https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/92b2b88a0892bc166f3228513e6bd8df.pdf ff34f903a78bf86ffe6cfe082a82ac2a PDF Text Text Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project GAC ATIP A-2023-02220 GAC Special Registry File 9500-00 Part 1 "[Foreign Intelligence] Collection: Organizational and Operational Options" Note: This unsourced, undated document was likely produced by officials in DFAIT in 2001. �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - o,vulguE' en vertu de la loi sur l'acces a !'information s.15(1) - Security SECRET HVCCO - COLLECTION: ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL OPTIONS Executive Summary Introduction: Canada will need to effect a number of changes to cope with the world emerging in the post-cold war era. The collective arrangements of that period provided, inter alia, defence in depth through NATO and NORAD and a system of intelligence sharing arrangements among an inner core of allies. Elements of this cooperation that continue to be of value to all participants will likely remain in place. It is unlikely, however, that the intelligence sharing will be as all-embracing and uncaveated as before. National interests will inevitably supercede some common goals and related intelligence will be witheld. Canada, like our quinquepartite intelligence partners, will want to review and re-prioritize national requirements for intelligence along with future defence needs and other subjects pertinent to foreign policy formation. At present, Canada is largely dependant on these partners (USA, UK, Australia and New Zealand) for foreign intelligence. This shared intelligence is supplemented by some Canadian-collected SIGINT, - land very limited HUMINT derived by CSIS as a b y - p ~ t counter-terrorism (CT) and counter-intelligence (CI) mandates. The missing element is neither provided by allies nor collected b~anada abroad. The issue of whether Canada can continue to develop soundly-based foreign policy against an incomplete and fragmented intelligence collection base needs to be addressed. The issue is extremely important if the premise is accepted that policy formation requires a policy-neutral perspective on the world aimed at portraying accurately the real situations that obtain in areas where Canadian foreign policy objectives must compete for attention. The Fundamental Facts: The current foreign intelligence base has served Canada reasonably well but exhibits both weaknesses and gaps. Intelligence analysis provided by allies is global in scope but gives no indicators as to origin or dependability. Further, judgements and conclusions cannot be probed, tested or confirmed by Canadian means. The raw intelligence on which the conclusions and judgements are based are not provided as an adjunct to the assessment. The forejgn origin product 000128 �GAC-ReleasedundertheAccesstolnformationsAct/ AMC-Divulgueenvertudelaloisurl'acce5iil'information SECRET HVCCO s.15(1) - International s.15(1) - Security - 2 - therefore might or might not address a Canadian priority. Canadian reporting is based on information from open sources or is provided in confidence through channels. It may provide pertinent information but it cannot be confirmed and it lacks the policy-neutral perspective necessary to give policy-makers an unbiased and factual backdrop against which to make their decisions. is a significant contributor to the factual data base but it can only collect what is available and is therefore dependant on the laxity of the target's communications security practices. Hence, in respect of sensitive information held by cautious custodians, it cannot be depended on to provide the desired intelligence. The HUMINT provided by CSIS is limited largely to collection in Canada and is consequential to its primary mandate to collect national security-oriented information in the context of its CT and CI mandates. Canada's intelli ence collection fully as . . 1.n ormed as foreign policy - - - - The development of a Canadian would also enable Canada, in concert with our partners, to bolster the collective effort against global threats such as terrorism and proliferation of sensitive nuclear, chemical, biological and missile technologies and materials. 000129 �GAC-ReleasedundertheAccesstolnformationsAct/ AMC-Divulgueenvertudelaloisurl'acce5iil'information SECRET HVCCO s.15(1) - International s.15(1) - Security - 3 Considerations: Three basic questions are where advice in training and tradecraft. Following this logic, responsive management centres Housing the capability, the expertise field-management responsibility within the same coherence and economy. Judgements and Conclusions: greatly assist policy makers to make their way in the changing world of modern era foreign policy. 000130 �GAC- Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC- DivulguE' en vertu de la loi sur l'accE's a !'information SECRET HVCCO s.15(1) - International - 4 s.15(1) - Security Main Study Introduction: The purpose of this annex is to introduce options for the organization and management of ■ - - - ■ collection operations. Tradecraft will not be discussed since it is a "how to do" rather than a "how to organize'' function. Further, given that Canada has not practised I ~ •collection, operational tradecrart is an area in ~eh we would, for the foreseeable future, solicit advice and enlist cooperation from our intelligence partners in areas such as basic training. This annex will deal only with concepts for categorizing and prioritizing operational options and will posit recommendations as to what is b_est-suited to Canada's needs. Annex A provided a focus for viewing ■ collection in terms of what it provides that other forms of collection cannot. This Annex will offer further differentiation between the available means o.!.J collection and will pose a division of labour between collection. It will :lso !:.:opose o~_i_o_n_a_1__a_r_1_u_r_u_ct_r_1a_g_e_n_1e_'!"'l"'r"'" _ _o_p_~_I_o_f_1_s_.~ - Characteristics of the Operational Setting: 2. Two characteristics of the emerging world that will probably endure well into the next century are volatility and permanent flux. During the cold war, the world was divided between allies, enemies and countries playing various supporting roles in the global ideological and geostrategic competition. The paramount targets of ■ collection during that era were, in descending order of priority: ••• • • • I I ■ ■ ■ ■ I ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ I I I 000131 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - o,vulguE' en vertu de la loi sur l'acces a !'information SECRET HVCCO s.15(1) - International s.15(1) - Security - 5 - 3. Canada chose not to be a player in the ■ collection of the cold war era. We received the benefits through membership in NATO and through the sharing of the analysis, judgements and conclusions of our quinquepartite partners. ■■■■■I - I Successive Canadian governments felt confident that Canada's own analytical abilities combined with information from other intelligence (shared raw SIGINT and - _ (/ sources and media reports) largely obviated the need for a capability. So long as our allies were prepared to provide us with analysed or otherwise refined product, extensive SIGINT and selected imagery, we received benefits well in excess of our own contribution (consisting of pertinent ~ o r t s , limited SIGINT collection and interview reports rrom immigrant While this dependency was seen by some as compromising the integrity of Canadian intelligence analysis, the majority preferred the situation in spite of its flaws, particularly when viewed against the risks inherent in collection. 4. The world emerging from the cold war faces Canada with less predictability and much less assurance that the intelligence collection priorities of our quinquepartite partners can continue adequately to meet Canada's need (if the ever did). Nonetheless, all of our partners will continue to derive sufficient value from the cm i nm1pn;::i rt- -i t-P that it is likely to continue. 5. Another defining characteristic of the emerging multi-polar world is the extent to which the search for intelligence will progressively take place within a more open environment in which filtering and assessing the plethora of information made available through advanced electronic systems will be a bigger task than obtaining the information. This will increase both the need and scope for wider and effectively targeted I collection from open or "provided in confidence" sources. This baton must be taken up -d 1 .intelligence . . generic an per t·inent collection aimed at ascertaining the real situation under scrutiny and its ~ wever, 000132 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - D,vulguE' en vertu de la lo, sur l'accE's a l'informat,on s.15(1) - International SECRET HVCCO s.15(1) - Security s.16(1) - 6 - ramifications, (i.e. that is not collected, oriented and biased toward policy prescription), will have to receive a greater emphasis than at present if it is to support effectively policy-neutral analysis. ~ i t e the wealth of overt collection - - - - - there will remain areas and subjects of critical interest to Canada where dependable information is not available from open sources. V Certainly, Canada will not be able to depend to be sufficiently persuasive always or even often to oo~ain sensi~ive information needed to give assurance that we fully understand situations important to our interests. 7. There will be instances where it is important to have a This type of that cold war fiction conjures up in its ~cenarios. It is nonetheless, a prototypical case officer/agent relationship. n it wou~ct be more akin to the means by which relationships than it i§_t.o.--J Carr'' al but relatively accurate descriptions of the agent/case officer relations of the cold war period. Its management would therefore require of the type best handled by Canadians specially traineo in managing discreet relationships. 8. In spite of the greater opening of political and economic environments, there are still in which Canada cannot afford to be without independent collection capability, either due to specific Canadian interest or to security concerns. Examples might be: ~ h e r e Canada will be develo in economic olitiecrr and d e v ~ assistance relations - / Other examples would be~Canada has growing political and 000133 �GAC- Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC- DivulguE' en vertu de la loi sur l'accE's a !'information s.15(1) - International SECRET HVCCO s.15(1) - Security - 7 - economic interests or is involved in multilateral regional, security-oriented diplomacy. Yet another example would be countries or regions where terrorism with a Canadian connection was an endur~ problem. - ■ - - - - ~aaalllin.est.uldllllle two-fold: first would be the need to neutralize the effects in Canada and prevent our being used as a support base for terrorists themselves or for associated financial transfers, clandestine arms purchases or storage. Second would be the need for Canada fully to know and understand political developments in these regions and countries. While our embassies can be counted on to provide timely reporting on many developments, they can provide, at best, only snapshots in time with limited shelf life and a bias toward specific policy priorities. While this might suffice in some cases, it cannot satisfy the need for policy-neutral intelligence contributing directly to assessment of the real situation on the ground, where Canada's initiatives and policies will interract with the prevailing political, economic and social realities. This type of information in this type of environment can best be col~ted~ - ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ •----■ • Can;da could, of course, simply avoid operating in environments such as this. However, Canada as a country and Canadians as a people may want to play a more complete and self-interested role in the world of the 90s. The argument can be made that it is time we shared the risk of protecting both ourselves and O~J~~~s from foreign terrorist threats and from other international~such as nuclear, CW, BW and missile proliferation. These are also areas in which a Canadian I capability would be most welcome to our quinquepartite partners. Given Canada's historical preference for collective means of enhancing security, this would contribute a high value increment of extremely cost-effective security cooperation. Organizational and Operational Options: 9. Should a decision be taken to develop a capability, organizational, management andoperationai"' options need to be studied carefully, followed by development of an effective selection, recruiting and training program. The question of institutionally locating the operational management unit also needs to be considered. The primary candidates a o o e . t o . - - - - - • !! !! !! !! ! ~ - - - - -- - - - - --; - - Fur!r, I ■ Iii. - - - - -- m eans that the candidate developed from the Further, in the vast majority of cases, the 000134 �GAC-ReleasedundertheAccesstolnformationsAct/ AMC-Divulgueenvertudelaloisurl'acc~:..1•intormation s.15(1) - International SECRET HVCCO s.15(1)-Security s.16(1) - 8 - These interpretive and reporting skills, plus the necessary discretion, are skills sought out and developed in the officer. 10. CSIS, on the other hand, has a more limited mandate and is necessary at the as oppose o management) level. The above differences account for the fact that the UK and Australia operate separate agencies, MI-5 and ASIO respectively, to deal with domestic security/intelligence functions while MI-6 (UK) and ASIS (Australia) deal with collection activities. 11. A second question field operations 000135 �GAC-ReleasedundertheAccesstolnformationsAct/ AMC-Divulgueenvertudelaloisurl'acce5iil'information s.15(1) - Security SECRET HVCCO s.16(1) - information from information. In 9 - Much of their time is also spent pursuing sand contacts privy to the sou ht after is highly unlikely that Canada o tions. Nevertheless, having a at least makes the option available were ever made to make use of such an opportunity. Judgements and Conclusions: a) The altered global relationships of the 1990s argue strongly for a full-scope Canadian intelligence collection capability. This would not replace but would supplement substantially and complement the quinquepartite intelligence cooperation and sharing that Canada currently benefits from. 000136 �GAC- Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC- DivulguE' en vertu de la loi sur l'accE's a !'information SECRET HVCCO s.15(1) - International - 10 c) Development of this missing element would be a cost-effective way substantially to increase the Canadian content of the foreign intelligence available to Canadian leaders and officials. Further, it would be managed to serve directly Canadian priorities such as the global security environment and political and economic stability and predictability. It would also_ -_._._._._.__._- - - - - - I ■■■■■■--- d) The skills required and the management environment best-suited to the discreet development of this capability are to be found, in ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ I This -would help ensure that the scope and organizational requirements are within affordable parametres and that operational considerations are tested against the valid experience of a country that shares similar foreign policy priorities with Canada (non-proliferation, peacekeeping, commitments to regional stability and human rights, arms control and disarmament and support for free-market precepts and practices). f) Finally and perhaps most important, there is an obligation closely related to national sovereignty, to provide assurance to Canadians that foreign policy formation and related decision-making is soundly based on accurate knowledge of the global environment in which Canada must make its independant way. 000137 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDFI Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDFI00016 Title A name given to the resource [Redacted] Collection: Organizational and Operational Options, Undated 2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource Undated-01 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived GAC Special Registry File 9500-00 Part 1 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource GAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Foreign Intelligence Service Description An account of the resource A-2023-02220 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Access to Information Request Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource English