https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/ab9b5fa0c4b3a027e80bff2e5f81a29c.pdf e32b8bfdcc67bf7aece4dfb9edb72fcd PDF Text Text Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project GAC ATIP A-2023-03407 GAC Special Registry File 9500-00 File Pocket DFAIT Livermore to Wright "The Case for a Foreign Intelligence Service" "What's Wrong with Foreign Intelligence in Canada?" 16 July 2003 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - o,vulguE' en vertu de la loi sur l'acces a !'information s.15(1) - Security Department of Foreign Affairs and !t1ternational Trade TO DESllNATAIRE fvlJW FROM EXPEDITEUR ISO Minht?:ire des Affuires etrang&res ot du Commerce intern2JiorwJ D. Livermore/992-7400 Security / Si§currt6 SECRET (CEO) F1!e / Dossler REFERENCE REFERENCE SUBJECT OBJET DISTRIBUTION Date July 16, 2003 A Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service Number I Numero Attached are two papers asking essentially for consideration of a Canadian foreign intelligence service. The first paper asks: what's wrong with foreign intelligence in Canada? The second paper is a "think-piece" arguing the case for such a service and endeavouring to pinpoint a strategy for getting this idea to Cabinet and beyond. In due course, we would be grateful for an opportunity to discuss with view possible ways forward. Daniel Livermore Director General Bureau of Security and Intelligence ,,,~•,,{' .... . , f}() • 1,,i !!,,p. \,11,J,b·, T 407 (93/12) q5 000085 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - o,vulguE' en vertu de la loi sur l'acces a !'information s.13(1 )(a) s.15(1) - International· SECRET s.15(1) - Security CANA.DIA.,_~ EYES ONLY What's wrong with Foreig_u Intelligence in Canada? Canada has very Jew independent sources of foreign intelligence. We depend on foreign intelligence from Allies, who are free to be selective in their distribution or to link distribution to their own foreign policy goals. While strong intelligence alliances are useful (we get products at a fraction of the cost to us), they nm the risk of creating "dependancies", where vve cease to work for ourselves and become branch plants for others. There is no strong "analytical" capacity in the Government of Canada, and Canadian leaders and senior officials are not accustomed to reading analytical materials (unlike the British tradition, of heavy reliance on the Joint Intelligence Comrnitiee). There are many unresolved conflicts in the Canadian intelligence community and a clear absence of collegiality. But because these issues are difficult, neither Ministers nor senior officials want them resolved badly enough to tackle the problems. There is no Canadian tradition of "policy-driven" or "client-driven" intelligence, whereas in the USA and UK, demand comes from the top. Instead., the intelligence function is not weU 1mderstood, and is often poorly coordinated at the centre, with meagre results for using expensive intelligence materials to unde1pin cliscussion of key policy issues. Tackling the problems: On the issue of Canadian independence in foreign intelligence, only the entry of Canada into foreign. intelligence collection abroad would help alleviate the problem. but a more considered approach is essential, namely, whether Canada ,vishes to create its ov,n foreign intelligence service (or capability). Our o,vn capability would help in several 'Nays. First, it would provide some of our own sources for addressing key information needs, instead of our almost total reliance on others to provide answers. Second, it would enable us to evaluate more critically the - The lack of a serious, professional analytical capacity i.n foreign intelligence has long been a proble:11, which the PCO/Intelligence Assessment Staffv.ms supposed to address. Improvements have been made, hut several additional steps seem essential: first, the TAS needs to be slightly larger, sirn:e it lacks breadth, and its analysts cover too much ground; it cam1ot be "professional" unless it is also "expert" in its areas of covcrag;:;; second, its style of writing ,md presentation needs to change; its reports are often '8G ooooss �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - o,vulguE' en vertu de la loi sur l'acces a !'information s.15(1) - International s.15(1) - Secu~ity SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY uninteresting and poorly drafted, presented in an unattractive format; although these are small points, they detract from marketing the product adequately; the LA.S should specialize in short, sharp, crisp, policy-relevant analyses, backed up by longer assessment pieces which are well d r a f t e d third, the Canadian Government must end the silly competition from CSIS (and to some extent DND) in the assessment business, and put its faith in the IAS to do the job; CSIS can produce materials, but let it be relevant fo its own securityintelligence mandate. Mandate issues cut to the heaTt of what the intelligence community is cmTently doing, and more-relevantly, not doing. T,vo remedial measures would be appropriate: - I I 1Vith respect to "policy-driven" or "client-driven" intelligence, progress has been made in the past several years, particularly within DFAIT and with the MMSI process. But we need all of Government to think about its "information" requirements as it makes policy decisions, and prepare baseline outlines of their needs, so that the intelligence community can work as the service.function it should be playing. There is the potential that a PCOled, revitalized MMSI process could play a more central role if there is a will at the top. Reform is a long process, with habits of mind and traditions playing as much of a role as machinery and policy issues. But it is possible to improve Canadian intelligence and ensure that we get value for money. 000087 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - D,vulguE' en vertu de la lo, sur l'accE's a l'informat,on s.15(1) - International s.15(1) - Security SECRET CAl~ADlAJ'\' EYES ONLY The case for a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service Kev points: " • ., the key "intelligence" issue confronting the Canadian Government is whether to create a Canadian Foreign Intelligence service_, for the co.llection abroad the absence of such an agency lies at the heart of many ofthe intelligence commumty's currc:it difiiculties; acquiring such a capability would complete our intelligence architecture. the creation of a foreign intelligence service \Vould give Canada a means of acquiring its own infom1ation to underpin foreign policy decisions, and by reducing our almost total dependance upon others, it would support and enhance Canadian sovereignty . without serious movement in this direction, we run a risk, namely having to continue to rely on informa.tion provided by others in support of foreign policy decision-making, at a time of possible divergence in foreign pohcies among the key intelligence allies. What a.re the issues? " " the key issue is whether or not Cana.da should acauire a c::mabihtv to do_ "Foreiim ,,, Intelligence"; other areas of "intelligence" are ·well covered, including~fenei,_J i,{;:)• C.) Intelligence, Signals Intelligence ,md Security Intelligence; our weak point is the absence of a separate foreign intell.ieence service. which can supply the Government of Canada with independent, high-quality information on developments abroad. ; /iii., (;v, 1 for a variety of historic reasons, we do not have a "central" intelligence mechanism like the .Americans, nor do we have a foreign intelligeru;eservTceTikellie13''ii11sh10-r..'.tfie-- u ? A Australians. Following 9/11, the creation of a foreign intelligence service was briefly discussed in PSAT, but received only cursory consideration and Vi,lS side-tracked, l , ~ '~\ .. " wlrv do we need a torernn mtclhzcnce agencv. ,md ,vhv nmv? fa part, because offae nature of the new security threats abroad, certain types of infomntion can only be acquired 000088 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - D,vulguE' en vertu de la lo, sur l'accE's a l'informat,on s.15(1) - International s.15(1) - Security SECRET CA..NADIAN EYES ONLY s.13(1)(a) We can no longer argue that "diplomatic reporting" fills an intelligence vacuum when it comes to reportii1g on Al Qaida or similar organizations. Without a capability of our own, we are reliant on information supplied by others, which in many cases can be tainted. In brief, our sovereignty is in part compron1ised by the absence of a capability to get the information we need for sovereign decision-making. In art as well we need the ea abilit now because e are also nummg the danger of havmg our Allies supply us information " • " • we also need senior-level consideration of a foreign intelligence service because the incremental---serious, a d v ~ a n d the Government. This is the which no serious democratic state would allow to persist. what would be the obiective of such a forcien intellieence agency? In brief, it would be driven by the information needs of senior Government clients. In other words, the principal objective of the ~ e to supply credible, authoritative information on foreign developments, - ifwe argue the case for a foreign intelligence agency, what are the issues, and the models? The attached paper describes the three basic models. But clearly the UK model of BSIS most closely suits the Canadian political system, our foreign policy traditions, and our accountability structure. The Australian model, built on BSIS foundations, is usefol in demonstrating how a small institution, with clearly-targetted geographic priorities, can meet intelligence needs. the key issues are: • ( a) authority: to whom does the agency repo1i? We believe that, consistent with the BSIS model, a new agency must fall under the Foreign Minister's authority; • (b) accountability: what structures are in place to ensure compliance with policy and law? There must be an oversight committee of Ministers, and possibly of senior "outsiders"; • (c) mandate: a relatively small agency requires a strict operational mandate as to the issues covered and the countries/regions of concentration; • (d) budget: we vvould visualize a service in the range of million per annum (possibly up to , when up to foll operations at the end of an initial five-year period; (e) publlc versus pnvate launch: we would recommend that any such service be initiated without acknowledgement but with appropriate accolmtat:J111ty strncrnres. 000089 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - o,vulguE' en vertu de la loi sur l'acces a !'information s.15(1) - Security SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY \Vhat is the wav ahead'! . . the issue of Canada moving towards its own foreign intelligence service needs initial buyin by the PCO Intelligence Coordinator, and in due course (and ideally) by CSIS and other members of the Canadian intelligence community; a· decision to create a foreign fj, . . . I .x,.,,,,,,.. mtelhgence service -l ~ , wo should ure th, qu~oon o, ucmng" t o n ; - - s=ce, whotho,- - • if the decis1on 1s m favour of building, over time, a Canadian foreign intelligence capability, a successful strategy would probably begin with a short period of , leading within a year or hvo to a disti11ct service, with a speci:fic mandate • because creation of a service will take time, the ideal scenario would unfold as a se1i.es of distinct steps, with the speed of the "tnmsition" some,vhat dependant on the availability of new resomces; as there is little prospect oJ "separating" CSIS's major foreign i11telligence resources from their security intelligence establishment, most new resources should be considered incremental. a number of steps wiil be necessary: • first, senior Ministers, including the Pri..rnc Minister., need to take a decision in principle on the creation of a foreign intelligence service, through a paper possibly jointly drafted by DFAIT and I'CO; lllltil relevm1t senior Ministers are agreed in principle, it makes little sense to work on the larger, complex issues of scope, responsibilities, mm1date, etc. second, once senior Ministers are azreed. the issue needs to go to Cabinet bv wav • of a formal MC,. ~ at this stage, buy-in by all members of the, C:madian intelligence community is essential, including by the Solicitor General; at this stage, the issue of fLmding needs to be resolved.. third, once Ministerial and Cabinet decisions in principle are sernred, a transition group needs to be fonued to manage the forei 6'l1 intelligence fllllction as the new service ttkes shape; ideally, the group would be composed ofDFAIT, PCO and CSIS officials, working jointly on issues ofprocedLrres, responsibilities, etc. I . • • fourth, specific assistance and cooperation need to be sought from our key partners the;r experience, where relevant, can help :ichieve des:red goals more quickly, abser:t Canadian experience in this mea. fifth, once agreement 011 responsibilities, mandate, direction and budget is achieved, the service would be launched incrementally, as part of - 000090 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - o,vulguE' en vertu de la loi sur l'acces a !'information SECRET CAL''•!ADIAN KYES ONLY a gradualist five to ten-year plan, with a coherent long-term strategy. Immediate Steps: 6 "4 ii:)~" 1!f' fr;ff> Over the next few months, as transition issues take shape, 'NO need to test the water? VliJf Ministers be responsive to the idea of a new foreign intelligence service? Is there a perceived need for independent Canadian capabilities in this area? Or is the cunent situation perceived as satisfactory? We then need to engage key Ministers individually on the problem, the range of possible alternatives ahead, and our reconunended option. \Ve need to be prepared to place a fully-considered, well-defended proposal before Mini.sters over the next six to nine months. ltl 000091 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDFI Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. 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Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDFI00018 Title A name given to the resource Daniel Livermore, DFAIT, The Case for a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service & What's Wrong With Foreign Intelligence In Canada? 16 July 2003 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 16-Jul-03 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived GAC Special Registry File 9500-00 File Pocket Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource GAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Foreign Intelligence Service Description An account of the resource A-2023-03407 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Access to Information Request Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource English