https://declassified.library.utoronto.ca/files/original/7a3e895cbd2d7cfb5e89ccaa3bf2facf.pdf 923ca752d7fd481d6a0308b9af627be9 PDF Text Text Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project GAC ATIP A-2023-03407 GAC Special Registry File 9500-00 File Pocket DFAIT Gould "Information Support for Foreign Policy Formulation" 2 November 2001 �GAC- Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - o,vulguE' en vertu de la loi sur l'acces a !'information s.15(1) - Security SECRET jf gould/995-0750 2 Noveniber, 2001 Issue: Information. Support for Foreign Policy Formulation S1tmmarv: A paradigm shift occurred on September 11, 2001. Just as the Cold War earlier defi11ed Canadian foreign policy, so terrorism will define our conduct of international relations for the foreseeable future. For the members of the coalition, includi.ng Canada, all bilateral relationships will be affected by the response of the partneT country to terrorism; the agendas of all international fora will be changed to take into account post-September 11 priorities. The conduct of this newly re-focussed foreign policy agenda requires extensive and trusted information. The information presently available is derived principally from diplomatic reporting, and seco):ldarily from intelligence. The resource cuts of the 90s have limited DFAlT's political reporting capability abroad and analytic capacity at home. Most missions have only one political officer, who spends much ofhis!her time on program activities. Many missions, including several in the Gulf, have no resident political officer and m·e covered, for this program, from a 'hub' mission. Even where officers are available, it should be recognized that there are limitations to what diplomats can collect - ■ I The largest part of the foreign intelligence available to foreign policy decision makers is provided by our allies in the fonn or SIGINT, HillvllNT and assessed product, with SIGINT making up the bulk. (SIGINT is very useful, but, _ _ _I ----The dependence upon Allied ' s ~ n e n t s is w o n y i n ~ n never be sure that Allied intelligence will not be deliberately withheld or distorted and, given our limited resources, we cannot independently verify or conoborate the 'shared' intelligence. In order to meet our foreign policy obligations, we need a significant increase in our ability to collect and analyse foreif,'11 infonnationl ,. To meet this identified need, the Department has tvvo options: ► ► the assignment of more political reporters abroad and more political analysts at home, or the above plus the creation of md other types of intelligence abroad, as required for foreign policy decision-making. -1- •i 31 000131 �GAC - Released under the Access to Informations Act/ AMC - D,vulguE' en vertu de la lo, sur l'accE's a l'informat,on s.15(1) - lnternat~onal. • SECRET s.15(1) - Security Analysis: Pros: 1. Enhanced collection and analysis capacity will: a)-better inform policy decisions and increase the chance Canada can avoid unwelcome surprises Cons: l. There is no significant down-side, beyond increased cost, to enhancing Canada's existing analytic capacity or increasing the number of diplomatic reporters stationed overseas. 2. There are factors to be taken into acco1mt if a separate agency is to be established for the collection of intelligence abroad: a)- It would be expensive. b}-provide Canada with more information to "trade", thereby leveraging our product against the greater quantity of information available from our Allies c)-give Canada an independent ability to verify information received from other sources [n the case ot a newly estabJ1snea agency, useable d)-provide i r r f o r m a t i o ~ production might be several years away. relating to issues where our interests are at odds or in competition with them, particularly c) a)- if successful, provide decision-makers with independent insight into the intentions and plans of foreign states and non~state actors b)-not surprise other countries, many of whom probabl3 Decisions Requi,red: ► ► ► Should additional diplomatic resources be assigned to Canadian missions abroad and analytic resources added to PCO/IAS in Otta,va? or Should more diplomatic reporting and analytic resources be added to existing resources a distinct entity be established to. facilitate the collection of the required information? Do you wish DFAIT to prepare, for the consideration of the Ad Hoe Committee, a business case for either of the two options? -2- /3'2.. 000132 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource CDFI Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CDFI00015 Title A name given to the resource J.F. Gould, Information Support for Foreign Policy Formulation, 2 November 2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 02-Nov-01 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived GAC Special Registry File 9500-00 File Pocket Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource GAC Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Canadian Crown Subject The topic of the resource Foreign Intelligence Service Description An account of the resource A-2023-03407 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Canada Declassified Type The nature or genre of the resource Access to Information Request Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Language A language of the resource English