbreign intelligence abroad, as being ''un~Canadian'.'; or,it may be viewed It as a practical necessity for Canat:la gi tli() ~ri<i today. •• •••• Inaddifion, furth~ to discussions among Deg.ill(!$ inQpt<lbet '.2006dtJs by no t11eans clear th4t enba1tdng foreign inte!Hgence capacity (i.e., p9litical, military and ~noµtie intellige11ce to iidva;ice C11nadi.lnfo.terest$Jis actually the key interest of the Govem;n.ent. Tiie platform commitment of the Q.ovemmen~ wzis to create a nt:w agency to ''effectively gather intelligenc(!. overseas, .• .··.... . independently counter threatsbeforetheyreachCa!7ada, tinfincr.·ease ~llied intelligence operations", TheGovemment ma)'preforto incr9115e and £.!}l'l~nce PS-SP .Aa200S-0096 1481 000049 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - o,vulguE' en vertu de la loi sur l'acces a !'information s.15(1) - Security s.69(1 )(g) re (a) TOP SECRET CEO Canada's involvement h foreign operations to ensure the safety and security of Canada and Canadians at home and abroad. Should the Government prefer to enhance foreign operations abroad, discussion should perhaps instead focus on whether the National Defence Act should be revised to allow the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) to target Canadians engaged in threat-related activities abroad. Interdepartmental Issues While most departments and agencies will likely agree that much is to be gained by enhancing Canada's foreign intelligence capacity, it must be emphasized that consensus on a recommended approach has not been reached. Further work with departments and agencies are required prior to presenting • There is recognition among departments and agencies that any enhancements to existing foreign intelligence collection capacity should also provide for increased coordination among Canadian intelligence agencies and departments, including for example: • .Q_Increase / expansion of secondment and liaison arrangements; .Q_Ncw administrative mcchanisms/MoUs for coordination within the community; o Consideration of the role(s) of the National Security Advisor, or ofa new "National Security Commissioner" as discussed in the Government's election platform (this may b"'. a longer term issue); or o Government-wide interoperability of secure communications (this is a longer tenn lss11e, with work ongoing). ·{ Formatted: Svl!ets and Numb~rlng \ Departments also agree includmg policy makers an t osc wit 1 respons1bil!ties tor intelligence, military, diplomatic or law· enforcement operations. This is a subject under aetive discussion among ADMs. Increasing Canada's intelligence analysis capability is essential to allow government departments to make use of information collected whenpreparing assessments on the dimension, scope and impact of threats and our interests, and in detennining our approaches to address them. PS-SI' A-2008-0096 1482 St> 000050 �GAC- Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC- D,vulguE' en vertu de la lo, sur l'accE's ii !'information s.15(1) - Security TOP SECRET CEO Resources • The precise costs associated with amending the CSJS Act and subsequently implementing CSIS's new mandate are difficult to assess in the absence of well defined objectives (presumably GoC priorities). • The recent decisions on security and intelligence priorities by Ministers provide general guidance. The five priorities identified are: countcr-terrorisn1, supporting the Afghanistan mission, counter-intelligence, organized crime, and weapons of mass destruction. It is v1orth noting that the priorities are predominantly micnted to security intelligence. Parallel investments in departments/agencies other than CSIS would be reguired in connection with an expanded foreign intelligence mandate for CSIS, for operations support and coordination (e.g., DFAIT, CSE, Justice). /,fore broadly, if there is a desire to expand capacity of other departments and agencies for the collection of intelligence (potentially all types) abroad, resources for a range of functions should be considered, including: I •••• -. .- j _suppo_rt; analysis and asses'sii'iem. Con'siliera.ole farther mterdepartmental d1scuss10n and analysis ofrequirements is required. Parliament Amending the CSIS Actto remove the "within Canada" provision from s.16 would be contentious and could lead to a complex review of the entire Act, initiating debate and discussion on a broad range ofissues relating to CSIS' mandate, powers and activities. <;:oncems could be raised over a perceived "concentration" of intel1igence powers arid capabilities in the hands of one agency. Conversely, opening up the CSIS Act would provide a potential opportunity to address other issues (e;g. CSIS sharing of classified information with provincial governments or the private sector). In light of Justice O'Connor's recent reports, somehow addressing ove_rsight and review in the context of CSIS and other departments and agencies' operations abroa,1 would be important. Establishment of a committee of parliamentarians to review national security matters would be one way to do this. 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Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDFI00024 Title A name given to the resource TD No. 342201, Memorandum to the Deputy Minister, Enhancing Canada's Foreign Intelligence Capacity (Update and Next Steps), Undated After October 2006 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource Undated-06 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived GAC Special Registry File 9500-00 File Pocket Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource GAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Foreign Intelligence Service Description An account of the resource A-2023-03407 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Access to Information Request Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource English